The Portuguese campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

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Seminar Proceedings
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

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# Índice

**Prologue**

Tenente-General Mário de Oliveira Cardoso

**Foreword**

Tenente-General Rui Manuel Xavier Fernandes Matias

**Introduction**

Carlos Filipe Afonso

Vitor Lourenço Borges

**Abstracts**

**The political projects to unify Europe as a counterpoint to the Great War**

Alexandre Figueiredo

**Perceptions of attrition in the strategic and operational planning of the First World War**

Nuno Correia Neves

**Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century**

António Paulo Duarte

**German Geopolitics in the First World War: the case of Southeast Africa**

Marisa Fernandes

**The German Empire’s geopolitical strategy to weaken the Portuguese presence in Africa before the First World War**

Gisela Guevara

**Pembe. The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame**

Marco Fortunato Arrifes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The impact of the late-nineteenth-century military intervention in Mozambique on the development of the campaigns in Africa</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Jorge Fernandes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First World War in Angola. The German attack on Naulila. Preparing for one war and fighting another</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luís Barroso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique and the choices made by Heinrich Schnee and Von Lettow-Vorbeck during the Great War</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuno Lemos Pires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>Guarda Republicana</em> of Lourenço Marques</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rui Moura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A General Staff Officer in the Great War: two examples from the campaigns in Africa</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Ribeiro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders in Africa (1914-1918): an ill-fated generation. Commanding officers of the 1st Expedition to Angola</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renato Assis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Great War and Medicine in Africa: in pursuit of new questions and in search of new results</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margarida Portela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Filipe Afonso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitor Lourenço Borges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief author biographies</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prologue

‘Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it’

(George Santayana -1905) ¹

This quote, which I came upon by chance in a daily newspaper, has accompanied several of my interventions as President of the Coordinating Committee of First World War Centenary Remembrance Events. It represents the stance, which we have taken since the beginning of our activity, not to celebrate but rather to evoke the sacrifice of our Soldiers and Sailors, of their families, and of the Portugal of the time; to seek to understand the full political context which determined and conditioned our active participation in the Theatres of Operations of Africa and Europe; to examine how the military objectives that had been defined to achieve the intended political aims were approached in terms of military strategy; to understand the great lines of action of national strategy.

The IESM (Institute of Higher Military Studies) is the Institution par excellence to develop themes related to the study of military strategy.

We have taken note of several works by First World War authors, both strictly military and the reports of personal experiences denouncing the extreme violence and ordeals which the Portuguese Soldiers and Sailors were subject

¹ Spanish philosopher (1863-1952). The quote belongs to the 1st volume of his work, The Life of Reason.
to in the African TOs and in the Flanders. However, the ‘rationale’ behind the political decision to actively participate in the war and the way in which that war was conducted has only recently begun to be researched and systematised.

It was our duty to propose that the IESM organise two seminars, one devoted to Africa and the other, to be held in 2017, on the European TO to ascertain the reasons for our country’s involvement in an extremely violent world conflict which, at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), was thought would never be repeated, but that would, after all, last until the present day.

Moreover, despite having participated in the Paris parade as one of the victors, Portugal appears to feel defeated at its very core, an image which seems to have seeped through to public opinion.

This was, then, my motivation for choosing the quote introducing this text.

The above text was written after the Seminar was held; we must, therefore, direct a few words of acknowledgment to the Direction of the IESM and to all those directly involved.

Mário de Oliveira Cardoso
Lieutenant General
The seminar ‘The Portuguese campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War’ was co-organized by the institutions of higher military studies, and was also the first meeting of the First World War Centenary Remembrance Events held at the IESM.

This seminar belonged to a set of similar initiatives organized by various entities supported by the Coordinating Committee and was (not only, but to a large extent) the result of the work conducted at the IESM Centre for Research in Security and Defence (CISDI) on the First World War.

The year being 2015, the theme chosen as the backdrop to the work conducted during those two days was to be directly related to the 1914-1915 biennium, a period in which Portugal was actively involved in combat but had not yet declared war. The War being fought in Africa at that time cannot be analysed at the international level without a relation first being established with the colonial geopolitical background of the late nineteenth century, nor can it be separated from the political-strategic circumstances of the early twentieth century. Furthermore, we cannot disregard the national context of the time and
the climate of great instability in which a young Republic fought to keep the course that had led to the events of 5 October 1910 from being reversed.

The multiple dimensions of the biennium evoked in the Seminar required us to search for a compromise between the diversity of general perspectives and the objectivity of the different interventions. If, on the one hand, both Europe and the World had become involved in a conflict of unprecedented scale, the situation in Portugal had its own specific features which, seen from the present, were clearly and directly related to the international situation, but which were interpreted in rather different ways by the protagonists of the time.

It was our intention that the seminar not be circumscribed to the presentations and discussion taking place in the scheduled panels. When organizing working days, the pauses between panels and meals were conceived as an opportunity for all participants to interact and continue the discussions started in the auditorium, and to perhaps trade questions, answers and wholesome conversation which could not, due to time constraints, occur during the panel discussion and Q&A.

I am certain that a meeting of this kind has constituted a unique opportunity for the enrichment of all, and it is my belief that the objectives outlined for the seminar have been achieved. Posing questions to the past - which are always related to the present - should have provided some answers, but likely has also raised new questions, generated different hypotheses and pointed to different avenues of research.
Introduction

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The participation of the IESM in the First World War Centenary Remembrance Events comes at a time when the IESM Centre for Research in Security and Defence (CISDI) is undergoing restructuring and expansion. The research project submitted to the Coordinating Committee of First World War Centenary Remembrance Events emerged as an opportunity to develop the Centre, inasmuch as remembrance periods are excellent opportunities to revitalise research.

The IESM has committed to taking an active role in the events organized by the Coordinating Committee and the Seminar entitled ‘The Portuguese campaigns in Africa: from the Imposition of Sovereignty to the Great War’ was the first scientific event organized by the Institute under this banner.

The seminar was organized under three headings:

- To create the conditions to continue the discussion proposed by the Coordinating Committee for the quadrennium of remembrance events;
- To maintain the panels focused, where possible, on the Portuguese intervention in colonial Africa;
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

- To seek approaches to the First World War not often touched upon by historiography.

In mid-2015, one of the most developed research lines in the IESM project was the analysis of the political and strategic contexts of belligerent powers as a way of framing the adaptations of the Portuguese military instrument. Thus, it was considered appropriate to include a panel dedicated to this broader issue, even though it fell somewhat outside the theme of the Seminar (while still being related to that theme).

In order to address the second heading in particular, the time period under study was expanded to cover the campaigns to enforce sovereignty claims at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, providing context to later military interventions, already in a context of world war. In fact (and as was evidenced by the different interventions during the Seminar), any approach to the conflict between colonial powers in African theatres during the Great War that does not take into account the circumstances that had developed over the previous decades, especially those that took place after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, will be incomplete and difficult to achieve.

To address the third heading, speakers were invited who could present innovative perspectives about the campaigns and about the specific topics under study.

In addition to these headings, the panels were organised so the work could be developed from the general to the specific; from the contextualizing approaches to those presenting the consequences of lived situations, regardless of the specific date on which they occurred.

These Proceedings have been organized, where possible, according to the order in which the interventions took place. It is important to present, in general terms, the concept under which the work of 25 and 26 June 2015 was developed:

- Day one began with an overview of the Portuguese entry into the Great War by Professor Nuno Severiano Teixeira (PhD). It was followed, that same morning, by a first panel focusing on a few general perspectives related to the conflict. The afternoon panels focused on international relations, in particular between Portugal and Germany, and the European race to Africa in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century;

- Day two featured two panels directly related to the military operations in Africa: first, the speakers addressed the strategies
and actions of the military forces in Angola and Mozambique, and afterwards provided detailed observations about the protagonists on the ground. The findings were presented orally, as a synthesis of the main ideas exposed during the opening presentation and the five scheduled panels.

The present publication includes nearly all the papers that were presented during the Seminar, as well as an additional text by Margarida Portela on medicine in Africa during the Great War.
The political Projects to unify Europe as a counterpoint to the Great War
Alexandre Figueiredo

Abstract

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the two deadliest wars in human history. However, both events were no more than an introduction to destruction and carnage at an unprecedented scale. Indeed, throughout the centuries, Europe has only experienced peace and concord for short periods of time. However, many voices also called for peace and unity as a counterpoint to the war. What we propose to accomplish in this work is a survey of some of those projects.

Keywords: Projects for Peace, World War II, History of Europe, Unification of Europe; European Federation.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: 
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

Perceptions of attrition in the strategic and operational planning of the 
First World War

Nuno Correia Neves

Abstract:
The First World War compelled a generation of military leaders to readjust their way of thinking and plan a war of attrition in which wearing down the enemy became the primary goal. The Objective of this paper is to portray the difficulties posed by that process of adaptation both in terms of strategic planning and of what it meant for the planning and conduct of operations, in an example of adaptation of a military apparatus to a type of conflict contrary to the principles which guided the development of that apparatus.

Keywords: Attrition, First World War, Schlieffen Plan, Opponent Perception.
Portuguese Strategic Thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century
António Paulo Duarte

Abstract:
The history of strategic thinking is a type of study which allows us to understand strictly strategic dynamics, but it is also a tool to understand the anxieties, interests and self-construction methods of the societies that produced that thinking. In short, strategic thinking allows us to know and understand the dynamics of national and foreign policy, as well as the geopolitical and geostrategic frameworks that were defined at the time and that frame our interpretations of the present and our projects for the future.

This conference will examine some of the most relevant authors and works of Portuguese strategic thinking in the decade before the onset of the Great War. Based on this research, we will then examine and seek to provide an interpretation of the defining characteristics not only of strategic thinking, but also of how well coeval authors understood international and national reality, particularly with regard to Portugal’s vulnerabilities and potential at the time.

This study will delve into works by Raul Esteves, Pereira de Silva and Botelho de Sousa, among others, and will also seek to examine each author’s interpretations, both converging and conflicting, of the reality to which Portugal belonged, as well as what they believed was the scope of strategic thinking. Thus, this study will include a section devoted to the strategic military conceptions of the Navy and the Army.

Keywords: Great War, Strategy, Strategic Thinking, Great Britain and Portugal, First Republic.
German Geopolitics in the First World War: the Case of Southeast Africa
Marisa Fernandes

Abstract:
This paper aims to portray German Geopolitics in the African territory during the First World War, focusing mainly on Deutsch-Ostafrika (present-day Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) and on Mozambique, as well as on the German interests and on their attempt to annex Northern Mozambique to Deutsch-Ostafrika, culminating in the Battle of Negomano (1917).

This paper will also attempt to underline the importance of the German project for Mittelafrika as one of the courses of action of the Weltpolitik adopted by the Germany of Wilhelm II in 1890, which had a direct impact on German interests in Mozambique and on the Portuguese colonial territory in Africa.

The Mittelafrika Project and the interest in Mozambique resulted from the need for Lebensraum in Africa, and took on economic and cultural contours which are characteristic of German Foreign Policy to this day.

Keywords: Geopolitics, Germany, Southeast Africa, Mozambique, Portugal, First World War.
The German Empire’s geopolitical strategy to weaken the Portuguese presence in Africa before the First World War

Gisela Guevara

Abstract

In his analysis of the patterns of cooperation/conflict between the great powers before the First World War, John Mearsheimer pointed out that, during the forty years preceding the First World War, the European powers had cooperated among themselves, even if to a very limited extent, which did not, however, prevent the emergence of significantly divergent interests and the outbreak of conflicts. This was certainly the case in the African stage, where German and British ambitions towards the Portuguese empire were not at all dampened by two secret agreements granting the Portuguese colonies to London and Berlin. Portugal was the most weakened of all the nations with forces on the black continent, due both to financial problems and to the political situation. The last years of the monarchy and the first years of the Republic would undoubtedly be marked by great instability. Both Germany and the United Kingdom wished to take advantage of that weakness.

This paper will focus primarily on examining how the German Empire exploited the difficulties Portugal was undergoing by devising a geopolitical strategy to gain advantages in the ports of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique and in the Bay of Tigers in Angola, with the purpose of strengthening the German naval bases against Britain’s naval power. Let us remember that, until 1902-1903, Germany had been a potential ‘hegemon’, which meant, among other things, that the country’s wealth, population, military power and technology threatened to dominate the system and overthrow Britain from its place as number one world power. According to Mearsheimer, between 1871 and 1902, the European system had been characterized by a state of ‘balanced multipolarity’. However, from 1903 onwards, this balance ceased to exist and in its stead emerged an ‘unbalanced multipolarity’. In this lecture, we will focus in particular on how the strategic ports in Africa under Portuguese sovereignty became the object of an aggressive game of geopolitical interests, in particular those of Germany and England, in the context of a coming world war where naval power was believed to be a deciding factor.

Keywords: First World War, German Empire, Portuguese Colonies, Mozambique, Mittelafrika.
Pembe. The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame.

Marco Fortunato Arrifes

Abstract

‘The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame’ – with these words, José Eduardo Agualusa described, in his novel A Conjura, the consequences of the defeat of the Portuguese troops in southern Angola in 1904.

One tenth of the troops stationed in Angola lost their lives in the event which went down in history as the ‘Massacre of Vau de Pembe’.

Defeat in Africa was not a novel occurrence. Quite the contrary. However, the famous Mozambique campaigns and the victories in Bailundo and Humbe had begun to foster a feeling of triumph, which was then violently curtailed.

Although circumstantial, the impact of the event cut deep into Portuguese society. Religious ceremonies honouring the dead multiplied across the country, at the same time as the progressive opposition launched a violent attack on the reform government in the House of Representatives and the press published opinion pieces, surveys and interviews with military personnel who attempted to provide an explanation for the events.

The objectives of this paper are threefold: first, to understand why the national historiography, in its various stages of evolution throughout the twentieth century, appeared to be completely oblivious to the event. Even without wishing to indulge in meaningless hagiography, the famous words of Vieira still often come to mind: ‘If you have served your Homeland and she was ungrateful, you have kept your duty, and she her ways’; second, to study the different types of political and social impact caused by this military failure; third, to ascertain the true implications of the proposals which emerged at the time.

Keywords: Angola, Pembe, Kwamatos, Colonial Army, Overseas Army, Military Expedition.
The impact of the late-nineteenth-century military intervention in Mozambique on the development of the campaigns in Africa
Paulo Jorge Fernandes

Abstract

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Portuguese were only accustomed to receiving news of military defeats and humiliations from the overseas provinces, usually at the cost of the lives of the soldiers involved in such actions. Frequent reports arrived periodically to the mainland of how the Portuguese ambitions in Africa were threatened either by local uprisings or by the greed of the major European powers.

This scenario began to change in the final years of the nineteenth century. In late 1894, the country became involved in one of the first colonial wars on multiple fronts in modern times, misleadingly called ‘Campaigns for Pacification’ of the overseas territories, consuming previously unrecorded numbers of human and technological resources. The operational results were rather encouraging, also owing to the large-scale use of auxiliaries recruited from different parts of the Empire and to the improvements in the logistical means employed, particularly in terms of health conditions and superior armament. On the other hand, a colonial hagiography serving well-defined ideological purposes was built around a generation of ‘Heroes’, military officers who were born with these campaigns. For those heroes, the overseas territories were part of the country and should therefore be defended from outside aggressions, whatever those were. The Empire was not open to discussion because it was seen as a factor of national unity. This lent legitimacy to a patriotic, bellicose rhetoric concerning the Overseas Territories which spanned across the different types of political systems in Portugal until the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the country’s colonial matrix was never officially called into question.

This paper seeks to discuss and problematise the above aspects of the impact of the military involvement in Mozambique, from the Portuguese war doctrine of the late nineteenth century to the eve of the opening of the African front, already during the First World War.

Keywords: Campaigns in Africa, Mozambique, Mouzinho de Albuquerque.
The pre-emptive attack on Naulila

Luís Barroso

Abstract

This paper aims to emphasize the strategic-military aspects of the battle of Naulila between Portuguese and German military forces on 18 December 1914. The vast historiography produced after the Portuguese participation in the First World War classified the German action as a punitive raid. However, the strategic and military conditions in West Africa and Angola lead us to believe that this was a pre-emptive action to disrupt what the Germans believed was the preparation of an attack from Angola. The movement of the Portuguese forces to the southern border of Angola and the fact that the Germans were vulnerable to attack by exterior lines may have been decisive indicators for the German attack of 18 December 1914.

Keywords: First World War, Alves Roçadas, Naulila, South West Africa, Pre-emptive Strike.
Mozambique and the choices made by Heinrich Schnee and Von Lettow-Vorbeck during the Great War

Nuno Lemos Pires

Abstract

The memoirs of the Governor of German East Africa, Heinrich Schnee, and of the Commander-in-chief of the Protection Force, Paul Émile von Lettow-Vorbeck, demonstrate well the atmosphere of tension between the two men, specifically during the German campaign in Mozambique in late 1917 and throughout 1918.

Schnee advocated for neutrality from the beginning of the Great War (August 1914), believing it could safeguard the German territories in Africa. Vorbeck wished to attract the enemy, that is, the British, preventing their forces from being employed in other theatres of the Great War: ‘we did not command the sea (...) but had a loyal population of eight millions suitable for military service (...) England could take away the last fit Askari to other theatres of operations (...) it would, therefore, obviously have been an advantage for England if any agreement had existed which condemned us to neutrality’ (Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923: 21-22). The theory of the Commander-in-chief was victorious, or rather was imposed, and Schnee joined the military columns and complied with Vorbeck’s provisions. When the armistice was announced just a few days after the German forces left Mozambique, Schnee immediately asked for control over the political decisions and deeply regretted the embarrassment of being forced to evacuate the colony (Schnee, 1918: 121).

Vorbeck had managed to stall the enemy, compelling him to fight and to engage human, material and financial assets in much higher numbers than the Germans. Germany capitulated and lost the territories in Africa. The British, the Belgians and the Portuguese lost thousands, hundreds of thousands of lives. Was there a victor in Africa?

Keywords: Lettow-Vorbeck, Heinrich Schnee, German East Africa, Deutsch Ostafrika, Mozambique.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

The Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques
Rui Moura

Abstract

Since 1914, the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques was responsible for security and law enforcement in all areas of the southern region of Mozambique, performing typical Gendarmerie tasks such as occupation and military policing of the territory, internal security and public order, immigration police, as well as other public health and game services, also serving as customs guard both within the territory and along the border with the colonies of South Africa and Rhodesia. The units of this force were also prepared to carry out combat operations, provide security to columns and conduct reconnaissance missions.

The units of the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques, which were known as the best military force in Mozambique, were not only the most well trained but also had the greatest intervention capacity and participated in the campaigns against the Germans in northern Mozambique, reinforcing the Army forces in Rovuma in 1916. Colonel Azambuja Martins, Chief of Staff of the 3rd expedition to Mozambique, stated: ‘On 18 May [1916], the Governor General [Álvaro Xavier de Castro] embarked for the Ruvuma in Lourenço Marques with the reinforcements he had managed to mobilise in the Colony, forming a European mounted infantry company with the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques and an indigenous company belonging to the same unit (which was considered an elite force, as all officers had completed their respective arms course)...’ (MARTINS, Eduardo Azambuja (1935) A campanha de Moçambique. In Martins, Ferreira, dir. (1934-1935) Portugal na Grande Guerra. Lisboa: Ática. Vol. 2, pp. 147-148).

Keywords: First World War, Guarda Republicana, Mozambique, Lourenço Marques.
A General Staff Officer in the Great War
Fernando Ribeiro

Abstract

The General Staff Service was established in 1899, replacing the General Staff Corps created in 1834. The Law of 26 May 1911, which aimed to reform the Army after the implementation of the Republic in 1910, kept the same designation.

This paper aims to characterize the profile of an Officer of this Service during the Great War. Having come into adulthood in a troubled time, both politically and economically, these officers had urban backgrounds, came from families who could afford to provide them with an education, and enlisted in the Army to be trained as officers as soon as they came of age.

The officers of the General Staff Service received specific training for the performance of their duties and, as it was a basic course of the Military Academy [Escola do Exército], this training was similar to the one provided in the remaining Arms of the Army until 1890. It became a complementary course from 1891 onwards, remaining an independent Corps, but one which gave access to all Arms of the Army.

During the Great War, the General Staff Service did not fit into the expected profile for the time: its officers were assigned prominent duties of great responsibility, often related to manoeuvre planning and training, and eventually influenced the entire institution while benefiting from certain advantages with regard to their careers.

Keywords: Great War, General Staff Service, Military Career, Army Officers.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: 
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

Commanders in Africa (1914-1918): an ill-fated generation

Renato Assis

Abstract

This paper is part of a project funded by CINAMIL under the banner ‘A Portuguese form of command and military leadership in the Great War – Africa’. The relevance of this theme stems from the fact that, at the onset of hostilities, the situation faced by the units of the Portuguese Army and the commanders deployed to Africa to defend the integrity of the colonial territories was quite atypical thanks to the introduction of two new realities: a technically and tactically superior opponent, in contrast to the engagements in Africa in the previous decades; an inefficient army, the result of political and social instability in the country.

The present paper aims to identify the sociological profile of the commanding officers of the units deployed to Africa between 1914 and 1918 (a total of about 60 captains, majors and lieutenant colonels) in search of key trends related to: social background and professional experience, with particular emphasis on combat experience in the campaigns in Africa during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century; command and/or general staff duties performed in Portugal and in the colonies; party political involvement in the implementation of the republic; any duties performed in civil organizations in the country or in missions abroad.

The methodology adopted is based on the research of primary sources, with emphasis on the individual cases of the officers in question (Military Historical Archive and General Archive of the Army), Army Orders and other types of orders, as well as official correspondence. Eventually, descendants of the officers may be contacted in search of ‘unofficial’ information (memoirs, souvenirs, notebooks, etc.).

Keywords: First World War, Africa, Angola, Commanders.
The Great War and medicine in Africa: the quest to find new issues and the search for new findings
Margarida Portela

Abstract

The First World War Centenary Remembrance years are currently being celebrated worldwide. It is the duty of Portugal to remember the conflict without narrowing that study to the European stages and to the years after 1916 because, by then, hundreds of Portuguese expeditionary forces had already been deployed to Angola and Mozambique to reinforce the Portuguese sovereignty in those territories.

In late 2013, our quest for these new issues and our search for new findings led us to begin a research project aimed to better understand the Portuguese Medical-Military Health Service during the Great War. We found early on that the international studies on the Military Medicine of the time focus primarily on Europe, following a strong historiography tradition which tended to exclude Portugal from those discussions and from other issues related to the Social History of Medicine.

This article is only a small fraction of an ongoing research project and simply aims to draw attention to certain issues related to Portuguese military medicine in the African theatre of operations by recalling stories, experiences and echoes of memoirs, emphasising the importance of these sources of knowledge. We thus hope to improve the understanding of military medical logistics in the campaigns in Africa and France, which will contribute in the short-term future to a greater perception of the phenomenon of the Great War in Portugal, based on a comparison of theatres of operations and from the perspective of military medicine.

Keywords: Portugal, Great War, Medicine, Africa, Memoir.
The political projects to unify Europe as a counterpoint to the Great War

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1. By way of introduction

One century has passed since the beginning of the Great War, and in this year that marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, more than talk of war - specifically of the Great War, with its vast web of political, social, economic, military dimensions and aspects, among many others -, what we propose to accomplish in this work is a Peace itinerary. It is, in fact, an itinerary of the accounts which at different times and throughout the centuries some of the most distinguished figures in the politics, science and culture of the Old Continent have left for future generations, perhaps anticipating the fateful events of the first half of the twentieth century.

The influences of these anticipatory projects are, indeed, absolutely clear in the design of the supranational European institutions created after the conflict of 1939-45. In one way or another, those proposals envisaged only two possible fates for Europe: union or (self)-destruction.

Thus, the armistice which was signed in a railway carriage, north of Paris, on 11 November 1918 would only temporarily suspend the hostilities
which very nearly annihilated the Old Continent once again, and over the four years that followed. Indeed, even before the unprecedented destruction caused by the Great War, the peoples of Europe had reached an agreement - to put a definite end to that fatal propensity for lasting and recurring bellicosity. Thus, after a scant two decades had elapsed, and even if under different forms and featuring different protagonists, the peoples of Europe were tirelessly working on the issues that the previous confrontation had suspended and for which the Treaty of Versailles, in 1919, had not provided a satisfactory solution. More barbaric and crueller than the Great War of 1914-18, the conflict of 1939-45 was also truly global: 1) because of the number of countries involved, both directly and indirectly; 2) because the battles took place all over the globe; 3) but mainly because, for the first time, humanity as a whole was facing the real possibility of self-extinction.

Thus, bearing in mind that the Great War(s), like many other military events, before and after, had Europe as a stage and the peoples of Europe as protagonists, and that these phenomena are well documented and widely studied, it is imperative, as mentioned above, to conduct a survey of alternative programmes, as these are evidently not as widely known.

2. The medieval proposals for supranational arbitration systems among sovereigns

The first efforts towards a rapprochement on a continental scale followed the final dismantling of the structures of the Western Roman Empire still in place and emerged, rather against the general trend of the time, during the decline of the Middle Ages, in a time when the dominant sentiment was, according to Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa (2004: 17), quite the opposite, more specifically there was an increasing reinforcement of national sovereignty, as even the term ‘Europe’ was falling out favour. However,

[...] the arrival, first of the Mongoles (sic), and especially of the Turks would change the entire political balance of the kingdoms and principalities of Eastern Europe, creating a deep sense of uncertainty that can almost be compared to the one caused by the disappearance of the Western Roman Empire.

Thus, certain voices emerged who recalled the name Europe as a designation that represented an ideal unity of nations or Christian kingdoms in the face of external threats.
The political projects to unify Europe as a counterpoint to the Great War

Frederick II spoke openly of Imperial Europe, and even Dante Alighieri\(^1\) had used the term on various occasions. In fact, Dante came across as truly nostalgic for Christian unity and, as such, proposed rulers accept a system of arbitration in their disputes, which would be represented by the Pope.

In the Renaissance, Erasmus of Rotterdam was a standard-bearer for a particular sense of European unity, an idea that failed to reverse the emerging nationalist and bellicose tendencies that would eventually be accentuated during modernity. However, throughout the seventeenth century, a number of distinguished philosophers also defended the idea of a Europe which took the opposite path. Thus, Emeric Crucé\(^2\) would propose the ‘creation of a permanent Assembly or Senate of States, located in Venice, “where all sovereigns should have perpetually their ambassadors, in order that the differences that might arise should be settled by the judgment of the whole assembly”’\(^3\) (Crucé, cited

\(^1\) Dante wrote *De Monarchia* (1308) in a time when Philip the Fair had defied both the pope and the emperor: “O wretched mankind! How many storms, how many misfortunes, how many shipwrecks must you inevitably endure as long as you, having become a beast of many heads, strive to achieve contrary ends”. Dante, longing for Christian unity, suggested that sovereigns must at least accept a system of arbitration: “Between any two princes, one of whom is not subject to the other, an argument may arise (...). Therefore, a means of resolution must intervene between them. And since neither is subject to the other; one cannot investigate and judge the other – because equals cannot hold power over one another - there must be a third person, invested with a broader jurisdiction, who may hold power over both. This person will be a Monarch...” That universal monarch would therefore have the primary duty of solving disputes between sovereigns by means of arbitration. This idea of arbitration is at the heart of many subsequent projects; it may even be said that no plan for peacekeeping could ignore it. “War is refusal of arbitration”, Édouard Herriot would state six centuries later’ (Soulier, 1997: 233). See also Silva, 2003: 71-72 and Soares 2005: 81.

\(^2\) French monk, politician and writer, professor of mathematics in a College in Paris (c. 1590-1648), a contemporary of Louis XIII, author of *The New Cineas, or Discourse of the Occasions and Means to Establish a General Peace, and the Liberty of Commerce Throughout the Whole World. To the Monarchs and Sovereign Princes of this time* - a pioneering treatise on international relations published in 1623. See also http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/144554/Emeric-Cruce

\(^3\) See also Moreira, 2004: 98. ‘His goal was universal peace. For that reason, the concept of crusade is absent from his thinking. All peoples, including the Turks, should be admitted into peaceful international interaction. Trade and labour will contribute to the advancement of States, not war. The Earth should be considered a city common to all. He was against all forms of warfare and refused to accept that any kind of honour or profit may be derived from it. He truly was one of the first advocates of the third State. In order to put his ideas into practice, he recommended that the Pope promote general harmony between the Christian princes. He entrusted the King of France with gaining the assent of the Mohammedans. Finally, the instrument that would ensure the implementation of the agreements would be an assembly composed of ambassadors representing all the princes. Should any contender not submit to the decision of the Assembly, they would receive the disgrace of all other princes, who would find some way of bringing them to reason.’
in Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 19). Similarly, the author proposed, in this same work (The New Cineas, or Discourse of the Occasions and Means to Establish a General Peace, and the Liberty of Commerce Throughout the Whole World. To the Monarchs and Sovereign Princes of this time), published in 1623 (and thus at the midpoint of the 30 Year War), the creation of an international federation based on peaceful relations among all peoples, which would depend on an Assembly of representatives of all European princes. The author wrote: ‘What a pleasure it would be to see men go freely here and there, and to hold intercourse with one another, without any scruples of country, ceremonies or other such diversities, as if the earth were as she really is, a dwelling-place common to all!’4 (Crucé, cited in Soares, 2005: 81).

The proposals of the Duke of Sully5 were drawn along the same lines (although to greater public attention, a consequence of the duties held by the author), devising a Europe composed of fifteen states, vested with broad executive powers which overlapped and strongly restricted the sovereignty of states. This federalist project would be overseen by a Council of Europe, which would, in turn, consist of six Provincial Councils and a General Council. ‘The responsibilities of this Council would be related to free trade, with the main objectives of eliminating customs tariffs and implementing peace, as well as the defence of Eastern Europe from the Turkish threat through arbitration and a European consensus’6 (Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 19-20). In reality, according to the authors, both the project by the Duke of Sully and those by other contemporaries generally reveal the growing concern among European intellectuals with establishing a balance between the different powers vying openly for a leading role, in the continent and globally, thus ensuring the security of Western Europe against the emerging power of the Ottoman Empire.

3. The modern federalist proposals

The Peace of Westphalia and, not least, its subsequent ‘confirmation’ in the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt (signed in 1713 and 1714, respectively), in addition to significantly changing the political map and the ever delicate balance between continental powers, paved the way for decades of effective peace, as indeed Carpentier and Lebrun (2002: 240) underlined with their theory: ‘[...] the

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4 See also Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 19.
5 Maximilien de Béthune, Baron of Rosny and Duke of Sully (1560-1641), was a minister of Henry IV who left in his memoirs, written between 1620 and 1635, a set of proposals for the creation of a union of European States.
treaties of 1713-1714 marked an important date in European history since they established a new balance of powers, none of which could then impose their hegemony on the continent - not even France or Austria. Over the next twenty-five years, in spite of the intrigue organized by Philip V, this balance would only partially be compromised.7

This period of relative appeasement in the perennial conflict among States was the backdrop for the apogee of human reason which would generate numerous initiatives calling for a different path for Europe than that of long-standing war, with the ideals of peace, unity and harmony emerging as fundamental concepts of the Enlightenment. The eighteenth century saw some of the most daring and innovative proposals in this area. The author of one such proposal was William Penn8, who, in his *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* argued for "a project for a Federation of Princes which included a General Council made up of delegates from the States in proportion to their importance: the German Empire, 12 delegates; Spain, 10; France, 8; Italy, 8; England, 6; Switzerland, 4; Poland, 4; Portugal, 3; Venice, 3; Denmark, 3; Netherlands, 4; the 13 cantons and neighbouring sovereignties, 2; the Dukes of Holstein and Courland, 1; and should the Turkish and Russian empires unite, they would each be represented by 5 delegates. The Council would make its determinations by a three fourths majority and it would have its own standing army. Peace would then reign and trade could develop and prosper"9 (Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 21).

Still according to Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa (2004: 22), the most important project to organise international society was developed by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre10, who advocated for a European Union consisting of 24 delegates.

[...] representatives of the following European states: France, Spain, England, Holland, Savoy, Portugal, Bavaria, Venice, Genoa, Switzerland, Lorraine, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, the Papal

8 William Penn (1644-1718) was an English citizen who immigrated to the United States; he was the founder and legislator of the state of Pennsylvania, from whose constitution the authors of the constitution of the United States would later draw their inspiration.
10 Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) was a member of the French Academy since 1695 and the French representative in the Peace of Utrecht treaties in 1713. He authored the *Project for Perpetual Peace*, which was published in Cologne in 1712 and reprinted in Utrecht the following year in an enlarged edition in two volumes, to which a third volume was then added for publication in Rotterdam (1729). On this subject, see also Ribeiro, 2003: 34-36; Soares, 2005: 82 and Cunha, 2004: 20-21.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: 
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

States, Muscovy, Austria, Courland, Prussia, Saxony, Palatine, Hanover, and ecclesiastical electors.

Each delegate would hold one vote and the Chambers would settle any commercial disputes. It would begin with a Congress [in] The Hague or in its vicinity – a preview of the Congress that would meet precisely at The Hague in 1948 with the purpose of implementing the European Union.

Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) also reflected, throughout the entire eighteenth century, on similar proposals to mitigate the long-standing conflicts of the Old Continent (Ribeiro, 2003: 34-36; Soulier, 1997: 235-236; Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 22-23; Moreira, 2004: 100). Leibniz, who is said to have maintained correspondence with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, ‘[...] proposed a Union of European diversity and the establishment of a Permanent Council or Senate responsible for monitoring the general interests of Christendom’ (Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 22). Rousseau likely had contact with the writings of Saint-Pierre through the mother of one of his disciples, who had given him a collection of papers which belonged to the cleric, along with the request to make a summary thereof. Rousseau published the writings in 1761, in Amsterdam, under the title Extract from the Project for Perpetual Peace by the M. Abbé de Saint-Pierre, JJ Rousseau, citizen of Geneva, suggesting that a Federation of Princes could intervene in conflict mediation by exerting pressure and/or military sanctions through the creation of an organization comprising nineteen members, including the Papal States and Russia.

This survey of the most important programmes for the pacification of Europe produced during the eighteenth century must also include Jeremy Bentham, whose essay A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace, written between 1786 and 1789, introduced the idea of ‘international public opinion’ as an element which was simultaneously innovative and decisive in any efforts made towards a continental union, arguing, in that same essay, for the establishment of a Diet ‘[...] which will report opinions on issues of common interest, with the purpose of: reporting its opinion, causing it to be recognized by each State and putting refractory States under the ban of Europe’.

The last contribution of import for this survey was formulated by Kant, who was inspired both by the writings of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, with which he was also familiar, as well as by Rousseau’s contribution the

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following year. In 1795, in Königsberg, when the epitome of the German Enlightenment published his small, albeit dense, essay *For Perpetual Peace*, his bold proposals quickly garnered widespread recognition for their criticism and condemnation of the antisocial practices of States and their political stance in favour of arms, war and conquest, and, not least despicably, tax collection. ‘Kant proposed that the law of nations must be based on a “Federation of free States”, all republics, that is, founded on the freedom of their members, and on submission to a common law, as was the case of the United States of America’ 12.

The events of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, particularly the independence of the United States (1776) and the French Revolution shortly after (1789) decisively influenced not only the political and military balance in Europe, but also, and especially, continental thinking. The French Revolution’s legacy to humanity were two of the founding principles of contemporary societies: the first had been tested in the process leading to American independence, although it would only be definitively established with the breakdown of the structures of the Ancien Régime - the notion of fundamental human rights; and a second principle - people’s right to decide their own destiny. In fact, ‘between 1789 and 1815, Europe breathed to the rhythm of France. The “Great Nation” first asserted itself by the power of ideas, and later by that of arms’ (Carpentier and Lebrun 2002: 277).

Napoleon’s dream followed the imperial dream of the Holy Roman Empire. All symbols of the Empire tended to reconnect with an idealized past: Napoleon took the title of consul before investing himself Emperor; created a Senate, as in Rome; prefects, as in Rome; gave the eagle to the armies as an emblem, as in Rome; erected triumphal arches as the Roman emperors did and crowned his son King of Rome. His relations with the pope clearly portray this state of mind. Napoleon wrote in his correspondence, a letter of 7 January 1806: “For the Pope I am Charlemagne because like Charlemagne I unite the crown of France with that of the Lombards, and my Empire borders on the Orient”. He also refers to “Charlemagne, Emperor of France and our illustrious predecessor”. But Napoleon’s ambition went far beyond symbolism. He imposed his authority to all the nations of Europe: “He would have wished for all of Europe, as Las Cases noted in *Memorial*, a uniformity of currency, weights, measures,

the unity of law”; he dreamed of a universal Empire, which did not end in Europe13.

After the final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Allied victors who met in Vienna between October 1814 and June 1815 began devising a process, as defined by its main promoter, Austrian Chancellor Metternich, which aimed to ‘restore the Europe of balance and the law of nations’ (Metternich, cited in Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 25) or, in the words of Cunha (2004: 27), ‘[...] from the victory of the four great powers, in 1815, an organizing principle was drafted for Europe, which was simply an improvement - albeit a significant and profound one – of the system of balance of power’. Benjamin Constant (1767-1830), in his essay The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation in its relations with the European civilization, published in 1815, which many interpret as an anti-Napoleonic pamphlet, called for a modern federal project for the Old continent based on a free and peaceful union of European peoples and diversities, refusing both the French imperialist tendencies of the previous decade to annex states by force of arms, and any other ideas intended to establish a centralized state. It was against this background that a new model of political-territorial organization for continental Europe emerged which benefited, under the supervision of England, the opposing powers of France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. ‘On behalf of “universal peace” and of a “European balance”, the power and the union of absolute monarchies was lauded as sacred (Holy Alliance14 - 1815) in opposition to a revolutionary France’ (Ribeiro, 2003: 43).

However, the nineteenth century’s most striking contribution to a European integration project was the motion prepared by Claude Saint-Simon (1760-1825) in 180315. Having fought in the American War of Independence, Saint-Simon argued for importing the American model and adapting it to European reality, in combination with a new spiritual power which would supplant that of nation-States. Later, in 1814, Saint-Simon and historian Augustin Thierry developed and strengthened the previous document by

13 Soulier 1997: 60-61, quotation marks in the original. Cf. also Perez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 22: ‘Napoleon Bonaparte modernised and standardised the structures of European states and also codified their legal systems. The Constitutions have guaranteed the principles of equality under the law and the division of powers characteristic of the democratic system. Napoleon would state in St. Helena that he was in favour of creating a great Confederation of Peoples of Europe, of unifying the currencies, weights, measures, laws’.

14 With regard to the Holy Alliance and its role in international relations and Public International Law, see Cunha, 2004: 27-36.

15 Letters from an Inhabitant of Geneva to His Contemporaries. On this subject see Ribeiro, 2003: 43.
co-authoring and publishing *On the Reorganization of European Society, or the need and the means to unite the peoples of Europe in one political body, while preserving national independence for each one.* In this work, Saint-Simon becomes ‘[...] the true predecessor of the institutionalist trend which led to the drafting of the ECSC and of the Common Market Community Treaties in the twentieth century. Saint-Simon proposed the creation of a pan-European general Parliament composed of 240 members and divided into two chambers - Commons and Peers -, after the British model’ (Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 25), and based precisely on the union between France and England (Soares, 2005: 83).

After the Congress of Vienna, the policies leaning towards a union of the peoples of the Old Continent began to garner favour with politicians and with European elites in general. The notion of Europe was reclaimed and appeared, according to Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa (2004), in different types of works: literary, philosophical, historical, scientific, as well as in the press. Despite certain nationalist tendencies in the more important artistic, cultural, political and religious movements of the time, the patriotic dimension seemed to live in harmony with European appeal, both theories having been greatly welcomed by Italian writers in the period between the Vienna Convention and the dawn of the second half of the nineteenth century, including Giuseppe Mazzini, Vicenzo Gioberti and Carlo Cattaneo.

4. The federal proposals in the run-up to the Great War

One of the most iconic moments of the nineteenth century, which represented the sentiment calling for the appeasement of differences and for unity and peace in the continent was, however, the prophetic speech by Victor Hugo in Paris, 1849, at the time of the second of the three Peace Congresses held in 1848, 1849 and 1850 in Brussels, Paris and Frankfurt, respectively.

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16 The relative ease with which those unionist ideals seeped into Italian thinking is understandable if we consider that Italy was then no more than a set of microstates dependent and, in most cases, subject to a foreign power. Indeed, the Risorgimento, which consisted in the process of unification of the various Italian states, took place precisely between 1848 and 1849, and was concluded in 1870 with the annexation of the former seat of the Papal States, Rome, to the Kingdom of Italy. It is also noteworthy that these manoeuvres on Italian territory took advantage of similar and somewhat simultaneous events in Central Europe, where the political map was undergoing substantial changes. The Austrian hegemony of the Habsburgs was drastically diminished not only in Italy but also further north, where Prussia played a leading role in the German unification materialized in the Second Reich of Otto von Bismarck. Cf. Carpentier and Lebrun, 2002: 330-335; Roberts 1997, 296ff.; Navarro, 2005: 211ff.; Wright, 1982: 208ff.; http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risorgimento.
At the time, the eminent French writer, who chaired the event, gave a truly unifying inaugural speech:

A day will come when the bombs will be replaced by the venerable arbitration of a great sovereign senate which will be to Europe what this legislative assembly is to France... A day will come when we shall see those two immense groups, the United States of America and the United States of Europe, facing one another, stretching out their hands across the sea... In the twentieth century there will be an extraordinary nation... Paris will be its capital but its name will not be France: its name will be Europe. It will be called Europe in the twentieth century and, in the ensuing years, once further perfected, it shall be called Humanity (Victor Hugo cited in Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 26)\textsuperscript{17}.

Notwithstanding this process of affirmation of national units, which emerged essentially from the Italian (1870) and German (1871) unification processes, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century voices still called for the aggregation of the different European States in a supra-state structure, with the favoured solution being a federation, albeit a decentralized one that also guaranteed respect for the smaller and less influential nations. Along those same lines, the proposals by Charles Fourier, who advocated for ‘[the] establishment of a sovereignty that would be superior to the sovereignty of each state’ (Charles Fourier, cited in Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 27), of Proudhon, who defended, in The Principle of Federation, the division of nation-States into multiple decentralized communities that would later be aggregated in a continental federation, arguing that ‘the twentieth century [...] will open the Age of Federations, or else humanity will undergo another purgatory of a thousand years’ (Proudhon, cited in Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 27), and also of Ernest Renan, who noted that the European project would only be possible once any attempts at hegemony by one of its nations were definitively abandoned: [the] establishment of a new Roman Empire, or of a new empire of Charlemagne has become an impossibility. Europe is too greatly divided for an attempt at universal domination not to provoke a coalition that would quickly bring the ambitious nation back within its natural borders’ (Ernest Renan, cited in Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 27). Cunha (2004: 36) even credits Renan with a proposal for the creation of a European federation based on the cordial relations between France and Germany, which would sustain the prosperity of the continent. According to the author, this proposal even predates by almost a century some of the key ideas that would later appear

\textsuperscript{17} See also Ribeiro, 2003: 46 and Soares, 2005: 84.
in the plan by Robert Schuman, which was the basis for the European Coal and Steel Community.

The forecasts and concerns of the advocates of a new order for the Old World which could avert the devastating effects of war could not be more reasonable. Indeed, and as stated by Roberts (1997: 23), at the turn of the century ‘nationalism was, without a shadow of a doubt, the political principle the masses responded to with the most enthusiasm’. This proposition was true to such an extent that after a first decade of accumulating tensions Europe exploded, in the second decade of the twentieth century, into the most brutal and deadly conflict that had ever taken place among men, but not before it had been properly tested in the two Balkan Wars, first from 1908 to 1913, and then in the third quarter of 1913.

The November 1918 armistice was confirmed in the middle of the following year through an international Treaty which was signed in Paris:

On 28 July 1919 the Treaty of Versailles was signed in the gallery of mirrors in Versailles, whose art. 231 stated that Germany and its allies were the real culprits of the conflict and that they should answer for the damages suffered by the Allied governments and by those associated with them. [...] The Treaties of 1919-1920 - Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly, Paris, Trianon, Sèvres, Riga and Lausanne - completely transformed the European political map. National minorities did not assimilate their integration into states foreign to their borders, history and culture and, of course, the German people never accepted the responsibility or the charges and territorial amputations imposed upon it, and a revisionist feeling remained dormant which would result in the second European and global conflict (Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 29).

5. The European Federalist Movement in the Post-World War

One of the most important consequences of the 1914-18 conflict was precisely a new general awareness of the urgency of an effective programme to unite the various European States and avoid further bloodshed. It was precisely that plan for continental reconciliation and lasting peace that would originate the pan-European movement born in the aftermath of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. This association was inspired by the work published in 1923 by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, in which ‘[…] the movement argued that the political unity of the continent should be based on Franco-German integration, whose traditional disagreements had been the source of the previous European
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

conflicts’ (Soares, 2006: 10). With regard to institutional organization, Kalergi
defended that the Pan-European Union resulting from those efforts should
be composed of a bicameral Legislature, in which ‘[…] a Lower House would
represent the peoples of Europe - with a deputy for every million inhabitants
- and a Senate would convene the representatives of States. This process
should begin by calling a meeting of an intergovernmental conference to draft
a Treaty which would define, in a first phase, the objective of establishing a
customs union and a single economic space’ (Idem, Ibidem)18. The latter idea
was launched in 1927, in a conference that took place in Vienna (the seat of the
Pan-European Union) and was attended by Aristide Briand, Robert Schuman
and Konrad Adenaeur, the first having been nominated to, and accepted, the
post of Honorary President of the Pan-European Movement.

According to several authors (Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 31;
Soares, 2006: 10; Chaves, 2005: 28; Soulier, 1997: 253; Silva, 2001: 149; Cunha
2004: 40ff.), those efforts, which were largely supported by Kalergi’s enthusiasm,
resulted in the speech by Aristide Briand (1862-1932), the then Chairman of the

18 Cf. also Silva, 2003: 73-74; Cunha, 2004: 37ff.; Chaves, 2005: 28; Martins, 2007: 11; Pérez-
Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 30-31; Silva, 2001: 137; Soares, 2005: 90-92; Soulier, 1997: 253,
who said of Kalergi: ‘This young aristocrat was genealogically devoted to his commitment
to the European cause: the son of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat of Dutch-Greek origin
married to a Japanese woman, Austrian by birth, Czech after the Treaty of Saint-Germain
and naturalized French in 1939. In 1923, he published a short work, *Pan-Europe*, which
immediately met with strong support. The starting question was: “Can Europe, politically
and economically fragmented as it is, ensure peace and independence in the face of the
flourishing extra-European world powers? Or will it be forced, to save itself, to organize
into a Federation of States?” He stated his concerns, emphasising the urgency of the
matter: “Europe, which has almost entirely lost its self-confidence, hopes for aid from
abroad: some hope it will come from Russia, others from America. These two hopes are a
mortal danger for Europe. Neither the West nor the East care about Europe: Russia wants
to conquer it - America wants to buy it”. Therefore, “Between the Scylla of Russian military
dictatorship and the Charybdis of American financial dictatorship, (the) path for Europe
is called Pan-Europe, which means that Europe must help itself by establishing, with a
practical objective, a political-economic union”’ (italics in original). Silva (2001: 145) also
cites some of the most emblematic passages of the 1924 European Manifesto by the count
of Coudenhove-Kalergi. This famous manifesto states at one point: “Is it possible that,
on this small European peninsula, 25 states live side by side in full international anarchy
without it ending in a terrible political, economic and cultural disaster? Anti-Europeans
say yes, it is possible, as it has been so until now. But that is to ignore the facts: the
twentieth century has changed everything, even the very foundations on which rested
this diversity of European states […]. The entire problem is then expressed in the following
dilemma: war or peace, anarchy or organization, arms race or disarmament, competition
or cooperation, collapse or union…. Those who are not Pan-European are anti-European.
We will be complicit in the fall of Europe if we do not attempt to save it […]. Over and over
again this simple truth is to be repeated: a divided Europe leads to war, oppression and
misery. A united Europe leads to peace, freedom…” Coudenhove-Kalergi, cited in Silva,
2001: 145.
Council of France, in September 1929 at the pulpit of the League of Nations. ‘In that intervention, - Soares states (2006: 10) - Briand proposed to his political counterparts the forging of a type of federal bond between peoples that were geographically adjoined in the European territory’19. Earlier, Briand had already ensured his name would be carved into the annals of international political history ‘for having lent his name (in collaboration with Frank Kellogg, the American Secretary of State) to the first international pact which “outlawed” war: the Briand-Kellog pact, as it became known, [...] was signed on 27 August 1928, at the Quai D’Orsay in Paris’ (Chaves, 2005: 29, italics in original).

Aristide Briand also played a key role in appeasing the resentment of the Germans, whose national pride had remained wounded since the humiliation of Versailles, attempting to overcome the issue of the Rhineland through negotiation and by reducing and easing the war reparations to be paid by Germany to France. This agreement, which led to the formalization of the Locarno Treaty (1925), was only possible thanks to the open-minded and progressive Briand, but also to the commitment and conversational ability of speaker and German Chancellor Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929), an understanding that would culminate with the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the two leaders of the Franco-German axis.

After his speech in September 1929 ‘[...] the 27 European members of the LN convened and Briand was asked to prepare a memorandum. The document was drafted by the General Secretary of the Quai d’Orsay, Alexis Léger, and was issued on 1 May 1930’ (Soulier, 1997: 255)20. However, Stresemann’s death one month after Briand’s speech, the Stock Market Crash of October 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression that lasted for the next decade, the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe, particularly in Germany21, and Briand’s death in 1932 overshadowed the concerns of the political elite with ‘the European Union project presented in the Memorandum of 1930 (which) failed because the League of Nations, fearing a loss of control over the development of inter-European relations, strongly opposed it’ (Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 34).

Nevertheless, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European Union remained intensely active promoting the unification of the Old Continent with the drafting, in February 1930, of ‘[...] a project for a European Pact in Berlin that

19 Italics in original.
20 See also Moreira, 2004: 166.
21 Hitler won the September 1930 elections and earned public trust again in 1932, more than doubling the first vote with 6.5 and 13.5 million votes, respectively. Cf. Pérez-Bustamante and Colsa, 2004: 34.
formalized the creation of a “European Federation”, the first principle of which expressed the will to maintain the absolute sovereignty of the European States and provided for the establishment of federal bodies - the federal Council, or Upper House, composed of representatives of the States or the Federal Assembly, or by delegates from the Parliaments, the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Chancellery. The Federation would have its own financial system and citizens of individual States would also be European citizens22 (Idem, Ibidem).

Throughout the 1930s, and even if the adverse international environment meant the issue of uniting the Old Continent politically and economically was no longer at the forefront of the discussion among the most prominent policy makers (the death of Aristide Briand having dealt a further blow to those efforts), the truth remains that the idea of a united Europe definitely entered the field of political discussion and reflection despite that failure. In this regard, Maltez (1999) states:

As noted by Max Beloff, ‘it was a gesture, nothing more; but in history, gestures have their importance’. Meanwhile, the sign was interpreted by the forecasts of thinking men, creating a vast literature that fearlessly proposed a United States of Europe, endorsed by personalities such as Gaston Rio, Carlo Sforza, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Benedetto Croce, Julien Benda, Edmund Husserl, and many others who laid down the foundations of what would become resistance Europeanism23.

Subsequently, and still according to Maltez (1999), in 1928, in Europe ma Patrie, Gaston Rio called for the creation of a European federation whose primary aim was to prevent the disintegration and consequent submission

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22 See also Moreira, 2004: 190-193, who, paraphrasing Kalergi, summarised the key issues of the European problem. “This is the European issue: is it possible that, in the small European quasi-island, twenty-five states can live side by side in international anarchy without such a state of affairs leading to the most terrible of political, economic and cultural disasters?” Let us consider the answer, also transcribed by Adriano Moreira: “The future of Europe depends on the answer to this question. It is, therefore, in the hands of Europeans. Because we live in democratic states, we are all responsible for the policies of our governments. We have no right to simply criticise, but have a duty to contribute to the development of our political destinies. We cannot tire of repeating this simple truth: a divided Europe leads to war, aggression, poverty; a united Europe leads to peace, prosperity.” Moreover, Moreira concluded that “[...] Coudenhove-Kalergi saw a Europe desperately divided into revisionist and anti-revisionist nations. [...] It did not require prophecy to see that, sooner or later, these conflicting tendencies would lead to a new world war. In summation, only Pan-Europe would be able to withstand the peril.”

of the continent to any of the blocks vying for control over it, especially the Russian, British and American blocks. The following year, Carlo Sforza (1872-1952), Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1910 and 1921, and later Ambassador of Italy in Paris, where he lived in exile (by order of Mussolini, since 1925, as soon as the latter took power, and until 1940, during the German occupation of France, later moving to England), contributed to the discussion with the publication of the work *États Unis de l’Europe*.

New contributions emerged in 1930, among which *Vers les États Unis de l’Europe* by Bertrand de Jouvenel and a proposal by Édouard Herriot, *Europe*, in which Herriot called for a European Union governed by the League of Nations, which would include the United Kingdom. Without a doubt, 1930 was a thriving year for production in this field. Therefore, mention must also be made of *Das Spektrum Europas, Uniting Europe* and *Gli Stati Uniti d’Europa e del Mondo* by German Hermann Keyserling, Rappard Swiss and Italian Giorgio Quartara, respectively. Let us still follow Maltez (1999):24

The *Storia d’Europa* by Benedetto Croce emerged in 1932. It was followed, in 1933, by English author Arthur Salter’s *The United States of Europe*, and by *L’Art d’Etre Européen*, by André Rousseaux. Julien Benda’s *Discours à la Nation Européenne* was also published that same year. The following year, it was the turn of an Italian, A. D’Alia, with *Confederazione Europea*. In 1935, Edmund Husserl held his famous Vienna Lecture, *Philosophy in the Crisis of European Mankind*. Four years later W.B. Curry, an American, published *The Case of Federal Union*. W.I. Jennings’ *A Federation for Western Europe* and M.A. Bingham’s *The United States of Europe* were published in 1940.25

However, in order to achieve that remarkable unionist design and before peace could finally prevail in a mortally wounded Europe, it would be fatally and ominously necessary to employ the infamous brutality of force of arms to triumph once more, with the mournful outcome now known by all, as indeed the words of Édouard Herriot already seemed to prophesy, here paraphrased by Cunha (2004: 49), ‘[...] Greece died once because it did not know to federate at the right moment’, and it was therefore essential to ‘[...] discipline a continent that had, over the centuries, consumed much of its vital forces in warfare’.

We now return to the beginning, completing the circle. The World Wars of the twentieth century, and in particular the war which concerns us here, are

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24 See also the survey conducted by Adriano Moreira on this subject (2004: 189-193).
25 No italics in original.
nothing more than an expression of the long-standing inability of European men to compromise and cooperate. Should any doubts remain, the numerous testimonies we have offered here, proposing courses other than the way of arms, would dispel them.

Indeed, Europe is now often defined culturally and politically by celebratory metaphors suggesting a proud sense of collective: ‘cradle of civilization and western culture’, ‘home of humanist ideals and Human Rights’, ‘beacon of knowledge and science’. Such metaphors do not, however, erase from the collective memory the dismal narrative of a continent marked by the deaths and mass destruction caused by an almost permanent state of war, which has been recorded as far back as one can go.

As noted by George Steiner (2007: 30-35) in his Essay *The Idea of Europe*, unlike American place names for streets and avenues, which are based on a system of numbers or neutral names like ‘Pine’, ‘Maple’, ‘Oak’ or ‘Willow’, in Europe ‘the’ school boys and the urban men and women live in veritable resonance chambers of historical, intellectual, artistic and scientific deeds. Often, the nameplates display not only an illustrious or specific name, but also relevant dates and a brief description. [...] The escutcheons hung in many European households speak of more than artistic, literary, philosophical or political eminence; they also celebrate centuries of massacres and suffering, of hatred and self-sacrifice. [...] [In Europe] the memorials of murder, individual and collective, are everywhere’.

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Lisboa. Ideias e Rumos.
Perceptions of attrition in the strategic and operational planning of the First World War

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“The gaze should be large and broad. This is the twofold gaze, perception and sight. Perception is strong and sight weak. In strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close, and to take a distanced view of close things.”

Miyamoto Musashi,

One hundred years past, the First World War has become a conflict easy to analyse but a difficult one to understand.

One assumption is fundamental to understand the planning process at all levels: that plans are not based on reality, but on the perception that the planner has of reality. Our study of the Great War has been considerably affected by this phenomenon because, as a recent conflict between very well organized bureaucracies, the wealth of sources allows us, as historians, to deal with the objective reality of the facts, but the huge social and cultural development of the century makes it extraordinarily difficult to assess the action of the main actors, personalities who, by all indicators, must be acknowledged as highly
intelligent, but who paradoxically made choices that, in light of the facts, appear to us now to have been entirely wrong. This does not happen in earlier conflicts, where, generally, our view of events stems from the subjective narratives of the participants, aligning us with the perceptions of leaders, or in more recent conflicts, where our intellectual proximity to the decision-makers draws us into their viewpoint. Thus, we see Arsuf through the eyes of Richard I, but we do not see Verdun through the eyes of von Falkenhayn.

Therefore, the Great War must be looked at through the perceptions of decision-makers, even if it requires us to adjust our view of reality so that we may understand their actions and draw important lessons from those actions.

Two perspectives will help us overcome this problem.

We have known since Sun Tzu that, in order to succeed, we must accept the gap between perception and reality, and conduct our actions, not against our opponent’s reality, but against the perception our opponent has of reality. Thus, as historians, we must focus our study not only on reality but also on the perception that decision-makers in 1914-18 had of reality.

We also know, thanks to Napoleon, that we are all creatures of our uniform, that is, of the social and cultural circumstances of our time. Therefore, it is in the culture of the time under study that we must seek the matrix to which we must align our perceptions.

Figure 1 - Sun Tzu and Napoleon remind us of the importance of perception and context.

Source: http://www.therightplanet.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/sun-tzu_0.jpg
Source: http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/03/15/article-2293722-0294CDD8000004B0-59_306x455.jpg
Let us then attempt to understand the perspectives of the authors of two of the most universally criticised intellectual exercises that shaped the Great War, the Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII.

We will begin by countering the widespread misconception that the military refused to accept the progressive dominance of defensive firepower over manoeuvre in the technological context of 1914, which is said to have been anticipated solely by civilian analysts such as Jean de Bloch.

On the contrary, the military were perfectly aware of those conditions, not only through the distant example of the American Civil War, but from their extensive observations of the Russo-Japanese war, the Cuban war or the Boer war. Proof of this is the heavy investment in machine guns and rapid fire artillery designed to sweep the battlefield with shrapnel ammunition, as well as in the excellent defensive employment of these weapons since the start of the conflict. The issue was not one of ignoring reality, but of refusing to accept its limitations.

Figure 2 – Rapid-fire light artillery and machine guns were at the centre of all armament plans before the war and of the early defensive success.

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Canadians>Loading_18_pounder_WW1_LAC_3405482.jpg
Source: http://browningmgs.com/WC/Photos/Vickers1.jpg

The late nineteenth century/early twentieth century was a period of affirmation of human genius over natural and material limitations. The perfect expression of this spirit was the maxim by George Bernard Shaw: ‘The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man’.

The attitude of military leaders, of looking to go beyond the limits of what was reasonable to achieve a quick victory in spite of constraints, is a
manifestation of the spirit of their time. If we take context into consideration, it is clear that the Schlieffen plan went from initial design to practical application precisely during the period of time in which the Panama Canal was built, and that the German General approved the concept the year Albert Einstein published the first version of the theory of relativity.

In terms of national aims and geopolitical ambition, the Schlieffen plan was the German Empire’s answer to the challenge of a war on two fronts; much like the Panama Canal was the answer of the United States to the need to expand into two oceans, which in both cases constituted a massive national effort to change the world.

A simple corollary to a huge intellectual edifice, ‘keep the right wing strong’ is the strategic equivalent of $E=mc^2$ in all its complex simplicity, and both cases are a manifestation of an era searching for inclusive responses, above all else.

Figure 3 - The Schlieffen plan and the Panama Canal were two precisely contemporary national responses based on the refusal to adapt to geopolitical constraints and on the determination to employ massive efforts to overcome those constraints.

Fonte: http://www.dhahranbritish.com/history/images/schlieffenplan.jpg
Fonte: https://ioepanama.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/map-panama-canal.jpg

In reality, the top military leaders of the time did not see themselves as technicians or as specialists only, but as thinkers operating on the same intellectual level as their peers in the sciences or the arts.
Perceptions of attrition in the strategic and operational planning of the First World War

Figure 4 - Schlieffen and Einstein were contemporaries and had in common their quest for a simple and inclusive formula to explain a complex problem.

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Albert_Einstein_(Nobel).png

Figure 5 - The Plan XVII military leaders and the artists of the Futurist movement had in common the subordination of all an intellectual construction to a key idea.

Source: http://www.worldwar1.com/maps/xviiplan.jpg
Source: http://33.media.tumblr.com/8e620fcbd53051f31fe625e3dbe3a281/tumblr_inline_nfmbzvYhYr1t1th6k.jpg
Thus, in their total adherence to a central idea, the obsession of the French strategists with the offensive spirit, the ‘elan’ that would lead them to victory, can only be understood on the same level as, for example, the contemporary Futurist movement’s obsession with speed, and it is a typical concern of the intellectual movements of the time, which were always driven by a key idea or principle.

Thus, in their apparent unreasonableness, these military plans are an answer to constraints which are more than just technical, but are the cultural constraints of the early twentieth century. Like Gloria Swanson’s character in Sunset Boulevard would say: if these plans seem megalomaniac today it is only because wars have become small.

How was it then possible that what was probably the most intellectually gifted and ambitious military generation failed so clearly in their attempt to avoid defensive stagnation?

Asian artisans believe the gods live in the details. For Western strategists, demons lurk in assumptions. In both cases, the plans failed because of wrong assumptions which resulted from an erroneous perception of the opponent’s capabilities. Thus, the Germans failed because they underestimated the resilience and flexibility of the French, and the French failed in the same manner because they underestimated the German capacity for organization and mobilization.

This initial failure caused the war in the western front to turn into a conflict of attrition, as Lord Kitchener had stated in the early days or Jofre after the Marne or von Falkenhayn after the failure of his Ypres offensive.

And if Kitchener was able to predict the nature, and even the duration of the war in its early days, it was because the attrition characteristics of the Western Front were not derived from the trenches alone, but were essentially caused by opponents who were balanced both in resources and capabilities.

Once this state of affairs had been achieved, the peculiar characteristics of the First World War allowed the Germans take a defensive stance in a terrain of their choosing, forcing the Allies to create attrition through offensive action. Casualties were, therefore, no longer a means to achieve an objective, but became themselves a goal in an inversion of the traditional military rationale.

The situation required a response on two levels, the material and the intellectual.

The answer to the material issues came swiftly through advances in technology and the subsequent development of tactics. In two years, artillery
evolved from what was essentially a machine for mowing down infantry into a landscaping tool. In one year’s time, Renault had invented the modern tank, producing about 3000 the following year. In two years, aircraft evolved from toys to actual combat machines.

Figure 6 - Kitchener, Jofre and von Falkenhayn are proof that decision makers are capable of understanding the evolution of reality.

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Lord_Kitchener_AWM_A03547.jpg

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/Joseph_Joffre.jpg

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0b/General_Von_Falkenhayn.jpg

evolved from what was essentially a machine for mowing down infantry into a landscaping tool. In one year’s time, Renault had invented the modern tank, producing about 3000 the following year. In two years, aircraft evolved from toys to actual combat machines.

Figure 7 - Due to how quickly it was designed and the numbers in which it was produced, the Renault FT-17 tank is a symbol of the extraordinary technological response to the problems of the Great War.

Fonte: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/FT-17-argonne-1918.gif
The main problem was an intellectual one, caused by a generation of servicemen who had devoted their entire lives to the cult of manoeuvre as the superior form of war and were then required to absorb the realities of a war of attrition and to create the mechanisms to conduct that war.

This problem of perception of the conflict manifested itself in four core areas:

- Political–military relations
- The conceptualisation of the war
- The planning and conduct of operations by the different echelons
- The evaluation of results.

Attrition as a concept cannot be politically accepted in political-military relations. If the problem was not felt so keenly by Russia and the Central Powers, it was because the war created an overlap of political and military power; in the powers that remained democratic during the war, a problem arose when defining the objectives of operations. Simply stating that an offensive will be launched which will cost heavy casualties in the mere hope it will inflict heavier casualties on the opponent requires a directness only dared by von Falkenhayn. If, for the French, the clear separation of spheres of competence between politics and the military allowed the High Command to accept politically defined objectives, and consequently to conduct operations according to purely military (and attrition-based) conceptions, in the United Kingdom, the influence of political decision-makers strongly conditioned operations. In a society with a tradition of transparency and political control over military operations, Haig was forced to plan offensives with decisive objectives and could not take a stance of pure attrition, which hampered his success in that area.

Thus, while both Allied Armies were told the Somme offensive was part of a group of offensives to break enemy lines that would bring the war a successful end (the others were to take place in the Russian and Italian fronts), the French treated their major offensive component purely as an action of attrition, with limited success in that regard, while the British expanded and modified their initial realistic plans and attempted to achieve a decisive and politically desirable victory, thus compromising their attrition objectives. The process was repeated in 1917, when Haig was forced to launch an offensive to wear down the German army and relieve the pressure on its allies, and had to define a politically acceptable objective in order to recover the government’s fragile confidence in his leadership, specifically the capture of the German submarine bases of operations, leading him to attack a sector that was ill-suited
to attrition operations and to excessively prolonged operations. It is especially interesting to contrast the success of offensives with limited preparation (Messines and Vimy) with the failure of the major offensive (Ypres). Messines clearly showed that the British fully dominated the conduct of attrition warfare, and the unrealistic objectives for Ypres illustrated how political constraints played a role in their perception of the conduct of the war.

In an interesting example of the same problem, the German high command, usually not partial to parliamentary control mechanisms, formed an unlikely alliance with the parliament to enforce a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. Elevated to the political level, this military concept was presented as the key to a quick and decisive victory, garnering great excitement in public opinion and inevitable disappointment when it failed to live up to expectations, in a clear demonstration of how difficult it was to adjust the duration of a conflict of attrition to the political debate and to social realities.

The main difficulty for policy-makers in conceptualizing war was to break free from their training, which upheld the primacy of manoeuvre and of the offensive spirit, and, generally speaking, to abandon Napoleon and return to Vauban. In this instance, the German devotion to manoeuvre and decisive battle meant that there was a particularly strong resistance to attrition, which led to von Falkenhayn’s dismissal as soon as he planned an operational concept based on attrition. The Germans were, moreover, waging a war of maneuver on the eastern front, which reinforced the apparent relevance of a classic model of war, and the offensives of 1918 were therefore a desperate attempt to enforce a model based on maneuver, which inevitably proved disastrous from the point of view of attrition.

The constraints intrinsic to conflicts of this type proved to be even greater when it came to the planning and conduct of operations by the various groups. In reality, in conflicts of attrition it is extremely difficult to find objectives that may lead to offensive operations which are advantageous in terms of attacker/defender casualties and which can be put into practice as a planning basis for units on the ground. From the defender’s perspective, the vulnerabilities are: exposure to the initial artillery preparation, maneuver during counter-attacks and movement during reinforcements. The French took three years to find and refine an ideal model (which, in a temporary abandonment of the post-1914 French pragmatism, Nivelle relinquished with disastrous consequences in 1917 to attack in the English way). General Fayolle was the leading expert in this model. The level of difficulty, combined with the drawbacks of Auftragstaktik for a conflict of attrition, hindered von Falkenhayn’s
plans in Verdun. The German general had devised a type of battle designed to expose the French infantry, which would be lured into counter-attacking and defending objectives of an essentially psychological value, on unfavourable ground; however, his subordinates identified and overcame objectives in classical terms of conquering terrain, letting themselves be dragged into a rationale of position maneuver that cancelled out much of the advantages von Falkhenhein had wished to explore. The decentralized command practiced by the German army granted greater initiative to subordinate levels, which had proved beneficial in manoeuvre actions but undermined the kind of precise centralized management crucial to a battle of attrition, which would prove critical in the operations of 1918.

Another problem emerged when evaluating outcomes; the need to resort to casualty estimates proved particularly difficult in a fight where most casualties occurred beyond our lines and where the number of prisoners, traditionally the most reliable indicator of an opponent’s wear, was not proportionally significant. The excessive optimism of all general staffs, which in the case of the British was reinforced by the classic reliance of democratic societies in the reports of its own bodies, led to grave errors and misled the High Command as to the actual effectiveness of the tactical models adopted, errors which still endure in the British historical analysis of the conflict, as it attempts to legitimize the major offensives of 1916 and 1917 as a model of attrition. The problem becomes even more complex as opponents adopt different concepts and continue to analyse an opponent’s actions as if they mirror their own. It was the case, for example, of the German estimates of French casualties in Verdun, which assumed that the rapid rotation of the French units was due to exhaustion, and could not deduce that the adoption of short intervals rotations had actually been a plan to prevent exhaustion; this led to a greatly exaggerated estimate of French casualties and to the persistent pursuit of an operation that had already outlived its usefulness.

In 1918, the evolution of the conflict finally yielded a French model that proved to be the most appropriate to the conflict in the western front, with a clear separation between the political sphere (where the inspirational leadership of Clemenceau took the stance of supporting the war effort without interfering in its conduct) and the military sphere (with the acknowledgement of a clear rationale of attrition), allowing the military level to deploy successive offensives aimed more to destroy the German forces than to break through their defences.

Thus, in 1918, Foch achieved Sun Tzu’s ideal by attacking Ludendorf’s perception of reality, forcing him into a type of combat where the true ‘Schwerpunkt’ was not to be found on the ground, but on the undefended space
between reality and the German general staff’s perception of reality. Luddendorf defended each sector to prevent a breach; something which he feared would be decisive, not realizing that Foch only intended to make him pay the price of each apparent defensive success, plus interest. This asymmetry of perceptions was enhanced by an asymmetry in material assets, with the allies employing combined combat arms intelligently (something which had already become clear in their management of the response to the 1918 German offensive), finally resulting in the gradual but irreversible destruction of the German combat capabilities by successive and continued allied offensives.

The German misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict was later expressed in a reductive and distorted view of the causes of the defeat in which the lack of perception of a decisive military defeat fed the myth of having been ‘stabbed in the back’.

Furthermore, this being a work of history, a cliché inevitably comes to mind, in this instance the Santayana maxim which states that those who do not understand history are doomed to repeat it.

Looking at the current conflicts in the light of Great War analysis, the unreasonable ambitions of the Schlieffen Plan seemingly echo the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, based on wrong assumptions that underestimated the resistance of the environment where the plan was to be implemented.

A parallel can also be drawn between Haig’s dilemma when compelled to seek swift military success and the ‘surge’ of Iraq 2007, revealing a typical need of democracies to seek decisive battles with politically acceptable targets in a conceptual refusal of attrition mechanisms.

Furthermore, our obsession with anything that could be described as either ‘smart’ or ‘net’ shows that we build entire models on culturally dominant ideas, much like the creators of Plan XVII did.

The victors of a hundred years ago would most likely find our wars rather easy to analyse and quite difficult to understand.

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Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century

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Introduction

What is the nature of strategy?

Any historical study of strategy must necessarily challenge the nature of that field of knowledge by outlining its characteristics and by dissecting it to better highlight its features. Strategy has its own history, which derives from a socially and culturally developed construction. Strategy, as a field of knowledge constructed by the thinkers who engendered it and by the political and military agents who implemented it, is a recent phenomenon dating back to the eighteenth century. Furthermore, over the last two centuries, the disciplines contained in that field of knowledge have varied as the scope and framework of strategy expanded. What, then, must we analyse and dissect when attempting to study the strategic thinking of yesteryear? The strategic treatises of the time? War-related political thinking? Or geopolitics? And can strategic thinking occur in periods when the concept of strategy did not yet exist? And if it did occur in some form, in what terms was it framed? These are important issues for those who seek to conduct a historical study of strategy. The present text considers that, just as with the study of economy, strategic thinking and strategy in general can be studied even during times when the concept did not yet exist, because for both sciences reflection and practice are not an end in themselves, but a way to understand specific external realities: the problems with overcapacity and shortages, in the case of economy; violent and hostile conflict between
organized groups and human communities, in the case of strategy. The same could be said about history, which, in its study of humankind and human reality over time and in the long term, does not shy away from attempting to understand civilizational realities that occurred before the concept of history had emerged, when time was mythical, purely circular and eternally repetitive; and yet, those agents are not denied their legitimate historicity.

But even after the field of strategy became a historical reality practiced by specific agents and taught in specific schools, the scope of those studies was likely quite different from that which shapes it today. Strategy has had its own singular evolution as a field of knowledge. It is actually a science, and like all sciences it is permanently being constructed and framed as different theories overlap in widespread discussion.

Thus, in order to study the strategic thinking of a given era, we must first outline that era’s perceptions of strategy by conducting a thorough survey of sources, generally (but not only) textual, which deal with the problems we now call strategic to better understand the strategic rationale of the men of yesteryear and their attempts to pacify the hostile realities that surrounded them. A sound theory illuminates research by broadening the readings of reality of those who study it while directing them towards their goal.

Due to the specific nature of strategy, strategic thinking is not solely the province of treatise writers. Treatises are certainly one of the types of media through which strategic thinking is expressed, but other materials, usually texts, are relevant to the study and understanding of strategy. It would be a profound loss if the study of strategic thinking were to focus entirely on the strategy treatises of a given era. Since strategy deals with issues related to the kinds of armed conflict with which human groups and communities must cope it is imperative to include in the study of strategic thinking, for example, the discussion on those issues within a given society, both those that were widely contested in public fora and those which, in spite of having taken place within a small core of agents, often had a strong, real impact.

This conference aims to examine Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century. But in order to study Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century, one must not narrow it down to the notions of strategy of the time. This would be tantamount to interpreting ancient times as simply the words from their own past, without endeavouring to study that past in light of our understanding of history. If history must respect the diachronic identity of time, the past cannot be interpreted only through its own perspective, as this would result in a repetition of that perspective; instead,
Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century

each era must be framed within a broader context, allowing for a more distant viewpoint and hence a broader vision, thus contributing to a deeper, and undoubtedly different, understanding of reality than that of coeval thinkers\(^1\). All history is contemporary, in the words of Benedetto Croce\(^2\), and any reading of the past is surely an interpretation, respecting the diachronic identity of each era in light of contemporary knowledge. The study of the strategic thinking of an era is, then, illuminated by the contemporary idea of strategy.

Thus, Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century cannot be circumscribed to the texts produced by the few national treatise writers. Texts other than treatises may be reflections on the position Portugal occupied in the world in a context of increased armed conflict between the imperial nations of Europe, as well as on the issues concerning ‘national defence’, as strategic-military issues were described at the time. This is the case of the texts discussing the construction of a squadron of battleships published in the pages of the *Military Journal* and of the *Annals of the Naval Military Club*, and also in the minutes of the House of Representatives in 1912 and 1913. Other relevant texts on Portuguese strategic thinking can be found in the private correspondence of some of the most important political figures of the time, addressing Portugal’s position within the framework of an international system deeply upturned by intense hostile rivalry which eventually led Europe to the Great War.

If this kind of literature is to be included in the field of strategic thinking, both a robust theory and a sound definition of strategy must be developed, framing these texts as part of a fundamental strategic ‘corpus’. This strategic ‘corpus’ derives from the object of study of strategy – armed conflict in organized groups and human communities - and, consequently, all literature dealing with this reality may be framed as part of a great body of strategic texts.

The first part of this study must necessarily flow from the starting question: ‘What is the nature of the strategy?’ The answer to this question can then be used to study Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century in its textual multiformity. This conference will thus examine a few of the authors and the most relevant works of Portuguese strategic thinking in the decade before the outbreak of the Great War. This research will be the basis for the study and interpretation of both the intrinsic characteristics of strategic thinking and of the awareness that coeval authors had of the international context

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2 Cited in Torgal, 2015, p. 73.
and of national reality, particularly with regard to Portugal’s vulnerabilities and potential at the time. This study will focus on works by certain authors of treatises on strategy, such as Raul Esteves and Pereira de Silva, as well as on the speeches and political discussion involving certain choices in the field of ‘national defence’, as it was then called, and also of certain letters exchanged between important political figures addressing various issues of international policy and national foreign policy.

1. The Nature of Strategic Thinking

What is the nature of strategy?

The idea of strategy is a recent one, dating back to the early eighteenth century at the most, and the term only became popularised in various European languages at the end of that century. The introduction of the term into military discourse, where it had first emerged, correlates with the development of true national armies, which significantly increased their ranks and began operating through various autonomous bodies that combined to fight the decisive battle/s. The birth of strategy can be explained by the parturition of an intermediate stage between political or political-military command and combat (which is the province of the tactical level). Until the eighteenth century, the military command - or, more accurately, the political-military command, since when the head of State did not conduct the war directly, this was done by someone to whom he had directly delegated his powers and thus held political and military power – generally conducted and led the tactical action directly. The emergence of mass armies and the division of campaign forces into various corps that could conduct separate but joint operations made it necessary to establish an intermediate step between tactical action and political rationality: strategy had been created. Strategy emerged as a bridge between politics and the goals of war, which tactics must achieve by overcoming the enemy in combat. Strategy emerged from the complexity of warfare. And that complexity continued to increase with the approach of the contemporary era, as the areas of action where belligerent actors resolved their differences through armed conflict expanded.

The expansion of the areas involved in armed conflict and its ever-possible corollary, war, has also broadened the scope of strategy, which

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3 Coutau-Bégarie 1999, pp.59-60.
4 Duarte, 2011, p. 68; Duarte, 2013, pp. 50-51.
5 Gray, 2010.
has been gradually subdivided into specific spheres of action. As Edward Mead Earle noted in the 1930s, the ‘nation in arms’ was an all-encompassing concept which required the development of a ‘grand strategy’ integrating the military and diplomatic components and coordinating the various branches of the military and the government, particularly in terms of raising morale and economic resources. Whether in the concept of ‘grand strategy’ developed by the various Anglo-Saxon countries or in the concept of ‘comprehensive’ or general strategy implemented by the French and Portuguese schools, strategy is, in the words of John Lewis Gaddis, an ‘ecological discipline’ in that it can reveal all sides of a problem and establish connections between them with an objective in mind, acting in concert and overcoming the opposition to achieve that objective. Or, as stated by Colin Gray, it aims to provide strategists with the intelligence to shape reality in their favour, as this ‘near alchemical process necessarily involves the manipulation of two distinct currencies, military effect and political effect’ (considering as political the economic, social, diplomatic dimensions, etc.), to produce the effects of strategy, which lead to a predefined political goals. Or, as mentioned by Coutau-Bégarie, a distinguished representative of the French strategy school, ‘a wide palette of means and modes of action’. The ability to read complex scenarios and the capacity to act in those contexts regardless, achieving the desired goals, is a structural characteristic of strategy. The other is overcoming the opposition which any agents aiming to fulfil a given goal must face.

Indeed, the object of strategy is not a set of units, but a defiant opponent. Adversarial dimension and conflict rationale are core elements of strategy. The ‘other’ is seen as a dilemma and as the enemy because it possesses substance and claws. Strategy deals, then, with armed conflict in adversarial, paroxysmal and intensely agonistic environments where two opponents battle each other, looking simultaneously to coerce and to resist coercion, with antagonistic goals. However, this dimension refers to a third essential component of strategy: knowledge.

It has rarely been pointed out that the art of war as a whole and all the expertise flowing therefrom, such as strategy and tactics, are founded

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7 Gaddis, (n.d.), pp. 9 e 16.
10 Brodie, 1965, p. 5.
12 Duarte, 2013, pp. 51-55.
on knowledge. This truth, which can almost be said to be irreducible, has often been unconsciously expressed in various art forms, from literature to cinema, but it has mostly remained hidden due to clearly ideological reasons and cultural prejudices. And yet, if any field of knowledge has merited a high level of study and exploration, both theoretical and, for evident reasons, practical, it is the art of war. Sun Tzu said that a head of state must devote vast amounts of time to the study of the art of war, or suffer dire consequences. Strategy, as Coutau-Bégarie often noted, is essentially the ‘dialectic of intellects’.

In a rather expressive fashion, Abel Cabral Couto outlined the deeper meaning of modern and contemporary strategy in two definitions. Strategy, in the words of the author, is ‘the science and art of developing and employing the moral and material forces of a political unit, which arouse or may arouse hostility in another political will’. More recently, Cabral Couto recast this first definition to include the notion of competitiveness in the potential for armed conflict. Thus, for the author, strategy is ‘the science and art of establishing and prioritizing objectives in the light of the aims of an organization, and of generating, structuring and employing tangible and intangible assets to achieve those objectives in an openly armed conflict or in competitive (agonic) environments’.

Cabral Couto’s definition includes the key elements that summarise the development of strategy - the idea that strategy is conceptual knowledge designed to act on reality (a praxeology), the manipulation of resources (both material and non-material or moral) and the overpowering of an opponent –, as well as singling out the actor of strategy, which is policy. Knowledge is an axis around which both moral and material resources are organised, as well as one’s knowledge of an opponent, allowing one to condition, constrain or coerce – if not definitively eliminate – that opponent. Edward Mead Earle, one of the founders of the first cycle of studies in the United States on what would be known in the late thirties as grand strategy, noted, according to a biographer, that to lead a modern nation in a context of total war it would

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13 The practice of violence is seen as the antithesis of reason and awareness; on the contrary, war is par excellence the province of a prudent and calculating game, where the coolness of reason must prevail over the excitement of emotionality.

14 Sun Tzu, 2006, p. 65.
15 Coutau-Bégarie, 1999, pp. 73-4.
be necessary to mobilize the academia, especially the social sciences\textsuperscript{18}, given
the breadth and depth of expertise needed. Coutau-Bégarie was referring
to ‘strategy as a method’, then describing a variety of strategic methods:
historical; realist; scientific-rational; prospective; geographical; culturalist;
synthetic; and philosophical, which he also described as the sublime method.
These methods made it possible to turn thought into action, or rather,
discursive action into material action\textsuperscript{19}.

Therefore, strategy emerged as discursive action designed to promote
material action, which in turn must transform reality. Strategy is a process\textsuperscript{20},
much like diplomacy (which is also a specific type of strategy), as noted
by Ambassador Bernardo Futscher Pereira\textsuperscript{21}. It is a predictive, selective
and responsive vision capable of long term planning\textsuperscript{22} through long-range
thinking\textsuperscript{23}. The procedural nature of strategic action correlates to its discursive
nature. Because it is a narrative, strategy unfolds in a process composed of
paths and goals. There is truth in Antonio Horta Fernandes’ interpretation
of strategy as more than a discipline of means; it is a discipline with its own
ends\textsuperscript{24}. Thought corresponds to action, or rather discursive action correlates
with material action to provoke an effect which leads to an end. The effect is
the result of strategic action and the political goals constitute the ends.

Strategy being a human action, it can, in a sense, be defined as the
management and manipulation of individuals organized in communal
structures by discourse and material action, aimed to constrain, coerce and,
if absolutely necessary, to eliminate other individuals, also organized in
communal structures, who oppose the desired ends of the first.

The discursive or narrative nature of strategy and the correlation with
procedural dynamics or with material action reflect the ideological meaning
of strategy, both merging into the effect that leads to an end\textsuperscript{25}. This ideological
meaning should not be interpreted in a pejorative sense but by looking to
the deeper meaning of strategy as a means to build and structure - in its

\textsuperscript{18} Ekbladh, 2011, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{19} Coutau-Bégarie, 1999, pp. 256-275.
\textsuperscript{20} Hoffmann, 2014, p. 477.
\textsuperscript{21} Pereira, 2012, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{22} Edwards, 2007, p. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{23} Idem, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{24} Fernandes, 1998 and 2011.
\textsuperscript{25} On strategy and ideology, and as an example, see Coutau-Bégarie, 1999, pp. 235-6.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

deepest etymological meaning\textsuperscript{26} - a new reality. Producing an effect which leads to an end represents the desire and will to change reality. Strategy is thaumaturgical, curative; like war, it aims to bring down the enemy\textsuperscript{27}, the opponent, and to rewrite reality, and, in that sense, it is ideological. It is a type of rationality guided by pragmatism, which aims to rewrite the world.

The above digression placed strategy within cultural dynamics. A discursive action designed to foster a physical action, this discipline produces an ideological discourse - like all discourses are ideological - that rewrites the world; in short, it seeks to bring about a transformation of reality, defining it by words and actions. Language and action combine, reflecting the comprehensive nature and wide scope of strategy.

Thus, it is no accident, but rather it is inscribed into the essence of this discipline, that strategy is most often expressed through treatises and other literary works, in discussions in the press or in public fora, and in other types of media where discourse plays an important role, such as private correspondence. We are in the presence of strategic discourse when all the above elements, which belong to the nature of strategy, are accounted for: it is a discursive action - an encompassing type of thinking imbued with an ideology that purports to change reality - which seeks to foster a material action (based on various different types of media); intends to produce an effect (overcoming an opponent by conditioning, constraining or, if absolutely necessary, eliminating that opponent); generates a positive end (that is, successfully effects change in the previous negative reality). Therein is the curative, or thaumaturgical, nature of strategy.

2. Portuguese Strategic Thinking: discourse and action

Our knowledge of Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century stems from several types of narrative texts, that is, discursive actions. Aside from a few treatises, it can also be found in other texts such as projects and proposals for action plans which were published in military

\textsuperscript{26} The word ‘structure’ comes from the Latin word ‘struere’, which means to stack, to accommodate, and which derives from the Indo-European word ‘ster’, an expression that means to detach or spread. The following is a link to the ‘Consultório Linguístico’ website: http://consultoriolinguistico.blogspot.pt/2011/05/etimologia-de-estrutura.html, accessed on 28 June 2015. It is believed that there is a paradox in the etymology of the word ‘structure’: that of destruction as creation and as construction.

\textsuperscript{27} On the thaumaturgical nature of war; see Duarte, 2013, 47-48. As strategy springs from war, the thaumaturgical nature of war inscribed itself into strategy, perhaps even more profoundly considering that the discipline emerged as an instrument for the conduct of armed conflict.
Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century

magazines, in discussions in the House of Representatives and the Senate and in the laws emanated from those legislative bodies, and in private correspondence. This conference, which does not purport to be a comprehensive study, will present relevant and significant examples of Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century: Raul Esteves’ Treatise on military mobilization and national defence in Portugal; and several other texts, with special focus on Pereira da Silva’s commentary on the naval plan of 1912-1913, on the views of Afonso Costa, the main coeval politician, concerning Portugal’s international situation, and on the correspondence between João Chagas and José Relvas regarding the country’s position in the context of the opposition between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente in 1912-1913. Each of these texts, which are varied in nature, may be included in the discursive narratives that outline Portuguese strategic thinking at the dawn of the twentieth century: they present a vision and a broad spectrum of knowledge, define an opposition that must be overcome and provide a course of action and intermediate and final goals that must be achieved.

a. Defence and National Mobilization in Portugal

In 1910, Raul Esteves, then an engineering lieutenant, published a treatise on the role of fortification in the country’s defence plan: A Fortificação no Plano de Defesa do Paiz. The text is mainly a reflection on the issues related to fortification and how it relates to national defence. Nevertheless, during the first quarter of the book the author frames, as one must, the issues of military fortification in relation to the national defence policy and to general military strategy, as we would call it today. This is a particularly interesting reading because the views presented by the author fit those advocated by the ‘young Turks’ of the republic for the national defence of Portugal.

Raul Esteves starts by pointing out the relationship between civilizational stage and the shape of war, noting that the coeval modalities of warfare were born during the French Revolution:

The most profound transformation, whose lessons are used to draft laws even today, was undoubtedly that which resulted from the fighting that took place after the French Revolution, where, in the wake of political evolution, the art of war acquired a new shape, very different from the one it had before (...)29.

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28 Esteves, 1910.
29 Esteves, 1910, p. 2.
In the author’s opinion, this new form of warfare consists in national wars born of a new political era, that of a government by the nation, for the nation:

It was then that a new era began: the era of national wars, which was logically related to the new political era of government of the nation, for the nation.30

Further on, the author argues for the evolution of the military organization into a ‘nation in arms’ system by mobilising high numbers of personnel at a reasonable state of readiness, replacing the standing army of the time for a periodic service similar to the system in place in certain countries:

The demands of modern warfare, which require the presence of high numbers early on in the hostilities; the inability during peacetime to keep in the army ranks all the young men who are in a position to compete for the defence of the Nation; (...) the national scope it must assume (...), all of which converge towards an evolution which will lead to the constitution of the nation in arms (...).31

After briefly touching upon the strategic readings which reflected on national mobilization, Raul Esteves assesses that Portugal could potentially raise a force of about 200,000 troops32.

Other authors concerned themselves with the issue of the nation in arms and of a general compulsory military service. In fact, national mobilization based on a conscripted army - different from the standing army, which was based only on the staff enlisted at the time (the first rate forces)33 – was more than a strategic necessity derived from the evolution of the major continental powers, but was a way to adapt that organization to reflect social, political and cultural modernity. The nation in arms was truly the government of the people. As stated by Hélder Ribeiro in the House of Representatives, in 1912, ‘the nation in arms is the army integrated into the Nation (...), the army of democracy, composed of all able citizens (...)’.34 Raul Esteves’ vision was inscribed into law with the military organization of the Republic. With the Recruitment Act of 2 March 1911, based on the mobilization of the nation, the Republic established

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30 Esteves, 1910, p. 2.
31 Esteves, 1910, p. 34.
32 Idem.
33 According to the definition set out in the law governing the nation in arms. Secretaria da Guerra, 1912, p. 3.
the militia army, a mass army with abundant reserves, compelling citizens to carry out their duty and their right to participate in the defence of the nation.\footnote{Secretaria da Guerra, 1912, pp. 4-5.}

The fortification plan for Portugal must have been prepared within this framework of constitution of the nation in arms. For Raul Esteves, Portugal’s military defence strategy had been, and still was, essentially defensive,\footnote{Esteves, 1910, p. 12.} focused either on repelling an invasion of the country or on liberating invaded territory.\footnote{Esteves, 1910, p. 8.} However, the author does not rule out the possibility of exploiting the outbreak of a war with ‘our probable enemy’,\footnote{Esteves, 1910, p. 10.} an archetypal formula in many Portuguese strategic treatises of the nineteenth century and of the dawn of the twentieth century to refer to Spain without stating the country’s name outright, to attenuate the ‘severely unequal circumstances of power’ and to ‘balance’ the inequality between the peninsular nations, incorporating in our territory parts of the opponent’s.\footnote{Esteves, 1910, p. 10.}

A pivotal element in this treatise, and in many other treatises of the time, is the view that Portugal must be able to defend itself, at least in a first stage of the contest with its likely enemy. Raul Esteves acknowledges that ‘the sea is our true base of operations’ and that the protection of our communication routes was fatally dependant on allied naval forces; the author does not foresee the plans for a national squadron, nor does he posit that those plans may ever become reality.\footnote{Esteves, 1910, pp. 31 e 47.} Nevertheless, national mobilization and the nation in arms would ensure a consistent military force capable of defending the national territory, especially as most studies indicated that Great Britain, Portugal’s main ally, would not be able to send crucial aid in case of aggression by land.\footnote{Esteves, 1910, pp. 57-58.}

Based on the above assumptions, Raul Esteves criticized the ‘concentrated defence’, Portugal’s land defence plan which followed the example of the Peninsular War by circumscribing the national defence to the ‘old lines of Torres Vedras’, if somewhat expanded to Santarém and the Mondego River, and which was the basis for the ‘Lisbon entrenchment camp’.\footnote{Esteves, 1910, p. 20.} The author believed this design was gravely flawed in two aspects: it would leave a considerable part
of the country to an invader and it would promote a sense of moral inferiority generated by the defensive stance\textsuperscript{44}. In fact, the author eventually declares defence to be a ‘desperate measure’ and argues for an offensive strategy\textsuperscript{45}.

Raul Esteves’ proposal went in another direction altogether. The author begins by stating that the national defence system is the combination of a campaign army and fortification, with the army’s effective staff raised to a minimum of 200,000 troops, thanks to the nation in arms\textsuperscript{46}. Thus, the system should evolve towards a forward defence, combining fortification and military campaigns to enable the country’s defence immediately at the border. This defence would be based on successive fortified lines and entrenched camps, which should be of a ‘markedly offensive’ nature, as bases for flanking actions against an invading army\textsuperscript{47}. Raul Esteves also underlines the crucial importance of the railway in the quick mobilization of a defence, but recognized that the national railway system was still a long way from having the required capacities to meet our needs, and that the same was true of the road infrastructure\textsuperscript{48}. The campaign army, as a mobile force covered by fortification systems, could not only ensure the defence of the country but could also implement an offensive strategy\textsuperscript{49}, especially as it would ensure ‘moral superiority’\textsuperscript{50}.

This work by Raul Esteves is a treatise on strategy in the sense given to that expression by the author’s contemporaries. It deals with the issues of national defence in the expectation that Portugal might become a belligerent in a military conflict, which today would be described as typical, as the country would be standing against organized armed forces led by political architectures composed of sovereign States of symmetrical status\textsuperscript{51}. This concern with the higher purpose of the armed forces derives from the need of those forces to fully accomplish their warlike mission: national mobilization through conscription, forming the nation in arms (the mass army), addressing the issues related to the railway and road infrastructures which were vital to military communications, and external alliances, which were crucial to mitigate our weaknesses.

\textsuperscript{44} Esteves; 1910, pp. 28, 31 and 171. The author disregards the experience of the Peninsular War. It was conducted under foreign command and it was not subordinated to the national interest.

\textsuperscript{45} Esteves, 1910, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{46} Esteves, 1910, pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{47} Esteves, 1910, pp. 44-45.

\textsuperscript{48} Esteves, 1910, pp. 50-51.

\textsuperscript{49} Esteves, 1910, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{50} Esteves, 1910, p. 164.

\textsuperscript{51} This distinction may have originated with Beaufre, 2004, pp. 38-39.
Halfway through his book, Raul Esteves recognized that Portugal’s defence would be incomplete without a true naval squadron because, while the fortification of the coast could protect the Lisbon port, it did not ensure the freedom of communications needed to support the national defence effort; therefore ‘to conquer that domain, a single means (was) unanimously accepted: the combat squadron’\textsuperscript{52}. Hence, although the Republic followed the ideal of the future General Raul Esteves by implementing a universal conscription of citizens and national mobilization\textsuperscript{53}, it also produced a naval plan along the same lines.

b. The discussion around the Republic’s Naval Plan

Due to its discursive nature, one of the features of strategy is how easily it opens itself to discussion on various related topics. In fact, that discussion is a result of forethought, prudence and deliberation, which are vital to any type of strategic planning. Strategy is not only accomplished by going forward, rather it reflects on the path before embarking on the journey\textsuperscript{54}. Therefore, this reflective nature is often the source of discussion on the issues related to strategy.

If there was any discussion around national defence in the years immediately after the proclamation of the Republic, it was the issue of the naval plan. Indeed, in the words of historian Antonio Telo, as a reward for the Navy’s support of the Republic, a plan was outlined to carry out a thorough refit of the naval force with the most cutting-edge warfare technology of the time: it was nothing less than a battle squadron built around the most modern battleships available\textsuperscript{55}. This idea for a naval program was defended, for instance, by the then First Lieutenant Fernando Augusto Pereira da Silva in a short work published in 1909\textsuperscript{56}. The initial proposal for the reorganization of the Navy and for a naval plan was met with the criticism of someone by the name of C.C., in the \textit{Annals of the Military Naval Club}. The mere fact that this critic signed

\textsuperscript{52} Esteves, 1910, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{53} In fact, this was only a reality in the letter of the law. Indeed, conscription and national mobilization as defined in the legislation were never implemented in times of peace during the Republic. At the beginning of the Great War the army’s troops were greatly enfeebled and by 1915 had become completely depleted. For a summary of the military reforms of the Republic, see Duarte, 1914. On Portugal’s military resources, especially with regard to the troops available, see Fraga, 2010, pp.2.
\textsuperscript{54} For a reflection on this nature of strategy, see Fernandes, 1998 and Duarte, 2013, pp. 56-58.
\textsuperscript{55} Telo, 1999, pp. 232-236.
\textsuperscript{56} Pereira da Silva, 1909, pp. 129-130.
simply C.C. could indicate that the reorganization of the Navy, which had one of its major advocates in the then First Lieutenant Pereira da Silva, had been met with broad approval within the organization, forcing critics to hide by behind acronyms57. At any rate, in mid-1912, C.C. appears in the pages of the Annals of the Military Naval Club questioning certain claims in the retrofit plan for the squadron. Beginning by stating that national defence is the foundation of national autonomy58, the author goes on to note that Portugal must combine land and sea for its defence, so, should the country rely solely on a powerful navy, it would be defeated on land by its most likely enemy (note the usage of this concept). The author then calls for the creation of a joint committee of the army and the navy charged with planning the defence of Portugal59. With regard to naval planning, C.C. underlines the need to take into account the nature of the alliance with Great Britain and the ‘orientation of global policy’, that is, the international framework and Portugal’s position within it60. With this criticism, C.C. points out to his audience that a reorganization plan of the Navy and a naval refit does not constitute, per se, a national defence policy. Echoing, likely without knowing it, Clausewitz’s letter to Major Roeder in 182761, C.C. emphasises that the reorganization project for the Navy and the naval rearmament should be conducted according to a framework in which the situation of the international system and the goals of Portuguese foreign policy and defence are taken into consideration. C.C. concludes by going into more technical issues. The ships originally planned by the Navy Committee pointed to capital ships - battleships - weighing 20,000 tonnes. C.C. notes that these ships were becoming outdated, as the new generation of battle vessels was fitted with large-calibre artillery, larger than what the proponents of the naval rearmament plan had provided for, and if the plan was to be put into action, then ‘small and poor nations should only buy the best and most innovative technology that the art of engineering had to offer’62. It seems clear that there is a deceitful logic at play here, almost an artifice, which states that if one is to buy low quality materials, then the best thing to do is avoid spending those sparse financial resources on useless objects.

57 Silva Pereira himself stated he did not know who he was addressing in his answer to C.C.. Pereira da Silva, 1912, p. 361.
58 C.C., 1912a, p. 229.
59 C.C., 1912a, p. 230.
60 C.C., 1912a, pp. 230-31.
61 For a transcript of this letter, see Paret, 1992, pp. 126-27.
62 C.C., 1912a, 237-238 (238 for citation purposes).
Pereira da Silva, an advocate of the Navy Commission naval project, replied to C.C. on the pages of the *Annals of the Military Naval Club*. Evidently, the core issue of national defence - which pervaded the issue of the Republic’s foreign policy in the years immediately before the Great War - was the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the stance Great Britain would take if faced with a more complicated situation in terms of Portuguese sovereignty, either in the mainland or in the colonies. For Pereira da Silva, the naval reorganization and the Navy rearmament policy should not be defined primarily by the alliance, but by a political and strategic national vision. The author notes that a military organization derived from the alliance ‘is in conflict with the lessons of history’, and subsequently notes that a nation’s military organizations should not be subject to the contingencies and volatility of international politics, especially as commitments are not categorically defined even between equal allies, adding that an alliance between a lion and a lamb is always harmful to the latter. Behind this conception is a core perspective of the First Republic’s defence and foreign policies at the onset of the regime. The alliance was crucial for Portugal’s independence but the British government was not a reliable element in that respect. The need to somehow guarantee Portugal’s autonomy from Great Britain implied a tougher stance by the Portuguese within the alliance. In order to balance the scales, Portugal had to be seen as an asset on the international stage. Pereira da Silva subtly touches upon this issue by emphasizing that, with regard to the naval plan, ‘the stronger and more powerful we are (...), the more solid and valuable our alliance (...)' Almost all political discourse, as will become apparent, converged on this political-strategic topos. With regard to the more technical issues, Pereira da Silva was a proponent of the project of naval rearmament of the ‘Great Commission’, stating that, more than considering each ship separately, the primary concern should be the cohesion and flexibility of the squadron.

C.C. renewed his criticism in a later issue of the *Annals of the Military Naval Club*. At first, he opposes Pereira da Silva’s vision for the alliance, assuming, however, a self-critical stance:

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63 On this subject see Telo, 2010, pp. 229-287, Ramos, 2008; Fraga, 2010, pp. 51-54ff. The Portuguese were not certain that Great Britain would protect them from invasion or from the usurpation of their colonies by third parties.

64 Pereira da Silva, 1912, p. 362.


66 Pereira da Silva, 1912, p. 366.

67 Pereira da Silva, 1912, pp. 369-370.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

[Pereira da Silva] seems to have concluded from our article that in our opinion only alliances should dictate an armament project, while to us it seems to have been made clear that we consider it one factor among others (...). (...) Now, I agree with my esteemed colleague that the arming of a nation depends on its national and foreign policy, which includes alliances (...).68

If the alliance was one of the key issues in the discussion, one other issue was the problem of which weapons should be acquired. And this issue was in a sense related to the alliances, since the projections of the Navy Commission dictated that the new squadron must be capable of combat against best navies in the world, as well as of being integrated into the main squadrons of those navies, something which required the most powerful armament available69. And thus C.C. comes to the pivotal point in his argument:

In this first point, there is only one argument with real weight, which is the budget available for the battleships; but any technical committee, more than anyone, must now obey the principles of economy; and real economy is more than simply spending, it is spending well70.

Here are, then, the touchstone and the cornerstone of the problem with the rearmament of the Navy and with the creation of the battle squadron planned by the Navy Commission: the State’s financial resources.

In 1913, Pereira da Silva effectively acknowledged that a naval program would be constrained by financial resources, but he did so by listing it among a number of other factors: ‘geographical location, political aspirations, the need for commercial and industrial expansion, the wealth of our territory, the antagonisms caused by our collective temperament, our economic performance and, finally, our financial resources’71. Going even further, he begins the text by noting that a naval program ‘is more than anything the resolution of a strategic and political problem with far-reaching implications’72. It seems clear that Pereira da Silva sought to emphasize the relevance of the political and strategic elements to the detriment of the economic and financial aspects. To back his arguments, he added two additional factors: a) the country’s dependence on third parties for the protection of its maritime lines of communication and for

68 C. C., 1912b, p. 543.
69 C. C., 1912b, p. 545.
70 C. C., 1912b, p. 545-546.
71 Pereira da Silva, 1913, pp. 242-243.
72 Pereira da Silva, 1913, pp. 241.
its connection to the colonies - which was a vulnerability; b) the nature of naval strategy, which, as it unfolds in a flat, open space with no geographic accidents, can only be offensive and therefore required the most advanced technological capabilities.\textsuperscript{73}

But, as Afonso Costa, head of the government, stressed a month later in the House of Representatives, ‘In fifteen years, I have never been a proponent of taking out a loan for the acquisition of a War Navy; have never been in favour of acquiring units which did not gather the consensus of technicians, nor of building new ships in the Navy Arsenal, because that would require a thorough study’.\textsuperscript{74} And, as if reiterating his perspective right from the beginning of his speech, he began by stating that he had always been a ‘defender of fiscal balance’.\textsuperscript{75}

The naval program had been no more than a fantasy. It mirrored the dilemmas of a colonial power without a squadron that did it justice and of a small power with a regime ostracized by Europe that rendered it vulnerable and isolated. Hugo de Lacerda responded to the issue rather brilliantly in June 1914, on the brink of the apocalyptic onset of the Great War, ‘collaboration is the strength of the weak’.\textsuperscript{76} In essence, the whole issue of national defence was related to the issue of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

c. Foreign Policy and National Defence

In 1935, in a note dated 20 September, Salazar claimed that the New State was developing a foreign policy, as opposed to what had happened during the First Republic, which, in his opinion, had only had ‘mere foreign relations’.\textsuperscript{77} Although this statement is not altogether impossible to believe, it can be said to be wrong in the context of the radical interventionism of 1914-1918. In reality, the existence of a foreign policy pursued with diligence explained the national belligerence from 1916 to 1918. Nevertheless, the interventionist policy of the so-called ‘democratic’ party and its companions was not caused by the war, but

\textsuperscript{73} Pereira da Silva, 1913, pp. 244-247.
\textsuperscript{74} Costa, 1976, p. 466 (Afonso Costa’s speech in Session N. 102 of the Chamber of Representatives on 19 May 1913, pp. 21-23).
\textsuperscript{75} Idem, p. 464.
\textsuperscript{76} Lacerda, 1914, p. 400. The document is an attempt to reconcile the contrasting opinions on the naval plan and is based on Mahan’s rationale. The naval issue must be structured by taking into account the global context, combining naval defence, land defence, merchant shipping and support policies.
\textsuperscript{77} Cited in Pereira, 2012, p. 54.
it inscribed itself into the interpretation that Republicans in general made of Great Britain’s stance towards Portugal (the cornerstone of the national foreign policy) and of the international stage in which the regime of the second decade of the twentieth century was integrated.

The speech given by Afonso Costa in Santarém on 3 November 1912 can be seen as the first public expression of a vision of a true foreign policy for the infant Republic. It was not by accident that the speech began with an affirmation of the alleged sustainability of the New Republic:

She is alive and well and she is already so strong, capable of walking and of bearing fruit.

Afonso Costa then defined the Republic with two phrases: ‘the government of the people’ and ‘love of the homeland’. Next, he added that it was necessary to redefine the rights and duties resulting from the alliance with England within the new political framework of a patriotic government of the people. The framework in which Afonso Costa envisioned the need to collaborate with Great Britain was the inevitable and devastating tumult that was soon expected to occur in Europe. But Portugal’s role in this future conflict was inscrutable, as the ‘nature, extent and effects’ of the alliance on our international stance had not yet been defined. Therefore, attending to the national defence was an urgent priority.

Afonso Costa’s speech mirrored the dilemmas of the First Republic with regard to its international position - internationally isolated and with a dubious relationship with Great Britain. According to the author, the vagueness that characterised the relationship of the Republic with the Alliance perfectly mirrored the situation of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Great Britain’s stance towards Portugal was reserved, suspicious of the new regime, which seemed too radical and not always effectively liberal, and moreover the cause for great political and social instability. We must also consider the good relations between Great Britain and Spain and their considerably higher value to the Entente, as well as the pursuit of an understanding with Germany with respect to the ‘naval race’ and to a possible partition of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, and that both situations encouraged British diplomats not to commit to any assurances.

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78 Costa, 1912, p. 6.
79 Idem, pp. 6 e 7.
80 Idem, ibidem, p. 8.
82 Idem, ibidem, p. 10.
regarding the Portuguese colonies or the national defence. Thus, only a tougher international stance could improve Portugal’s relations with its old ally and strategic parity between both partners. In the conceptual framework of 1900, and given the inevitability of an approaching European conflict of vast proportions, strategic parity meant military capabilities, as the texts above show. Thus, the redefinition of the nature, extent and impact of the alliance for both partners required an urgent reform of the national defence. The naval program and the Army reorganization were crucial elements to redress the relationship between the two allies. As it turned out, the restructuring process was involved in a tug-of-war with fiscal austerity.

d. Alliances and National Sovereignty

One possible solution was perhaps recasting the alliance within a network of alliances. This was proposed by two of the most distinguished Republicans in July 1914, in a brief exchange of correspondence between the two: one was João Chagas, diplomatic representative for Portugal in Paris at the time, and José Relvas, Portuguese ambassador in Madrid until early 1914.

José Relvas informed João Chagas of his efforts as ambassador to Spain to strive for a rapprochement based on the support of Spanish politicians and distinguished intellectuals who recognised that such a rapprochement between the two nations, which would remain independent, would strengthen both against the greed of the great European powers. The rapprochement between Portugal and Spain was to be a first step towards integrating both countries in the Entente.

The idea met the approval of Afonso Costa’s cabinet in May 1913, and initially consisted in an understanding between Lisbon and Madrid, an ‘entente’ with the support of Great Britain, and, in a second phase, in a wider alliance of Western European countries - Great Britain, France and Italy - , which would

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83 On these circumstances see, for example, Telo, 2010, pp. 229-287, Ramos, 2008.
84 What follows is basically the vision expressed in the letters of José Relvas, as the content of the replies by João Chagas is unknown, although it may be inferred from the former. Note that, even though this correspondence dates from July and August 1914, there is no mention of the imminent outbreak of a war in Europe. However, the crisis triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria had been in place for a few weeks at that point. The outbreak of the war came as a complete surprise to Lisbon (and to Europeans). The idea of war was often expressed by the European chancelleries and by the European press, but in reality, the outbreak of the conflict was unexpected.
86 Idem, p. 203.
include the Iberian countries. For José Relvas, this larger ‘entente’ would stem from two smaller ‘ententes’, the Franco-Spanish and the Anglo-Portuguese, which should be of great interest to Italy\textsuperscript{87}.

And to what end did José Relvas propose this course of action:

Numerous and extremely complex reasons have led me to believe it was crucial to help tear down that wall, and to let the Republic communicate with the international environment (...)\textsuperscript{88}.

José Relvas’ intentions, which had the support of João Chagas, mirrored the drama of a Republic that was internationally isolated, eager for recognition and, more importantly, for security. For Relvas, Chagas and Afonso Costa, the solution to overcome this international isolation was the integration of Portugal into the ‘Entente’. An effective alliance, rather than a dependency, would ensure both an end to the insularity into which the Republic had led Portugal, and a tougher international stance, positioning the country within a multilateral international architecture where it would enjoy greater parity with the remaining partners. Given the extraordinary discrepancy of power between the two partners, the duality of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance invariably put the weakest ally in a position of dependence, that of a ‘lamb’ taken advantage of by the ‘lion’, in the wise words of Pereira da Silva, making it more vulnerable to the whims of the more powerful partner. In contrast, in a multilateral alliance, like in a game with several players, being the weaker ally was not as important because the greater complexity of exchange mechanisms resulted in greater parity. Collaboration in a wider context meant leverage of power and enhanced strategic parity.

Just as in Afonso Costa’s speech, the ‘nature, extent and effects’ of the alliance between Portugal and Great Britain, along with the issue of Spain, were the core elements of Portugal’s integration in the world. In light of the British suspicions regarding the Republic and of the Spanish hostility to the regime, the solution did not rest in ‘à outrance’ resistance by Portugal, which

\textsuperscript{87} José Relvas to João Chagas, in a letter dated 24 August, 1914, in Correspondência Literária e Política com João Chagas, (n.d.), p. 207. This letter is particularly interesting as it mentions the outbreak of the war. As often happened with correspondence at the time, the text of the letter was not written in one sitting but could take a few days to complete. Near the end of the text, as he is preparing to close the letter, José Relvas writes that he had received news of the German declaration of war to Russia, stating that this was the same as “saying [a war had broken] between Russia, Germany, Austria, England and France...’’. Idem, p. 209.

\textsuperscript{88} José Relvas to João Chagas, Correspondência Literária e Política com João Chagas, (n.d.), p. 203.
was clearly not feasible, but in a strategic move in the opposite direction: to integrate the country in a multilateral system which lent it recognition and renewed international prestige.

This line of action was tirelessly promoted by the interventionists from 1914 to 1918: the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps sent to Flanders was the first step of a plan that had been developed before the war. Even the historians who most criticised the interventionist project acknowledge that this was the interventionists’ primary goal89.

Conclusions

Strategy deals with armed conflict and coercion: simultaneously coercing and resisting coercion, each actor striving to achieve their own objectives by surpassing the opponent’s adversariality. Armed conflict derives from adversariality, which poses one opponent against another, requiring both to develop a course of action that makes the adversary’s resistance easier to overcome by acting as a compelling factor for the other’s action. This path is necessarily a process, much like walking is a process, and like all strategy is a process involving the construction of a path with a specific purpose, planning the different stages, milestones, and the way to overcome the opponent’s resistance. To build a path is to build a narrative, outlining a goal and identifying the means and ways of achieving it, as well as ways of mitigating both the weaknesses and the resistance that prevent that purpose from being achieved. Strategy is, then, narrative text, or knowledge. It is an alphabet that allows us to read the world and the construction of the world itself, to know where one comes from and how to reach one’s intended objectives. And it is to tread that path while overcoming the resistance opposing one’s progress. As all alphabets, strategy is knowledge expressed by language, a thought that seeks to act on the world and configure it according to the wishes of its authors. Hence, strategy is expressed, first and foremost, in various types of texts: in addition to classic treatises, it can be found in written discussions, speeches (usually political), in both official and private correspondence, and in strategic and operational plans, as well as in legislative or political-institutional texts. Readability is a characteristic of strategy, and the only means to identify the path that must be taken, so that by overcoming the opposition and eliminating armed conflict the intended final objective can be achieved through a sequence of partial steps and intermediate goals.

89 See, for example, Telo, 2010, pp. 299ff.
In the early twentieth century, Portugal faced a hostile agonic environment compounded by the proclamation of the First Republic - the third republican regime in Europe at the time. Portugal’s excessive dependence on the alliance with Great Britain with regard to security and to the overseas territories left the Portuguese Republic in an extraordinarily vulnerable global position, considering the heightened international tensions and the specific interests of that country, which were not always in agreement with national interests. In turn, Spain, Portugal’s traditional enemy with which there was a history of several centuries of conflicts, after years of torpor felt a renewed temptation and desire to incorporate into its rather larger body its vulnerable and ill-fated Iberian neighbour. The proclamation of the Republic escalated the animosity between the Iberian regimes and weakened the national position within the international community, thus increasing the temptation for Spain.

To remedy this weakness, a few texts were published in the first two decades of the twentieth century which sought to propose a strategy, that is, courses of action that might potentially strengthen the national body and its security, mitigating vulnerabilities, either in specific aspects or from a more complete and comprehensive perspective.

Raul Esteves, then a lieutenant, published a treatise on the national defence and fortification of Portugal. There, the then young lieutenant called for the creation of a general military service and for a general conscription to mobilize the nation for national defence, which would become the nation in arms. Doubting that Great Britain would secure our defence in a first phase of a conflict between the Iberian states, and seeking to ensure that our resources would not be taken by a rapid Spanish incursion into national territory, the author advocated for a general military service to ensure the availability of a military force of 200,000 troops for a robust border defence until the arrival of the military forces of our British ally, and the idea of a concentrated defence was set aside in favour of a forward defence. National conscription was an objective shared by many for Portugal’s military organization, and it was indeed established by the laws of the First Republic of 2 March and 23 August 1911; however, it must be acknowledged that those laws were never truly enforced by this regime, except during the Great War.

But, as even Raul Esteves assumed, Portugal’s true base of operations was at sea, and this fact also implied the refurbishment of the Navy. For military strategists, it was perhaps viable to leave the protection of our lines of communication to our ally and to its naval hegemony, but for the strategists of the Navy this did not seem entirely feasible as the defence of shipping lanes
converging on Lisbon and the connection to the colonies had to be taken into account. This more than justified the modernization of the Navy and of its armament with the most modern battle squadron available, which could collaborate on equal terms with the Royal Navy and secure the protection of national maritime lines of communication. The acquisition of this squadron was discussed by Navy officers in the *Annals of the Military Naval Club* and in the *Military Journal*. Aside from the more technical discussion on the characteristics of the battleships to be acquired, two questions were raised about the armament of the Navy: whether the costs were in line with the country’s budget and whether the relationship of this squadron with the Royal Navy of Portugal’s main ally, Great Britain. These questions opposed those who saw the squadron as instrument of emancipation from Great Britain to those who questioned how to reconcile it with fiscal austerity.

The issue of the English alliance is the key to interpreting the Portuguese foreign policy in the early years of the First Republic. The ‘nature, extent and effects’ of the English alliance defined Portugal’s stance and foreign policy in the apocalyptic European conflict that was approaching, as stated by Afonso Costa in his speech in Évora in late 1912. In fact, given Portugal’s inherent weakness and the insularity caused by the proclamation of the Republic, an alien regime in a stage populated by very conservative monarchies, the country was extremely dependent on Great Britain’s stance towards it and on its passing whims in the rising international tensions of the second decade of the twentieth century. This situation led to the assumption by Spain, or by certain elements in the country, that the moment had come to secure the incorporation of Portugal into a finally unified Iberian body. Redefining Portugal’s position within the alliance towards a more strategic parity between both partners was crucial for the Portuguese regime.

In this sense, José Relvas proposed, in 1913, to integrate Portugal in the Entente through a first rapprochement with Spain, with the consent of Great Britain, reversing that country’s stance with regard to the Republic and the Portuguese nation, turning a grave peril into a new ally, and, in a second stage, to integrate the Iberian countries in the Anglo-French alliance. This great Entente might even have the power to attract Italy, which could also integrate the alliance. José Relvas’ ideas never went beyond the planning stage even with the support of the government of Afonso Costa, the approval of Great Britain and the support of certain Spanish politicians and intellectuals, but nevertheless became inscribed, just like the issue of redefining the alliance, on the interventionist path that led Portugal to participate actively in the First World War.
In reality, Portugal’s inherent fragility during the early twentieth century was exacerbated by the country’s isolation after the proclamation of the Republic, causing the international environment to be particularly hostile to the sovereignty and independence of the nation and of the overseas territories, encouraging the Iberian neighbour’s ibericist tendencies, which had been dormant until that moment. The intensification of the Spanish threat and the abandonment of Portugal by Great Britain, or at the very least the estrangement between both countries, called into question the validity of the alliance, and the republican governments, with the most radical at the forefront, decided to rewrite the relationship between Portugal and the world, on the one hand seeking to address the weaknesses in the national defence with the reorganization and attempted reinforcement of the Army and the Navy, and, on the other, with a redefinition of the architecture of alliances in which the country was involved, at the same time attempting to redefine the ‘nature, extent and effects’ of the old Anglo-Portuguese relationship towards greater parity between both partners.

This interpretation of the national strategic thinking of the first two decades of the twentieth century demonstrates the idea recently expressed by Bruno Reis, which states that, in addition to a strong official and institutional doctrine, a ‘high level of informality and possibly a late and narrow formalization and reflection’ may often occur when developing a strategic design and national conceptions of strategy. It is clear that certain issues were recurrent in the interpretation several national strategists made of Portugal’s political, strategic and geographic situation. The most important were Portugal’s situation of dependency in relation to Great Britain and the doubts over whether the latter would ensure Portugal’s military defence in case of aggression, doubts which were accentuated by the cooling down of relations with the Republic and, in contrast, by the good relations between London with Madrid. The other topos was the ‘Spanish peril’, which was quite real at the time, as evidenced by the historiography, given King Alfonso XIII of Spain’s intentions of annexing Portugal into his political body, one way or another. This strategic reading, that is, this path would lead to belligerence and to the military expeditionary force sent to Flanders in 1917-1918.

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German geopolitics in the First World War: The Case of Southeast Africa

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1. Introduction

This paper aims to characterize German Geopolitics during the First World War, focusing especially on the case of Southeast Africa and on the German interests in the region, without forgetting that, since 1890, the ultimate goal of German foreign policy was the country’s recognition as a Weltmacht [world power], which also meant going into Africa and attempting to establish a colonial empire.

We will also endeavour to understand, considering that there is a tempo tríbio¹ (Moreira, 2005) in social reality (in which the Present is the result of the circumstances and consequences of the Past, which has already happened, and a ‘preview’ of the future, which will happen soon), how to identify the common traits between German Geopolitics in the First World War and German Geopolitics today.

This paper is based on primary (German) sources and on secondary sources dealing with the way certain (German, French, English and Portuguese) authors address Germany from 1890-1918 and German Foreign Policy worldwide and particularly in Africa; the paper is organized into three main parts.

The first part, ‘From the Unification in Mitteleuropa to ein Platz an der Afrikanischen Sonne’, introduces the motives for the German colonization of

¹ NT: Triple time.
Africa, subsequently addressing the views of Friedrich Ratzel and the policies of Otto Von Bismarck and Wilhelm II on the construction of a German colonial empire in Africa, and concludes with project Mittelafrika.

The second part, ‘Even before the First World War: The interest in the Portuguese Colonial Space in Africa’, begins by addressing the Congo Conference (1884/1885), continues ‘To the Bay of Lourenço Marques: The German Trans-African Project’ and concludes with the German (and English) diplomatic pressure on the Portuguese Colonial Space.

The third and final part, ‘The First World War: from Deutsch-Ostafrika to Mozambique’, seeks to characterize the Geopolitical Space of Mozambique and ascertain to what extent Germany still maintains economic and cultural relations with the countries of the former Ostafrika and with Mozambique, and concludes with an examination of the key aspects of the Battle of Negomano as the culmination of German Geopolitics in Southeast Africa.

2. From the Unification in Mitteleuropa² to Ein Platz an der Afrikanischen Sonne³:

   a. The Economic and Cultural Reasons in the pursuit of more Lebensraum: the motives for the German colonization of Africa

   The book Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonie? [Does Germany need colonies?], by Dr Friedrich Fabri (1824-1891), known as the ‘father of the German colonial movement’, was published in 1879. In the author’s opinion, German colonialism was essentially motivated by economic and social reasons, mainly as the result of the depression, of unemployment and of the population growth during the Second Reich. One of the author’s arguments rested on the issue of German emigration, which, according to Fabri, should not flow to the United States, to South America, or to the British colonies, where the Germans would distance themselves from their homeland (Germany), but to their own colonies, where the Second Reich would put into practice its ‘civilizing mission’, which was seen as a cultural mission to disseminate the German language and culture throughout the world. In Fabri’s opinion, this would be a way for the unified Germany to strengthen and preserve its power.

   The Deutsche Kolonialverein [German Colonial Association] was created along the same lines in 1882, registering about 9,000 members by the end of 1884 and about 12,400 members in 1886. The Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation

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² Middle Europe.
³ A place in the African sun.
German geopolitics in the First World War:  
The Case of Southeast Africa

[Society for German Colonization] was founded in 1884 thanks to the work of Carl Peters, Carl Jühlke and Joachim Graf von Pfeil; in 1887, the society counted a total of 4,500 members. Some of the objectives of this society were: acquiring capital for the colonization process; acquiring overseas colonies; and directing German emigration to those regions. Contrary to the Deutsche Kolonialverein, the Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation was responsible for preparing actual colonization projects. However, in 1887, both were merged into the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft [German Colonial Society], which increased its members from 14,483 to about 43,000 until the First World War (Speitkamp 2008, p. 20).

In fact, the German colonial movement was small in numbers but was nevertheless relatively influential, because among the most influential pressure groups and colonization agents were: the geographic societies; the transnational networks of goods, especially the Hanseatic League; and the missionaries (Conrad, 2012, pp.23-25). The geographic societies had contributed to the scientific knowledge of the African continent (and its financially unexplored territories) and to emigration projects since the mid-nineteenth century. With regard to the transnational networks of goods and the purpose of the Hanseatic League, Zimmermann (1918, p.1) was of the opinion that the origins of German colonial expansion were undoubtedly related to the League, as it had established extensive trade networks in the world even before the German unification in 1871. The Hanseatic League supported free trade and could be described as cosmopolitan, and it was also responsible for establishing commercial networks and conquering markets by disseminating information (images and ideas) about foreign lands among the Germans.

Therefore, mention must be made of the four arguments for German colonialism presented by Conrad (2012, pp.27-29). The Second Reich, albeit being a latecomer to the group of first industrialized countries, had been undergoing an overproduction crisis since 1890, which had impact on the metallurgical, electrical and chemical industries. Hence, due to the increasing economic and industrial development, there was a need to find more resources and new export markets for products, something that could be achieved by owning colonies. This was, according to Conrad (2012, p.27), the commercial interests argument.

Due to agricultural hardship, population growth rates and the industrial boom, it became crucial to expand trade since as early as the reign of Wilhelm II (1859-1941), and it was during that period that products ‘Made in Germany’ began to flood the market, offering a good quality-price ratio when compared to competing products. Compared to the English, the Germans had a higher
workload, lower wages, fewer strikes and lockouts, customs protection, lower transportation costs, investment in education (technical education - Germany is a systematic nation, based on science), initiative and adaptability (needed for learning foreign languages). Moreover, they sought (and seek) progress and studied (and study) trends and needs (Hammer, 2013, pp.154-155).

In addition to this trade policy, the German merchant fleet was expanded and subsidiaries and branches of German companies were established throughout the world, as was the case with Siemens-Halske, AEG, OSRAM and Bosch, for example. Trade expansion was eventually accompanied by financial expansion, which resulted in the establishment of subsidiaries of German financial institutions all over the world, the most notable example being the Deutsche Bank. One example was the case of Siemens-Halske - Deutsche Bank; Siemens-Halske began as a family business founded by a former first lieutenant of the Prussian telegraph-sapper corps and became a multinational company thanks to a close alliance with the Deutsche Bank (Stürmer, 2000, p.55).

The mobility argument was also presented, partly as a way to regulate the high population growth rate in Germany. This meant allowing Germans to immigrate to the German colonies, which would prevent them from mixing with the majority population, thus losing the German national characteristics. This was a discourse of Deutschum [Germanness] geared towards a policy of Germanisation for locations under German control, as underlined by Conrad (2012, p.27). Colonies would therefore be like a ‘new Germany’, as well as a way to prevent the Germans from immigrating to the US, where they would ‘decay’.

According to this same rationale, the Alldeutscher Verband [Pan-German League] was founded by Carl Peters in 18914 to the acclaim of the military and of the German academia, with the main goal of disseminating the German influence throughout the world; among its members were personalities such as the German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), as well as a few extremists such as Otto Richard Tannenberg, author of Groβdeutschland: die Arbeit des 20.Jahrhundert [Greater Germany: a project of the twentieth century], published in 1911 (Bogdan, 2003, p. 331).

Another motive, related to the above, was cultural colonization, based on the idea that the Second Reich was fulfilling a civilizing mission. This was, however, a common feature of colonialism in general, because colonialism was considered a synonym for cultural superiority, especially as the European

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4 It had only been known as Alldeutscher Verband since 1893. The previous name was Allgemeinen Deutschen Verband.
colonizing countries had already undergone an industrial revolution and enjoyed better quality of life. On the other hand, the technological advances gave rise to the cult of progress and to an unrestricted capacity for improvement, something which the colonized had never experienced (MacQueen, 2007, p.38).

For the Second Reich, that civilizing mission was related to the superiority of the German language advocated by Johann Fichte (1762-1814), author of *Reden an die deutsche Nation* [Speeches to the German Nation], published in 1807/1808, and a precursor of Pan-Germanism⁵, and to the superiority of the Aryan race and of the German people (an elite race, a superior people who would rise above all others if they were but able to preserve their beauty, strength and intelligence, not least for the superiority of the German language), as defended by Germanophiles Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882), author of *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines* [An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races] (1865), and Houston Chamberlain (1885-1927), author of *The Foundation of the 19th Century* (1899).

Finally, another motive for German colonization which turned out not to be relevant at the time was the desire to use the colonies as a space to release conflicts and antagonism, a means of overcoming internal tensions in the Second Reich by extraditing all those who had been involved in disputes or were found guilty of laziness or vagrancy (Conrad, 2012, pp.28-29).

As we have observed, German colonization was essentially driven by economic and cultural motives that are still features of German Foreign Policy today, even after one century has passed.

Thus, the first set of motives – which were economic - was related to the need to find new markets for German products, leading German merchants and industrialists to leave Germany and settle in various parts of the world, funded by capital from German financial institutions. The Deutsche Bank was founded in 1870 for that purpose and it remains a guiding principle for the bank’s global presence as a financial institution today.

The second set, cultural motives, was related to the global dissemination of the German language, which followed the departing German merchants and industrialists. To meet this need, the Goethe-Institut was established in 1951 and tasked with disseminating the German language and culture.

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⁵ An expression of national determination, pan-Germanism advocated the need to preserve and strengthen the German way of life. It was, according to Usher (1913, p. 232), self-preservation. Indeed, Pan-Germanism was a political movement which aimed to bring together all German-speaking peoples in the Großdeutschland [Greater Germany]; since the late nineteenth century, many pan-Germanists began to be influenced by racist theories that would eventually also influence German Colonialism.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

throughout the world; today, there are about 136 Goethe Institutes worldwide (Fernandes, 2013a).

In reality, Germany and the remaining States were attempting to expand their borders, disputing spaces that were often held by other States, employing military force and risking war. However, this demand for more Lebensraum [living space] often began with scientific missions and with the settlement of German merchants, and it was only later, as a result of the Congo Conference (1884-1885) and of the Weltpolitik [world politics] in force since 1890, that there was a German military presence in those spaces.

In 1884, when Germany arrived in Africa, most of the territory was already under the control of other colonial powers, including France and Great Britain. Even so, the German colonial empire consisted of four colonies scattered over the African territory: Deutsch-Südwestafrika [German Southwest Africa], Deutsch-Ostafrika [German East Africa], Togoland [Togo] and Kamerun [Cameroon].

Because the focus of this study is ‘German Geopolitics in the First World War: The Case of Southeast Africa’, we cannot fail to mention that this was how the occupation of Deutsch-Ostafrika (present day Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda) was carried out. The occupation of Deutsch-Ostafrika, the most valuable German colony (and also the most populous), was the result of the efforts of Carl Peters (1856-1918), who, in late 1883, decided to explore the region as a private citizen and concluded ‘contracts’ with the locals. The German government decided to treat these documents as protection contracts and granted territorial powers to Peters’ company. However, a few years later, in 1891, the constant conflicts and warfare led the German imperial government to take over the administration of the region (Conrad, 2012, pp. 50 and 51).

b. The idea of a Colonial Empire in Africa: the Perspective of geographer Friedrich Ratzel, framed by the Perspectives of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm II

As the man responsible for the unification of Germany after the Prussian victories in the war against Austria-Hungary in 1866 and France in 1870-1871 under the auspices of the triumph of the idea of Kleindeutschland [Little Germany], Bismarck had as his main objective the consolidation of the Second Reich in Europe, which was its geopolitical space of action par excellence. This was, perhaps, the reason for the Chancellor replying, when asked about the possibility of building a German colonial empire in Africa, that in his map
of Africa, France lay to the West and Russia to the East. On the other hand, Bismarck would rather concern himself with containing European rivalries (thus changing the balance of power by building a complex policy of alliances in which Germany played the role of diplomatic arbiter\(^6\)), while France’s isolation in the European space was an incentive for the latter to seek a colonial empire in Africa and Asia.

In the perspective of German political geographer Ratzel, Germany felt similarly under threat: the country is located in Mitteleuropa [Middle Europe] and has no natural boundaries (the only maritime border, with the North Sea\(^7\) and the Baltic Sea\(^8\), that is, two inland seas, is to the North and does not provide direct access to the ocean). Germany was thus under pressure from all sides, especially from France to the west, and from Russia to the east; it was caught in an enclave, and its dimensions were insufficient (Fernandes, 2011, pp.270-271). Following his Doctoral Dissertation, entitled Die Chinesische Auswanderung [The Chinese Emigration], in 1876, Ratzel also compared Germany and China, the Middle Kingdom, and therefore considered that the Second Reich should empower itself with stronger strategic means capable of containing a possible threat on two fronts (Korinman, 1990, p. 57). However, while continuing to support Bismarck’s idea of Kleindeutschland, Ratzel also supported an alliance with Austria-Hungary, the expansion to the east, towards Poland, and the final annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, which would translate into the evolution of Kleindeutschland into Großdeutschland [Greater Germany]. In essence, Ratzel sought to find a way to balance the idea of a State-continent with the control of the whole western isthmus of Eurasia, as underlined by Gallois (1990, p.210).

In fact, the idea of a State-continent resulted from his experiences in the journey to the United States of America in 1873. Ratzel believed the dimensions and vastness of spaces allowed for the constant circulation of population and the subsequent conquest of territory from east to west; as a result, the political leaders of those areas were compelled to develop their territory as a whole.

The political geographer believed that the future belonged to State-continents; therefore the Second Reich had to rise to that category before it could become a Weltmacht [world power] (Defarges, 2003 p.76; Korinman 1990, pp.60-61; Lorot, 1995, p.16). Germany’s consolidation as a Weltmacht

\(^6\) This was reflected in the establishment of the Triple Alliance with Italy in 1882, of the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1887, of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and of the Mediterranean Agreements with Great Britain.

\(^7\) The North Sea was under British control.

\(^8\) The Baltic Sea only allowed Germany access to Scandinavia and Russia.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

meant the Second Reich had to become a naval power by building a German maritime fleet on par with the English maritime might, one which was capable of strengthening German power in the world. Ratzel mentioned this in his work *Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse* [The Sea as the Source of the Greatness of a People] in 1900, an addition to Chapter XXII of his *Politische Geographie* [Political Geography] published in 1897.

When compared to Bismarck and to Wilhelm II (1859-1941), who had been emperor of the Second Reich since 1888, Ratzel seemed to align more with Wilhelm II than with Bismarck in terms of policy. While Bismarck wanted stability and a unified Second Reich, Wilhelm II, on the other hand, wanted *ein Platz an der Sonne* [a place in the sun] for Germany, which meant turning his European power into a world power.

Bismarck eventually changed his mind with regard to colonization, but not until 1884, and he was only moderately interested in the matter as he believed German colonization should be brought about by trade and private enterprise. The Second Reich only supported the establishment of coal stations and commercial bases, and only where it served the interests of German Foreign Policy, and thus the colonies were not called ‘colonies’, a term which was avoided, but ‘protectorates’. It was, above all, a way to solve to the overproduction crisis in Germany at the time.

The turning point in the German Colonial Policy only came with the adoption of *Weltpolitik*, a new Foreign Policy by Wilhelm II (1859-1941), after Bismarck’s resignation in 1890. One of the aims of *Weltpolitik* was to exploit economic possibilities outside Europe by identifying the regions capable of meeting the geopolitical needs of the colonial and maritime expansion of the Second Reich, which Ratzel seemed to confirm with his concept of *Lebensraum* [living space]. In Ratzel’s opinion, much like living organisms, the different States are engaged in a constant struggle for survival in their quest for more Space for their fulfilment and development as political beings.

Along these lines, and inspired by Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) and his work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* (1890), the Second Reich began implementing a naval policy in 1898, with Admiral Alfred Tirpitz (1849 -1930) as Secretary of State of the German Imperial Naval Office, and built a high seas fleet that became the second largest in the world. Tirpitz was involved in founding the *Deutscher Flottverein* [German Navy League], a pressure group acting directly on the Ministry of the Navy, financially supported by Krupp and by Stumm, the companies responsible for the propaganda announcing Germany’s need for a powerful navy to protect maritime trade and colonial
interests, and to support the desire for Weltmacht. For Wilhelm II, grandson of Queen Victoria (1819-1901) and a great admirer of English naval power, the future was at sea: imperial power meant maritime power and maritime and imperial power were mutually dependent to such an extent that one could not exist without the other.

Weltpolitik, the new German Foreign Policy, also included the Mitteleuropa programme, which concerned the creation of a German Customs Union in Central Europe, and the idea of Mittelafrika, which was related to the German control of Central Africa, both contributing to Germany’s conquest of ein Platz an der Sonne [a place in the sun].

c. **The idea of Mittelafrika**

Under Wilhelm II, the Second Reich’s quest for ein Platz an der Afrikanischen Sonne [a place in the African sun] resulted in the idea of Mittelafrika (Figure 1), initially a project to unite all German colonies in Africa from Togoland to Deutsch-Ostafrika, including the Congo and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

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9 The name given to the ambitious German foreign and colonial policy advocated by Wilhelm II.
10 Middle Africa.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

The idea of Mittelafrika effectively corresponded to the region of Central and Southwest Africa, a region of note in the African space for its hydrographic wealth. The Congo River, which crosses the tropical forest, Africa’s largest river basin, is located there, and many of its tributaries are also large rivers; the region is likewise home to the sources and upper courses of the great African rivers (with the exception of the Niger River). The Great Lakes are also located there, at the fracture of the Great Rift, which extends to east Africa (Correia, 2010, pp. 302 and 345).

As for climate, it is a heterogeneous area with dry, arid and hot climates characteristic of the Horn of Africa and hot and humid climates with heavy rainfall characteristic of tropical forests, without forgetting the continental climate typical of the plateaus (Correia, 2010, p. 345).

The wealth in water resources makes this region favourable to agriculture and there is an abundance of mineral resources: gold, diamonds, copper, nickel, cobalt and coltan (Correia, 2010, p 353.).

Thus, Guevara (2006, p. 50) points out that the Mittelafrika project was developed around the Congo and Zambezi rivers, an idea dating at least to the eighteen eighties. It is also noteworthy that Kusserow, advisor to the German Foreign Office, proposed the same type of colonial expansion to Bismarck in April 1884.

The Congo Conference held in Berlin sought to transport the concept of buffer States to Africa, which meant the creation of an independent and neutral State in Central Africa headed by a sovereign of a small country, Belgium, thus avoiding a direct clash of interests between the major powers (France, Germany and Great Britain) (Guevara, 2006, p. 55).

The idea came to the fore again under Leo von Caprivi (1831-1899), chancellor between 1890 and 1894, following the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. Friedrich von Lindequist (1862-1945), governor of Deutsch-Südwestafrika between 1905 and 1907, advocated for the annexation of the Belgian Congo and for the consolidation of a German empire in the African space from Kamerun to Deutsch-Ostafrika, thus providing the domestic industry with an important source of raw materials and satisfying the agricultural concerns of the Allddeutscher Verband [Pan-German League]. The Congo would single-handedly act as the main industrial engine of the German overseas empire, and Deutsch-Südwestafrika could be turned into a plantation economy to absorb the emigration of new settlers.

Bernhard von Bülow (1849-1929), chancellor from 1900 to 1909, wanted to connect the German colonies, which required the annexation of Tigers Bay

Wilhelm Solf (1862-1936), Secretary for the Colonies from 1911 to 1918, declared in a written memorandum to Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856-1921), German chancellor between 1909 and 1917, that Portugal should cede Angola and northern Mozambique to connect the colonies of Deutsch-Südwestafrika and Deutsch-Ostafrika (Ferro, 2008, p. 185). The Second Reich should also include the Belgian Congo, part of French Equatorial Africa up to Lake Chad, Togoland and Dahomey (now Benin), North Senegal, and part of Gambia up to Timbuktu (which belonged to Mali). Arthur Zimmermann (1864-1940), State Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1916 to 1917, envisioned a German empire in Africa which spanned Central Africa (between the Sahara and the Zambezi) and also included Madagascar, the Azores, Madeira and Cape Verde.

By March 1918, the Germans also wanted the whole of Mozambique, northern Rhodesia, Uganda and Kenya, the British Gambia (including Bathurst and Dakar), the Portuguese Guinea and a number of naval bases (Ferro, 2008, p. 186).

Essentially, Mittelafrica was to extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean (Gann, et al, 1977, p. 230), thus ensuring Germany’s economic self-sufficiency through the exploitation of natural resources of arable land and the control of trade routes. The German government was effectively under constant pressure from the colonial societies, from the pan-Germanists and from other right-wing movements with regard to the German colonial expansion within the African space (Olusoga et al., 2010, p.267).

3. Even before the First World War: the interest in the Portuguese Colonial Space in Africa

a. The Congo Conference (1884/1885)

Once the importance of the Congo Basin was ascertained, in light of the overproduction crisis in the German industry and particularly in response to pressure groups and German colonization agents, the Congo Conference, also known as Berlin Conference, was held between November 1884 and February 1885 under the direction of Chancellor Bismarck. Portugal, Belgium, Spain, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States were a few of the nations invited.

The main objectives of the Conference were the discussion of free trade and free navigation in the Congo River (also known as Zaire River, the second
longest river in Africa, after the Nile) and in the Niger River (the third largest African river), and of effective methods to occupy the colonisable territories of the African coast. In fact, this was an attempt to avert the immediate partition and closure of a wealthy region of central Africa, particularly the Congo Basin, which Germany had interests in, as mentioned above.

Despite having lost the Port of Banana, Portugal still held on to Cabinda, Molembo and part of the left bank of the Congo River (Guevara, 2006, p. 71). It is worth mentioning that Adolph Woermann, ship-owner with a strong influence on the colonial policy of the Second Reich suggested, in an 1883 memorandum, that the German Foreign Office should resort to diplomacy to prevent the recognition of the Portuguese claims over the mouth of the Congo River (Guevara, 2006, p. 51).

b. To the Bay of Lourenço Marques: The German Trans-African Project

Since the eighteen eighties, the Bay of Lourenço Marques was the planned point of arrival in the German project for a Trans-African railway. This Trans-African railway would depart from Tigers Bay, Angola’s largest island, cross Deutsch-Südwestafrika and extend to the Transvaal (supporting the South African Republic by providing an Atlantic exit), and from there to Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and to the Indian Ocean.

The German Trans-African Project consisted in a railway route for German trade from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, with access to seaports.

In fact, Germany realized early on that, if it was to become the (self-appointed) ‘world champion of exports’, it would have to resort to maritime trade to become economically competitive, due to the comparatively low costs of using the sea as its preferred means of communication. Hence the importance placed by Germany on creating the conditions for the transport of goods and raw materials by developing the maritime and port industries (in combination with the railway) (Fernandes, 2013b, p.440).

Guevara (2006, p. 49) effectively confirms this, stating that German naval reports in 1882 already emphasized the German interest in the harbours and bays of the Portuguese colonies in Africa.
c. The diplomatic pressure by Germany (and England) on the Portuguese Colonial Space

(1). The Secret Anglo-German Agreements of 1898

The first secret agreements\(^{11}\) between Great Britain and Germany were concluded in 1898 and consisted in two conventions concerning the fate of the Portuguese colonies (particularly Angola and Mozambique) and the problem of Portuguese foreign debt, without any attempt having been made to ascertain the Portuguese interests in the matter. Great Britain’s goal was to secure German neutrality, the withdrawal of German support to the Boers Republic in South Africa, and a reduction of the rearmament program of the German Navy.

Portugal, however, refused the Anglo-German offer of financial aid and the agreements were consequently inapplicable. Great Britain was not interested in implementing the agreements because they favoured Germany, expanding the latter’s territories in Africa. Should Portugal have accepted the German financial aid, Germany would have been entitled to the customs revenue of northern Mozambique to Shire, of southern Angola to Benguela, and of Timor. Germany wanted these agreements to remain secret to prevent a French counter-offer to Portugal, which would render the Anglo-German agreements inapplicable.

At the same time, on 14 October 1899, a secret declaration was signed between Great Britain and Portugal reaffirming the validity of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance treaties of 1642 and 1661. Should there be a conflict between Great Britain and the Boers Republic, Portugal would not remain neutral but would assist Great Britain, which, in turn, would do the same for Portugal. Neither party was allowed to participate in a War or in a treaty that might harm the other party. Finally, Great Britain would be compelled to defend and protect all Portuguese colonies from current conquest or from future enemies, which meant the Anglo-German agreements for the Portuguese colonial space were voided (Magalhães 2000, p. 207).

(2). The attempt to review the Secret Agreements in 1913

After 5 October 1910, the date of the implantation of the Portuguese Republic and of the adoption of the 1911 Constitution, the first Republic was

\(^{11}\) The first convention stated that financial aid to Portugal would be the result of an agreement between Great Britain and Germany, with the aforementioned territories as collateral. The second dictated that, should Portugal fail to repay its debt, it would lose Angola, Mozambique and Timor, which would henceforth integrate the British colonial empire and the German colonial empire (Lara, 2000, p.50).
officially ‘born’ in Portugal. Portugal became a Republic in a time when most European countries were still Monarchies\textsuperscript{12}, which was one of the reasons for Portugal’s growing isolation within Europe. Another reason for the strategic devaluation of the role played by Portugal was the greater preponderance of Spain in the Iberian context, which Churchill supported (Santos, 2011, pp. 65-66) and which turned out to have consequences for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

In 1911, a second round of meetings began between Great Britain and Germany concerning the Portuguese colonies. The signature of the Anglo-German agreements of 1898 revealed the potential for a rapprochement between the two countries, especially when it came to a possible division of the Portuguese colonies.

Great Britain and Germany were to review the 1898 agreements in 1913, whereupon Mozambique would be annexed by Great Britain, with the exception of the Niassa province, and Angola (in Cabinda), Niassa in Mozambique and São Tome and Príncipe would be annexed by Germany. Initially, Germany’s aim was to obtain British support to German economic penetration\textsuperscript{13}, especially in Angola, but also in São Tome and Príncipe and Mozambique. However, Great Britain intended to inform France about the inclusion of São Tomé in the English text, something which displeased Germany as the country did not wish the agreements to be published before they had been signed.

In reality, the French, who were interested in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Cabinda, only had access to the Anglo-German agreement after it had been concluded, and, on 14 February 1914, France offered Portugal alternative financial aid to develop the colonies: France asked for 50\% of all revenues from the Portuguese colonies.

At the same time, German private initiatives continued to occur within the Portuguese colonial space, always with the support of the German imperial government. On 28 May 1914 the majority of the shares of the Niassa Company were acquired by a German financial institution. Two months later, Germany prepared a financial aid package to propose to Portugal with the revenue of the customs of Angola as guarantee.

\textsuperscript{12} The failure to apply the Anglo-German agreements for Portugal was largely owed to the relationship between King Carlos I of Portugal and his (second degree) cousin Edward VII (uncle of Wilhelm II). Thus, the secret declaration of 1899 was a demonstration of dynastic loyalty and solidarity between the two kings (Santos, 2011, p. 73).

\textsuperscript{13} With the creation of a company comprising different economic interests, funded mainly with German capital (Santos, 2011, p. 67).
It was only in July 1914, after successive changes to the text and after publication had been postponed a number of times (by Germany), that Wilhelm II gave permission for the documents to be signed, but by then it was too late: on 28 July, the First World War began.

4. The First World War: from Deutsch-Ostafrika to Mozambique

![Geopolitical Space of Mozambique](image)

**Figure 2 - Geopolitical Space of Mozambique**

*Source: prepared by author*

**a. The Geopolitical Space of Mozambique**

In the Geopolitical Space of Mozambique (Figure 2), the border between Mozambique and Deutsch-Ostafrika is defined almost entirely by the Rovuma River, which flows into the Indian Ocean. Deutsch-Ostafrika corresponds to the space now occupied by Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.
With regard to resources, Mozambique holds extensive gas, gold and coal reserves in the Rovuma basin\textsuperscript{14}. It is also rich in other minerals such as titanium, graphite, tantalum, beryllium and zinc. It also possesses a considerable drainage system, which can be used for energy production.

Compared to Mozambique, \textit{Deutsch-Ostafrika}, especially Tanzania, is rich in minerals\textsuperscript{15} such as gold (it is the world’s third largest producer), iron, coal, nickel, copper, titanium, cobalt, kaolin, platinum, tanzanite, uranium, diamonds and precious gemstones, as well as natural gas. Rwanda has tin and tungsten reserves, and Burundi has nickel, uranium and vanadium.

In general, the tropical climate typical of \textit{Deutsch-Ostafrika} and Mozambique is characterized by high temperatures averaging 20 °C, with a maximum amplitude range of 10 °C. Summers are hot and humid and the temperature and precipitation are usually lower in the winter.

Regarding terrain, north of the Zambezi River there is a large plateau with a small coastal plain where coral reefs can be found. Inland, there are mountain massifs which belong to the Great Rift Valley. To the South there is a wide coastal alluvial plain with savannah crossed by the valleys of several rivers.

In terms of hydrography, there are 14 different rivers in Mozambique: the Ruvuma River (formed near Lake Niassa, in present day Tanzania, which was included in \textit{Deutsch-Ostafrika}); the Messalo River; the Lúrio River; the Zambezi River (the largest in Mozambique and the fourth largest in Africa, and also the largest African river flowing into the Indian Ocean); the Pungwe River; the Buzi river; the Save River; the Limpopo River (the second largest African river flowing into the Indian Ocean); the Incomati River (which flows into the Bay of Maputo, formerly Lourenço Marques); the Umbeluzi River (which flows into the Bay of Maputo and shares an estuary with several other rivers like the Matula, the Infulene and the Tembe); the Tembe River; the Maputo River; the Lugenda River; and the Shire River. With the exception of the last two, almost all major rivers in Mozambique run west to east or northwest to southeast, flowing into the Mozambique Channel.


There are also several lakes in Mozambique. The largest is the Niassa, which the country shares with the Tanzania of former Deutsch-Ostafrika and Malawi; it is located to the northwest, at the southern end of the Rift Valley, with a system of several lakes that has been declared World Heritage by UNESCO. Three lakes intersect there: the Bogoria, the Nakuru and the Elmenteita, in one of the areas with the greatest bird diversity in the world. Equally important, the Chiuta and Chirua lakes are located in the southern end of the Rift Valley; it should be noted, however, that only the eastern shores belong to Mozambique. There are several lagoons in the south coast running parallel to the coastline, including: the Dongane, the Poelela, the Maiene, the Quissico, the Marrângua, the Inhampavala and the Bilene.

In turn, Deutsch-Ostafrika was located in the African Great Lake region, where the three largest lakes in the continent can be found in the territory of Tanzania alone (which borders Mozambique): the Tanganyika is located on the western border, the Victory lies to the northwest and the Malawi to the southwest. There are six rivers in Tanzania: the Kagera, the Mara, the Rufiji, the Rovuma, the Ruvubu and the Nile (the largest in the world). Burundi has three rivers: the Kagera, the Ruzizi and the Ruvubu; as does Rwanda: the Kagera, the Nyabarongo and the Ruzizi.

Thus, the characteristics of the geopolitical space of Mozambique were not entirely different from those of Deutsch-Ostafrika, and Germany understandably wished to annex that territory to their colony, a requirement for the implementation of project Mittelafrika. In fact, German ownership of Mozambique meant control over more resources in Middle Africa and an extension of the wealth of Deutsch-Ostafrika, which was larger than that of the poorer (in resources) Deutsch-Südwestafrika, leading Germany to covet Angola and to fight for control over the southern part of the country in the First World War.

It may also be interesting to ascertain to what extent Germany remains interested in establishing economic and cultural relations today with the States that once comprised Deutsch-Ostafrika.

In fact, Germany seems to maintain an interest in establishing economic and cultural relations with Mozambique, although to a lesser degree than with Angola, for example, which may reveal a certain preference for the latter. Angola (in the Atlantic Ocean) seems to be the first priority and Mozambique (in the Indian Ocean), the second priority.

It is worth noting that Mozambique is the fourth most important partner in Germany’s relations with the African space, after South Africa, Angola and
Namibia (former Deutsch-Südwestafrika). According to the German Foreign Office, the presence of natural gas reserves has heightened the German interest in Mozambique. In fact, since 2011, bilateral economic relations have developed with renewed vigour.

Compared to the States of the former Deutsch-Ostafrika - Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda\(^\text{16}\) -, German exports to Mozambique in 2012 had a lower value (a total EUR 63.5 million\(^\text{17}\)) than German exports to Tanzania, the largest of the three States of the former German colony, recorded at EUR 144 million in 2013\(^\text{18}\). On the other hand, Germany registered higher import values from Mozambique than from Tanzania: EUR 188 million for Mozambique\(^\text{19}\) and EUR 111 million for Tanzania\(^\text{20}\).

Taking into account the values registered for Namibia, one of the States in the former Deutsch Südwestafrika, and for Angola, it is apparent that German exports to Angola are in the lead (EUR 391 million\(^\text{21}\)), followed by Tanzania (EUR...
144 million\textsuperscript{22}, Namibia (EUR 133.56 million\textsuperscript{23}) and, finally, Mozambique (EUR 63.5 million). As for German imports, also according to data from the German Federal Foreign Office (2014), Angola is in the lead (EUR 294 million\textsuperscript{24}), with Mozambique in second place (EUR 188 million\textsuperscript{25}), Tanzania in third (EUR 111 million\textsuperscript{26}) and, finally, Namibia (EUR 102.13 million\textsuperscript{27}).

Angola can provide Germany with a populous market (capable of absorbing German products and services), wealth in natural resources and the largest drainage system in the region; in return, Germany can provide Angola with techniques and technologies in transport and telecommunications, health and agriculture, and in the vital energy sector (Fernandes, 2013th). Therefore, the two economies appear to be complementary.

Culturally, Germany maintains closer relations with Tanzania than with Mozambique, which is confirmed by the presence, since 1962, of a Goethe-Institut in Dar es Salaam, the largest and most populous city in Tanzania, country capital until 1973. However, Mozambique has a Mozambique-Germany cultural institute/Goethe Centre ICMA, founded in 2003, and many Mozambican citizens have studied or worked in the German Democratic Republic, which could explain the greater interest of Mozambique in establishing relations with Germany.

\textbf{b. The Battle of Negomano: the Culmination of German Geopolitics in Southeast Africa}

The Battle of Negomano (Figure 3), on 25 November 1917, was the culmination of German Geopolitics in Southeast Africa, chiefly because it


The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

was the key moment in the German dispute for the geopolitical space of Mozambique, as we shall see.

Figure 3 - The Battle of Negomano (1917)
Source: prepared by author.

The first incidents north of Mozambique took place as early as August 1914, even before the declaration of war on Portugal by Germany on 9 March 1916, with the attack on Maziúa, near the border with Deutsch-Ostafrika. It should be noted that the first incident in Mozambique happened before the first incident in southern Angola on 19 October 1914, in Naulila; also noteworthy is the fact that the incidents occurred with greater intensity in Angola, and were also ‘resolved’ earlier, thanks to the support of the South African Union\(^\text{28}\), which influenced the retreat of the German troops from the geopolitical space of Angola.

On the other hand, the situation in Mozambique developed in a rather different manner and, since January 1917, the Portuguese ceased their advances into German territory, having nevertheless reached the north bank of the Rovuma River. However, in November that same year, the Portuguese troops were almost destroyed by the Germans in Negomano, with 50 soldiers killed and 99 taken prisoner\(^\text{29}\); hence, this Battle is a symbol of the German superiority over Portugal in the dispute for the geopolitical space of Mozambique. Moreover, the German troops deployed to the region were in far worse condition than they

28 It is noteworthy that, more than a conflict between Germany and Portugal, this was primarily a conflict between Germany and England. The South African Union and the Belgian Congo were also involved in the events, to mention only the most relevant aspects.

had been two years earlier, beset as they were by lack of food and ammunition, which, incidentally, they managed to recover with the Portuguese defeat. Negomano is at the intersection of the Rovuma River with the Lugenda River, on a relatively wealthy strip between the ocean and Lake Nyasa.

Two aspects of the German offensive in the geopolitical space of Mozambique should likewise be noted: the use of Askari, that is, indigenous peoples from *Deutsch-Ostafrika*, who fought as mercenaries and who were heavily trained and very well paid. Their employment proved highly effective, even when used against larger forces; and the use by General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870-1964) of guerrilla warfare, which is characterized by the extreme mobility of combatants, that is, ‘the superiority of movement which the enemy is unable to pursue’ (Leal, 2012). The idea was to keep the enemy occupied, wearing them down both materially and morally.

Indeed, Germany did not retreat in Mozambique because it was losing the dispute with Portugal – as we could see, it was not -, but because it knew an armistice had been signed, which only happened on 12 November 1918.

5. Conclusion

The German Geopolitics of the First World War emerged as a consequence of the pivot by the German Foreign Policy towards a *Weltpolitik*, in force since 1890, which was reflected (though not exclusively) on the acquisition of the world’s second largest navy and the pursuit of a colonial empire in Africa.

In fact, because of its enclave position - *Mittelage* [centre position] - within Europe, the unified Germany needed more *Lebensraum*, a requirement which was markedly economic (to export products and to look for raw materials) and cultural (to disseminate the German language and culture throughout the world) and which constituted a feature of Geopolitics German even today, some one hundred years later. Currently, German Geopolitics no longer involve territorial expansion and war, instead displaying marked economic and cultural tendencies, which are reflected, for example, in the role of the Deutsche Bank as a financial institution with global positioning and in the mission of the Goethe-Institut since the nineteen fifties of teaching the German language and culture to foreigners.

Indeed, the scramble for Africa resulted in the idea to build *Mittelafrika*, a project that would bring the wealthy Congo Basin and the Zambezi under German rule, uniting all the German colonies from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Indian Ocean, and which would likewise include Angola and Mozambique. Mozambique appears here as an extension of the space of the Great Lakes.

The German overproduction crisis in the nineteenth century and the need to export German products also led Germany to consider ‘Die See als Straße des Welthandel’ [The Sea as World Trade Route] practically since its origins as a unified state and, during the period under study, to attempt to gain control over important ports (and trade routes) such as those in Angola and Mozambique.

For example, the German interests in Mozambique were focused on the Bay of Porto Amélia (under the administration of the Niassa Company) in the north and in the Bay of Lourenço Marques in the south.

The First World War had a special impact on northern Mozambique, near the border with the German colony, with incidents taking place as soon as 1914, almost a month after the beginning of the war with the attack on Maziúa. Contrary to what had happened in Angola, Germany retreated from Mozambique not because it was losing the war in that particular region, but after the Great War ended in 1918.

The Battle of Negomano (1917) appears to have been the culmination of the German superiority over the Portuguese in Mozambique, a ‘cursed’ event which one must recall in order to draw all possible lessons thence, but which, at the same time, one wishes to forget: the Portuguese troops were nearly destroyed by the Germans and did not recover until the end of the war; moreover, the Portuguese surrender to the German forces ended up resupplying the enemy with the provisions they needed to continue the conflict.

In truth, however, despite the essentially economic and cultural nature of the German Geopolitics of the time (as is still the case today), this did not prevent Germany from using its military forces in an attempt to penetrate, first, the geopolitical space of Angola, and by extension the geopolitical space of Mozambique. This happened mainly because Germany was, at that time, a militarist country, where the military were present in the business sphere and held positions as directors of companies or banks.

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The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War


German geopolitics in the First World War: The Case of Southeast Africa

The German Empire’s geopolitical strategy to weaken the Portuguese presence in Africa before the First World War

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Introduction

Chancellor Bismarck’s resignation in 1890 left the door open for the German Empire to follow the ‘New Course’ policy. This meant that, from then on, the Reich would no longer be as wary of possible tensions with Great Britain, the largest maritime power at the time, and would attempt to acquire colonies ‘at any cost’, thus expanding its naval power. A new department of colonial affairs (the Kolonialabteilung) was created that same year, in April, and while it was dependent on the German Foreign Office in matters of relations with other States and on other issues, it also enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy as, from that moment on, it had direct access to the chancellor. In Berlin, the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) was restructured and new political figures were placed in key positions. Before a few years had passed, German emperor Wilhelm II declared that: ‘The future of Germany is at sea’¹.

The new German foreign policy was based on the premise that any nation with the ambition to become a power in the international system would necessarily have to become a maritime power. In a historical context where aviation was not a decisive factor, to control and dominate large colonial areas it was necessary to possess strategic naval bases. However, Germany, a latecomer to the scramble for Africa, did not possess any. The

¹ Speech by William II in 1896.
solution proposed in Berlin at the time was to acquire them from nations considered to be ‘dying’, as was the case of Portugal and Spain. Social Darwinism had been met with great acceptance in countries like Germany and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This ideological view held that social evolution would determine a struggle between nations in which the ‘fittest’ would eventually vanquish the weakest nations, also known as ‘dying nations’.

Not only were these Social Darwinist ideas well received by the more radical movements, such as the pan-Germanic League, they also met with the approval of the political elites in Germany and in the United Kingdom. For example, Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief in the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), justified the conflict as a biological necessity that would lead to a renewed drive in Great Britain’s quest to become a world power. In turn, German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow announced in a speech that Germany was entitled to a ‘place in the sun’ (*Platz an der Sonne*), which implied that the expansion of the German Empire could legitimately be accomplished at the expense of the colonies of the so-called ‘dying nations’. Both in the United Kingdom and in Germany, a legitimizing discourse was being constructed to justify colonial expansion at the expense of other countries.

Portugal struggled with a serious economic and political crisis in the last decades of the twentieth century. In January 1891, a Republican uprising in Porto attempted to overthrow the monarchy. There were also disturbances in Lisbon, where the royal family was accused of not defending the interests of the country. The lower social strata had been gravely affected by the economic and financial crisis, while the king and the royal family were criticised for their lavish expenditure.

The position of the Portuguese monarchy had been weakened since early 1890, when the diplomatic representative of the British government in Lisbon presented an ultimatum in which London demanded the immediate withdrawal of Portuguese troops stationed on the territories of Central Africa coveted by the British, that is, the region which roughly corresponds to present day Zambia and Zambezia.

The Portuguese colonial project, known as the ‘Rose-coloured Map’,2 aimed to connect a territorial strip of southern Africa from Mozambique to Angola, and was brutally at odds with Great Britain’s ‘Cape to Cairo’ project. On the other hand, it also affected the interests of a *Mittelafríka* which was still

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2 Officially published in 1886 by the Portuguese.
under construction. For this reason, the German ambassador in London was instructed to warn the British that the Anglo-Portuguese dispute also called into question German interests.

Finally, in late 1894, the German Emperor officially instructed his chancellor to begin negotiations with the United Kingdom for the partition of Mozambique.

Both Germany and the United Kingdom took advantage of the small nation’s deteriorating situation to begin negotiations regarding the division and redistribution of its African colonies. Indeed, the situation in the country was dire, as Portuguese state expenditure was consistently financed by loan applications to the Bank of Portugal at the expense of devaluing the national currency. Devaluation led in turn to speculation and to the purchase of large amounts of foreign currency. Because the only safe government bonds had already been mortgaged to foreign creditors, the successive governments resorted to short-term loans (at high interest rates) from the main European financial markets in order to cope with public spending. Thus, the idea for the first secret Anglo-German agreement on the Portuguese colonies was born. The aim was to pressure Portugal into accepting a joint loan from Berlin and London, with the Portuguese colonies, or rather, their customs revenues, as collateral.

From a system analysis perspective, it is worth mentioning that Europe was experiencing an ‘unbalanced multipolarity’, as noted by Mearsheimer. That is, until 1902, the German Empire had been a potential hegemon. In other words, Germany’s wealth, population, military power and technology threatened Great Britain’s status as a world power but had not yet dethroned it. From 1903-1905, the old continent entered a ‘balanced multipolarity’. Germany, finally holding 36.5% of European wealth, had the capacity to mobilize 1.5 million soldiers. The German army was the most powerful in Europe. For its part, Great Britain only held 34.5% of Europe’s wealth compared to 50% in 1890. Thus, the issue of partitioning the Portuguese colonies became critical because if Germany gained access to the excellent ports and bays in Angola and Mozambique, it would hold strategic bases for its expanding navy, allowing it to compete with the British navy in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. These are, then, the issues that we will address in our text.

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3 Schaeffer, Munster, 1995, p. 92ff.
1. The Portuguese financial problems and their danger to the colonies

In mid-1892, without prior notice, the Portuguese government announced to the committees of foreign creditors it would be reducing the interest rates of its foreign debt to 2/3. France, Germany and Great Britain vigorously contested this measure. The reason was simple: the financial groups in those countries were Portugal’s main creditors holding the most important ‘slices’ of Portuguese debt. The French owned 57% of that debt, the British owned 16%, and the German, 15%. A smaller amount was in the hands of the Dutch and the Belgians\(^5\). It was precisely during those years that Germany and Great Britain began to discuss the future of the Portuguese colonies and the possibility of demanding the colonial territories from Lisbon as collateral for a new, rather large loan.

In 1895, the British, eager to acquire southern Mozambique, began to consider various hypothetical scenarios to divide the Portuguese colonies. The Germans, in turn, supported the Boers in an attempt to protect German-Boer interests in South Africa. Indeed, following the ‘Jameson raid’, an armed group from the Chartered led by Leander Jameson invaded the Transvaal.

The attack, which may have been ordered by magnate Cecil Rhodes, was vehemently repudiated by Germany and Portugal was requested to allow safe passage through Lourenço Marques (present day Maputo) to a Navy detachment deployed to defend the interests of the German subjects in the Transvaal. Lisbon refused the request. However, the incident had made it clear that there was considerable friction between Germany and Great Britain in southern Africa. It is imperative to understand that this is the context in which London and Berlin began to consider a solution to appease this rivalry, which would be the division of the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

The opportunity to consider negotiations that could lead to an Anglo-German colonial agreement came in 1897, when Lisbon requested a loan from London to make the payments on its foreign debt coupons. Prior to this request, the British had demanded as a term of the loan that Portugal accepted to form an Anglo-Portuguese company to oversee the management and administration of the Lourenço Marques port and railway. The proposal was rejected by Lisbon and talks with the British government were unsuccessful. Similar attempts to negotiate the conversion of foreign debt with German and French also failed, which meant that Lisbon found itself in dire financial straits. This allowed Berlin to consolidate the project to

\(^{5}\) For further information on this subject see Guevara, 2006, p. 133ff.
partition Angola and Mozambique with London in order to gain access to the Portuguese ports in Africa.

It is worth noting that, between 1815 and 1914, the system of forces and alliances in Europe had managed to avert any far-reaching wars. However, from the late nineteenth century onwards, the system began to show signs of weakness, undergoing several successive, increasingly more intense crises. For Paul MacDonald, the European concert that resulted from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 had introduced the novelty of compelling the great powers to act in a relationship of close interdependence. This ensured stable peace and security in the continent. However, when the German Empire challenged the European concert in 1871 by defeating France in the Franco-Prussian War, the next step appeared to be the overthrow of British naval supremacy. For this reason, the German strategic bases in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans posed a danger to London.

2. The German Empire and the Iberian nations

The emergence of Germany as a determining factor in the international system attracted a great deal of interest in both Portugal and Spain. The Iberian nations had expressed their dissatisfaction with either French or British demands on numerous occasions. Especially in Portugal, there was the perception among the leaders of the monarchy that the British ally only used the small nation when circumstances so demanded. When Bismarck’s policy in Africa gained anti-British bent, the Portuguese thought they would be provided with the desired opportunity to curtail London’s ambitions. We cannot forget that, during the Napoleonic invasions, the price paid by the small nation for British protection had been an informal occupation of its territory.

Bismarck, who had consolidated Germany’s position as arbiter of Europe, expanded his claim of being a mediator to Africa. It had already happened with the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), when the Portuguese diplomats had made efforts towards a rapprochement with Germany and France, as Lisbon considered the greatest threat to its colonies to be the United Kingdom. At that time, Portugal negotiated with Germany and France to secure the claims of the ‘Rose-coloured Map’.

Lisbon’s strategy was to forge bonds with Berlin and Paris and with

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6 Macdonald, 2002 Columbia University.
7 On the Anglo-German rivalry over Madeira see Guevara, 1997.
8 For an examination of the Rose-coloured Map see Nowell, Lisboa, 1982.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

the local government of the Transvaal in order to consolidate its sovereignty in southern Africa. In the nineteen nineties, the Portuguese-German rapprochement had been concluded with the concession of Catembe, near Lourenço Marques, to Eiffel, a German merchant. The concession was granted in August 1894 and renegotiated in 1897. However, with regard to West Africa, Lisbon’s proposal to define the southern border of Angola with German South West Africa, which aimed primarily to keep the coveted Tigers Bay under Portuguese control, was rejected by Berlin. As early as 1895, the Viscount of Pindela had made numerous attempts to bring Portugal and Berlin to a definitive agreement on the southern border of Angola. However, those efforts had been answered by veiled threats, which made it clear that, should Tigers Bay not be included in German territory, German lenders would not facilitate debt negotiations with Portugal. The Germans had their own plans for a project in Mittelafrika, and those plans included southern Angola.

It should be recalled that, although Portugal had tried to build a ‘new Brazil’ in Africa, in fact, the most significant territories under Portuguese sovereignty in Mozambique and Angola were still a narrow coastal strip. Colonial occupation was almost non-existent in the inland territories. The small nation had endeavoured, since the eighteen eighties, to occupy those territories both militarily and administratively, but the task was a difficult one as Portugal faced the fierce rivalry of the other European nations. It was feared that Germany, a latecomer to the scramble for Africa, would try to annex part of the Portuguese colonies, ignoring the country’s ‘historical claims’.

From 1880-1890 to 1889-1890, expenditure on the colonies had risen from 574 contos to 3800 contos de reis, which corresponded to a 7.2% increase in public spending. Despite its domestic difficulties, Portugal insisted on maintaining control of the African colonies against the wishes of the German empire, which aspired to ‘a place in the sun’ (Platz an der Sonne) through the acquisition of the main ports in Angola, and against British interests in Mozambique, especially in the south. Portugal had been attempting to negotiate with Germany and Great Britain and, at the same time, to hasten the effective occupation of its territories in accordance with the principles defined in the Berlin Conference.

Although the German and British capitalists had access to more resources than the Portuguese, the former preferred to invest in large

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10 Bertie Memorandum, 1.05.1898, BD, vol. 1, no. 65.
infrastructure works in the United States rather than risk their capital in Africa, which was considered a high-risk stage. The major issue was not so much, as certain authors have claimed, that the Portuguese government could not attract capitalists to Africa while the other European nations could, but that of all the European nations Portugal’s fiscal problems presented with the most catastrophic dimensions, and that the circumstances surrounding the monarchy, which were extremely unstable, were deteriorating the country’s position within Europe.

Like Germany, Portugal identified Africa with an imperial mission. However, in the case of Portugal, the aim was to endow a small nation with a vocation that would project its greatness. For Germany, Africa would be a way to consolidate its Weltpolitik against the United Kingdom, demonstrating the alleged German ‘superiority’. The geopolitical component was also vital to the nations involved. For Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique were geostrategic ‘bargaining chips’. The idea was not so much to sell or mortgage the colonies, but to use their strategic value with Germany or Great Britain to gain leverage and to restructure the debt with the help of Berlin or London. For Berlin, access to the ports in Angola or Mozambique would enable it to expand its naval power.

Germany used Spain’s intentions of annexing Portugal as leverage against Lisbon. After a catastrophic Spanish defeat against the United States in 1898, there were concerns in Lisbon that Madrid might see in Portugal a way to balance their losses. Germany had sought a rapprochement with Spain with the purpose of securing access to naval bases, such as Fernando Po, on the West African coast, for use of the German Navy. From that moment onwards, it was not unthinkable that Berlin might attempt to apply the same strategy to the Portuguese ports in Angola or Mozambique.

3. The first Anglo-German secret agreement is signed

The Anglo-German secret Agreement on the Portuguese colonies was signed in August 1898. It dealt mainly with the possible division and redistribution of Portuguese colonial territories between German and Great Britain, should Portugal ever request a joint loan from both countries with the colonial customs income as collateral, as can be seen on map 1:

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The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

Figure 1 - The 1898 Anglo-German secret Agreement on the Portuguese African colonies
Source: W. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, N. York, 1951
The idea behind this secret pact was that, should Portugal not be able to repay the joint loan, the Portuguese colonies would be reclaimed as ‘mortgaged property’ by the aforementioned powers.

One of the problematic aspects of this pact was that it was a secret agreement, and Portugal had not been officially informed of its existence. In fact, Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in London, had been made aware of the pact by British sources. However, officially, Portugal was free to argue it knew nothing about the agreement. The other aspect was that, despite its fragility, Lisbon vigorously refused to accept the joint loan offered by the two powers, persisting in its primary objective, which was debt conversion\textsuperscript{13}.

The erroneous idea generally held, with few exceptions, by Portuguese and foreign authors during the twentieth century, was that the Portuguese monarchy had not defended the colonies. This idea has been refuted elsewhere by the present author, so we will not delve further into it\textsuperscript{14}. Let us recall that, in the late 1960s, Charles Nowell, one such rare exception, stated:

‘The common assumption that the little kingdom rested supinely on ancient exploring laurels while others did the work is both unfair and untrue’\textsuperscript{15}.

The secret agreement was ratified on 26 September 1898. It stated that, among other provisions, the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa would be divided into spheres of influence under the control of London and Berlin and would later enter into the possession of those two States. The forecasts indicated that Portugal would likely lose the colonies, as the country’s financial situation was considered hopeless. The preamble to the agreement gave legitimacy to the pact, explaining that it was intended to protect the small nation from ‘international complications’\textsuperscript{16}.

The agreement featured a convention stipulating that the guarantee for the loan would be the customs revenues of Mozambique, Angola and Timor. The concession of Catembe was safeguarded in a secret convention, as, in theory, privately acquired rights would be respected by both British and German subjects. Southern Mozambique, with the coveted Bay of Lourenço Marques, would be under the control of London, and southern Angola of Germany, should Portugal ever accept a joint loan which it could not repay. This would never come to pass, because not only did Portugal not accept the

\textsuperscript{13} Guevara, 2006.
\textsuperscript{14} Guevara, 2006.
\textsuperscript{15} Nowell, 1969, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{16} GP, vol. 14, no. 3872.
loan, but London and Berlin did not act in solidarity and later boycotted the implementation of the pact. Due to its foreign policy interests, Germany did not intend to concede the Bay of Lourenço Marques to London and, in turn, ceding the naval bases in Angola to Germany was not in the plans of the United Kingdom. We shall address these aspects shortly.

4. Angola and the German ambitions

The German ambitions for Angola were known to Lisbon since the 1880s. At the midpoint of the decade, during the lead-up to the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), German army Major Hermann Wissmann conducted a scientific and military expedition to the Lunda Empire in northern Angola, which, according to the Portuguese, was a cover for its true objective, the occupation of that territory. In order to counterbalance the German advances, Lisbon sent, almost simultaneously, an expedition led by major Carvalho Henrique charged with securing the signature of a peace treaty with the Lunda emperor and establishing ‘civilizing bases’ for future Portuguese settlers. The possibility of establishing a religious mission would also be ascertained.

In southern Angola, Berlin’s attention was drawn quite early on to the excellent Tigers Bay, as the German protectorate established in 1884 under the name of German South West Africa (now Namibia), did not possess any good ports. Lisbon reacted swiftly also in this instance by sending several scientific and military expeditions to contain the ‘German threat’. Lisbon sought to secure the loyalty of local chiefs to the Portuguese crown, something which was not always possible to achieve.

In the nineteen nineties, the colonization of Angola became more aggressive. The territories in which the local leaders did not accept the Portuguese authorities were subjected to so-called ‘pacification actions’, which corresponded, in reality, to military actions of subjugation by the Portuguese crown. The Portuguese colonial policy had become harsher because the fear of occupation by foreign powers, including Germany, had grown more intense. First, there were external claims based on the principle of effective occupation set in the Berlin Conference. Second, it was widely known that Germany was conceiving a project for Mittelafrika, which had some resemblance to the Rose-coloured Map and included parts of Angola. Finally, with the Anglo-German secret agreement, Tigers Bay had been included in the German sphere of influence, which made the south of the colony even more coveted by Berlin.

17 Carvalho, Lisbon, 1895.
Despite the country’s financial difficulties and meagre resources, from the mid-twentieth century onwards Lisbon used all means at its disposal to secure the African territories. In addition to officers and soldiers from the mainland, the army now included citizens living in Angola between 20 and 30 years of age. Additionally, Boer forces (usually of Dutch origin) were employed to supply the Portuguese military with oxen, weapons and food. After the conclusion of the campaigns, they received as compensation the cattle stolen from local populations.18

After the signature of the Anglo-German Agreement in 1898, Lisbon quickly became aware of the pact, which was supposed to remain secret, as mentioned above, and Portugal began to take active steps in the main European capitals to reach a general agreement with its main creditors. It was a way to secure the conversion of the Portuguese external debt at lower rates. The basic idea was not only to pay off the debt, but also to restore the country’s credit in the major financial markets.

Lisbon refused to accept proposals, which mostly came from German financiers, for a large loan with the Portuguese colonies as guarantee. The main problem was that in order to assert its effective occupation of Angola, Lisbon had to attract foreign capital to the country, which would allow it to build the infrastructures needed for the occupation of vast territories.

The strategic concession granted by the Portuguese government to the Ambaca Company in northern Angola aimed to extend the railway from the excellent port of Luanda to Ambaca. The goal of this concession was to consolidate control of the inland territories and to prevent the rubber trade from being diverted to the Congo Free State. Several powers had ambitions with regard to the Ambaca railway. Germany sought to annex the north of Angola to Mittelafrika and acquire naval bases. The British, for their part, had interests in the territory both for its wealth and its naval bases. As this territory was included in the British sphere, the Portuguese strategy was to opt for the ‘lesser evil’, that is, to allow Belgian capital in to counteract the British and German ambitions.

In southern Angola, the Moçâmedes Company was coveted by the British, German and French alike. The territory belonging to this company had acquired exceptional value in 1899 with the onset of the Anglo-Boer War. The war had prompted the German objective of forming a Boer-Germanic belt that could break the British siege of the Boers. With the project for a railway

The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

departing from the Atlantic Ocean, in Tigers Bay, located in the Portuguese sphere, Berlin,anked by German financiers, sought to acquire a concession to build a railway that would unite the Boers of South West Africa (which did not possess any good ports) to Tigers Bay. Through this route, the Boers could gain access to the sea without having cross British territory.

The aforementioned mega-project was designed to connect west Angola to the Bay of Lourenço Marques by the following route: Tigers Bay (Portuguese territory) - German Southwest Africa (German territory) - Buluvaio (under the control of Rhodes) – the Transvaal (Boer) - and finally, the Bay of Lourenço Marques (Portuguese territory in Mozambique).

To counter the German plans, Portugal balanced the rivalries between powers, eventually refusing to grant a concession to the Moçâmedes Company. Portugal thus prevented southern Angola from falling either into German control or into the control of British Rhodes.

5. Mozambique, the ambitions of the powers and the ‘German factor’

While Angola was mainly the object of German ambitions - even if we take into account that the Ambaca zone was not included in the German territory in the secret agreement of 1898 -, the greatest risk to Mozambique came from the British. The British had coveted Mozambique since the nineteen eighties. There, the Portuguese had followed the British charter model and granted extensive rights to the Mozambique Company. The company had taken over law enforcement and administration duties which were usually the purview of the State. The vast powers granted to the Mozambique company quickly attracted foreign capital, especially from Great Britain and France. Many of these companies were directly linked to the magnate Rhodes under a system of sub-concessions. It was precisely one of those companies that would later build the railway from Beira (in Mozambique) to Mashonaland (now Zimbabwe), under the administration of the British South Africa Company.

In southern Mozambique, Lisbon countered the British ambitions with the so-called ‘German factor’. This meant that, since Lisbon was aware of the German support to the Boers against London - although Berlin’s stance was officially neutral -, it attempted to mitigate the German demands for a division of the Portuguese colonies. Let us remember that the Lourenço Marques

20 On this subject see, for example, Newitt, 1997, p. 347ff.
railway had become exceptionally important during the Anglo-Boer War, as it enabled the rapid transport of food and weapons to the soldiers.

If the British won the war in southern Africa, it could mean the loss of the Portuguese colonies because the area would be under the control of the ‘perfidious Albion’. Thus, a hypothetical integration of the Portuguese-German-Boer colonies could act as a counterweight to the powerful bloc of British colonies. The Portuguese diplomacy acted as mediator between the Germans and the British because, on the other hand, an excessively strong German power in the region could also endanger the Portuguese colonies.

Another strategy used by Portugal to secure Mozambique was to use the German demands in Southern Africa to mitigate the ambitions of the British towards that colony. Lisbon had shown signs that it might give in to the requirements of Berlin should London not respect the sovereignty of Mozambique. The most significant event was the concession granted to Eiffel, a German trader backed by Berlin, who wanted to build a railway departing from Catembe to serve the Boers. The documentation consulted in the Bonn, Berlin and Freiburg files shows that, on the one hand, Portugal feared the ambitions of the German Empire, and on the other, the Empire was also crucial to curtailing London’s ambitions regarding Mozambique. In many respects, the German and Portuguese interests in Mozambique were similar, as the British expansion posed a danger to both nations. London feared the consolidation of a Boer-German belt despite the 1898 Agreement. It should be recalled that the British suffered early setbacks in the Anglo-Boer War. Finally, the fear that Portugal might come to an understanding with Berlin was an important factor in London’s signature of the equally secret Anglo-Portuguese Declaration in 15 October 1899. Finally, in 1902, Lisbon reached a general agreement with its foreign creditors. That same year, the Anglo-Boer war would also come to an end.

Conclusions

Germany had taken advantage of Portugal’s structural weaknesses to sign a secret agreement with London providing for a partition of the small nation’s colonies. Despite the pact, Berlin had not ceased to support the Boers in their war against London, which went somewhat against the spirit in which the agreement had been reached in 1898. Berlin wished to gain possession of quality ports for its Navy, which it had been increasingly reinforcing. According

to Mearsheimer, in 1902, as the Anglo-Boer War drew to an end, Europe entered into a ‘balanced multipolarity’ which made Germany a threat to the power of the United Kingdom. The secret agreement on the Portuguese colonies had only stimulated the rivalry between London and Berlin and did not actually contribute to peace in Europe. In turn, Portugal was able to keep its colonies and its ports with high geostrategic value, even if at a high price. Lisbon acted to defend the African colonies and to force the conversion of its foreign debt, showing that it was not a ‘dying nation’ after all. Finally, in 1902, the small nation signed a general agreement with its foreign creditors.

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The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame.

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1. Introduction

On 25 September 1904, a military column that had been deployed to occupy the Kwanyama region in southern Angola was attacked and severely defeated by the Kwamatos. Over two hundred Portuguese soldiers are thought to have died in the fight, of which 109 were Europeans and 145 were Africans.

The column left Lubango on 22 August and reached the Humbe, the furthest reach of Portuguese influence in the region, on 11 September. The going was slow because of the rugged terrain and the sluggish Boer cars, and the lack of water made the march toilsome, but it was nonetheless conducted in an organized manner, and there were no major incidents.

On 19 September, the column, which had meanwhile been reinforced with indigenous companies and auxiliaries, was put in motion, and after 2Kms the troops began crossing the Cunene River. The crossing took a day and a half, with the troops already under Kwamato fire. The Battle of Vau de Pembe had begun.1

The forces commanded by Captain João Maria Aguiar, Governor of Huila Province, bivouacked in square once they reached the left bank of the river. The bulk of the troops remained stationed there for six days, during which they were buffeted with constant low-intensity attacks.

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1 For a detailed analysis of the development of this conflict see Borja (1904), Almeida (1904), Moraes (2007), Salgado (2011).
On the 23rd, an offensive reconnaissance action commanded by then Captain Gomes da Costa came into direct confrontation with the Kwamatos, who did not put up significant resistance. The troops took advantage of the opportunity to set fire to a few libatas\(^2\) and to carry out a more thorough reconnaissance of the surrounding territory.

Two days later, a new detachment entered the woods, this time commanded by Captain Pinto de Almeida and, approximately 8Kms from the main column, in the Umpungo chana\(^3\), it was surrounded by Kwamato forces and completely destroyed. A few retreating soldiers were even hit by friendly fire from the artillery stationed along the river.

That same day, the survivors retreated toward Humbe, crossing the Cunene in only three hours, leaving behind provisions, wine barrels, wire, all the zinc sheets they had used to protect the trenches which had been built to protect the square and many heavy supplies.

A thunderstorm had meanwhile broken below the plateau, hindering telegraphic communications. Still, the first news of this upsetting event reached Moçâmêdes as early as the 28th. Uncertainty and incredulity abounded during those first few days but feelings of consternation and revolt soon began to spread. In Portugal, it was not until October that the initial reports were disclosed to great commotion. Displays of grief and religious ceremonies in honour of the dead multiplied across the country, while heated discussions erupted in the two houses of parliament, led by representatives of the Progressive Party, the opposition party at the time.

At the same time, there were calls for punitive expeditions, and several disciplinary inquiries were launched which culminated with the appearance of the commander of the expedition before the War Council. The thinking produced by military circles, which sought to find an explanation for the events, often opened up new advanced platforms of analysis for the organics of the military mechanisms overseas.

### 2. Objectives

Despite the deep sorrow felt in Portuguese society at the time having been overshadowed by more pressing issues on the political agenda, the campaign was in fact a matter of some importance, which, in our opinion, makes it even harder to understand why it was barely mentioned in the years to come.

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\(^2\) TN: dwellings

\(^3\) Plain.
This importance was evidenced by the fact that, for the first time, Angola was the stage for the preparation and subsequent execution of the most modern operational and tactical mechanisms such as forming square during battle and marching in double column, the systematic organisation of reconnaissance operations and the efforts to rationalise logistics or regulate stationing procedures.

These principles, which stemmed from the influence of the victories in the Mozambican campaigns of 1895, had already been used in the Bailundo and Humbe campaigns, but in Angola they were implemented in a fully integrated manner, based on two other critical lessons learnt in Mozambique. First, that it was necessary to secure superiority of arms to neutralize the overwhelming inferiority in terms of human assets, an aspect common to all European armies in Africa and, second, that there was a pressing need for troops from the mainland.

This campaign can thus be said to mark a break in southern Angola. There was a transition from a concept of conflict that often amounted to little more than a police action, or even a quarrel between brigands or a belated display of a kind of romantic chivalry, to actual warfare actions which could still be described as relatively low-intensity, but which undeniably fit into the definition of war as a ‘state of conflict between political groups, in which armed force is employed and violence is used in an organized manner to accomplish the aims defined by policy’

For different reasons, the results on the ground in September 1904 were not as expected but the truth remains that all subsequent campaigns until the late 1920s, when the sovereignty claim process in southern Angola was concluded, were essentially built around these basic principles, including the actions of Alves Roçadas and Pereira d’Eça in 1915.

Therefore, this work seeks to achieve three basic goals. First, to understand the reasons for the silencing of this event by historiography. Second, to assess the political and social impact of the defeat, both in Angola and in the homeland, and finally, to ascertain, in general terms, the thinking produced at the time which attempted to uncover the causes of the defeat.

3. Pembe in Historiography

Regarding our first objective, which is to understand why this defeat fell into the oblivion of history, we will begin by pointing out that this historical

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silence is also noticeable in the fields of art and culture, from music to painting, film or literature.

Indeed, and despite the different aspects of the military niche having inspired areas as diverse as film, painting, music and even comic books, in reality none of those areas deemed the facts related to Pembe worthy of attention.

Over the last century, for example, our literature produced some of the most memorable moments in national culture, where military themes were highly developed and the various African wars in Portuguese history were often either the protagonists or the background for multiple storylines. However, Pembe is almost a banned subject, only mentioned in passing in four or five novels, the most prominent of which were written by Angolan authors Pepetela and José Eduardo Agualusa, the latter from whom we borrowed the title of our work5.

We do not intend to cast any kind of aspersions by mentioning this ontological absence of Pembe from the domains of artistic creation; it is simply a fact, and one that we do not intend to discuss here.

In any case, this was one of the largest Portuguese defeats in Africa and considering the impression those dark lands left on the national imagination, it seems that the issue of the defeat, which could in itself be an explanation for such forgetfulness, especially in times of mythological construction, cannot be the only way to explain the phenomenon we call the silencing of Pembe.

In order to do this, we believe we must call upon other dimensions, including the lack of dissemination of the topic in the domains of official or academic memory, which alone has rendered it inadequate as a basis for creativity. That is, one cannot create upon what one does not know.

Here we enter the domain of historiography, the field of knowledge responsible for consolidating and making available the knowledge of the past, regardless of compelling ontological and epistemological developments.

And in fact, when one begins to analyse the major works in the national historiography, it becomes apparent that, regardless of editorial context and,

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5 In Os Colonos, António Trabulo presents a romanticized view of the colonization of southern Angola; the reference to Pembe is circumstantial and takes up only seven lines. Both José Eduardo Agualusa, in his novel A Conjura and in the short story collection A Estação das Chuvas, and Pepetela, in Yaka were able to employ the sharpness of their writing in producing a few pages of dazzling creativity based on the event.
The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame.

therefore, of the different methodological frameworks, the event was either simply forgotten⁶ or only mentioned in passing⁷.

On the other hand, with regard to the studies that devoted some space to this subject, it is important to distinguish between those included in general approaches, and those which are found in more specialized works of Military or Colonial History.

In the first category, we will begin by highlighting two relatively recent attempts to revive the study of Portuguese Expansion, História da Expansão Portuguesa, directed by Francisco Bethencourt and Kirti Chauduri, and A Nova História da Expansão, coordinated by Joel Serrão and A.H. Oliveira Marques. Both mention the defeat of Vau de Pembe. In Volume IV of História da Expansão Portuguesa, Valentim Alexandre notes the importance of this expedition, underlining its objectives and the number of troops employed while at the same time drawing attention to the impact of the outcome in Portugal⁸.

In vol. XI of Nova História da Expansão, Aida Freudenthal points to the 1904 defeat as an example of the permanent state of conflict which persisted in the south until 1915⁹.

Neither case was an in-depth examination, but the methodological characteristics of both works, which focus on the problematization and broad contextualization of the facts, mean the problem is at least integrated into a whole, although it is never made clear that certain relevant breaks resulted from the dynamics of the event.

With regard to the second category, we must begin by saying that, as we were able to find numerous examples spanning a significant period of time, from the 1940s to the present day, the methodological perspectives we encountered

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⁶ As is the case in the following works: História de Portugal by A.H. Oliveira Marques, Nova História de Portugal, directed by the same author in partnership with Joel Serrão, Portugal Contemporâneo by Antonio Reis, História de Portugal, attributed to José Mattoso, and the recent História Contemporânea de Portugal, directed by António Costa Pinto and Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro.

⁷ See Damião Peres, who, in volume VII of the Monumental edition of his História de Portugal, in the chapter devoted to the Overseas Territories, in a total of 80 pages divided into four chapters, makes a single indirect reference to Vau de Pembe when describing Alves Roçadas’ appointment as leader of the campaign, following the debacle of 1904. João Medina, director of História de Portugal, devotes two lines to the event in the chapter ‘The military campaigns in Africa at the end of the century’. Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão mentions the event in Vol. X of his História de Portugal, in a chapter suggestively titled ‘A generation of Heroes’, which highlights the figure of Lieutenant João Roby, one of the officers killed in Umpungo.


⁹ Marques, 2001, p.274.
were necessarily diverse and follow the painstaking pace of innovation in the national historiography.

Thus, the incontrovertible work História do Exército Português by General Ferreira Martins is an example of a descriptive and traditionalist type of approach which, despite its obvious merits, could not resist describing the event from an uncritical, at times even slightly hagiographic perspective.\(^{10}\)

More recent works, such as Nova História Militar, directed by Manuel Themudo Barata and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, or the encyclopaedia-type work História das Campanhas de Angola by René Pellisier, are not only more prolix in their examination of the subject, but also mark a sharp evolution in Military History, which is now interested in more than mere fact, description and biography, but nonetheless has no problem understanding that those dimensions must also be called upon to help build the great mosaic we call history.

The above demonstrates the near-silencing of the event which the following may help shed a light on.

First, it appears that the more traditional outlook that dominated the Portuguese historiography until the mid-1960s, based primarily on the descriptive and biographical dimensions, while predisposed to factual and anecdotal analysis did not occupy itself with military defeats.

A second glance reveals that the painstaking process which renewed the Portuguese historiography over the twentieth century soon began to marginalize Military History, which was seen as a paradigm of the kind of traditionalism that must be overcome.

With regard to the first point, it is worth noting that during the Estado Novo, the very political environment, seeking the recognition of Portugal’s specific claim to Africa both national and internationally, required the consolidation of certain forms of heroicity as a link to the country’s mythological and apologist past of the sixteenth century, and allowed only the glorification of great deeds and military victories.

At the same time, we cannot fail to mention a fundamental cultural issue: the difficulties felt by the Portuguese intelligentsia in overcoming the nineteenth century perceptions of ‘the negro’. This meant that, well into the twentieth century, the indigenous populations were still seen as children in need of protection, or worse, like wild, brute savages.

\(^{10}\) Martins, 1945, pp.454/455.
At the same time, the ‘imperialist’ discourse gained an adjectival dimension, but one lacking any substantive developments. That is, while it is true that, in the words of Margarida Calafate, ‘all empires are largely imaginary or political fictions by nations that exceed themselves’\textsuperscript{11} in the Portuguese case this schizophrenia manifested itself in the difficulty to accept any evidence of weakness.

Even through analysis and reflection, to accept a military defeat against indigenous populations was to call into question the country’s perceived image of superiority, which was also needed to justify the national discourses of power assertion.

With regard to the second point, the historiographic renewal movements can be said to have been marked from birth by their distrust of the military. The currents inspired by the Annales School called for the suppression of the individual, of the exclusive appreciation of the upper echelons and of all that was factual and descriptive, thus calling into question everything that had characterized Military History until that moment.

In any event, Portugal was slow to accept these principles but they were still enough to exile military historiography from the academic domain, which then became a hunting ground of sorts for military scholars and military training spaces.

In recent decades, a set of individual and even institutional initiatives began to reverse the situation, renewing Military History by abandoning its propagandistic dimension and endowing it with ontological scope. However, paradoxically, and because it was marked by the preponderance of more traditional views, the ‘battle’ dimension has not been significantly reclaimed as a privileged object of study.

The strategic studies on the daily lives of soldiers and on military technology and culture have increased, but the same cannot be said of war itself.

It seems clear that the study of war cannot be circumscribed to military perspectives, especially if that implies forgetting the impact that war, due to its capacity for destruction, has on the social whole. War transfigures social norms, alters landscapes, has an impact on culture, economy and politics, and all these aspects must be studied, but at the same time the actual battle should not be disregarded, and one should instead attempt to understand its specific dynamics, structures and developments. This awareness is keenly felt in Anglo-Saxon historiography but has been rather absent from many of the

\textsuperscript{11} Calafate, 2004, p. 122.
evolutionary leaps in Portuguese historiography and is thus another possible reason for the silencing of Pembe.

4. Social and political impact

While posterity may have had little to say about Pembe, the same cannot be said of its contemporaries. In fact, each new report from Africa sent major shockwaves throughout several levels of society. Multiple solidarity actions and religious ceremonies were held all across the country, while the press issued opinion pieces, interviews and news reports, and the parliament began an intense political discussion that lasted until the fall of the Regenerator government of Hintze Ribeiro.

a. Social impact

With regard to this dimension, it should be clarified from the outset that the adherence of the Portuguese society to the African imperial project during the nineteenth century was far from unanimous. For the overwhelming majority of the population, Africa was a land of exiles, disease and ill-fortune, and the reports of defeats, which were indeed abundant, did not cause any stir unless in very exceptional situations such as the death of the Count of Almoster in the third Humbe revolt, in 1897.

On the other hand, in intellectual circles the opinions were markedly divided. For some, the path of Africa, justified as it was by the oft-mythologized heritage of the glorious past of the discoveries, clearly converged with a Europe with newly acquired colonial ambitions from which Portugal felt increasingly isolated; for others, on the contrary, colonization was seen as a sign of national decay, and the sale of the African territories seemed to them a reasonable solution12.

Meanwhile, the impact caused by the British ultimatum and the changes in the international political system did not fundamentally alter the above circumstances, but still stirred feelings of patriotism and, most of all, contributed to a certain kind of loftiness in the perceptions of Africa, which escalated the construction process of a colonialist ideology.

This resulted in an obvious attempt at power projection by manus militaris, through the so-called pacification campaigns, which were no more

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12 See, for example, Antero in Causas da Decadência dos Povos Peninsulares or Eça in Farpas.
than effective actions of occupation to consolidate a new ruling order. This paved the way for the iconic military victories of the late nineteenth century in Mozambique, specifically Marracuene, Magul, Coolela and Mandlakazi, but also in Angola, in Bailundo and Humbe, already in the early twentieth century. These victories were magnified by the press and transformed into near-mythological symbols, generating a triumphalist feeling in the country and bringing glory to a new generation of soldiers, who were praised in the homeland, where they were greeted by the king, decorated and celebrated.

Thus, Africa was increasingly seen as the stage where the country could be redeemed and as an opportunity to gain recognition in the concert of nations, thus the defeat of 1904 constituted a violent clash with reality and caused widespread waves of discontent. The first news was met with bemusement in Moçâmedes. The initial reports had supposedly arrived at dawn, on 26 September, but it was only on the 28th that they began to spread to great commotion and upheaval. Several symbolic measures were immediately taken such as a ban on playing music on the main street, and public donation campaigns were set up for widows and orphans.

At the same time, in the major metropolitan newspapers a highly critical discourse began to circulate against the Lisbon government and the expedition commander, who was held fully accountable for the defeat. In the mainland, newspapers from all over the country, which until that moment had been far more concerned with the Russo-Japanese War, began to turn their attention to the woeful events of southern Angola. Opinion pieces were published daily, mainly by newspapers Diário de Noticias (DN) and O Século, and there was constant coverage of the political and social impact of the event.

At the same time, motivated by the lack of official reports, on 5 October hundreds of people occupied the Navy Ministry, demanding the release of the official casualties list, which, rumour had it, existed somewhere in that institution. According to the DN\textsuperscript{13}, Minister Raphael Gorjão issued an order to divulge the list of military casualties, then later regretted it and issued a counter-order. The official comprehensive list of the dead was only published on 10 October, although on the 6th the DN had already published the names and biographical data of the dead officers and sergeants on the front page\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{13} Diário de Noticias, 6 October 1904, p.1.

\textsuperscript{14} On the 10th, issue 49 of the magazine Ilustração Portuguesa also published photos of nearly every dead officer. On the 16th, issue 138 of the Brasil-Portugal magazine and, on the 20th, issue 929 of the magazine O Ocidente published photos of thirteen officers fallen in Pembe on the front page.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

At the same time, both official and private manifestations of grief multiplied and Masses for the repose of the dead were held all over the country\(^\text{15}\). On 13 October, official funeral rites in honour of the dead soldiers were held in the Church of São Domingos. The obsequies were attended by King Carlos, Prince Afonso, virtually the entire government and diplomatic corps, and a large audience that had gathered in the square in front of the temple since the early hours of the morning, filling it to capacity.

\textbf{b. Political impact}

In terms of politics, the impact of the disaster of Vau de Pembe translated into a heated political debate in both houses of Parliament. In the House of Representatives, there was a breach in the customary consensus between the two major parties (the Regenerator Party, in power at the time, and the progressive party, the opposition) in matters of foreign policy or public order. On 4 October, the Minister of the Navy, Raphael Gorjão, interrupted the 2nd session of the 2nd parliamentary sitting of the House of Representatives to announce the defeat of Captain Pinto de Almeida’s troops, and the opposition members initiated a ten-day debate during which they attempted to exploit the commotion that was spreading across the country as reports from official sources in Angola confirmed the size of the defeat.

In the House of Representatives, the discussion centred on political accountability and the conduct of operations on the ground or the conduct of the men in the campaign was never called into question. On the contrary, great lengths were taken to extol the heroic qualities of the Portuguese troops, who were completely exonerated from any blame. The two major issues under discussion can be summarized into two levels. On the one hand, there was the immediate issue of how the reports had been managed by the Regenerator cabinet and, on the other, there were the issues directly related to the military actions under discussion.

At first, the ministerial cabinet was reprimanded for failing to formally inform the nation until 4 October, as it was common knowledge that the first telegrams with news from Moçâmedes had arrived in Lisbon on 26 September. The second level concerns the subsequent demands to clarify the mission objectives, composition, troops and weapons. With regard to objectives, there

\(^{15}\) We found mention of religious celebrations for the repose of the victims of Vau de Pembe in such places as Almada, Aveiro, Barcelos, Beja, Braga, Cascais, Coimbra, Ferreira do Zêzere, Leiria, Mafra, Moçâmedes, Oliveira do Bairro, Paço de Arcos, Paredes, Silves, and Torres Novas.
was no significant challenge from the progressives because, in their opinion, the crux of the problem lay in what they considered to be an insufficient number of men mobilized for the campaign and in the scarce - and especially defective - warfare equipment provided to the troops. Concerning the latter, emphasis was particularly placed on the ammunition distributed to Pinto de Almeida’s detachment, which was thought to be insufficient.

Simultaneously, in the House of Peers, the interventions from the opposition were led by Generals Dantas Barracho and Sebastião Telles, as well as by Aires de Ornelas, who echoed the concerns of the other house of parliament by addressing more technical issues and therefore began analysing the conduct of operations. One such issue was with the leadership of the expedition, as the choice of captain was considered inadequate, especially when there were other soldiers in the expedition who held the same rank and also had seniority. While this is a significant issue which concerns the unique dynamics of military communities, it will only be briefly mentioned here as the decisive factor for the outcome of operations is considered to be the model of offensive detachment adopted. The Provisional Instructions for Field Service in Africa written in 1896 by Eduardo Costa, which were used by Mouzinho in the Mozambique campaigns, stated that reconnaissance should be carried out by cavalry patrols and small groups of highly mobile indigenous auxiliaries.

In view of the above, Aires de Ornelas declared that a lack of respect for these principles, which were by then considered doctrine, had been one of the reasons for the failure of the expedition. Ornelas added that he found it difficult to understand the use of a detachment like Pinto de Almeida’s, which at almost five hundred soldiers seemed at once wholly inadequate to reconnaissance actions and too small to progress safely on the ground, an assumption which the events in Pembe confirmed.

In the face of this criticism, the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Staff, Hintze Ribeiro, attended the session of the House of Representatives on 13 October and argued for themselves by claiming that this kind of outcome was always possible in situations of warfare, and although the rhetoric employed by both men implied an acceptance of responsibility, they effectively rejected any charges. Both men also claimed that all the resources requested by the commander had been made available for the expedition and that equipment and troop reinforcements were also provided during the preparation phase, already on the ground, some of which were even rejected, as they were deemed unnecessary by João Maria de Aguiar.
This climate of parliamentary tension did not last for long. Soon, other more pressing domestic policy issues came to the forefront, as was the case of the ‘tobacco issue’, which eventually even led to yet another fall of a Hintze government and another return to power by José Luciano, who was by then physically fragile, in another episode of what João Franco, in 1900, dubbed major party rotativism.

5. The causes for the fiasco

The discussion generated by the Pembe debacle in various platforms of debate - the press, the parliament, and the military circles - demanded to know at once what had caused the defeat. Four fundamental issues constituted the guiding foci of the discussion: the objectives, the human and material assets, the campaign preparation and the tactical framework. Let us examine at some length the discussion around each item.

6. The Objectives

a. The political objectives

There was never any major controversy around the objectives that shaped the 1904 expedition, neither in the context of the attempts to politically exploit the consequences of the debacle, nor in the military circles where the event was discussed.

This state of affairs stemmed from an apparent platform of consensus regarding the policy for Africa.

That platform, which we call consensual - aware, however, that ‘consensual’ does not stand for ‘unanimous’ -, was essentially driven by the desire to ensure, using as little resources as possible, the continuity of a policy, and especially of a discourse which, shaped as it was by the trauma of the ultimatum, called for the consolidation of practices that, while not assuring a truly effective occupation, were justified by that objective. From the above we may then draw two dimensions. One is related to what we will refer to as domestic policy, for reasons of convenience, and another concerns the international dimensions of the policy of the final phase of the constitutional monarchy. On the domestic level, it was imperative to consolidate mechanisms of sovereignty over the African peoples; internationally, it was necessary to take a stance on the perceived German ambitions for southern Angola.
With regard to the first dimension, we must begin by noting that the sovereign mechanisms of influence were far from being consolidated in the region. The exercise of national power was sparse and inadequate in the area west of the Cunene River and thus was continuously under threat by the Ovampos peoples (mainly the Kwamatos and the Kwanyama), who resisted any form of taxation, often attacking the scattered nuclei of white settlers and their respective economic interests. Externally, since 1870, a new international reality had emerged from the collapse of British hegemony and the emergence of other powers (particularly Germany) which claimed significant portions of the colonial rule, leading Portugal to undertake material and ideological efforts to consolidate the colonial Africanist discourse under construction.

In the aftermath of the 1898 agreement between Great Britain and Germany16 and of the issue of the definition of borders between Angola and the German colony of South West Africa17, Lisbon glimpsed the German ambitions and found them a clear danger to its interests. Furthermore, in 1904, in South West Africa, General Von Trotha defeated the uprising of the Hereros, who had been on the run since then, but concerns were raised that these peoples may have crossed the border to Angolan territory, or, on the other hand, that the German army on their trail could effectively occupy territories Lisbon regarded as belonging to Portugal. Thus, in 1904, the circles of power defined clear and ultimately unanimous strategic objectives: it was necessary to break the resistance of the Ovampos and to unequivocally affirm Portugal’s claims over those regions of southern Angola.

It is worth noting, however, that the above-mentioned consensus began to crumble when the discussion moved from the great purposes of the State to the use of resources on the ground. That is, there may have been an agreement on what objectives to accomplish, but the same was not true of how those objectives were to be accomplished. Essentially, this meant that it was imperative to discuss the fiscal issue. Let us begin by stating that Portugal was the European country with the largest proportional allocation of

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16 Distressed by the declaration of bankruptcy in 1892, the Portuguese government considered obtaining a loan from England, with the revenues from the colonial customs as collateral. Aware of this possibility, Germany, whose colonial ambitions had been awakened, approached London, which was interested in the proposal and agreed to share the customs revenues of the Portuguese colonies while ensuring that failure to repay the loan by Portugal would imply the partition of the spheres of influence of those customs between Germany and England. Aware of the agreement, Portugal did not accept the loan.

17 See *Convênio Barros Gomes-Schmidtals*, 1886 – Arquivo Histórico Militar -P.2 – M.31 Processo 34.
resources to an overseas policy, and that military expenditure in particular was always deeply regretted, leading many to call for financially less demanding processes of affirmation of sovereignty, such as the advancement of trade networks, the action of religious missions or even the use of diplomacy as a rapprochement strategy.

The Africanist military circles were convinced, however, that political objectives could only be achieved with an increase in military spending. In their opinion, the instability in the south, the lack of penetration on the ground and the irreverence of the Ovampos peoples proved that military occupation was the sole guarantor of an effective ownership claim. Therefore, they advocated the need for rapid progress in the hinterland in order to reach the borders that had been established in the international agreements and to consolidate an effective presence there. Their recommendation was to exploit the existing communication routes while simultaneously occupying that line of penetration with military outposts to ensure not only the protection of said communication routes, but also to serve as power projection centres to implement sovereignty mechanisms over the indigenous peoples.

In other words, there was a call for the systematic occupation of territory by occupying strategic points and projecting successive sovereignty operations from those points, penalising the economic interests of indigenous peoples and maintaining constant surveillance, which meant breaking with the common practice of withdrawing the troops after defeating the insurrectionist peoples. This required highly mobile military columns and, at the same time, the construction of forts and their subsequently garrisoning with well-equipped units, which required the allocation of financial resources that, in the early twentieth century, the government could not afford.

It should be noted that the resistance to the increase of expenditure in Africa did not imply a mere schism between the military and political spheres, and that the situation was far more complex, as the Africanist stance had managed to garner a fair measure of support from certain political sectors, particularly the opposition, while simultaneously eliciting revulsion from certain sectors of the Army, for whom defending restraint in the overseas fiscal policy was a way to avert negative effects on the structural reform of the mainland system of forces, which they considered more urgent.

In fact, this dichotomy was ever present until the beginning of the Great War. On the one hand, there were those for whom successfully achieving the defined objectives required greater budgetary allocation, while there were others who considered curtailing the expenditure for Africa a priority.
The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame.

It should be noted, merely as an example, that the immediate result of the commotion caused by the events in Pembe was a general impulse to organize a punitive expedition, even as a committee was appointed to conduct a survey of new armament for future overseas operations and Eduardo da Costa\(^\text{18}\) was asked to develop an operations project for the insurrectionist regions. However, fiscal restraint was eventually given priority over all these projects. The punitive expedition was delayed for several years; the proposal of the armament committee to replace all the Sniders used by indigenous troops with Martini-Henry rifles was never fully developed and Eduardo da Costa’s plan was considered impractical as the number of human resources and the budget it required from the kingdom, 1884 contos, were deemed excessive.

b. Operational objectives

The political objectives resulted in the orders issued by the Lisbon Government for the campaign against the Kwanyama in June 1904. The main objective defined at the time was the effective control of the entire region between the Cunene and Cubango rivers, and the occupation of Ngiva, the embala\(^\text{19}\) of the Kwanyama soba, was deemed imperative to achieve that purpose. A month later, on 16 July, Custódio Borja, Governor-General of Angola, sent his orders to the expedition commander. In those orders, he reiterated Ngiva as the main objective and stated the need to defeat the Kwamatos and to set up military outposts on the border with the German colony. These instructions resulted in the operational objectives defined by João Maria de Aguiar: the occupation of Mogogo (the capital of Little Kwamato) and Ngiva (the Kwanyama capital)\(^\text{20}\).

After the tragic events of September, the choices made by the expedition commander were enthusiastically discussed in certain circles with the following arguments: first, as the Kwanyama were considered the main opponents to Portuguese sovereignty, it was argued that the advances should have been made directly on their embala, thus avoiding a direct confrontation with the Kwamatos; on the other hand, the decision to cross the Cunene at Vau de Pembe was contested. The arguments put forth to support the second premise were

\(^{18}\) A distinguished Africanist, who had been Governor of the districts of Mozambique and Benguela and acting Governor-General of Angola, where he would even become Governor-General between 1906 and 1907.

\(^{19}\) The capitals of the Soba territories.

\(^{20}\) The marching order for the column which left the Humbe towards Vau de Pembe on the 19th definitively states: ‘the column will march tomorrow on Moghogho, the embala of the Kwamato soba, to defeat the natives of this region and of the Kwanhama’
based on the fact that Pembe was located 30Km from Mogogo and 50Km from
Ngiva, and that it was difficult to cover those distances, since the process was
only put into motion late in the year. The rain season was approaching and, from
that moment on, the progression of troops on the ground was non-existent, as
the paths were flooded and impracticable.

In the end, none of the above was considered crucial to the events of
25 September, which led to this kind of thinking being deemed somewhat
irrelevant to the discursive strategy of those who intended to hold the operational
command exclusively accountable. Nevertheless, these arguments were highly
criticised in a group of editorial pieces in both the DN and O Século, and also
appear in several interviews that certain military individuals anonymously
granted those agents of the press.

These communication strategies may have implied a rather hostile attitude
toward the expedition commander, but they also resulted in counter-arguments
which attempted to justify the choices made by João Maria de Aguiar, not least
because they considered that personifying the blame tended to exonerate the
underlying power structures, which were thus acquitted of their potential liability.

Two fundamental ideas can be briefly identified in the latter discourse. On the one hand, some claimed that the objectives defined by command were
well within the political objectives determined by the upper echelons, as well
as within the usual combat practices in Africa. On the other, some defended the
idea that the campaign had not been initiated too late, as the advance on Ngiva
was only scheduled for 1905. The first argument, which was later used by João
Maria de Aguiar himself, was initially used by military officers with African
experience, who, while expressing a degree of confusion at certain aspects
of the tactical framework employed, also wished to clarify that in the African
campaigns the defined military objectives were usually the occupation of the
dwellings of the peoples one wished to conquer, and not a direct confrontation
with enemy armies.

In fact, combat experience in the hinterlands had made it clear that, as
a rule, the conquest of the soba capitals resulted in a disorganized rout by the
indigenous populations. Indeed, the occupation of Mogogo and Ngiva made
perfect sense if the objective was to dismantle the resistance of those peoples.
On the other hand, the preference for facing the Kwamatos first, and only then
the Kwanyama, can be explained by the ever-present fear of a possible extended
alliance between the Ovampos peoples and by the belief that the Kwamatos
would be easier to defeat, after which the Kwanyama could be convinced to
surrender through diplomatic channels.

134
The second argument, which gained special visibility with the studies by Colonel Genipro de Almeida\(^2\), is more debatable because it contradicts the very order of the operations of 19 September, which expressly stated the immediate objective of advancing on Kwanhama. In any event, it is also a fact that an analysis of the memoirs and diaries of some of the deployed troops revealed general uncertainty about the objectives. Apparently, during the days when the troops remained stationed in the bank of the Cunene River, is was not generally known if the intentions of the command were to station the troops and build an outpost that would function as centre of operations for an initiative that would be carried out the following year or, rather, if the intention was to advance on Mogogo or even on Ngiva right from the beginning.

As the few surviving memoirs and diaries were written mainly by officers, this indecision is a source of bemusement which points to a failure of communication between Aguiar and his General-Staff, one of the problems thought to have had a major influence on the conduct of operations\(^2\).

7. The resources

The issues related to the resources available for deployment were at the centre of the discussion on the causes of the disaster. The human assets were called into question as some thought them insufficient and others, poorly prepared. The armament was also discussed, whether it was old or modern, and whether ammunition was insufficient or more than enough. There was no lack of opinions and controversy, and many were politically motivated and at times contaminated by ulterior motives, petty hatreds and acute rivalries. It is thus understandable if nothing conclusive can be drawn from the above. In any case, let us try.

a. Human resources

In this respect, we must separate the parliamentary opposition’s criticism of the government and the criticism directly addressed to the expedition commander. In the first case, the Regenerator cabinet was accused of providing a small, heterogeneous contingent, poorly prepared in the most basic principles of military education. In the second case, Captain Aguiar was accused of

\(^{21}\) Almeida, 1927.

\(^{22}\) Several of the officers had seniority and were more experienced in African campaigns than Aguiar, and therefore did not willingly accept his authority. Ex-officio, governors, even when they were not soldiers, commanded the expeditions in which they participated.
rejecting the Governor-General’s offer of 400 auxiliary troops while still in Luanda and of recruiting only 100 Muximba auxiliaries on the plateau, where he could have conducted an expanded recruitment of indigenous auxiliaries.

As for the charges put forth by the parliament, it must be noted, first, that the criticism focusing on the insufficient troops in the column rested mainly on the conviction that certain information coming from Angola was true, namely that which attributed a recruitment capacity of over twenty thousand warriors to the enemy.

However, the sources are not in agreement, neither with regard to the total numbers in the expedition, with different numbers appearing even in the memoirs of some of the expeditionary soldiers, nor to the indigenous recruitment capabilities. In any event, the collated sources led us to believe that the estimated total number of men in the march to Pembe, approximately between 1800 and 2000, was not very far from the truth.

As for the Kwamatos, who fought against the column during those fateful days in September, and in particular against the ill-fated detachment of Pinto de Almeida, it is virtually impossible to make an estimate that does not raise multiple questions. However, contemporary criticism stemmed from assumptions which must be considered in the light of the following observations. First, the European armies in Africa traditionally fought

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23 In July 1904, the newspaper Correio de Mossâmedes reported that a possible alliance of Ovampos peoples could gather as many as 30,000 men.

24 Contreiras Junior speaks of 1800 men, including regular and irregular troops (Contreiras Junior, 1937, p.7), Salgado reports 2053, including 519 Europeans (Caldeira, 2011), and more recent authors, like Jaime Ferreira Regalado, reiterate the number of 1800 men and specify that, of those, 500 were European (Regalado, 2004, p.15); René Pelissier speaks of a total of 1160, of which 507 were Europeans (Péllissier 1986). On 25 August, the DN mentions 2200 soldiers but a letter of 22 September from the correspondent in Moçâmbedes, which was published on 14 October, mentions 2000 men. In a report from 1927, Genipro Almeida states that, upon the departure from Lubango, the expedition had 1223 men, of which 493 were indigenous auxiliaries. In Humbe, the column was reinforced with the 15th and 16th indigenous companies, reaching a total 2030 men, of which 199 from the 15th company did not initially advance to Pembe. According to these figures, the full expedition which progressed to the Cunene counted a total of 1831 men.

25 Eduardo da Costa (1906 pp. 22-24) presents a summary of known calculations before 1904, where a possible coalition of Ovampos peoples is presented with wildly different potential numbers; some attribute 20,000 men to the coalition while others speak of 50,000 men, although regarding the Kwamatos alone, the projections never exceed 15,000, with 10,000 being the number mentioned most often.

26 Contreiras Junior (1937, p.33) mentions the great superiority of the enemy, in a proportion of 30 or 40 to 1.
outnumbered, exploiting their tactical and logistical superiority\textsuperscript{27}. Second, the difficulties in securing communications, food and transportation did not normally allow for large expeditions. Third, in the Umpungo battle, it was not the bulk of the column that was massacred, but only an offensive detachment, and thus it cannot be said that the defeat resulted from a lack of manpower for the expedition, but possibly from the division of the force.

In turn, the criticism regarding the heterogeneity of the troops stemmed from a negative view of the men forming the disciplinary battalion, which was composed of deserters and convicted criminals\textsuperscript{28}, and of the high numbers of indigenous conscripts, approximately 1300 to 1500, which greatly exceeded 50\% of the troops. Many now recall the victorious campaign of 1895, in Mozambique, where not only were the latest technology, the most current tactics and the most appropriate logistical procedures employed, but the bulk of the military troops on the ground were forces from the mainland. Either way, the discussion on the use of indigenous troops was marked by highly contradictory views which expressed strong ideological positions and went beyond simply discussing this particular conflict. Indeed, the arguments of those who considered the use of indigenous elements excessive often reached discursive levels closely derived from the principles of Social Darwinism. The ‘negro’ was considered a brute, with limited capacity for learning, and, when armed, dangerous for white people.

However, the critics could not deny the usefulness of indigenous troops for the African campaigns and understood that they brought undeniable advantages from the outset, first for the abundant resources they provided and also for their greater ability to adapt to the climate and geographical reality, which Europeans found rather punishing. However, in their opinion, these advantages could only be used to their full potential if the natives were given a frame of behaviour by a competent white leader, as they argued had occurred in Mozambique, but not in Angola. Many of these criticisms must also be understood in a broader context of opposition to the military reorganization of 1901. The reorganization aimed to avoid resorting to expensive metropolitan expeditions, which often had to be mobilized to contain the constant indigenous uprisings, by creating a set of legal mechanisms to promote the employment

\textsuperscript{27} According to Eduardo Costa (Costa, 1896, p. 78), the troops in Marracuene fought in a ratio of 1 to 4, in Magul, of 1 to 24, and in Coolela, of 1 to 20.

\textsuperscript{28} Still in Lubango, the disciplinary detachments left a negative impression by robbing commercial establishments and defecting with the product of said robbery but, in fairness, their combat actions demonstrated bravery and were thus highly praised in all the official reports and memories analysed.
of indigenous troops, specifically by training indigenous infantry and mixed artillery companies.

At the same time, troops had to be deployed from the mainland, as the overseas army seemed incapable of performing what should have been its core mission - to secure an effective occupation, to enforce territorial integrity, to keep the peace and to protect economic activity -, thus calling for a reorganization. For that end, the two armies would remain active, one in the mainland and one overseas, with the latter operating under the Navy and Overseas ministries, but a number of mechanisms would be introduced to facilitate the transport of European troops to Africa, namely: promotion for volunteers who, upon their return the kingdom, would have to be admitted to the access roster of their respective arms, bonuses for time served, better salary conditions and gratifications.

However, in practice these mechanisms met with a degree of resentment from those who did not want to leave for the colonies and who considered that the periodic deployment of troops overseas divided the army of the kingdom without any advantage for the overseas army, because those deployed seldom remained in Africa once they had completed their commission and received the respective promotion.

Many of the provisions set out in 1901 were altered, some were never applied and, for the great part, the indigenous companies that were formed were eventually extinct before 1910. But the truth remains that in 1904 the criticism generated by this reform was intense and mobilizing, and it also provided a context for the criticism of the indigenous soldiers employed in Pembe. As for the technical training of the troops involved in this campaign, it cannot be denied that it was highly precarious and rudimentary and in line with the levels of illiteracy in the Portuguese society of the time. With regard to the forces sent from the mainland, we must begin by separating the officers from the remaining contingent. While it is true that the educational levels of the first were highly diverse, all had undergone basic training far beyond what was then considered normal. However, they had no specific training regarding colonial matters, and there was a lack of soldiers with training in more technical areas, such as engineers or sappers.

29 Decreto da Secretaria dos Negócios da Guerra, November 14, 1901, in Ordem do Exército n.º 17, p. 377.
30 The organic division between the overseas and colonial armies lasted until 1926, when the private staff was extinct.
The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame.

At the same time, the few officers in the campaign with experience in Africa had acquired it in Mozambique and not in Angola, and this eventually proved to be a relevant factor, as they did not demonstrate the insight needed to tailor their Mozambican experience to the realities of the west coast, which was considerably different in some respects. On the other hand, and due to the policy of promotions defined in the reorganization of 1901, many of the second lieutenants in the expedition were actually non-commissioned officers in the army of the kingdom, who, unjustly or not, were accused of not having the required technical expertise or leadership skills to properly enhance the indigenous capabilities. Regarding the enlisted, the vast majority were reservists who were not only illiterate, but were also ill-prepared in military terms31.

As for the indigenous troops, on the one hand, their adaptability to the harsh terrain and climate was an important asset; on the other, they generally showed serious training deficiencies, which in many cases could be resolved if properly addressed, but in others, as was the case with shooting skills, were not as easy to overcome. In this regard, Bartolomeu Paiva, commander of the Muximba auxiliaries, said in an interview with Diário de Notícias: ‘The blacks almost did not know how to shoot a weapon. The Kwamatos would have had to fly in order to be hit.... One day, when the Kwamatos came within 40 meters of the camp, a group of soldiers received them with a salvo. Well, not one black dropped to the ground32’.

To be fair, the march between Lubango and Humbe was spent providing the soldiers with intensive training on combat tactics, rapid transition from marching formation to square formation, field service, protection on the move and stationary protection, setting up and dismantling a bivouac, firing discipline and practice in the shooting range. But it is not hard to accept that this training may have proven insufficient.

b. Material resources

Where armament was concerned, the criticism arising from the analysis of the Pembe campaign had focused on the idea of political and technical incompetence. The first was revealed in the alleged neglect by the government in terms of supply of weapons and ammunition, and the second in the lack of inspection by the commander, who supposedly did not examine the quality of

31 Still in Lisbon, these troops had to be given some rudimentary training at the level of drill commands, so they could present before the king at the farewell ceremony.
32 DN, 5 December 1904, p. 3.
the weapons distributed, and whose estimate of the total ammunition needed was also inadequate.

Regarding the first argument, in which the progressive opposition based many of their parliamentary interventions, it should be noted that on 11 May, still during the preparation phase of the expedition, Governor-General Custódio Borja sent the following telegram to Lisbon: ‘The service weapon of the indigenous units, which has been traditionally used in this province, is an old Snider rifle with all its ballistic features completely absent. The cartridge provisions are partly deteriorated and are also untrustworthy, which is where the Snider’s flaws become evident as a weapon of choice for the troops of this province...’

There was no reply to the telegram. But three months later, Minister Gorjão, concerned with the news reports that attributed to the Kwanyama a wealth of human assets armed with over 200 improved firearms, asked Borja to consult with Aguiar regarding a possible need for reinforcements. João Maria de Aguiar replied in a telegram on 15 August that nothing was required because he had all the resources he needed. This reply was often used by the Minister of the Navy in the parliamentary discussions of October to justify his statement that all the resources requested by the expedition had been provided.

In fact, the armament of the troops upon leaving Lubango appears to have been perfectly suited to the expected characteristics of the operation, particularly to ensure an effective technological superiority over the Ovampos. In fact, despite it being common knowledge that the indigenous troops acquired arms and ammunition from Portuguese and German merchants, and especially from missionaries, their logistic capabilities were not accurately known. However, it seems clear that much of the information disseminated on the military capabilities of the indigenous troops was intentionally inflated as a strategy to request more resources, so it seems that the opinion of the Huila governor was essentially well-adjusted in the sense that the Kwamatos were not likely to be on any kind of equal footing with the national forces.

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33 AHM/2/2/9/7.
34 Kropatscheck repetition rifles, Snider rifles and carbines, eight 7 cm pieces. BEM (Bronze, Striated, Mountain) pieces, 4 Hotckiss heavy machine guns and 1 Nordenfeldt machine gun.
35 The information that was disseminated was rather contradictory; some mentioned 5000 warriors armed with Martini-Henry rifles, others went as far as to claim that the indigenous troops owned Mausers, which even the mainland army only began to use in 1905.
Concerning the quality of the weapons, it must be remembered that it was common practice to send weapons that were no longer in use by the army of the kingdom to the colonies, and while this never led to any significant issues in terms of technological superiority, it sometimes led to tactical embarrassments. Even as older weapons were sent from the mainland, the local authorities were able to acquire more advanced weapons in South Africa, which meant the columns often presented in combat armed with obviously different weaponry, sometimes from different generations, and it was common, as seen in the battle of Vau de Pembe, to see some soldiers armed with repeating rifles while others fought with carbines and older models of repeating rifles.

Since the Portuguese forces fired on command, in continuous fire, this meant it was impossible for all soldiers to shoot at the same time, something which could have extremely negative consequences for little disciplined and ill-prepared troops.

Regarding the criticism directed at the commander of the column and his alleged negligence in relation to the inspection of the readiness of the equipment and his poor calculation of ammunition needs, it should be noted that, during the fighting, many of the Sniders used by the indigenous troops were found to have been seriously defective. A few were missing the rear sight, in others there was no front sight and the hammer did not work, and many even jammed after heating up. However, the poor quality of many of these rifles had not only been previously diagnosed but had been reported to the higher echelons in May, so the attempt to assign responsibility to the expedition commander appears to have been somewhat forced.

The issue of ammunition is somewhat more complex. During the combat of the 25th, and after an hour of disciplined fire on command, many soldiers began to shoot freely, which turned out to be a decisive factor in the depletion of ammunition on one of the faces of the square, forcing a charge with bladed weapons, and there the indigenous troops were clearly superior. In the marching orders published in Humbe on 18 September, the last day the troops were stationed before the march on Pembe, the ammunition allocated to each Infantry enlisted stood at 120 cartridges, although many would later state that soldiers had no more than 10 cartridges each during the Umpungo battle. These allegations cannot be confirmed, and in fact large quantities of ammunition were stored in the bivouac next to the river which, for reasons unknown, was not distributed to Pinto de Almeida’s detachment. Thus, it seems clear that there was a serious flaw, but one that, however, can only marginally be attributed to the expedition commander as the ultimate responsible for operations because
The inspection of the ammunition distributed to the soldiers does not appear to have been a direct attribution of his duties.

c. The tactics

The doctrinal framework for overseas military action was based primarily on the Provisional Instructions for Field Service in Africa. In this document, Eduardo da Costa, in an update to the Provisional Regulations for the Army Service in the Field, provided instructions for colonial operations in terms of reconnaissance, information, marching, stationing and combat. This work was of significant importance, as it provided the basis for many of the most important campaigns in Mozambique in the late nineteenth century and it was responsible for the adoption of the square formation in the marching and fighting tactics employed in the colonial campaigns.

This tactic, which had worked well in the fights with the Vatwa, had some limitations when facing opponents employing different types of strategies, as indeed happened in Mozambique, in the Namarrais campaign. The Vatwa preferred fighting in open field, en masse, while attempting to envelop the opponent, therefore an army with superior armament could form in square and then only had to hold its position and resist until the opponent was defeated by the heavy losses inflicted. The Kwamatos, on the other hand, used tactical gear, camouflaged themselves in the vegetation or took advantage of other subterfuges such as the termite hills in southern Angola. They hid behind tree trunks and other obstacles, firing from a covered position and without taking major risks, and only when the circumstances were favourable. They aimed at the officers and the solipeds, wearing down the Portuguese forces physically and morally and trying to provoke them into excessive consumption of ammunition. Once the enemy was fatigued and worn down by the casualties, if the Kwamatos sensed that the ammunition had been depleted, they attacked with a clear advantage, looking for close combat with bladed weapons, where they were superior. Thus, under these conditions, the square, if it was even formed, should have the ability to scatter quickly, so that after the preparatory artillery action a decisive assault could be launched on the enemy, who was expected to retreat even with superior numbers.

In the case of Vau de Pembe, captain Pinto de Almeida, who had combat experience in Mozambique but not in Angola, chose to hold the square for an hour, which caused the ammunition to be depleted and allowed the Kwamatos to attack, breaching one of the faces of the square and spreading panic in the column, leading to a late and disorderly retreat. Indeed, two offensive
actions were launched during the period when the troops formed in square were under enemy fire, neither very successful. One of those actions was carried out by the Dragoons, which were not the most suitable unit for overgrown woodland areas, as the indigenous troops, protected behind the trees and vegetation, fired on the riders and their mounts, which in turn were advancing ‘blind’. The squadron commander was killed during this operation and the Dragoons retreated to the square. The other initiative was carried out by a platoon of disciplinary troops, which successfully occupied an area at the edge of the woods. Later, inexplicably, Almeida Pinto issued orders to regroup, allowing the Kwamatos to return, regroup and subsequently attack the square en masse.

Thus, it seems that although the long-term stationing on the banks of the Cunene and the division of forces proved to be controversial options, it was the misuse of the square formation that was critical to the defeat, as, in an attempt to repeat the success in Mozambique, the square remained fixed for over an hour, responding with heavy fire to enemy attacks. This allowed the Kwamatos to deplete the ammunition of the Portuguese troops and then launch a final decisive counterattack, breaching the square.

**Conclusion**

Fear, anger and shame, the formula found by José Eduardo Agualusa to describe the events in the banks of the Cunene on 25 September 1904, appears to be an accurate summary of what happened on that day. Clearly, this reading is largely a reflection of a creative reinterpretation of events, but the fact remains that several situations allowed us to adapt reality to this literary formula. Even though talking of a general climate of fear would be an exaggeration, the truth remains that for a few weeks in southern Angola there were constant fears among both civilians and the military that the Kwamatos could cross the river, attack Humbe and advance on Lubango, and some of the latter recommended leaving the Fort of Humbe for fear of such an attack.

As for anger, that sentiment was clear in the desire for revenge and retaliation expressed by Portuguese society, which led to the appointment of committees and the drawing up of plans to renew the colonial armament and to prepare a punitive expedition, which never did happen along the lines recommended at the time.

On the other hand, for a society that clearly held a perspective of civilizational superiority in relation to the indigenous peoples, the defeat was not
only a humiliation but also a profound shock in face of the climate of euphoria that was beginning to emerge as a result of the latest successful campaigns.

In any case, the feelings of shock were intense - as can be seen from the impact of the political and social shockwaves -, but also brief, and few lessons were learned from the event. The belief that the defeat was the result of individual error, and above all of circumstantial vicissitude, contributed to this state of affairs and meant that, essentially, nothing had to change. In fact, when considering the arguments on the table, these were used primarily as political weapons and the attempts to find explanations were not always aligned with a reformist stance. That is, in the discussions then held in the various areopagi, few had attempted to find proposals that did more than serve corporate interests, and even the reflection on the causes of the defeat always seemed more geared towards immediate political gain or protecting class interests, or even settling old scores, than towards a true analysis of the events that could lead to changes in the models of action.

It may be true that, of the different arguments brandished at the time which sought a reason for the defeat, many were not decisive, such as the definition of objectives and even the management of human and material resources, which were generally suited to their purpose, but the truth remains that others, such as the lack of training of officers and subsequent logistical and tactical mistakes, appear to have been decisive for the fatal outcome. However, and due to the above, none of these flaws were remedied and the same mistakes continued to be made despite some important innovations by Alves Roçadas in later campaigns.

Admittedly, for various reasons, these errors no longer had the same consequences, although in 1915, during the Môngua battle, Pereira D’Eça committed the same tactical errors, forming the square for nine hours and completely exhausting the Portuguese soldiers, and it was only because they had plenty of ammunition and, above all, because they received reinforcements in time, that they did not suffer yet another defeat. But it is also true, despite the brave and often heroic action of the Portuguese troops, that the great objectives achieved by the end of the 1920s owed more to the action of diplomacy than that of arms, as the latter, for a number of different reasons, but also for the lack of institutional capacity to learn from past mistakes, could not have done it on their own.
The Empire blanched in fear, anger and shame.

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The impact of the late-nineteenth-century military intervention in Mozambique on the development of the campaigns in Africa

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Introduction

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Portuguese were accustomed to receiving nothing but news of military defeats and humiliations from the overseas provinces, usually at the cost of the lives of the soldiers involved in those actions. At least since 1844, if not earlier, frequent reports came to the mainland of how the Portuguese ambitions in Africa were threatened either by local uprisings or by the greed of the major European powers.

This scenario began to change in the final years of the nineteenth century. In late 1894, the country became involved in one of the first colonial wars on multiple fronts in modern times, misleadingly called ‘Campaigns for Pacification’ of the overseas territories, which at first were carried out only in Mozambique but that later were expanded to the territories from Guinea to Timor, including Angola and even India, compelling the country to employ human and technological resources - war material – the likes of which had never been seen before in those lands. The operational outcomes were rather encouraging. The national mobilization resulting from the issues overseas that was implemented from the late nineteenth century onwards was not initially based on external influence. The operational achievements of that time also

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1 This paper was based on a text inspired by the author’s own book, Mouzinho de Albuquerque: um soldado ao serviço do Império, Lisbon, A Esfera dos Livros, 2010.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

owed much to the large-scale use of auxiliaries recruited from different parts of the Empire and to the improvements in the logistical means employed, particularly in terms of health conditions and superior armament. On the other hand, a colonial hagiography serving well-defined ideological purposes was built around a generation of ‘Heroes’, military officers who had been born with these campaigns. For those heroes, the overseas territories were part of the country and should therefore be defended from outside aggressions, whatever those were. The Empire was not open to discussion, because it was seen as a factor of national unity. This lent legitimacy to a patriotic, bellicose rhetoric concerning the Overseas Territories which spanned across the different types of political systems in Portugal until the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the country’s colonial matrix was never officially called into question. This paper seeks to discuss and problematise the above aspects of the impact of the military involvement in Mozambique, from the Portuguese war doctrine of the late nineteenth century to the eve of the opening of the African front, already during the First World War.

The changing colonial paradigm

On 13 March 1896, downtown Lisbon was filled with good people who gathered to watch something that had never before been witnessed in the capital of the Empire. Gungunhana, king of the Vatwa, who had spent the last few years terrorizing south-central Mozambique, was to disembark that afternoon at the Navy Arsenal along with his entourage; they had been captured in Chaimite in the previous year, a few days after Christmas, by a little-known Army captain, Mouzinho de Albuquerque3. As soon as the news spread to Europe, the event quickly became the most significant action in the military offensive carried out by Portuguese forces in that province by the Indian Ocean, which was then beginning to yield surprising results. In Lisbon, the prisoners were put into cars, which more resembled cages, and were paraded for hours as hunting trophies in the downtown streets, after which they were incarcerated in the Monsanto Fort. A few weeks earlier, in mid-January, the capital stopped to cheer the expeditionary force that had been sent to Mozambique and was then returning to Europe in the wake of a series of military victories in the name of the nation, contributing to change public opinion and the stance of policy makers in relation to the overseas territories, which, it was thought at the time, would be controlled by national authorities on several continents. For the first

3 Bretes, 1989.
The impact of the late-nineteenth-century military intervention in Mozambique on the development of the campaigns in Africa
time in the eyes of the common citizen, the longstanding Portuguese presence in Africa revealed itself in a clear display of dominion and force unlike anything recent generations had ever witnessed. Even the press took an interest in the event, giving it unprecedented coverage⁴.

Until then, the defeats had at times reached catastrophic proportions, as in the various campaigns carried out in Zambezia since the 1860s⁵. Over the following years, and until early 1895, news of this kind was essentially the norm. Successive metropolitan governments were paralysed mainly because of lack of financial means and inadequate investment in technological resources, but also by the absence of a clear strategy in the policy for the colonies, and were never in a position to effectively respond to the intimidation of the indigenous troops and of the forces at the service of foreign powers, especially Great Britain. The actions taken had never been anything but symbolic. These failures corresponded to a nation’s inability to assert any kind of authority outside its continental boundaries. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of national emigration at the time flowed towards the New World, and the overseas territories, especially in Africa, more than serving as spaces for the fixation of European populations, continued to be a compulsory destination for convicts, with few choosing to settle in those lands voluntarily. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Portuguese living in Angola and Mozambique (no more than 15,000 in total) mostly settled along the coast lines and gathered in the few urban centres. In fact, the area under the control of the white settlers was more nominal than real, even in Portuguese India, in Macau, or in the Portuguese half of Timor, where the total European population did not exceed 5,000⁶. The Portuguese immigrants were searching for other lands⁷.

In the final years of the nineteenth century, this scenario began to change. The colonial paradigm reached a turning point after the resolutions of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). Portugal came under direct pressure from the international community to effectively occupy the territories over which it claimed dominion, whether that dominion was recognized by African or Asian powers or not. In essence, it was necessary to decide on one of various possible courses of action and on how to proceed regarding the ‘recolonisation’ of the Empire⁸. In the beginning of the 1890s, there were even plans to invest on the

⁴ O Ocidente, 25 January 1896.
⁵ Pélissier, 1994.
development of the territories through economic progress and by expanding the State’s power infrastructure in coordination with British interests. It was a logical choice, but one politically infeasible at the time. The patriotic wave that swept the homeland and gave visibility to the republican movement, especially after the Ultimatum (1890), prevented any progress in this area, especially in Portuguese Southern Africa. Thus, the easiest, possibly least expensive, and certainly more demagogic solution was chosen, that of military intervention as a form of defence and promotion of national sovereignty in the colonies. From 1894 onwards, the country became involved in one of the first colonial wars on multiple fronts in modern times, misleadingly called ‘Campaigns for Pacification’ of the overseas territories, from Guinea to Timor, including Angola, Mozambique and even India, which consumed previously unrecorded numbers of human and technological resources. The phrase ‘Campaigns for Pacification’ was coined at the time, and it assumed - wrongly - that the national forces controlled the spaces where uprisings against the Portuguese influence were occurring, which in a way reduced the military operations to mere policing manoeuvres to restore ‘order’. In fact, the uprisings taking place almost all over the Empire from the late nineteenth century onwards, with the exception of the Cape Verde islands and São Tome and Príncipe and Macau, had different timings and causes depending on the region where they originated. However, those uprisings resulted from local populations forming movements to resist various forms and intensities of colonial rule and were eventually quashed by sovereignty enforcement campaigns in territories that previously had not been heavily controlled, or even at all. Sometime between August and October 1894, two of the regulados controlled by Tsonga chieftains implanted in the land encircling Lourenço Marques, which was supposedly controlled by the crown, rebelled against the Portuguese authority. This rebellion concerned the increase in the hut tax charged by the Europeans, which had been recently raised from $900 to $1,350 reis, payable in pounds, although it was practically impossible to collect the tax outside ‘urban’ areas. This was not, however, the only reason for the indigenous uprisings. The Portuguese had allegedly interfered on a dynastic question involving a property dispute to the disadvantage of a local chieftain. Furthermore, resentment against white settlers subsisted because of the use of compulsory unpaid work and of excessive actions by those who recruited hand labour through informal channels, in addition to the brutality of foremen during the construction of the Lourenco Marques railway. Under

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10 NT: territories.
similar conditions, that is, without sufficient military means to respond to the insult, the Portuguese resorted to the assistance of the most obedient chieftains. The same thing happened again, but the shot backfired against governor Silva Antunes, who saw the supposed allies switch to the side of the enemy, as they were displeased with the quality of the weapons they had been issued to combat the local uprising. In mid-October, Lourenço Marques was again attacked by indigenous groups, allegedly of Vatwa ethnicity. About 1,500 warriors almost managed to take the ‘city’. The artillery was somewhat effective and defended as well as it could, inflicting about one hundred casualties on the assailants. A massacre of larger proportions was only avoided thanks to the prompt intervention of the naval station force composed by the corvette Rainha de Portugal, the gunboat Quanza and two launches. Some of the crew of the first ship even disembarked to avoid greater harm\textsuperscript{11}.

In light of the news of the attack, and bearing in mind the history of conflict with the British in the region, the spirits of the members of the Lisbon government of the time were aroused. Some suspected that behind the manoeuvres was none other than Cecil Rhodes himself, the strongman for British interests in the area. Also, in October 1894, the ministers discussed with King Carlos whether it was possible to deploy a military column to submit the indigenous populations to the Portuguese authority. It was not hard to reach a consensus on the matter. All agreed on the ‘urgent need to keep the key to Southern Africa in Portuguese hands\textsuperscript{12}. Politically, the opinions of progressives, regenerators and even republicans did not much differ in this regard. They understood that the events were not simply a military affront to the Europeans, and the possibility that the Portuguese territories might be conquered by the ‘cafres’\textsuperscript{13} was never seriously entertained. Their fear was the possible loss of the province to British rule, which would indeed be irreparable in the post-Berlin conference environment. A decision had to be made, the faster the better. This time, the executive led by Hintze Ribeiro and João Franco gave a vigorous response. The Minister of the Navy and of the Overseas Territories - frigate captain Neves Ferreira - began by appointing the famous playwright and former Minister of the Navy (1890-1891), Antonio Enes, as Royal Commissioner invested with broad powers to combat the Mozambican uprising. Afterwards, over the following months and until April 1895, three shipments carrying a total 2,886 white soldiers were sent to Mozambique. Never in modern times

\textsuperscript{11} Fernandes, 2010.
\textsuperscript{12} Ornelas, 1902, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{13} NT: Kaffir.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

had the kingdom engaged material and human assets on such a scale to defend the overseas territories. The change in attitude by the Lisbon government was caused both by outside pressure and by a rare momentary improvement of the domestic economic situation. Let us recall that the State had declared partial bankruptcy in 1892, but thanks to the work of Minister Oliveira Martins and Minister Dias Ferreira the government budget deficit went from 40.5% in 1891-1892 to a budget surplus of 1% in 1893-1894 (the first time this had happened since 1851-1852). The country had at its disposal the financial resources it had previously lacked to mobilize and equip soldiers and sailors and deploy them to the overseas provinces. The effects were felt immediately and the military successes of 1895 in Marracuene (where the Portuguese troops had managed to successfully reform the square for the first time after it had been broken by indigenous troops), in Magul, in Coolela, in Mandlakazi and in Chaimite, in southern Mozambique, and in Maputo and Gaza in 1896-97, quickly reversed both public opinion and the government’s stance on investing in military means as a way to consolidate the Portuguese sovereignty over the Imperial territories. The ‘conquest’ would be accomplished by the force of arms.

The decisive investment on reinforcing the troops in Africa

In 1860, that is, in a time of peace in Europe, the Army counted approximately 24,000 men. By the late nineteenth century (in 1887) the total force already comprised 26,677 soldiers in the mainland and about 10,000 in the colonies - of which only 1,193 were European (12%). In this context of change, it became clear that an investment was being made on strengthening the imperial front. In 1910, the Army had 30,000 soldiers stationed in Europe (12% more than those recorded in 1887) and 13,000 in the colonies (30% more than in 1887). These numbers may seem insignificant when compared to the human assets that Spain, Great Britain, France or even Italy had engaged in the defence of their empires. During the ‘Ten Years’ War’ - also known as ‘Great War’ - between 1868 and 1878, Spain sent 181,040 troops to the Caribbean islands. When the separatist movement emerged in Cuba, the Madrid government sent approximately 58 battalions to fight the insurgents. Ninety thousand reinforcements were deployed in only a year and a half14. During the second half of 1895, almost simultaneously with the offensive action in Portuguese East Africa, about 60,000 troops sailed for the Caribbean. When the war ended in the ‘disaster’ of 1898, Portugal’s neighbouring country had to repatriate nearly 200,000 troops, figures

which were astronomical compared with the Portuguese reality. Still by way of comparison, Great Britain kept about 217,000 men stationed in India alone in 1897 and, in the late nineteenth century, the French engaged 17,500 soldiers solely in the conquest of Madagascar. Even a third-tier colonial power such as Italy had employed nearly 10,600 European soldiers in the battle of Adwa, in 1896, during the failed Ethiopia campaign. Despite the increased interest by the metropolitan government in the protection of the sovereignty of the colonies, the means used in that undertaking were always insufficient for their purpose. On average, Portugal could engage a soldier for every 154 square kilometres of its vast Empire (c. 2,000,000 square kilometres), while in the mainland there was a soldier for every 3 square kilometres.

The clear disproportion between the European reality and that of the colonies did not hinder the war effort in the following years, quite the contrary. From a global medium-term perspective, between 1841 and 1936, the national armed forces were engaged in at least 430 military operations in Africa (Guinea, Angola and Mozambique) recorded over 557 months, involving something like 58,000 regular troops and several hundreds of thousands of militiamen enlisted locally and indigenous auxiliaries recruited from all parts of the imperial space. Notwithstanding all the caveats this type of accounting implies, the recorded data has revealed that, despite the relative effacement of the military institution in the national political scene from 1851 onwards, the military remained quite active outside Portugal’s European boundaries, which contradicts the idea that there was an operational demobilization of the army once the process to consolidate Liberalism in Portugal had been closed, from the Regeneration onwards. If that was true in the mainland, the same cannot be said to have occurred overseas.

Still, the balance of these interventions varied according to geography and time frame. In Guinea, there were 81 expeditions from 1841-1936 - of which 40 took place between 1891 and 1925 - involving almost 8,500 regular troops, 2,000 militiamen and 40,000 ‘auxiliaries’ recruited in the region or ‘imported’ from other parts of the Empire. In a geographically limited area, the Army spent a total 65 months in actual campaigns, that is, it was occupied in combat for over 6% of the time considered for analysis, although at differing intensities.

On the other hand, in Angola, between 1879 and 1926, 154 operations were conducted with 30,800 regular troops, of which 26,000 were engaged

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15 Campos Júnior, p. 58.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: 
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

between 1902 and 1920. During 1848 to 1926, the army remained occupied in marches, battles and raids over 330 months (192 months alone between 1902 and 1920), that is, from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the First Republic the army was engaged in a war that lasted for 27 years, which represents an engagement five times higher than that in Guinea. In this case, the vast expanse of territory that had to be controlled required more means, but in 1906 about 4/5 of a space twice the size of France remained outside the control of the Portuguese forces.

In Mozambique, the national military presence was no less intensive. Between 1854 and 1918, 167 military actions were conducted (55 actions in Zambezia alone), registered over 196 months (more than 16 years of combat) and involving almost 19,000 regular soldiers, 70,000 cipaios\textsuperscript{17} and 100,000 ‘auxiliaries’. In the final years of the monarchy, the war effort increased considerably, as between 1891 and 1901 thirteen expeditions and about 8,000 European troops were sent to the colony, which became the largest drain on Imperial soldiers before the First World War.

The Portuguese military presence was also felt in the East. An uprising occurred in Panaji (India) in 1895, when approximately 300 locally recruited soldiers refused to leave for Mozambique during the night of 13 September, only 5 days after the battle of Mogul. It is worth noting here the common practice of deploying soldiers recruited in India for actions in Mozambique. However, since the defeats to Bonga in Zambezia (1867-1869) the country had been extremely averse to participating in campaigns in Africa. An expedition was then sent from Lisbon, led by Prince Afonso, brother of the king, which employed a total of 589 enlisted and officers. The offensive to subjugate this territory, albeit of low intensity when compared with those in other parts of the Empire, dragged on until 1897 in fights against guerrilla actions that were eventually overcome.

Finally, in Timor, from the final decades of the nineteenth century to the onset of the Republic there were ‘only’ 56 military operations, 22 of which were assigned to Governor José Celestino da Silva, known at the time as the creator of Portuguese Timor. Due to the distance from the mainland, these campaigns could not rely on the use of regular troops, as in Africa, and employed only 2,200 white soldiers. On the other hand, the success in those campaigns owed much to the large scale recruitment of ‘locals’ (about 6000) and warriors from local tribes (approximately 108,000)\textsuperscript{18}.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17] NT: indigenous law enforcement.
\item[18] Idem.
\end{footnotes}
The use of troops on this scale and the technological modernization of the armament resulted in a reversal in operational results. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the mainland thought of military clashes in the colonies as synonymous with failure and the sacrifice of the lives of the soldiers involved. Now, for the first time, the press could consistently announce victories and amazing feats. These successes brought about a generation of ‘Africanists’ who would come to play a crucial part in the modern revival of the myth of a ‘sacred heritage’ which the Portuguese were entrusted with preserving on other continents. Marcelo Caetano wrote, in what was a legitimizing discourse of the colonial policy of the Estado Novo: ‘The 1895 campaigns in Mozambique are a milestone in Portuguese contemporary history. Internationally, they demonstrated our ability to effectively occupy the colonies; they gave the country confidence in its own capabilities and actions, and marked the beginning of a new era for the overseas policy’.

This reorientation was guided by two fundamental ideas. On the one hand, maintaining the Empire was absolutely crucial for the country’s regeneration, and the colonial project became the cornerstone of Portuguese nationalism. On the other, the political instability in the mainland in the early twentieth century was the gravest threat to the integrity of the Empire. The military commanders, who had not created the state of disorder and did not desire it, presented themselves as part of the solution for the problem. The generation of officers who had become famous in the hinterlands of Mozambique grew in strength and importance as the nineteenth century drew to a close, to the point that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it stood as one of the most important pressure groups in the country. They stood at King Carlos’ side and were willing to secure and reform the regime in the name of order and for the glorification of the kingdom.

However, none took any steps towards that objective, although virtually all officers would at some point be acquainted with the temptation of power, as they came to have meaningful political careers in the administration of the Empire and in the government of the country. This cannot be regarded as simple coincidence. Aires de Ornelas, Chief of Staff of Mouzinho de Albuquerque, was Minister of the Navy and of the Overseas Territories alongside João Franco (1906-1908); Henrique da Paiva Couceiro, the south column guide in 1895, was acting governor-general of Angola (1906) and became a famous personality in the monarchist resistance during the First Republic; Eduardo Galhardo,
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:  
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

the victor of Coolela and Manjacaze, was governor of Macao (1897), minister plenipotentiary in China, in Japan (1897) and in the kingdom of Siam (1898), governor-general of India (1900-1905), director-general of Infantry services (1905), director-general of the Ministry of War (1906), permanent aide-de-camp for the king (1906), and was even appointed future Minister of War (1908); João de Azevedo Coutinho, the Navy man who had the trust of Mouzinho de Albuquerque during the campaign of Namarrais, was a member of Parliament (1900), served as governor of Mozambique (1905-1906), and was appointed Minister of the Navy and of the Overseas Territories on two occasions (1909-1910); Eduardo Costa was not only governor of the province of Mozambique but also of Angola (1906-1907); Captain Pereira de Eça, who was both appointed and dismissed as governor of the district of Lourenço Marques by Mouzinho de Albuquerque, gained recognition in the campaigns in Angola, where he served as governor-general (1915), and in Mozambique, and was eventually appointed Minister of War (1914); the young officer Ernesto Vieira da Rocha was aide-de-camp for Mouzinho de Albuquerque, became a General and was Minister of War on more than one occasion (1922, 1924-1925), as well as Minister of the Colonies (1925-1926); Freire de Andrade, António Enes’ chief of staff, was governor of Mozambique (1906-1910); Gomes da Costa, captain-major of Mossuril and governor of Gaza, became Marshal and President of the Republic (1926). This was the military elite who witnessed the construction of the colonial empire from the late nineteenth century onwards, and who was largely responsible for its administration.

Conclusion

Portugal’s reorientation towards Africa, a response to the policy of giving government grants to private citizens (1878), to the pursuit of an official rapprochement to Great Britain (1879), and to the consequences of the failed Treaty of Zaire (1884), of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) and of the British Ultimatum (1890), was not initially caused by external influence. There was more at play than the pressure exerted by the main European countries on the nation’s ability to own and administer vast territories away from the homeland. The changes in the external environment and the onset of the ‘Scramble for Africa’, although crucial to understand Portugal’s launch into a process of ‘empire-building’ from the last decade of the nineteenth century onwards, are just one part of the data in an equation that proved much more complex.

The consolidation of the borders was also not exclusively related with a simple desire to expand the empire and to build a new Brazil in Africa, which
Salazar’s rhetoric later consolidated as an official concept. Not only was the
geography of those vast regions unknown but the unforgiving climate was a
deterrent for immigrants, who did not wish to trade Brazil for clearly hazardous
lands. Likewise, the process did not even represent a response by the military
institution to its own ineffectiveness since the beginning of the Regeneration,
especially because the role that institution played in politics between 1890
and 1908 was largely exaggerated by contemporary observers. The military
were not only a minority in the Council of Ministers and in the two houses
of parliament, but they never expressed any intention to promote any kind of
martial law or to take upon themselves the power delivered to civilians, even
if those civilians were accused of incompetence or corruption. Despite their
growing influence, between 1878 and 1910, only 18% of parliamentarians in
the House of Representatives belonged to the military institution, with the
numbers rising to 21%, during the First Republic.

Despite the victories of the ‘generation of 1895’, the confusion
stemmed from the prominent role played by the military during the
following years, not in the reaction against the Monarchy, but against the
Republic. The officers who had gained recognition in Africa loathed politics
as a rule, although many were later appointed to political and administrative
positions. They considered that no self-respecting individual would be
willing to engage in the insidious machinations of Parliament. It is true that
they thought of themselves as the true representatives of the nation, more
legitimate even than the representatives and peers of the realm, and there
were those who supported them, but the ‘Africanists’ were a minority within
the hierarchy. In practice, they could have changed everything, but they
chose not to act. They chose to isolate themselves in a separate group within
the Army. They believed they were in a different class than that of other
officers. More capable and with a spirit they could not find anywhere else,
they deemed themselves destined for great things, which some eventually
accomplished. They began to feed the nostalgia for the times spent in the
African woods and hinterlands.

Therefore, the Portuguese participation in the ‘Scramble for Africa’ can
only be explained by combining the above factors, that is, by the change in the
international context which pushed the national governing elites to act quickly
because of a ‘new foreign policy’, and to seek the support of the armed forces
to fulfil that purpose. These conditions were compounded by another: the
changing overseas paradigm could also be explained as a national reaction to
the manifestations of radical colonial and anti-British nationalism that began
to emerge in late 1878, since the famous concession to Paiva de Andrade in Mozambique. The demonstrations against the Ultimatum held in the Chiado neighbourhood in Lisbon, and the subsequent humiliations imposed by treaties which were seen as outrageous only served to legitimize the course of action taken for the construction of the Empire. However, the emergence of this radical nationalism owed less to the Republicans, who exploited it rather well during the following years, than to the action of an extremist wing of the Progressive Party inspired by people like Mariano de Carvalho or Emídio Navarro, who elected to use the issue of loss of sovereignty in the colonies, and particularly in Mozambique, as a political weapon and as a form of protest for their lack of access to power, which had been blocked by the Regenerator Party of Fontes Pereira de Melo and even by King Luís.

There was no other possible response to the alleged insult of the Ultimatum. The only solution was the one which the regenerator and progressive leaders attempted to negotiate. The Spanish example clearly demonstrates this theory. The reaction to America’s insult brought on by the Cuba issue led to a colonial war in 1898 where Portugal’s neighbouring country saw what little remained of its colonial empire amputated. A justifiable counterfactual exercise might lead one to think that if the monarchists (or the Republicans) had opposed the British insult of 1890, such a reaction would have implied the loss of the national claims to Angola and Mozambique and would have led to the loss of the national territories in India, that is, in other words, the entire history of the Portuguese twentieth century may have been quite different.

Works cited


The impact of the late-nineteenth-century military intervention in Mozambique on the development of the campaigns in Africa


The First World War in Angola.
The German attack on Naulila.
Preparing for one war and fighting another\textsuperscript{1}

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Why did the Germans attack the Portuguese garrison in Naulila on 18 December 1914? Were the Portuguese prepared for it? In answering these questions, we aimed to emphasize some strategic-military and operational aspects of the battle between Portuguese and German forces in Naulila, in South West Africa, in the context of the global conflict of the First World War.

The battle of Naulila is a part of the Portuguese heroic narrative of the Great War\textsuperscript{2}, despite being considered a complete military fiasco resulting in the retreat of the troops and in the need to send a new expedition - a huge military effort for a nation on the brink of financial and political collapse\textsuperscript{3}. However, to hold Angola was crucial for Portugal, as it was the theatre where more military means had been engaged up to that point\textsuperscript{4}. The friction between Portugal and Germany in that region of Southern Africa stemmed from Portugal’s awareness of the agreements between Germany and Great Britain

\textsuperscript{1} This text was produced as part of the Research Project “Tipologia da Conflitualidade e Beligerância Portuguesa na Grande Guerra” by the Comissão Portuguesa da Grande Guerra (1914-1918). Another version was published in the journal \textit{Relações Internacionais}, issue 47, September 2015, pp. 127-148.


\textsuperscript{3} Telo, António, \textit{Os Açores e o Controlo do Atlântico (1898-1948)}, Porto: Edições, 1993.

The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

on the Portuguese territories in Africa, from the political situation in Portugal, and from the recurrent military, economic and political German incursions in southern Angola.5

Despite the number of troops involved, the battle of Naulila should not be analysed simply as a tactical confrontation but as part of a strategy with clear objectives by both countries. For the Portuguese government, it was an opportunity to prove to its allies and to public opinion that Portugal was capable of securing the integrity of the colonies, since maintaining the Colonial Empire was the main national concern and perhaps the only objective which gathered consensus in civil and political society at the time. It is therefore not surprising that forces had to be sent to the colonies, even in poor material and technical conditions. For the Germans in South West Africa, who were engaged against South African and British forces, the Naulila battle stemmed from the fear of having to fight simultaneously on two fronts against the allies, which was an unacceptable risk given their lack of resources.

Some historiography describes the Naulila battle as a ‘punitive attack’ against Alves Roçadas’ forces in the wake of an incident involving a Portuguese patrol and a German patrol, which ended with the death of nearly every German soldier.6 Others refer to Naulila as a strafexpedition (punitive expedition), but one conducted within the German active defence strategy for South West Africa, with the objective of securing the north flank, as well as to demonstrate the German superiority in the region, thus assisting the indigenous populations in southern Angola in rebelling against the Portuguese.7

6 L’Ange, Gerald, Urgent Imperial Service: South African Forces in German South West Africa, 1914-1915, Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing, 1991, pp. 170; p. 174; Baericke, Max E., Naulila: Erinnerungen eines Zeitgenossen, Swakopmund: Gesellschaft fur Wissenschaftliche Entwicklung und Museum, 1981, pp. 61-82; Casimiro, Augusto, 1914 Naulila, Lisboa: Seara Nova, 1922, p. 108; Arrifes, p. 159; The word ‘vengeance’ was used extensively by the Germans, most likely to motivate the forces in face of the region’s extremely harsh conditions, which were caused by the drought and by the lack of supplies. Captain José Mendes dos Reis, commander of the 2nd Battery of the 1st Machine Gun Group, stated that a German prisoner had told him that the Germans were attacking to avenge their comrades killed by Second Lieutenant Sereno’s patrol (AHMEME, 2nd Div., 2nd Sec., Box 21 (23 December 1914) - Report of the Commander of the 2nd Battery of the 1st Machine Gun Group and of the Naulila detachment);
7 Cf. Cann, p. 162; Santos, p. 73.
The First World War in Angola.

The German attack on Naulila. Preparing for one war and fighting another

Despite the number of soldiers involved (about 1500 Portuguese and 600 German), describing the battle of Naulila as a mere tactical event seems to be an oversimplification. First, both contingents were under the command of prestigious officers experienced in the African theatre: Lieutenant Colonel Alves Roçadas and Major Victor Franke. Second, the means engaged in the battle represented a huge effort for both contingents. For the Portuguese, the effort was due to a fragile economic and financial situation. For the Germans in South West Africa, who were engaged in a war against South Africa and Great Britain on the southern border, the operation on Naulila represented a high risk from a strategic-military perspective. In 1914, South Africa and Great Britain had almost 40,000 soldiers, while the total of German colonial troops, the Schutztruppen, did not exceed 2000 in German South West Africa, divided into 9 companies. Bearing in mind that the Germans were aware that Portugal was mobilising resources to deploy to Angola, they could not risk fighting on two fronts.

A documentation survey in the German archives in Freiburg and in the military archive of the General Army Staff in Lisbon led us to conclude that the German action should be considered a pre-emptive strike to disrupt the Portuguese forces in southern Angola, as the Germans believed Portugal had decided to join the Allies. Our argument is based on two important reference points: (1) the definition of pre-emptive attack, which refers to the use of military force against an enemy attack that is in preparation or is imminent; (2) and the opinion of the governor-general of South West Africa, who believed Portugal had decided to fight alongside Great Britain.

The Germans stationed in South West Africa, who had stopped worrying about the mainland early in the war, needed to keep open lines of communication with Angola, from where they received significant quantities of supplies. Great Britain had decided to expand the war into Africa, despite the agreements of the Berlin Conference in 1885 regarding the territories south of the Congo, which stated that those territories were not to be battlefields for the European colonial powers. The British decision left the German settlers in a delicate situation because of the power asymmetry in Africa dictated by geographical, military,

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11 L'Ange, p. 163.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

and diplomatic issues. However, the Germans considered that the future of the colonies would be decided in Europe, where they expected a quick victory over France. Thus, in Africa, it was only necessary to prevent the British from achieving victory before a decision had been made in Europe. It is therefore not surprising that the military strategy for German South West Africa aimed to stall for as much time as possible, which became doubly necessary once Louis Botha, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, decided to join the British. The German idea consisted in defending the southern border to gain as much time as possible, exploiting the size and aridity of the desert, and securing the north region of the territory as a last defensive stronghold\textsuperscript{12}. Hence, ensuring the safety of the north flank was vital to the success of the strategy.

\textbf{Brief characterization of warfare in Africa}

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the participation of European forces in wars in Africa was a recurrent phenomenon, however limited in time and space, to impose colonial authority over the indigenous forces. Nevertheless, the beginning of the scramble for Africa in early summer of 1914 changed that pattern, where colonial powers began to employ military forces composed of mixed units with African and European troops (settlers or mobilized in the mainland). The specific nature of the missions meant they had to adapt their structure, composition, weapons and modus operandi. The units tended to be low-level, armed mainly with light artillery and employed tactics that depended on the initiative of subordinate commanders, since they were able to scatter and fulfil independent tasks.

Although considered as secondary, approximately two million Africans were mobilized for combat or to perform other duties in the African theatre, mainly as bearers, and about 200,000 were killed in action or by disease\textsuperscript{13}. Compared with the European theatre, the death toll in combat in Africa was relatively low. However, there were tens of thousands of losses to illness and malnutrition\textsuperscript{14}. The Portuguese case was paradigmatic, as it engaged forces in both theatres. In Angola, during 1914, the number of casualties amounted to 648 killed by disease and 237 killed in action, which corresponds to 29\% in 3009 troops engaged in the expedition led by Alves Roçadas. In the case

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. L’Ange, pp. 158-160; p. 163.


of Mozambique (1914-17), 2633 soldiers were killed in action and 221 by disease, which corresponds to 40% in approximately 11,961 engaged troops. Compared to the data for Flanders, the numbers seem even more impressive, as the number of deaths in combat, by disease and by accident reached a total of 2086 in 55,165 mobilized soldiers, adding up to about 4%.

The main challenge faced by commanders was not defeating the enemy, but rather locating him. Much of the success of the operations depended on the capabilities of the units and elements assigned to reconnaissance and security, as well as on the ability to liaise between elements scattered across the battlefield. Another critical aspect that must be taken into account is the logistical effort required even for company-level units of about 150 men. If we consider a daily ration of 1.5 kg and a maximum weight of 30 kg per man, a mission requiring a 10-day march needed as many bearers as combatants. Therefore, the commanders faced the dilemma of having to choose between food and other supplies, such as ammunition. An infantry battalion on the move could have greater depth than a division in typical attack formation in the European theatre.

The road, rail and port infrastructure were virtually non-existent, and it was necessary to establish an effective link between the logistics bases and the battlefront supported by bearers and ‘étapes’. The fact that the colonial forces were usually equipped with non-standard armament (with various types of firearms and calibres) contributed to render logistics support even more complex.

Thus, fighting in Africa was essentially an infantry endeavour supported by machine-gun units, which were the most widespread heavy weapon on the battlefield, exceptionally suited to skirmishes between reconnaissance forces and security and low-level units. Although artillery pieces were very useful in open space or in a landscape with sparse vegetation, virtually none were present, with the exception of mountain artillery due its light weight. The logistic support required made them almost impossible to employ in a timely manner.

55 The numbers vary according to the sources, but still express the result of the combined data obtained by Marco Arrifes (p. 235) and by Almeida, Bello de, Meio Século de lutas no Ultramar: Subsídios para a História das Campanhas do Exército Português de Terra e Mar, Lisboa: Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1937 , p. 90; pp. 236-237.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

The Strategic Context

Since the late nineteenth century, a clear danger hovered over the two major Portuguese colonies in Africa (Angola and Mozambique), caused by the Anglo-German ambitions and agreements. These powers had their objectives made easier by what they saw as Portugal’s inability to both maintain an effective presence in those colonies and to defend them. Thus, one must assess the issues related to the possession of the Empire in Africa at the beginning of the First World War in two different dimensions. First, one must take into account the natural suspicion that the Portuguese nurtured against the British because of the Anglo-German agreements of 1913, since London wanted to prevent the expansion of Germany’s war navy by using Angola and Mozambique as a bargaining chip. The periods of tension arising from the Anglo-German naval rivalry gave way to improved relations thanks to the possibility of apportioning the Portuguese territories. It was anticipated that it was only a matter of time until the Portuguese territories in Southern Africa disintegrated, and Great Britain was seen as their natural heir. Second, the expected belligerence with the German forces in Europe constituted a direct threat to Angola and Mozambique. Despite the attempt not to involve the African continent, the British attack on Togoland made it clear that the war would have its African theatre, with sequels in Cameroon, East Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa.

Thus, in addition to domestic political issues and a severe financial crisis, the rivalry between Great Britain and Germany, and the role that Angola and Mozambique might play in their relations, made the Portuguese belligerence even more complex. In Angola, the dynamics that stemmed from Portugal’s distrust of the British and from the Anglo-German rivalry intersected with the Portuguese government’s need to assert its authority against the German colony of South West Africa, which had vaguely defined borders with Angola and was prone to constant political, economic and military incursions.

Once South African forces invaded South West Africa to support Great Britain (September 1914), the southern border became the main concern in Windhoek. The British wanted to seize the ports and the radio stations in South West Africa to isolate the Germans. The South African government, led

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17 Telo, António, Os Açores e o Controlo do Atlântico (1898-1948), Porto: Edições ASA, 1993, pp. 87-88.
by General Louis Botha, took the burden of the military campaign against the Germans to send a clear signal that his country could aspire to incorporate all territories under British rule in Southern Africa: Bechuanaland, South Rhodesia and Nyasaland. However, the decision to side with Great Britain was not unanimous in South Africa and culminated in the Afrikaner Rebellion against Louis Botha, which lasted until January 1915. The Boer revolt led by General Manie Maritz gathered a substantial number of rebels who had fought against the British in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. The coup failed due to the lack of a coherent plan and unity of command but succeeded in keeping the forces loyal to Botha engaged, disrupting the large-scale operations against the Germans between September and December 1914.

The Portuguese troops led by Alves Roçadas faced the German forces in the period between the beginning of the Afrikaner riots of August 1914 and the resumption of the South African offensive in South West Africa. Considering the strategic context, the greatest threat to southern Angola resulted from weak administrative and military implementation. In the early twentieth century, the Portuguese authorities only controlled about 20% of the Angolan territory, something that had been achieved at the cost of bloody campaigns for pacification. Alves Roçadas led the last campaign before the war in the Kwamato region, in 1907. Thus, it is not surprising that there was a feeling of uncertainty among the white population in southern Angola, not only regarding the indigenous populations but also towards the Germans in South West Africa, who roamed the region without significant interference from the Portuguese authorities. To gain access to the sea on the north hinterland of the colony, the Germans needed the port of Moçâmmedes, which was closer and was not under British control. Furthermore, since the late nineteenth century, the port of the Bay of Tigers in Angola was considered a crucial connection to a trans-African railway connecting South West Africa to the Transvaal and to Lourenço Marques.

The military and administrative implementation, and the length of the southern Angola border, left southern Angola opened for military, economic,
and political incursions\textsuperscript{24}. The Kwanhama population (Kwamato region) had resisted the Portuguese occupation and pacification efforts, and maintained close relations with the Germans, who provided them with weapons and encouraged them not to submit to the Portuguese administration. In 1912, the foundation of the Angola Bund aimed for takeover after the dismemberment of the Portuguese colonies, confirming Germany’s economic and political interest in Angola. In 1913, the German Consulate General in Luanda was established and a trade agreement meant to open the ports in Angola to the Germans. A Portuguese-German joint scientific committee, established to conduct studies in southern Angola, allowed its members to move freely, although only if escorted by the Portuguese delegation\textsuperscript{25}. The flow of merchants and other citizens from South West Africa, who the Portuguese considered as a spearhead for future military operations in southern Angola, was a normal occurrence since the beginning of 1914\textsuperscript{26}. Moreover, the German colony did not have enough supplies to feed its troops and white populations because of low productivity and severe drought during 1914. Therefore, the colony depended on open lines of communication with Angola, especially through the port of Moçâmedes, where the Germans negotiated their supply of food and fodder\textsuperscript{27}.

Thus, the Anglo-German conflict in the summer of 1914 made Lisbon fear for the sovereignty of its colonies in Africa. On 8 September, Norton de Matos decreed a state of emergency intended to end the constant border violations by the Germans in southern Angola, both military and civilian. On 17 September, the governor of South West Africa, Seitz, did the same, as he considered that he was surrounded by enemies and suspected that Portugal would soon declare war on Germany to support Great Britain in Africa\textsuperscript{28}. A large-scale German attack may have been unlikely, but the lack of military forces in Angola paved the way for the local populations to perceive Portugal as unable to control the region.

Despite the assurance that the colonies would be under British protection, in August 1914 the Portuguese Government (Democratic Party) decided to send


\textsuperscript{25} The decision was taken by the Portuguese Government without consulting Governor-General Norton de Matos. The governor feared it was a subterfuge for a political and military incursion into Angola, and protested with the government.

\textsuperscript{26} Casimiro, pp. 60-63.

\textsuperscript{27} Strachan, pp. 77-78.

\textsuperscript{28} Cf. Africanus, p. 11.
military forces to Angola and Mozambique. It was necessary to demonstrate the ability to mobilise forces, to assert authority in the colonies and to prove Portugal could be extremely useful to the Allies. Moreover, the defence of the African colonies was a matter of consensus, both political and public, regarding Portugal’s participation in the war.

Army Order No. 19 issued on 18 August specified that the missions that would be carried out by the forces would be assigned by the governors-general, since those forces were made available to the Ministry of the Colonies to man the border posts and to control the populations. The instructions of the Minister of the Colonies to Alves Roçadas aimed to reinforce the military apparatus to cover a possible German invasion, to ‘submit the savages’, to cooperate with the allied forces in the colonies, and to avoid the political hassle of witnessing a confrontation between the Germans and the British in Angola and Mozambique without having any troops there. However, it was also made clear that the expedition commander should make every effort to avoid causing any international incidents.

On 11 September 1914, less than a month after the order to form the expeditionary force under the command of Alves Roçadas, who accumulated the duties of governor of the Huila province, the force marched from the Rotunda in Lisbon to the port of embarkation, enthusiastically acclaimed by the crowd that rushed to the site. This was a sign that the population agreed with the decision of the Government and of the force commander, who was considered a hero after the success of the Kwamato campaign in 1907.

The preparation time for the expedition had been inordinately short, but Roçadas’ ‘Project of Operations’ predicted that the mission would most likely be defined by the need to maintain the public order, or to impose administrative and military authority in the Kwamato region. There were only two hypothetical scenarios, which would require the need to defend the integrity of the territory against the Germans. The first one, which Roçadas considered unlikely because the German forces were engaged against the British, was a German attack to invade Angola. In the second, Roçadas considered that the pressure exerted by the British in the South could compel the Germans to withdraw through

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29 Teixeira, p. 112ff.
31 Arquivo Histórico Militar do Estado-Maior do Exército (henceforth AHMEME), 2nd Div., 2nd Sec., Box 21 (10 September 1914) – Instruções e Plano do Roçadas: Instruções para o Comandante da Expedição de Angola.
Angola by using the port of Moçâmedes. Roçadas’ opinion regarding the most likely scenario and his previous experience in the Kwamato must have made him confident in the expedition’s success. Fighting German forces engaged on two fronts would make defending the border along the Cunene River easier, and would likely provide significant support to the British.

The Germans in South West Africa and southern Angola

The structure and numbers of the expeditionary force sent to Angola were more suited to a pacification campaign than to fight Schutztrüppen. These forces were formed by white settlers, were led by well-trained officers, and were reinforced by well-paid indigenous troops with a high level of military proficiency compared to other indigenous troops. Trained to act in independent company-level units suited to the terrain and to warfare in Africa, the Schutztrüppen were a powerful opponent for the Portuguese forces.

In addition to the German opponent, the Portuguese authorities had never completely subjugated the populations of the Kwamato, who had a strong German influence. Many worked in the Damaraland mines and dealt regularly with the German Protestant missions. The population could easily mobilize some 30,000 troops and arm about 15,000, and organize them into small units. They were able to perform important tasks in combat and used envelopment and siege tactics as preferred. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the military facilities in the region were essentially forts and ramparts for light weapons, as was the case of the Naulila Fort.

The onset of military action in Naulila was triggered by an incident between a German patrol and a Portuguese patrol on 18 October 1914, resulting in the death of nearly all German soldiers. After a series of border incidents, which led to the capture of several German supplies vehicles, on 18 October a Portuguese patrol led by Second Lieutenant Manuel Sereno intercepted a German group led by Schultz-Jena, administrator of the Outjo province in Angola.

Despite some initial animosity, the Portuguese patrol dined in the German camp and, while there was some mutual distrust, on the following day

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32 AHMEME, 2nd Div., 2nd Sec., Box 21 (7 September 1914) – Instruções e Plano do Roçadas: Expedição a Angola, Projeto de Operações.
33 Connaughton, pp. 111-112; Quesada, pp. 4-5.
both forces marched to Naulila to meet with the Captain-major of the Kwamato region. At some point, triggered by misunderstandings and mutual distrust, events escalated which resulted in the death of Schultz-Jena and of nearly every German soldier. If, on the one hand, the Germans had already attacked the Maziua outpost in the north of Mozambique, on the other, the fact that Shultz-Jena had in his possession a copy of the newspaper *O Século*, which had reported Roçadas’ expedition, was also an indication that the Germans did not trust the Portuguese neutrality\(^\text{35}\).

According to the documentation consulted in the German archives of Freiburg, Schultz-Jena led a group tasked to contact the merchants who supplied his province with food and to ascertain the effect of the arrival of Roçadas’ forces to the Cunene\(^\text{36}\). The Germans did not know exactly what Portugal’s stance on the war was and suspected that the Portuguese would side with the British, which created a problem with regard to their external lines of communication. As early as 25 October, the German authorities in South West Africa decided to take military action against the Portuguese troops in Naulila on the grounds that the incident had been a trap set by the Portuguese, who were going to open the north front in support of the British\(^\text{37}\).

However, the Germans first attempted a peaceful approach, as they did not intend to risk diverting forces from the south front. Thus, after receiving the reports of the death of Schultz-Jena, Theodor Seitz attempted to contact Norton de Matos, to no avail. On 24 October, Seitz received a telegram reporting that a new force of about 2000 men had debarked in Moçâmedes and headed to the German border. As there was no telegraph connection to Germany and he could not even contact the consul in Luanda, Seitz assumed that Portugal was at war with Germany. Norton de Matos even refused the German consul’s request to use the telegraph of a parked ship in the port of Luanda to contact Germany. Hence, Seitz met with the commander of the Schutztrüppen, Lieutenant Colonel Joachim von Heydebreck, and decided to conduct a military operation to prevent a Portuguese attack and to avenge the death of the Germans who had been the victims of a trap. Thus, he ordered a retaliatory action on some stations along the Cunene River, one of which was Cuangar\(^\text{38}\). For the Germans, it was a matter of honour and an

\(^{35}\) Africanus, pp. 31-32; Casimiro, pp. 72-73.  
\(^{36}\) Bundesarchiv, RH 61-42, p. 41.  
\(^{37}\) Bundesarchiv, RH 61-42, p. 42; Africanus pp. 31-32.  
\(^{38}\) Bundesarchiv, RH 61-42, p. 42; Zollmann, p. 212.
action to prevent any Portuguese ambitions for South West Africa. It was an application of the principle of attack being the best defence, although von Heydebreck only ordered the operation to forces that were not needed on the south front, which was the focus of the German defence effort³⁹.

The death of the German soldiers represented the outbreak of hostilities, and it came at a time when the Portuguese forces were moving south, which also provided grounds for suspicion that Portugal was taking an offensive stance. The German reaction was immediate and, on 31 October, they attacked Cuangar garrison and other outposts along the Cunene River (Bunja, Sambio, Dirico and Mucusso). Meanwhile, Roçadas was concluding the preparation of his force and recruiting indigenous soldiers in Huila⁴⁰. His main manoeuvre element was an infantry battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment (Viseu). The force was also composed of mountain artillery, engineers, and sustainment units (about 1400 men in total), to whom the colony’s forces would join⁴¹. The combat power of the force was suited to its foreseeable mission, which was to occupy the Kwamato region and to secure the line of communication linking Quihita - Gambos - Cahama - Roçadas Fort - Kwamato Fort⁴².

The attack on the Cuangar outpost compelled the Portuguese forces to hasten to the south border and to change their plan. The new situation forced Roçadas to establish a defensive line along the Cunene with a tactical point in Naulila to avert the invasion of the Huila province and consequently control the main routes to Moçâmedes⁴³. Despite the incident and the reprisals on Dangoena, Roçadas explicitly ordered his troops not to cross the border, as he had clear instructions from Lisbon to avoid any incidents that might lead to an aggravation of relations with Germany⁴⁴.

³⁹ Africanus, pp. 16-17; p. 35.
⁴⁰ Roçadas, p. 132-134.
⁴¹ Almeida, pp. 89-90; Roçadas, p. 243.
⁴³ AHMEME, 2nd Div., 2nd Sec., Box 21 (3 November 1914) – Instruções e Plano do Roçadas: Telegrama expedido por Alves Roçadas para o Governador do Distrito de Moçâmedes.
⁴⁴ AHMEME, 2nd Div., 2nd Sec., Box 22 (27 November 1914) - Service Order No. 13 of the Armed Forces Barracks, in operations in southern Angola between 09/09/1914 and 27/04/1915. The issue of the end of the Portuguese neutrality was a sensitive one, which the Government intended to coordinate with Great Britain. Even after the German attack on Naulila, the orders issued by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Sidónio Pais, minister of Portugal in Berlin, were to protest firmly but without violence, even though he was aware of facts that could constitute a declaration of war by Germany (MINISTÉRIO DOS NEGÓCIOS ESTRANGEIROS, Portugal na Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918): As Negociações Diplomáticas até à Declaração de Guerra (Tomo I), Lisboa: MNE, 1995, p. 171).
After several days of encounters between members of the Portuguese and German security forces during the months of November and December, the German forces attacked Naulila on 18 December. After four hours of intense fighting, Roçadas ordered to withdraw and abandon the position. Surprisingly, the Germans did not exploit their success, maybe because their mission was only to drive out the Portuguese forces, helping to free the region’s populations from the Portuguese administration for a time.

In addition to the psychological effects, the battle was a major political and military setback. The defeat left the region without Portuguese military presence and forced the mobilization of a new expedition with approximately 2400 troops led by General Pereira D’Eça, who had been minister of war when Alves Roçadas led the expeditionary force. In addition to the lack of resources, the poor quality and preparation of the troops, and the lack of logistical resources, Alves Roçadas’ mission was made even more difficult by the surprise of the German attack.

Given the objectives, the composition of the expeditionary force, and Roçadas’ experience, the pacification of the populations of the Kwamato region was expected to be a relatively simple and easy task. But after the ‘Naulila incident’ and the German retaliation on Cuangar, Roçadas thought the next logical step by the Germans would be a military action directed at Porto Alexandre or Moçâmedes, as there was the need to keep the lines of communication with Angola open because of the South African pressure. In fact, when the expeditionary force landed in Moçâmedes and moved to the Huila plateau (October 1914), the bulk of the German forces was engaged in operations against the Union of South Africa, therefore a large-scale military operation against Angola seemed unlikely. Thus, the Portuguese considered that the Germans’ military actions were more likely to take military actions to gather intelligence on the intentions of the Portuguese troops and to instigate an uprising among the local populations. As for Roçadas, the main concern of the governor-general of Angola and of the governor of the Moçâmedes province, following the attack on Cuangar and the increase of skirmishes, was an attack on Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre to control the routes and the railway line45.

However, in strategic and military terms, the Germans may have seen the action on Naulila from a rather different perspective. In September

45 The telegrams exchanged between Roçadas and the governor of the Moçâmedes province, Alfredo Felner, during the months of November and December 1914, were proof of this (AHMEME, 2nd Div., 2nd Sec. Box 23 – Instruções e Plano do Roçadas).
1914, in Sandfontein, a small town located on the border with the Union of South Africa, a German offensive action with a force of 1200 men managed to scatter a South African force of about 3000 men, capturing the advance guard and most of the force command\textsuperscript{46}. Bearing in mind the internal situation caused by the Boer revolt, this action aimed to disrupt and diminish the South African offensive capability. Thus, the same can be applied to Naulila, given the support the Germans deserved by the indigenous people of Kwamato. If we consider the Germans’ central position in relation their opponents, it was worthwhile to carry on disruptive offensive actions to wear down the enemy and stall for as much time as possible. After all, their opinion was that the future of the colony would be decided in Europe.

**The Military Action**

Once Roçadas received the news of the German attack on Cuangar, he sent an infantry company detachment (reinforced with an Erhardt artillery battery and a machine gun battery) commanded by Major Salgado (commander of the Viseu infantry battalion). The detachment was tasked to control the crossings at Calueque Ford and Elephants Ford and to gather intelligence on the German forces. Most of the reports made in the observation posts confirmed an increased presence of German military in the region\textsuperscript{47}.

The situation seemed to indicate a German offensive action already in motion, and the question was when and where an offensive would be carried out. The Portuguese defensive position was stretched over 30 km to cover the crossings of the Cunene River and to prevent the Germans from controlling the road to Dangoena and the Humbe region. The anchor of this defensive system was the Naulila stronghold, which housed about 600 soldiers (including some 200 African troops) commanded by Alves Roçadas. In the Calueque position, Major Salgado had 350 men under his command. Captain Aragão, commander of the 1st Cavalry Squadron, was deployed next to the crossing at Elephants Ford and the mobility of the mounted troops allowed them to balance forces between positions. Therefore, the defensive system


\textsuperscript{47} For details on the mission and on the daily life of the detachment commanded by major Salgado see Caldeira, Arlindo Manuel (Ed.), *O Sul de Angola no Início do Século XX. Cadernos de Guerra do Coronel Alberto Salgado*, Lisboa: Centro de Estudos dos Povos e Culturas de Expressão Portuguesa da Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 2001, pp. 133-135.
seemed suited to the expected mission, aside from the distance between the forces and the difficulty in transmitting information.

On 25 November, Roçadas received a telegram from the Colonial Office reminding him that Portugal was neutral, in clear contrast to what was happening on the ground\textsuperscript{48}. This might have confused Roçadas about the objectives of the government, and about the consequences of a clash. That is, the situation on the ground was clearly one of military conflict, but political conditioning prevented Roçadas from taking the initiative.

On 29 November, Roçadas believed that the Germans would attack from the west, by Elephants Ford and by Schwartz-boy Drift, and had instructed Salgado to set up outposts to block any advances into Humbe. Roçadas believed that the secondary attack would be on Naulila, as the various roads and fords rendered it too obvious as the main attack.

On 8 December, the Portuguese forces were ready to engage the German troops led by Major Franke, also a distinguished officer from previous campaigns in South West Africa, who commanded about 500 soldiers supported by six artillery guns and two machine guns\textsuperscript{49}.

The clashes between patrols from both sides gradually increased over time. On 13 December, the Portuguese captured a prisoner, who was interrogated by Lieutenant Aragão. The intelligence gathered indicated a German force comprised approximately of 700 troops tasked to avenge the victims of the Naulila incident\textsuperscript{50}. In the first instance, Franke’s main goal could not be simple vengeance, as it was a very limited objective at a time when the Germans were engaged in combat with South Africa and could not risk the loss of troops. However, referring to the attack as an act of vengeance was an important moralizing factor when asking that extra effort of his men.

Another possibility must be considered, one with a more logical objective - that the offensive action was an instrument to deter the Portuguese from supporting a future large-scale British operation from Naulila\textsuperscript{51}. Franke may have taken into account several factors as follows. First, the Naulila fort was located south of the Cunene River, and was easy to defend. Second, it facilitated the movement towards the south, and it was the arrival point of the ‘étapes line’ (the supply route from Huila). Third, the indigenous population

\textsuperscript{48} Casimiro, pp. 103-104.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibidem, p. 109-110.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibidem, pp. 117-118.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibidem, p. 136.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

nearby did not significantly adhere to the Portuguese administration, thus a military defeat would force the Portuguese to undertake another campaign in the region, losing time, as indeed happened in 1915 with General Pereira D’Eça.

The Portuguese forces in Naulila defended along the perimeter with the forces concentrated on the south and with other defensive positions set up along the Cunene River to control the fords. On 18 December, at 5:00 a.m., the Germans attacked with the sun at their back, making it difficult to determine the main attack axis. This axis was directed towards the Naulila stronghold, which was flanked and suppressed on the eastern side, where it was garrisoned by indigenous troops who were neither trained nor equipped to deal with suppressing artillery and machine gun fire. Furthermore, they huddled in the trenches, unable to respond effectively to the fire and abandoning the position. Four hours after the attack began, the Portuguese forces, unable to ensure mutual support between positions along the Cunene River, withdrew to the north. Roçadas tried to counterattack, but without motivated, well-trained troops the attack would be easily repelled. He only organized a rearguard to avoid pursuit, which the Germans did not do, although the column retreated chaotically while being attacked by indigenous soldiers. According to Major Salgado’s memoirs, after the retreat from Naulila to Humbe, the populations of the region were able to consider themselves free again and were avenged of the earlier humiliation, resulting in the complete retraction of the Portuguese military disposition from the region. Due to widespread rebellion, it was no longer possible for the Portuguese to know if the Germans had invaded the Kwamato territory.

Despite the Portuguese withdrawal, fearing pursuit and engagement by the German forces, Franke’s victory was in peril until the Portuguese abandoned their positions in Naulila. In fact, the Germans did not have more troops than Roçadas, and had only 50 to 60 military engaged in the assault on the fort, as the remaining troops had been instructed to stay in contact with Aragão’s security forces, and to provide protection to the artillery fire bases. Thus, aware that the Portuguese troops in southern Angola numbered about 2500 men, and that the South Africans had resumed offensive actions on the south front, the action on Naulila carried a huge risk and was not consistent with a mere punishing action for the Naulila ‘trap’ of 18 October. Franke did not exploit the success over the Portuguese because he lacked the means to do so and because he could not take

52 Costa, pp. 58-62.
53 Caldeira, pp. 26-27; p. 46.
54 Baericke, pp. 74-81; Santos, p. 73.
further risks. He knew the South Africans could disembark in Walvis Bay at any moment, and it was necessary to reinforce the defensive position there and to take command of Schutztruppen in Windhoek.

As can be seen, the German combat power was insufficient to defeat a strong defensive system. However, the scattered Portuguese forces, the composition of the garrisons, the lack of training of the Portuguese troops and Roçadas’ haste to retreat, made Major Franke’s mission even easier. The retreat directly resulted in insecurity and fear among Portuguese settlers in the region, since it triggered a spree of thefts, murders, and fires set by the indigenous populations on the equipment and crops.

The German victory in Naulila meant that, at least for a few months, the north flank was no longer a concern. Nevertheless, the fate of the Germans in South West Africa was sealed, as the superiority of South Africa and Great Britain would prove impossible to overcome. In July 1915, the Germans, unable to cope with the superior effectives of the South African forces, surrendered before knowing whether the action on Naulila had produced the desired results.

**Conclusions**

As we wanted to emphasize, the German objectives in Naulila went beyond a simple punitive action. First, the movement of the Portuguese forces was threatening the northern flank because the Germans were engaged in combat on the south against the British and the South Africans. As Portugal had an alliance with Great Britain, the Naulila incident was interpreted as a trap, and the reports received about Portuguese troops disembarking in Moçâmedes made the Germans believe that Portugal was going to attack from Angola. Second, it was too risky for the Germans to undertake a military operation engaging a considerable number of troops solely as revenge for the incident, given the disparity of their own effectives in relation to the allies’. Third, at the time of the operation in Naulila, South Africa and Great Britain were engaged with the Boer revolt, which allowed the Germans to focus on other parts of the territory. Fourth, after being surrounded by hostile forces, the Germans could not risk losing the lines of communications to the north or to admit a Portuguese attack to occupy a defensive stronghold in the north. The German strategy was based on disrupting actions, exploiting the depth and aridity of their territory.

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55 Bundesarchiv, RH 61-42, p. 44.
to gain time until a decision was achieved in Europe. The Germans knew that, should they be able to defeat or expel the Portuguese from the Kwamato region, the populations would also contribute to spark insurgency in the region, which meant new and longer expeditions.

The Naulila battle was a typical operation in an African theatre, involving low-level units, many logistical difficulties, and short-term actions. The Portuguese expeditionary force was constituted in a short time and was not prepared to fight against Schutztruppen, or to deal with the rigours of the African theatre. The Germans demonstrated clear superiority, although they did not possess superior means or military effectives. The quality, preparation, and motivation of the German troops must be considered a factor in their success. Both forces were assigned to renowned officers; therefore, it is important to understand that there could be more at stake than a mere skirmish or a tactical level, localised fight, although these were the characteristics of operations in Africa.

The speed with which the Portuguese organized and prepared the expeditionary force was evidence of strategic immaturity. Although the mission assigned to Roçadas did not consider a German attack as likely, its secondary objective was to oppose the advance of any forces, either isolated or attempting to invade the territory of the colony. Thus, that possibility had to be considered by Roçadas, who lacked the initiative needed to hamper the German preparations along the Cunene River. However, the non-belligerence constraints imposed by the Portuguese Government may have led him to confusion and inaction.

The withdrawal of Roçadas’ forces marked the beginning of a new phase in the Kwamato region, and the collapse of the efforts of the previous decades to ‘pacify’ the region. Despite having engaged in warfare with the Germans, Portugal was only officially at war with Germany on 9 March 1916, when there was no longer a German colony of South West Africa. Roçadas had prepared for one war, but found another.

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The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War


Mozambique and the choices made by Heinrich Schnee and Von Lettow-Vorbeck during the Great War

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The memoirs of Heinrich Schnee, Governor of GEA (German East Africa, which in the present day roughly corresponds to Tanzania or, in German, DO – Deutsch-Ostafrika) and of the commander-in-chief of the Protection Force, Paul Émile von Lettow-Vorbeck, illustrate the tense atmosphere and the major differences of opinion, decision and choices between the two men, specifically during the German campaign in Mozambique from late 1917 to 1918.

Schnee had advocated for neutrality since the beginning of the Great War (August 1914), believing that through it Germany would be able to hold the territories in Africa (since the Treaty of Berlin of 1885 - or the Congo Conference - where the colonial powers agreed to maintain neutrality in Africa and respect the integrity of their respective territories should there be a war in Europe). Lettow-Vorbeck wanted to detain the enemy, that is, the British, in Africa, preventing their forces from being employed in other theatres of the Great War: ‘we did not command the sea (...) but had a loyal population of eight millions suitable for military service’, he stated, arguing that ‘England could take away its last fit Askari for employment in other theatres of operations’, concluding his reasoning as follows: ‘it would, therefore, obviously have been an advantage for England if any agreement had existed which condemned us to neutrality’. The views of the Commander-in-chief won, or rather were imposed, and Schnee joined the military columns and complied with Lettow-Vorbeck’s provisions.

during the campaign. When the armistice was announced in November 1918, shortly after the German forces left Mozambique and entered Northern Rhodesia, Schnee immediately asked for control over the political decisions and, voicing his profound regret at the embarrassment of being forced to evacuate the colony, suggested that he had never agreed with the choices made by his military commander².

Lettow-Vorbeck had managed to stall the enemy, compelling him to fight and to engage human, material and financial assets in much higher numbers than the Germans. Germany capitulated and lost the territories in Africa. The allies - British, Belgian and Portuguese - who had lost thousands, hundreds of thousands of lives both inside and outside their territories, traded accusations and did not hide their resentment. Who was the real victor in Africa?

The course taken by the German political and strategic decision

To all appearances, at the beginning of the war in Africa, the Belgians pursued neutrality and the French and the British were more concerned with Europe and showed no intention of intervening in the German colonies at that time, although plans had been prepared for that purpose, some of them rather longstanding³. GB (Great Britain) was saddled with another major Boer uprising in the territories of the Union of South Africa and had even asked for assistance from Portugal once again in the form of a request for rifles⁴. Portugal was divided between its declared neutrality, an erratic European policy and divergent interests within Mozambique. But none of the colonial powers was effectively prepared to fight the others, the Germans included. In Portugal, the situation was even more serious because the Army had been politically destroyed, divided and diminished in the four years before the outbreak of hostilities⁵.

In the future theatre of operations in Africa, between 1914 and 1918, the policy did decisively little to predict, anticipate, decree and carry out coherent and feasible strategies for their forces. In fact, there was neither a common awareness of the general policy nor a clear vision for the African continent. The policy-makers and operational management had different

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² Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, pp. 21-22; Schnee, 1918, p. 121.
³ GB had plans to invade GEA since 1897, which were reinforced in 1905, 1908 and 1911, although they were never formally approved by London (Samson, 2013, pp.28-29).
⁵ Telo, 2015.
views of grand policy, of how to implement strategy, and of their respective roles in strengthening a common political and military stance. Everyone was suspicious of everyone else and little effort was put into cooperation⁶. One small exception showed that there was spirit and determination in the military command, although it did not garner consensus in GEA.

Until the early 1910s, military decision-making in Germany was autonomous from political decision-making. The operational commanders answered directly to the Kaiser and the generals were averse to mixing politics and war. In the case under analysis, that of GEA, things were aggravated with the Maji-Maji Rebellion between 1905 and 1907. The uprising was crushed by military action, for all effects and purposes completely disregarding any kind of coordination with the regional political power, that is, the government’s recommendations. These actions led to 75,000 deaths among African populations (villages were razed, chiefs were hanged, the dead were left to rot) - ‘the military had largely provoked the rebellion through its brutality and administrative ineptitude’⁷. As a result of this lack of coordination, a new department was created in Germany: the Reichskolonialamt - the RKA or Imperial Colonial Office. This was followed by the appointment of several civil governors who had power over the military in 20 of the 22 African provinces. But the situation that had been created was far from peaceful and there was permanent tension between civil and military authorities. This led to a misunderstanding between Governor Rechenberg and the settlers in GEA, with the latter openly refusing to acknowledge his ‘civilian’ leadership and forcing his resignation in 1912. He was replaced by a reputed lawyer, a 42 year-old liberal named Heinrich Schnee.

Without going into great detail about the personalities of the two leaders under analysis, it can be said that Schnee had a plan to develop the local populations and regions, and was also intent on a policy of non-hostility with the neighbouring powers: ‘No action should be taken that would jeopardise the bright future he envisaged for German East Africa’, because, he argued, the indigenous peoples had an innate tendency for belligerence,

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⁶ The French intentions of sending one Expeditionary Corps (Corp Mobile) with four battalions from Madagascar to fight in East Africa (with two battalions ready to leave in early 1915: one Malagasy Battalion and another composed of European, Creole, Senegalese and Cameroonian forces) were a testament to this unwillingness to cooperate. But the British suspicion that the French participation was a way to subsequently claim more territory in the region led to the decision to decline the offer (Abbot, 2002, p. 5).

so any action that could provoke it should be avoided. Lettow-Vorbeck disagreed and publicly stated his ‘distrust of Dr Schnee’s liberal views’, arguing that ‘the white man was destined to rule in Africa’. If the matter of who drove the policy and who implemented the approved strategy had been clear, there might not have been a problem, but the situation was never, in fact, neither transparent nor objective, rather it was ambiguous and tense. The solution found by the German government was a long way from being adopted in the colonies and their provinces, in the words of the Portuguese translator of Lettow-Vorbeck’s memoirs, because of an obvious ‘dualism of command and marked disagreement between the two leaders’. Adding to the confusion, the German government had defined a vague formula which stated that ‘should there be a need to mobilize troops, the decision of how they are to be employed will be the responsibility of either the Governor or the Commander-in-chief’. That is, contrary to what is currently accepted by governing authorities in most democratic countries, in the German African colonies at the time, once a conflict was declared, the determination of the war’s political goals was handed over to the military commander. A coherent policy for a given territory was thus limited and constrained by the interpretation of a potential situation of war.

The British case was slightly different, as the civil governor for BEA (British East Africa) was simultaneously the commander-in-chief, issuing direct orders to the commanders of the KAR (King’s African Rifles) Battalions, which caused and led ‘to friction because a civilian was issuing direct orders to a military officer’. For the Portuguese in Mozambique, the matter was also far from being clear because, although the chief commander depended on the governor politically, ‘he did not outrank him in the military hierarchy’. Thus, there were no obviously balanced or consistent solutions on the different sides of the dispute.

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8 Paice, 2008, p. 17.
9 ‘Old School Prussian who believed that military measures must remain exclusively military’ (Paice, 2007, p. 17); he had not participated in the Maji-Maji massacres but had experience in containing insurgency: ‘The Herero and Hottentot Rebellion in South-West Africa (1904-1906) introduced me to the peculiarities of bush warfare’ (1904-1906) (Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, p. 19).
10 Sibley, 1974, p. 17.
11 Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, p. XXII.
14 Marques, 2012, p. 35.
After disembarking in Dar es Salaam in January 1914, Lettow-Vorbeck stated that ‘in case of war, we should use all available means to attack our enemies and relieve the pressure in Europe’\textsuperscript{15}. Hence, the military-political malaise had begun as early as 1914, when he was appointed military commander and promptly criticized the defence plan in force since 1912, which Schnee had developed. Lettow-Vorbeck reinforced the idea that ‘GEA does not generate resources, nor should it be civilized, but can be used as a potential battlefield which must be exploited to the maximum to attract the forces of other powers, preventing them from intervening in Europe or diverting reinforcements from Asia and Africa (India and South Africa in particular)’. To accomplish this major political goal, which Schnee never shared or had a hand in defining, in 1914 Lettow-Vorbeck set a prime and immediate strategic objective, also without the consent of the governor: an attack on the Uganda railway\textsuperscript{16}.

**Attacks on British territory**

Great Britain was in fact surprised by Lettow-Vorbeck’s strategic initiative, as the German force available for the Army comprised approximately 216 Europeans, 2540 Askaris, as well as a police force of 45 Europeans and 2154 Askaris, and was later reinforced by the forces from the SMS \textit{Königsberg} and the survey ship \textit{Möwe}, over 322 and 102 European soldiers, respectively. The total number of enlistments in the \textit{Force} during the four years of war was 3000 Europeans and 11,000 Askaris. But not all were as available and determined as their commander: ‘To be honest, it took some time before many of the inhabitants of Dar es Salaam, and even some Government authorities, were imbued with the warrior spirit\textsuperscript{17}.

Lettow-Vorbeck had the clear intention of provoking not only Great Britain, but also Portugal and Belgium. Schnee, on the other hand, wanted a neutral Portugal so he could continue to use the Portuguese ports\textsuperscript{18}. Portugal and its colony of Mozambique (also referred to as Portuguese West Africa) was, more than once, the centre of political disputes between Schnee and Lettow-Vorbeck, but also between the British government and the top military commanders on the ground - Smuts, Hoskins and Van Deventer. There were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, pp. 5-6.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Anderson, 2014, pp. 26 and 68.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, pp. 21-23.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Anderson, 2014, pp. 37-41.
\end{itemize}
also crucial disputes among policy-makers and military commanders within the territory of Mozambique, for example between the Portuguese governor and the successive military commanders - Massano de Amorim (who replaced Álvaro de Castro as governor during the last expedition), Moura Mendes, Ferreira Gil and Sousa Rosa -, between the opposing political views of Lisbon and Lourenço Marques, or even between Lourenço Marques and the command post in Port Amelia; let us recall that ’Mozambique had eight governors-general and interim governors from 1910 to 1918 (...) Portugal had sixteen Overseas Ministers from 1910 to 1917’\(^\text{19}\).

Lettow-Vorbeck (1923, p. 32) stated: ‘I met two gentlemen belonging to the Government at Dar es Salaam who showed me a document dealing with negotiations for surrendering Dar es Salaam to the English (...) it did not occur to me that this might be some kind of agreement drawn up with the consent of the Governor (...) My intervention was not approved by the Governor, in whose hands, according to a Protective Force Ordinance, supreme military power was actually placed’. Lettow-Vorbeck was not yet in charge of defining the policy, but neither did Schnee control the operational tempo.

Schnee maintained his political resolve, hindering recruitment operations and the preparations for war, and did not report his attempts to negotiate with GB, Belgium and Portugal to Lettow-Vorbeck. The merchants complained to Schnee about Lettow-Vorbeck, who was dubbed the ‘Mad-Mullah’ by many in GEA because of his determination in bringing war to all places. But most of the inhabitants of the colony felt safer under Lettow-Vorbeck’s orders: ‘throughout the Colony, Government officials who answered to Schnee also accepted Lettow as their Supreme Commander’\(^\text{20}\). During the following months and years there was increasingly less opposition to Lettow-Vorbeck’s authority.

**Which policy for Africa?**

A number of factors prevented the application of European models to Africa, on all levels, from technique to combat, from tactics and strategy to decisions on grand policy. We shall now highlight some of those factors.

There were no reliable maps of the region and GEA was three times the size of Germany, it was covered by dense vegetation, there was no road

\(^{19}\) Pélissier, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 190-191 and 211.

system and there were only two railway lines\textsuperscript{21}. Water was more precious than gold, the tsetse flies prevented the use of horses, the rivers were infested with crocodiles, and the woods were overrun with lions, giraffes and bees. The British weak spots were also related to the lack of communications, thus ‘Vorbeck argued that the best tactic would be to attack BEA in its most sensitive point - the Uganda railway’\textsuperscript{22}.

None of the colonial powers were prepared: ‘in the eve of the Great War, BEA and Uganda were completely unprepared and did not expect any incidents in the region (...) only in 29 July 1914 was there a warning issued by the force commander, Sir Henry Belfield, to take precautionary measures\textsuperscript{23} and ‘there were no plans to increase the forces should the need arise’. One sentence sums up the situation at the onset of the war, ‘the British Army of the BEA was the only army who fought first and trained later’. As an example of this lack of preparation, it is noteworthy that ‘at the onset of the war 3000 volunteers had applied to the KAR, but there was no transport, arms or ammunition\textsuperscript{24}. The populations available were also few: GEA had 7.5 million inhabitants of which 14,000 were Indians and 5,300 were Europeans. BEA and Uganda had respectively 7 million inhabitants, with 28,000 Indians and 6,000 Europeans available for service. Finally, ‘the forces in Africa were conceived to deal

\textsuperscript{21} Paice, 2008, p. 10. The railway line was built between 1896 and 1912 (Moshi); between the city of Tanga and the base of Mount Kilimanjaro; in 1904, construction began on the Dar es Salaam line, which reached Morogoro in 1908, Tabora in 1912 (526 miles) and in 1914, Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika.

\textsuperscript{22} SIBLEY, 1974, pp. 22-23.

\textsuperscript{23} The forces in BEA and Uganda were: the 3rd and 4th KAR Battalions with HQs in Nairobi - 4 plus 1 camel company scattered across BEA with HQ in Bombo, with 7 companies scattered across Uganda, 4 companies of the 1st Nyasaland KAR Battalion, a total of 17 companies scattered across three territories - 62 officers, 2319 soldiers, a ratio of 1 European for every 30 Africans armed with rifles; each company was issued a machine gun and there was no artillery. On the German side, ‘in 1914 the Schutztruppe was organized in independent companies, each with three platoons of about 60 men in a ratio of 16 to 20 Europeans for every 200 Askaris (a ratio of 1 to 10); all companies were self-sufficient, with a small subunit for transport and support, the Feldkompanie (FK) or SchützenKompanie (SchK), in a total of 14 companies with 260 Germans and 2472 Askaris; each company was issued 2 to 4 machine guns and 250 bearers’; Sibley, 1974, pp. 15 and 18-19.

\textsuperscript{24} Sibley, 1974, p. 16. In a note which helps to understand the degree of loyalty of these forces, ‘one of the battalions, the 2nd Nyasaland KAR, had been extinct before the war began, and almost all its Askari immediately offered their services to the German forces, the Schutztruppe (...) provided they were paid, clothed and fed, the Askari remained loyal’. Or, as an Askari-Belgian prisoner stated, in another source ‘you know full well that the natives will always take the side of the fittest’ (Samson, 2013, pp. 34, 36 and 46 and Paice, 2007, p 50).
with uprisings and to maintain the public order, never to act against external entities\textsuperscript{25}.

The hierarchy was confusing: The Protection Forces (Schutztruppe) in GEA were under the commander’s authority but the police detachments were dependent on the civil authorities, and each province commissioner had a force of 100 to 200 men (roughly the same size as the protection force) to collect taxes and to assert authority, and they were, in the words of Lettow-Vorbeck (1923, pp. 9-10) in its very nature ‘a travesty of a military organization’. These (Askari) forces came from the protection force, depriving it of its best troops. Many German planters were former officers and ‘formed a valuable source of military power’. The Portuguese hierarchy was even more peculiar, as it relied more on European reinforcements than on local forces in case of war: ‘a diametrically opposed course of action to that of its allies; instead of draining the black continent for forces, it sent forces from the mainland to save the colony’\textsuperscript{26}.

All had rather different and opposing interests: their rivalries were greater than the cooperation objectives between GB and Portugal, France and Belgium\textsuperscript{27}. In Germany, Secretary for the Colonies Dr Wilhelm Solf wanted a coast to coast German Mittelafrika which included Belgian and Portuguese territories. The German colonies were heavily dependent on supplies from abroad, including coal to maintain the ships; therefore, the neutrality of the Portuguese ports was crucial to keep supplies moving, which was evidenced after the outbreak of hostilities, as GEA was only restocked from abroad on two occasions. Belgium also had a different approach to the conflict from the moment Germany invaded part of its territory in Europe and, from that moment onwards, the capture of German territory in Africa provided a basis for future negotiations. In addition to the difference in objectives, there were huge imbalances in the resources allocated to the campaigns, Portugal being the most striking example because of lack of resources, political chaos, lack of determination in defining coherent objectives and inability to support them\textsuperscript{28}.

The hostilities begin in earnest

‘According to an Ordinance, which certainly did not contemplate the case of foreign war, the supreme military power was in the hands of


\textsuperscript{26} Pélissier, 2000, vol. 1, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{27} Anderson, 2014, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{28} Samson, 2013, pp. 33 and 53; Marques, 2012, p. 113 and Anderson, 2014, pp. 18-19 e 23.
the Governor’ and, as there was no way to communicate with Germany, the Governor’s orders to avoid provoking foreigners in any way had to be followed. ‘My view was that we would best protect our Colony by threatening the enemy in his own territory’ but ‘the Governor, however, did not agree with the proposal (...) nor to concentrate our forces near Kilimanjaro (...) it was obviously necessary to collect our troops which were scattered all over the Colony’. This eventually happened in the Pugu plateau, a day’s march of Dar es Salaam. Lettow-Vorbeck had part of the police force under his command and wasted no time after the German reservists had been mobilized: he ordered the occupation of Lake Tanganyika (which was swift and effective and caused the thoroughly surprised Belgians to surrender the area because, as mentioned above, ‘many Europeans believed that on the strength of the Congo Act we were bound to remain neutral’). On 15 August, the town of Taveta in BEA was taken by the Germans. The results spoke louder and, at that point, Schnee was forced to agree with the military commander’s actions: ‘during the next few days the holder of the supreme military power was successfully persuaded to agree to moving the bulk of our forces to the Northern Railway’.

Preparations for guerrilla warfare had been made on Kilimanjaro ‘and our patrols were pushing beyond Taveta towards the British Uganda Railway’. Because he had already expected a British attack in late October 1914, with forces from India advancing on the capital or on Tanga (on the northern coast of GEA), Lettow-Vorbeck acted to secure those he deemed primary objectives, ‘unity of action’ and to ‘collect all available troops as rapidly as possible’. In turn, the governor, clearly showing that he continued to disagree with Lettow-Vorbeck’s views, had warned that a bombardment of Tanga was to be avoided at all costs; therefore, he would always favour negotiation over military action. On 2 November, 14 transport ships, two cruisers and 8000 soldiers advanced on Tanga and demanded an immediate surrender, but Lettow-Vorbeck was resolute: ‘To gain all we must risk all’.

Lettow-Vorbeck’s bold maneuver paid off. The English were said to have suffered close to 2000 casualties ‘but even greater was the enemy’s loss of morale (...) the troops had fled in wild confusion and dove head over heels into the lighters’. ‘At the beginning of November we were confronted with a concentric attack on our Colony, planned on a large scale. Its failure [in Tanga] made everyone expect that we would be able to hold our own in the Colony as

29 Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, pp. 24 and 33.
30 Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, pp. 36 and 43-44.
long as the home country could do so’. Lettow-Vorbeck’s policy was successful and Schnee lost all room for maneuver\(^{31}\).

The British strategy was then to move operations from Lake Victoria to the mountains of Kilimanjaro and Vorbeck’s true objective was to force the enemy to engage on a single point of the colony, even if it implied risks on other fronts. The heavy losses among officers, soldiers and bearers in the major battles led to a new decision by Lettow-Vorbeck: ‘(...) to stride great blows only quite exceptionally, and to restrict myself principally to guerilla warfare, was evidently imperative’. The deep forays into the Uganda railway had to end because there was almost no water or food. The choice was then to use small detachments of ‘eight to ten men, Europeans and Askaris, [who] rode round the rear of the enemy camps (...) and attacked their communications (...) and thus captured rifles, ammunition and war material of all kinds’\(^{32}\). In fact, Lettow-Vorbeck’s strategic initiative immediately earned him another year of activity: ‘as a result of the fighting in Tanga (...) 1915 can be considered a neutral year’\(^{33}\).

While the German provocations on the British territories continued, the divisions among possible allies were becoming increasingly evident. The governor of Nyasaland requested the support of Portugal but was disavowed by his ministry – he was only allowed to ask for help in case of acute danger, as GB did not wish to owe favours to its former ally. After the successive fiascos - especially in Tanga - GB changed its policy for Africa in early 1915, but it was still reluctant to engage large forces there, as Europe, Egypt and the Dardanelles were considered the priority. This fact was further reinforced when Lord Kitchener (Secretary of State for War) said to Lieutenant-General Wapshare: ‘I believe you should concentrate your forces and give up risky expeditions in East Africa where we cannot reinforce you sufficiently to be sure of success. You are entirely mistaken to suppose that offensive operations are necessary’\(^{34}\).

Lettow-Vorbeck was, however, greatly successful in the attacks on the Uganda railway. Relations between Schnee and Lettow-Vorbeck further deteriorated in July 1915 over the garrison stationed in Lindi (on the coast of GEA, just over the border with Mozambique): Lettow-Vorbeck believed they

\(^{31}\) Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, pp. 53-57. For a full description see Lemos-Pires, 2014: “O Exército de Portugal no início da Guerra: Ação, Reação e Omissão”.

\(^{32}\) Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, pp. 75-76.

\(^{33}\) Abecassis, 2014, p. 42.

\(^{34}\) ‘Portugal granted passage to forces through Mozambique towards Nyasaland in August 1914’ Samson, 2013, pp.58-59, 64; Anderson, 2014, p. 47, 64 and 70.
should march north and Schnee wanted the forces to remain because, as these were the same who had committed the massacres against the Maji-Maji, a new rebellion might occur in the area. Schnee countered the order of the military commander. Lettow-Vorbeck appealed the counter-order directly to the Kaiser and, along with the complaint, Schnee also attached an explanation: ‘we must prevent new riots by the populations in the region’. The complaint arrived in Berlin in August 1916, and while the military authorities ruled in favour of Lettow-Vorbeck, the RKA ruled in favour of Schnee. The different opinions in GEA matched similar divisions between the policy-makers in Berlin.

Lettow-Vorbeck decided to stop the attacks on trains (which had little effect) and began attacking and destroying bridges and tactical points. The military wanted the resources for combat and civilians wanted them to keep trade going, to maintain the peace, to keep the plantations in operation and the finances in order. Lettow-Vorbeck asked for direct control over economic measures and Schnee stated: ‘Lettow is an exceptionally talented soldier but utterly incapable of thinking of any solutions other than military’.

Meanwhile, there was another uprising by the populations of Nyasaland and with it a new request for aid from Portugal. Once again, no effective cooperation took place. By late 1915, GB had yet to mobilize the necessary troops to contain a large-scale rebellion, let alone face a well prepared GEA with an appropriate doctrine of employment of assets (guerrillas and lower ranks). In 1915 GB only had 17,000 men to GEA’s 15,000, although this number would increase significantly over the following years.

The great 1916 Allied offensive against GEA

An overall strategy was defined and the South African ambitions were clearly stated in the words of Botha/Smuts: ‘if GEA is conquered by the hand of South Africans, we will be able to trade it for the territory of Mozambique, into where we want to expand’. The Union of South Africa had never hid its interest in the territory of Mozambique, especially in the area south of the Zambezi: ‘the Transvaal should receive “volunteer” workers from Mozambique for its mines and in return the Lourenço Marques railway would be used for trading goods’. Anne Samson clearly states: ‘The South Africans wanted this railway’, quoting the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs: ‘The South Africans will never give up on conquering this area; the best thing for Portugal would be to

36 Anderson, 2014, pp. 82-86, 93-94 and 98.
sell it’. In May 1915, GB formed a new government, which led to an immediate and noteworthy change in policy: the onset of the cooperation with Belgium, including the planning of an Anglo-Belgian attack and the appointment of Brigadier General Northey (an experienced officer, highly reputed in the Army) to lead the south-western forces (Northern Rhodesia + Nyasaland). On 22 November, General Smith-Dorrien was appointed commander in chief of BEA, but he would never exercise his mandate. The allied attack plan on GEA had opponents in the homeland and remained a military and political dispute in GB: Lord Kitchener still opposed a direct engagement in the German colony, while his general staff supported it37.

After Kitchener’s dismissal on 28 December 1915, the numbers of the force in the field against the Germans were substantially reinforced with more than 1500 Indians and 13,400 South Africans in 1916. Large-scale participation by the Union of South Africa led to the decision to increase the number of brigades and divisions, to create an advanced Headquarters to coordinate operations and to incorporate a new strategy, which translated into prioritizing flanking manoeuvre, with a total of 40,000 men. Meanwhile, in what turned out to be a one-time occasion in May 1916, reinforcements from Germany arrived to GEA (on the supply ship Marie), and the German contingent reached its maximum numbers: 2712 Europeans, 11,367 Askaris, and 2591 auxiliaries in a total of 40 to 44 companies (each with 15 to 20 Europeans and 200 Askaris)38.

The Allies considered three different courses of action for an attack on GEA in 1916: 1) attempting to disembark in Dar es Salaam, which was deemed inadvisable in light of the clumsy debarkation in Tanga and of the difficult access to ports; 2) attacking Tabora (the former capital of GEA) directly from Lake Victoria, which would require lengthy marches in extremely inhospitable terrain and an extended line of communications and; 3) attacking from several directions at once: two columns would advance directly from Kilimanjaro to the Usambara Railway, and another would attack the central railway from the west with a Belgian force and from the southwest with a British force commanded by Brigadier general Northey. Plans for a major offensive were then approved according to the latter course of action: a simultaneous attack by the British from Rhodesia and BEA and by the Belgians from the Congo39.

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39 This was the situation in early 1916: ‘a large part of GEA was now in the hands of the British but Vorbeck’s Germans had not suffered any defeats’ Anderson, 2014, p. 106 and Sibley, 1974, pp. 36 and 95.
In the operations in the rest of the colony, and by early 1916, ‘owing to the lack of communications on our side this fighting resolved itself into a series of local operations, which were quite independent of each other’ and Lettow-Vorbeck added ‘it was different with the enemy’. Smith-Dorrien was taken ill and Smuts was assigned command of the Allies on 5 February 1916, lending weight to the South African ambitions. Smuts had a poor opinion of the Portuguese (he had never concealed it) and, aware of the turmoil that reigned in Portugal, which the situation in the colonies magnified, he did not fail to voice that opinion in his numerous reports.

The planned incursions began at the end of February 1916 and, in late March, clashes led to huge losses on both sides (with many killed in action, but mostly by disease, lack of resources and fatigue). Portugal was discreetly involved in this major offensive in Metangula, ‘more to avoid a British incursion than to cooperate against Germany’. The Belgians advanced in force and rapidly occupied the region of Rwanda. Meanwhile, there was a major breakthrough in logistic support - the north railway was completed - but the incursions were carried out at a high (and nearly disastrous) price. Smuts received instructions from GB to capture all of GEA and simultaneously to avoid antagonizing the local white populations. The Portuguese attack was halted and the crossing of the Rovuma prevented, and, paradoxically, it was Schnee’s decision to leave small garrisons at border posts, against Lettow-Vorbeck’s opinion, that succeeded in stopping the Portuguese incursion.

In turn, the Belgians managed to move swiftly in pursuit of their objectives and on 1 July had already arrived to Namirembe, after which they advanced on Tabora. In late May 1916, the Belgians had nearly occupied the whole Rwanda-Urundi region, and Wintgens, the German Captain, offered virtually no resistance and retreated from the area. In another area to the southwest Major General Wahle and about 5,000 men who had been initially stationed in the city of Tabora waited for the Belgian and British advance to execute the orders to ‘retreat and join Kraut and Vorbeck in the southeast region’. The Belgian forces moved on to Kigoma (which they captured at

41 The similarities in fighting technique and the ease of cooperation between the Portuguese and the Belgians led to later reports always speaking of the Belgians as the best forces (of their Force Publique) fighting in Africa, below the Germans and above the British (Abbot, 2002, p. 40). The Belgians also caused a considerable stir when, after occupying Tabora, going against what had been established by the Allies, ‘massacred the local populations with atrocities and brutality against the inhabitants of GEA’ (Anderson, 2014, p. 250).
the end of July) and the British, led by General Crew, managed to conquer Mwamza on 14 July. On 19 September, already after Wahle’s expected retreat, the Belgian forces occupied the city of Tabora, reaching their final objective, and thus ‘did not need to go further’ as they ‘had won the “race”’. Smuts, displaying a certain lack of diplomatic skill, suggested that the Belgian Force Publique remained under British command - implying that the Belgians were not prepared to lead -, which was immediately refused, causing ill-feeling between Belgium and Great Britain. The Anglo-Belgian cooperation was even declared terminated and was only resumed the following year. In essence, ‘the Belgians considered the campaign had been completed’.

To complete this phase, which consisted in a large-scale but also extremely exhausting attack in several directions, the coastal town of Bagamoyo was occupied by an amphibious force under the command of Rear Admiral Charlton, ‘with vast naval and land assets when compared with the small numbers of defenders, on 15 July’, followed by the conquest of the capital, Dar es Salaam.

Smuts sent an advance force along the Pangani Valley, supported by three secondary attacks: by Brigadier General Northey, by the Belgian forces, and also by the Portuguese; the latter, however, had great difficulty holding on to the territory they had acquired in the meantime (Nevala). The support to the Portuguese expeditionary forces was a clear administrative fiasco. Portugal had forced an entry into the war which had been clearly discouraged by the British authorities ‘we do not wish Portugal to abuse our future generosity by claiming German territories in the west and in the east, nor do we want them to think that we can be of great support in defence of their colonies’. Interestingly, there were groups in Mozambique who supported this idea of British non-intervention, as neutrality allowed them to profit greatly from smuggling to GEA.

In essence, the Portuguese plan had three major objectives: 1. retaking the small Kionga triangle; 2. securing the defence of the Rovuma River and controlling the territory of GEA to the Rufiji River and, finally; 3. occupying Tabora. Germany had only 300 of its 12,000 combatants near the south region at the time, but the Portuguese objective was obviously impossible to accomplish.

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43 Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, p. 104.
45 Kionga was the Alsace Lorraine of Mozambique, according to René Pélissier, 2000, Vol. 2, p. 397.
as they had almost no forces, the communication lines were extremely long and the resources available for reinforcements and logistics were thinning.

Confronted with a Portuguese invasion of GEA, Lettow-Vorbeck issued a clear order: crush the Portuguese and end the Makonde rebellion against the Germans in that region. Like he had done with the Belgians, Smuts suggested that the British should command and administer the Portuguese territories - Portugal also refused outright. Smuts’ plans were unrealistic and brought the main offensive to a halt, which let to Smuts’ resignation, and General Hoskins was put in command of the allied forces. At that moment, it was clear that the South African ambitions were, somehow, compromising Great Britain’s political determinations. Even if London was not aware of the full extent of the South African ambitions, the Portuguese knew them rather well: ‘the Boers, who founded the Transvaal Republic in 1844’ had always been outspoken about their ambition to ‘seize Inhambane or Lourenço Marques’ and had even ‘declared the annexation of Lourenço Marques (...) in 1869, under President Pretorius’46.

Hoskins took on the command of the Allies, and, in a testament to the extremely high means engaged in the campaign, immediately requested: 160,000 bearers, 16,000 men to replenish the forces for each month in campaign, the ability to build and maintain lines of communication, permanent bases and more fixed hospitals. Hoskins advocated a scorched earth policy for Mozambique47, as he believed that the Portuguese territories were not strategically important and the resources made available by Portugal ‘were ridiculous’ when compared with about 50,000 allied troops, including three new Belgian battalions, or when compared with more than 12,000 enemies in the GEA forces. Hoskins’, or rather, the Allies’ assigned mission was clear: ‘Do not allow the Germans to take Mozambique’ and, if necessary, provide support to the insurgents in GEA48.

Hoskins was removed from the command of the Allies on 23 April 1917 and South Africa succeeded in placing Lieutenant General Van Deventer (who

46 Pélissier, 2000, Vol. 1, p.116-117; ANDERSON, 2014, pp. 146-165. Many Boers moved to GEA and BEA in 1901, becoming important pressure groups on both the Germans and the British during the war (Samson, 2013, p. 34).

47 Similar to what was advocated and partially implemented by the Duke of Wellington one hundred years earlier, in Portugal, to stop the 3rd French invasion of Portugal in 1810.

48 Anderson, 2014, pp. 184 – 204. At the time, GEA was having difficulty maintaining its command unity. An example of that is a certain lack of discipline in the political implementation of Lettow-Vorbeck’s war: Wintgens, without instructions from Lettow-Vorbeck, decided to conduct a deep raid against British and Belgian forces.
had been one of Smuts’ most loyal subordinates)\textsuperscript{49} in command of the Allied campaign. Van Deventer’s mission was similar - to prevent GEA from invading Mozambique but, as we shall see, the mission failed and likely was not even attempted. Portugal played an even smaller role in the new plans for the 1917 offensive. The Portuguese had enjoyed negotiating with General Hoskins but had been left with a bad impression of Van Deventer, and the feeling was mutual as the correspondence collected by our research group clearly shows\textsuperscript{50}.

However, the situation of the British forces was dire because the Indian battalions were in no condition to fight (at less than 400 men each, with two of them at less than 100 men), disease abounded and ‘the Belgians were even required to provide support’. On the other hand, the Germans were organized into two main groups of 6200 men (in the west) and 2500 men (in the east), and still possessed good initiative capabilities. As the Germans advanced towards Mozambique, the British cut back on the resources to support and sustain their forces: of 328 support ships only 35 were used to reinforce the campaign in Africa, and the cuts were expected to continue\textsuperscript{51}.

Lettow-Vorbeck decided to take only his 2000 best fighters into Mozambique, leaving the rest behind (300 Germans + 1700 Askaris and about 3000 bearers). Apparently, both the British and the Belgians thought that the campaign had ended with the arrival of the Germans in Mozambique and immediately made significant cuts to support and resources, keenly aware that the Portuguese forces could never stop the Germans on their own. Van Deventer was furious when he learned that he did not have either the resources or the units to operate south of the Rovuma, and went so far as to think the Portuguese might still perform a miracle and stop Lettow-Vorbeck. Even Lettow-Vorbeck was surprised by the way the Allies had abandoned the Portuguese in light, as he wrote in his memoirs, of ‘the impossible English order to prevent the Germans from crossing the Rovuma’. Aware of the German advance with two

\textsuperscript{49} Known among South Africans as ‘the South African Knight - Sir Jaap’. One of the most prominent Boer leaders against the British in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902 - probably the first to open fire on the British), he would apparently become one of the more dedicated officers in the service of Great Britain. However, in our opinion, he never forgot the Portuguese support to GB, both in the Anglo-Boer War and in the Boer revolts of 1914. He was second-in-command for General Smuts in the Anglo-Boer war, which means there was long-term loyalty between the two: ‘General Smuts had great confidence in Van Deventer and it is said that he was the only man with whom he confided regarding his plans’. He spoke poor English and often used interpreters to issue orders to the British (http://www.angelfire.com/biz4/bigbrian/sirjaap.html, accessed on 11 June 2015).

\textsuperscript{50} EvocIGG- P. Tip&Bel - NA docs and Anderson, 2014, pp. 184-217.

\textsuperscript{51} Anderson, 2014, pp. 219, 231 and 250.
groups of forces, one to the southwest and another, more powerful, under Lettow-Vorbeck’s command near the Rufiji River, the British decision was clear – to continue to reduce their forces, means, and personnel, and to ‘push the Germans against the exhausted’ Portuguese troops, who, in addition to the factors mentioned above, were also fighting a domestic uprising in Bárue52.

Given that a German incursion into Mozambique was inevitable, Van Deventer’s mission was restated: 1. attacking the Germans whenever possible, causing as much damage as possible (note that protecting or defending the Portuguese was not part of his assigned mission); 2. preventing a potential invasion of Nyasaland; 3. preventing a new incursion into GEA53. While the first of objective wielded some results (rather more favourable to the Germans than to the British, whose numbers had always been - overwhelmingly - superior), only the second objective was achieved.

**Accounts from the land of Mozambique:**

One of the important documents we examined was the diary of Dr Heinrich Schnee, which he wrote for over a year between November 1917 and November 191854.

The situation was complicated for the German forces, as they had been immobilized in the Namuno region from December 1917 until the end of the rainy season in March 1918. They used the time to regain their strength because, in Lettow-Vorbeck’s words, ‘several hundred Askaris were taken prisoner. Valuable medical stores (...) and as a result of the Portuguese experience of centuries of colonial campaigning, of excellent quality, were captured, as well as several thousand kilos of European supplies, large numbers of rifles, six machine-guns and about thirty horses (...) A quarter of a million rounds of ammunition were captured, and this number was increased in the course of December to nearly one million’55. As noted by Pélissier, the populations received the Germans with open arms because they were effectively wearied

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52 Abecassis, 2014, p. 87; Anderson, 2014, pp. 255-258, 263 and Marques, 2012, pp. 114 and 185. “The mobilization of Europeans to fight against the Germans left only one constituency secretary in Bárue (...) and no military forces”. It is noteworthy that, once again, in the uprising in Bárue there was clearly a different stance among the British (who did not care about the ‘humiliation of the Portuguese but did not support the rebels’) and their Boers subjects: ‘Boers carters had helped the rebels near the Rhodesia border’ (Pélissier, 2000, vol. 2, pp. 349 and 355).


54 Document consulted in London at NA: WO 106 1460 – 1917-1918 Diary of Dr. Schnee

The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

and outraged with the ‘contracts forced on the region by the Niassa company’ and also with the ‘compulsory recruitment by the British in 1914’. Furthermore, the psychological action developed by ‘the German propaganda among the Ajaua Muslims (...) countersigned by governor Schnee’ which, among other measures, contained an alleged ‘German conspiracy that sought to destroy the homes of white settlers (with the residents inside) by Muslims who were willing to die’ led to obvious divisions and to an environment of tension and conflict. However, this could be applied to all African territories in general, as there were ‘anti-German Makonde, north of the Ruvuma’ and ‘anti-Portuguese Ajauas in the south’56.

The British voiced their suspicions that the Niassa Company was cooperating with the Germans (which included helping them recruit African troops in the area)57. For Portugal, this was an area where ‘there was no presence of the State (about 25% of Mozambique) (...) by order of a Board of Directors in London where the interests of the Randlords, followed by those of German bankers, reigned supreme’. In reality, it consisted in a ‘private colony inside a Portuguese colony’, which was not in Africa to ‘colonise but to extract the maximum profit’. This finding was confirmed, to much surprise, by the successive Portuguese expeditions sent from the mainland and, in addition to the factors mentioned above, it might provide an explanation as to why ‘the Germans, who were bitterly hated by their subjects, were never seen as enemies by Mozambicans’58. The British clearly stated that the Germans had power over the Company, as we could read in one of the documents collected: ‘Mr Pieter Vuyk from Amsterdam admitted he owned the shares on behalf of German companies’. General Smuts stated in the same document that it was in the interest of Great Britain to acquire the German stocks before the war ended, if it wanted to control the wealthy region and the access to the extremely important Port Amelia in the future. Smuts also added that the company was deliberately ‘corrupt and cruel’59.

In March, the British forces intensified their attacks on the Germans from Muite. In April the enemy ‘came so close that they had to evacuate Namuno’ and head to Nanungu. They reached Nanungu in mid-May. Agreeing with

56 In addition to several other motives, mentioned in: PÉLISSIER, 2000, vol. 2, pp. 406 - 409.
57 ‘The Makonde column led by Major Cunha, tasked with opening 14 kilometers of road (...) between 27 April and 14 June 1917 (...) destroyed 150 indigenous villages and was involved in several skirmishes with angry populations who were discontent with the actions of the Niassa Company’ (Marques, 2012, p. 207).
59 EvocIGG- P. Tip&Bel; 1917, NA T1 12131, pp., 7 and 8.
the words of Goodwin, a captured British Colonel, Schnee did not miss the opportunity to voice his opinion of the Portuguese: ‘I would not give a pound for 1000 of them, they are more of a danger than a help’60.

The reasons for the British declared lack of assistance to the Portuguese became increasingly clear and obvious - the British ambassador was asked to transmit the message that Smuts/Deventer wanted heard, to convince the other colonial powers that Portugal was unable to rule the African peoples. The key was to convey the image that the indigenous populations hated the Portuguese and only the South Africans knew how to deal with them (with their trademark roughness). Thus, the words of the British ambassador could not have been clearer: ‘The Portuguese authorities in the colonies are unable to govern the territories and are opposed by the native populations’. But Colonel Sousa Rosa, commander of the last Portuguese expedition, was keenly aware that, as Smuts had always argued, ‘the orders were to force the Portuguese to fight in the most inhospitable and dangerous regions of the Rovuma to allow the British forces freedom of action’ and that statement was also widely known to be ‘true’, contributing to further damage the reputation of the Portuguese administration.

Without going into detail about the Mozambique campaign, we have selected a few relevant passages from the German governor’s journal. The Germans attacked the Namacurra railway station, which at the time was also defended by British forces, who eventually escaped. During the pursuit, the British eventually attempted to cross the Namacurra River, leaving behind weapons and equipment, and at least 100 men drowned. The Portuguese officers and a few British noncommissioned officers who had not fled were taken prisoner. During the sack, the German victors indulged in unruliness, as many were drunk (and nearly passed out along the road, while others displayed violent behaviour, including one who began to fire his weapon indiscriminately), and even prevented a large part of the supplies from being distributed61. The interpretations of the fighting in Namacurra, which can be described as biased, are reinforced in Anderson’s work62 and in other British or South African sources. Although there were no doubts about the undisciplined withdrawal by the British, as well as, of course, by the Portuguese, several critics have tried to place the blame solely on the Portuguese forces. Of the many interpretations, the following is noteworthy, and in our opinion the most accurate: ‘the exhausted Portuguese and the newly-arrived English were easy prey for the Germans (...)

60 Schnee, 1917-1918, pp. 134-137.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

the Anglo-Portuguese force withstood more than twenty German attacks (...) among those who drowned was Lieutenant Colonel Gore-Brown, commander (...) ten Portuguese prisoners and four English prisoners63.

Even Lettow-Vorbeck himself admitted in his memoirs that the abandonment of the Portuguese was deliberate, stating that: ‘Deventer summoned me to surrender (...) our invasion of the Portuguese territory had put him at a loss (...) Neither he nor General Smuts had ever thought of sending a summons to surrender when the situation was favourable [to them]’64. Sousa Rosa became Van Deventer’s scapegoat, and he was eventually called back to Lisbon and arrested on arrival but, in London, the British awarded him the ‘Order of the Bath’ (had it all been charm diplomacy or was there a different kind of understanding between Pretoria and London?).

According to Schnee, the Portuguese territories were more fertile, had more water and more people worked and lived there than in the German territories across the border. They crossed the Malle River near Ossiwa and headed northeast under attack from the other bank of the river, suffering many losses, especially among the Askaris. En route, there was a clash with a British battalion, and after one battle the battalion was defeated and the commander and his general staff (who had no weapons and surrendered at once) were captured. Large quantities of ammunition, machine guns and rifles were seized. While the Portuguese forces were faced with this kind of situation in their ill-located and scattered defensive outposts, as we could see, the much larger and better supported British forces also had to deal with it frequently. In the aftermath of the attack, and after the British had surrendered, many of the German Askaris opened fire on the British Askaris, even after they had laid down their arms65.

On 3 June 1918, after a fierce attack and pursuit by 8 to 10 British companies, the Kohl detachments joined the General Wahle’s detachments and headed toward Koriwa. On 15 June, the forces arrived to Alto Molocue, a Portuguese town previously occupied by Muller’s detachment, which had captured a Portuguese captain during the operation. The operations in Mozambique were eloquently described by a German officer, who stated: ‘We chase the Portuguese, and the English chase us’66. This was the first Portuguese

64 Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923.
settlement Schnee had encountered which he had deemed well-built and well-planned, with beautiful and functional buildings\textsuperscript{67}.

The British (under Fitzcol’s command) were defeated in Namirrue and failed to prevent the crossing of the Molocue River. Already outside the Portuguese territory, Van Deventer then attacked the British leaders, blaming NORFORCE for lack of initiative and determination, but it was also acknowledged that the global strategy that had been defined was clearly failing\textsuperscript{68}. In between the exhaustive description of the daily activities in the campaign, there was constant criticism of the sacrifice asked of the troops when compared with the results, ‘on 31 August 1918 it was decided that the march would continue; it was promptly attacked by enemy patrols and many of the porters fled\textsuperscript{69}. Part of the encampment that had been left behind was captured and large quantities of supplies were taken. The march was carried out through difficult mountain terrain. In the end, in the meeting with General Wahle, it was confirmed that the gear and everything else that had been left behind was in the enemy’s possession, and that there were countless dead, wounded and prisoners\textsuperscript{70}.

As they approached German and British territory, the African troops deserted the German forces, ‘in only two days 300 of the most experienced carriers deserted while over 200 prisoners of war managed to escape\textsuperscript{71}. Schnee implicated Lettow-Vorbeck in decisions which had affected troop morale, as ‘pressure from the British increased on the flanks and rear of the German column’, forcing them to leave many of the wounded, and a few prisoners, behind. After a night without water, the march resumed on 7 September, and the description of the harrowing conditions becomes even more vivid: ‘The combatants and the African carriers suffer the most - they cough all night, many have severe lung infections, high fever, both from malaria and from common colds. It is the same with the Europeans’. Schnee wrote: ‘As we draw near German territory, the carriers flee’ and ‘aware that the region is densely populated, the natives have all fled\textsuperscript{72}.

\textsuperscript{67} Schnee, 1917-1918, pp. 143-144.
\textsuperscript{68} Anderson, 2014, pp. 260-261 e 284.
\textsuperscript{69} ‘Recruited by force in the villages along the way. All able men were captured and had to carry loads until others were captured to replace them (...) brutal but always effective methods’ (Deventer in PÉLISSIER, 2000, vol. 2, p.423.
\textsuperscript{70} Schnee, 1917-1918, pp. 17-20.
\textsuperscript{71} Anderson, 2014, pp. 260-261, 284, 290-291.
\textsuperscript{72} Schnee, 1917-1918, pp. 28-35.
Schnee criticized other decisions by Lettow-Vorbeck, stating that ‘it does not make sense to sacrifice the German sick by forcing them to follow the march’ and noted, after crossing the Rovuma while leaving Mozambique and returning to the German colony: in 10 months, they went from 278 to 168 Europeans, from 1600/1700 to less than 100 veterans and 300 Askari recruits, from 4000 bearers to less than 2000, in addition to prisoners of war (about 278?), women and children (1000 to 500?); of Schnee’s 10 personal bearers, three were seriously ill, and his horse collapsed and had to be put down. Near Lake Niassa, the desertions among the indigenous troops (both Askaris and bearers) increased despite significant raises in salaries, and those who stayed also expressed their desire to desert and return to their homelands. There were also no more indigenous populations to be captured because the British had forced them to abandon their lands. Finally, there was an increase in thefts within the column (Schnee himself was left without his shaving implements). On 12 November 1918, the column reached Kasama in Rhodesia73.

On 13 November 1918, a telegram arrived announcing that the war was over, and later another stated that the Kaiser had abdicated and gone to Holland. Schnee resumed his duties as governor and sent letters to the Prince Regent (GB) and to General Van Deventer (who commanded the British and Portuguese forces). Von Lettow-Vorbeck was told by the British that the German forces would have to evacuate from East Africa, which meant surrendering the territory to the occupants, and Schnee quickly wrote back expressing his anger at the decision in a clear and heartfelt manner, implying that Lettow-Vorbeck’s impetuous actions were to blame. Schnee rightly felt that they would lose the territories permanently. The forces that remained on 14 November 1918 were: 30 officers, 125 sergeants and European soldiers (a total of 155 Europeans, including Schnee), 1168 Askaris, 1516 bearers, 130 prisoners of war, 482 local bearers, 4410 natives (including women and children). On 26 November, the German troops formally surrendered. General Edwards, representing GB, introduced his officers to Schnee, who greeted all of them back, which Von Lettow-Vorbeck refused to do. There were delays, as the Spanish flu temporarily prevented them from boarding a Belgian vapour to return to Germany and, in the list of prisoners of war received on 29 November 1918, Schnee is referred to as ‘H. Excellency the Governor’; however, Lettow-Vorbeck still did not consider him as such74.

74 Schnee, 1917-1918, pp. 102-107, 110-120.
Schnee wrote in his diary that Von Lettow-Vorbeck had formally complained to the British about the treatment of prisoners and had not even informed him beforehand. Throughout the diary, Schnee frequently used just the letter ‘L’, or simply ‘Commander’ when he wrote (very seldom) about Von Lettow-Vorbeck.

On November 14, the total German losses were 3509 dead and 3731 wounded among the Europeans and 14,252 dead and wounded among the Askaris, in addition to two European and 2847 Askari deserters. In the same list are also mentioned 917,000 casualties among British forces in East Africa. Lettow-Vorbeck wrote in his memoirs that, during the Great War in Africa, and against the Germans, 130 generals and a total 300,000 combatants went into battle, suffering 20,000 casualties among European troops, 40,000 among indigenous and Indian troops, as well as 140,000 solipeds. Portugal recorded over 100,000 deaths among the local population.

Had it all been worth it? Schnee left the question unanswered.

**Final thoughts**

What Wellington tried to do in the Peninsular War between 1808 and 1814, that is, to attract as many French forces as he could to the Iberian Peninsula to weaken Napoleon in Central Europe, Lettow-Vorbeck also tried to do in GEA between 1914 and 1918. His goal was achieved and effectively fulfilled but, as could be seen, at a high cost. In the end, he had attracted the enemy forces and had worn them down severely, but he also had been left with no territory and no room to negotiate. Unlike Wellington, who had the Portuguese forces, militias and ordinances in Portuguese territory to guarantee his safety and the defence of a sanctuary, Portugal, Lettow-Vorbeck did not have local allies or regional support when taking his army beyond the borders of GEA. The populations at their rear surrendered to new occupants or simply attempted to restore their independence.

It was essentially a proxy war. The local populations were the ones who participated in larger numbers as combatants (including the Askaris), as auxiliaries (especially the bearers), and as collateral damage - with hundreds of thousands of victims scattered over multiple vast regions. Those affected

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75 Schnee, 1917-1918, p. 126; Lettow-Vorbeck, 1923, p. 23; Abecassis, 2014, p. 135; The Portuguese side recorded, during the four years of the war, 39,201 combatants, including those sent in from Europe (19,438) plus those living in Mozambique and the indigenous troops, with 2007 Europeans dying, plus approximately three times that number of African soldiers, and an ‘incalculable number of anonymous bearers’ (Marques, 2012, p. 18).
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

did not benefit whatsoever from the objectives and were simply victims who suffered the effects of those objectives, which they did not propose nor defend, and also never wanted.

Not a single colonial power engaged in warfare had been ready to fight the others at the beginning of the war. The forces, the recruitment system, the organization and the military equipment were designed only to maintain internal order and eventually to deal with frequent uprisings and insurgency by the local populations. The German initiative meant they adapted more rapidly but, generally, all countries were ill-prepared to fight. The difference was noticeable in the way each colonial power reacted and profoundly altered its political, economic and military means to meet the increased operational needs. When the operational needs increased, the efforts followed suit, and as the objectives were achieved those efforts were immediately slackened. These shifts were clearer in the resources made available by Great Britain and Belgium, especially as German forces drew nearer and later entered Mozambique.

In addition to a pre-existing situation of grave political and structural chaos, Portugal possessed far less human, material and financial assets than their allies. Against the same enemy, the forces of GEA, the British had 30,000 to 60,000 combatants permanently available (not including bearers), Belgian had several tens of thousands and both employed a great deal of efforts, time and resources in structuring and building complete support and sustain systems (from a reliable system of payments for fighters and bearers to appropriate lines of communication to support hospitals and distribution of ammunition and food). Portugal never reached ten thousand combatants, their largest expedition consisting of less than 5000 men, and, because it had a vast inhospitable area to defend, found it extremely difficult to concentrate their power and decisively influence the outcome of the fighting. The Portuguese effort was huge in national terms but small when compared to the size of allied army, which was described at one point as ‘an allied Army with an accumulated personnel between approximately 250,000 and 210,000 men’ or, for example, the case of the KAR, which had ‘at least ten times more numbers than the German forces’. In addition to this challenge, Mozambique had practically no support bases, much less lines of communication with proper support logistics. However, it is worth mentioning that it was a tremendous effort made by Portugal, at high cost; none described the gravity of the situation better than René Pélissier: ‘all the colonial campaigns in Mozambique from 1855 to 1917 combined had caused
less dead among the Portuguese than their intervention in the Great War in East Africa.  

The political and strategic objectives were established in an uncoordinated and inconsistent manner. As for Germany, even before the war, the absence of political control of military action had already been addressed with a change from the military administration of the German provinces to a civilian administration, but the definition of the campaign objectives in the event of war remained in the hands of the military commander. Thus, it was Lettow-Vorbeck who defined the level of political ambition and Schnee was often the one presenting tactical concerns, as we could read in the reports and diaries of both men. The policy advocated by the governor, of trying to hold the territory until the end of the war, was not successful, and the strategy devised by the military commander, who had markedly global goals, did not prevent the total loss of all German territories Africa, although it was partially achieved. In the case of Great Britain, there was a clear strong difference of political objectives between the leaders of the Union of South Africa and the policies issued by London. South Africa was more interested in Mozambique than in GEA and was willing to employ considerable means to capture it, and, while London agreed in part with those plans, there were other strategists who advised a more moderate effort to circumscribe the German action to its own territory (as Kitchener wanted). In Portugal, the political goals were thoroughly ill-suited to the military capabilities. In essence, given the limited resources and meagre conditions available, there was a lack of diplomatic ability to coordinate the overall war effort and a lack of determination in demanding that local interests be subject to national interests, as in the case of the Niassa Company and of many local merchants.

The mutual accusations of aggressive behaviour against the populations and the constant insults between combatants are a testament to the frustration caused by the many campaign objectives which no one could effectively achieve. Great Britain failed to prevent the German incursions into several of its territories, including BEA, and the German retreat into Mozambique, and also failed to control their final re-entry into GEA and, later, into Rhodesia. The Belgians, who had at first felt a profound impact on their territory in Europe, were the only ones to achieve the objectives outlined for their


77 ‘The local economy was soaring: in November 1915, a chicken could be bought for 10 or 12 cents, and in March 1916 it already cost 50 cents (...) in Lourenço Marques (...) the well-dressed men in luxury cars who entered the HQ (...) were suppliers of the military expedition’ (Marques, 2012: 33 and 215).
territory, and perhaps for that reason were the ones who least blamed others and seldom traded accusations - when things went sour, they terminated their cooperation, and when they felt respected again, resumed the cooperation. The Germans did not manage to gain the support of the regions they crossed and they could not hold their territory. The Portuguese were unable to achieve success in their offensive operations or to prevent the German incursion into Mozambique, or to form an effective alliance with the allies.

In the end, everyone lost much and a few gained little, but the price was also extremely high. The price paid in lives and resources was huge. The disfavour and sacrifices imposed on the local populations left deep marks on every territory. The ill-will caused by the accusations and mutual recriminations between and within each nation was deeply ungainly, petty and deceitful, as it was only the expression of the deep frustration felt by those who had failed in fully achieving their objectives. It is but human nature; as the Portuguese saying goes, when it all fails, when there is nothing left, ‘everyone fights and no one is right’. The only thing left was the future recognition of the art of war and the respect for the actions of Lettow-Vorbeck, but it was a small consolation built on much bitterness and suffering.

**Works cited**


The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War


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The *Guarda Republicana* of Lourenço Marques

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**Dedication**

To my grandfather, Lieutenant Joaquim José de Moura, who ‘participated in the operations against the Germans in East Africa from 1914-1919’.

(in Registo de Matrícula (Official Military Service Record) do Tenente Joaquim José de Moura, Arquivo Geral do Exército, which states that there was a ‘150% increase in service time in Mozambique between 14 August 1914 and 15 April 1919 (combat zone’).

**Introduction**

From 1914 onwards, security and law enforcement in all areas of southern Mozambique was assigned to the *Guarda Republicana* of Lourenço Marques (GRLM), replacing the *Guarda Cívica* which had until then been responsible for performing similar duties in the region. The GRLM took on the missions of occupation and military policing of the territory, internal security and public order, immigration police, as well as other animal health and game services, and even took on responsibilities as fiscal guard within and along the borders with the British colony of the Union of South Africa, which had been established in 1910, and the British protectorate of Swaziland.

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1 South Africa Act 1909 - Act of the British Parliament that created the Union of South Africa, which comprised the British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange River (Orange River Colony) and Transvaal. Only the Transvaal colony to the west and the Natal colony to the south had a southern border with the colony of Mozambique.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

The GRLM subunits were also equipped and prepared to carry out combat operations, columns security and reconnaissance. For that reason, the force was employed in the campaigns in northern Mozambique, fighting the Germans between 1916 and 1918.

Special conditions were given for its constitution, most importantly a careful recruitment process, as all officers were career officers from the Army School, the European other ranks were recruited in the mainland, preferably from the Guarda National Republicana (GNR) and the Guarda Fiscal, whose men possessed competencies which were difficult to find in 1914, as they had to ‘know how to read, write and count’, without forgetting that the native soldiers were selected among the best of the Landim, who were known as ‘the fearsome Mozambican soldiers, whom Gungunhana claimed as having the keenest warrior instinct’ (Sá, 1992)².

The formation of the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques

To understand the genesis of the GRLM, it is necessary to analyse certain important documents, including the correspondence between the Government of the Colony of Mozambique, seated in Lourenço Marques, and the Government of the Republic in Lisbon, which led to Decree No. 58 of 24 July 1913 of the Ministério das Colónias.

This statute, originally published in the Diário da República³, was published in the Ordens do Exército more than sixteen months later⁴ on 11 December 1914, at a time when the great European powers were already involved in the First World War, which Portugal would only join in 1916.

As for the text published in 1913, we found that it was preceded by a preamble that is not included in the version of the Ordem do Exército of 1914, and which is highly relevant to understand the origins of the GRLM.

This preamble mentions a decree of 17 April 1911, through which ‘a special corps of troops, the Guarda Cívica of Lourenço Marques, was created in Mozambique⁵, which ‘due to the way it was organised and to the recruitment

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⁵ Portugal, [Decreto do Governo de 17 de abril de 1911 s/ n.°], in Diário da República, n.º 96 (26 de abril de 1911), p. 1710.
conditions could effectively guarantee the public order and the defence of that colony\textsuperscript{6}.

The analysis of the 1911 decree revealed that the organization of the Guarda Cívica was based on the structure of an infantry company (Article 3), with about 230 European troops, commanded by a captain (Article 1), recruited from the active Army, the Guarda Fiscal, the Guarda National Republicana and the Policia Cívica (article 2). However, the recruitment was carried out mainly in the Policia Cívica and the Guarda Fiscal and, as we shall see, the corps did not demonstrate a satisfactory degree of discipline and cohesion in the conduct of its difficult task.

Already in December 1912, the dismissal of the Commander of the Guarda Cívica by the Secretary for the Colonies, in Lisbon, at the request of the governor-general of Mozambique, on the grounds that the Guarda Cívica of Lourenço Marques did not receive the ‘clear and manifest support required from the official stations it answered to in this Province\textsuperscript{7}, revealed that this corps had been discredited and that there was an urgent need to replace it.

For this reason, it can be read in the preamble to Decree No. 58, that it was necessary to ‘mitigate the expenses incurred in the constitution of that unit, and, on the other hand, to organize a military corps which, in addition to being capable of cooperating in the important service of occupation and security of the territory, could also carry out the duties of a purely administrative police for the civil divisions, of special emigration police, of urban police, and also serve as a fiscal guard\textsuperscript{8}.

There was certainly obvious concern with providing the southern region of the Colony of Mozambique, the only portion of the colony that had not been granted to a chartered company \textsuperscript{9}, with a new elite force recruited among the best military personnel, as can be seen from the recruitment requirements:

\begin{quote}
To fully execute this mission, it is necessary to conduct a recruitment process appropriate for this particular corps, and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{6} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{7} AHU. Ministério das Colónias. Direcção Geral das Colónias. 5ª Repartição. [Ofício s/n.º]

\textsuperscript{8} Preamble to Decree No. 58. Op. Cit.

\textsuperscript{9} Chartered companies (or privileged companies) were private companies holding a government grant letter conferring them the right to certain trade privileges. In those regions of the colonies administered by concession, public power was not exercised directly through sovereign state bodies, but was instead entrusted by the State to these commercial companies that exercised that power under government supervision. The Niassa Company (1890), the Mozambique Company (1891) and the Zambezia Company (1892) were all operating in Mozambique in 1914.
the personnel should, when possible, be constituted with other ranks with experience in the military, who, for their experience in the ranks and the discipline acquired, can set an example in the colony and for their cohesion and homogeneity can assert their authority over the native peoples, over whom they should exert influence more for the conscientious performance of their duties and self-respect than for the employment and action of force.

The Republican Guard will be assigned another service, no less important: that of civil police for Lourenço Marques.

The honourable traditions passed down by the old police force for the supervision of Lourenço Marques, at a time when the recruitment of staff was conducted with scrupulous care and the command was assigned to a carefully selected elite of officers, a corps which performed the difficult service of civilian police, worthy of the highest praise; and, on the other hand, the discredit which befell the current civil police corps in that city, with several recent investigations having revealed the irregular manner in which the service operated, caused this task to be assigned to the Guarda Republicana, which will be constituted as soon as the current guards in the civil police force complete their service time\(^\text{10}\).

Whether the replacement of a security force of a predominantly civil nature by a republican guard was motivated by lack of discipline, cohesion or example, there were other possible issues, which may include political motives, and the financial argument was also not forgotten.

The salaries of the military personnel and of the other civil servants in the colonies were greatly reinforced with additional service bonuses as compensation for the harsh conditions and the distance from their families. The salaries of the Guarda Cívica, which was wholly manned by European personnel, were considerable, as can be seen in the constituent statute that defined the salary scales. The civic police officers had evidently higher salaries than the officers serving in Army units, and even higher than the officers of the future Guarda Republicana, and the costs of the European other ranks of the civic police were particularly high. On the other hand, the native soldiers had much lower salaries than the Europeans (a ratio of one to four) and were more easily recruited; therefore, the native companies led by European officers and sergeants were an interesting solution in many respects.

But how could a Guarda Republicana be created with more personnel and stricter recruitment without increasing spending?

\(^{10}\) Ibidem.
Once more, the solution to the problem is explained in the preamble of Decree No. 58:

The officers, sergeants and other ranks of the Guarda Republicana must, however, be attributed special salaries higher than those of other garrison units in the province, which will not result in an increase in expenditure, as the Guarda Cívica, the dragoon squadron, and the 12th Native infantry company will be extinct\textsuperscript{11}.

That is, to constitute the new Guarda Republicana, the Guarda Cívica, as well as the Dragoon Squadron, the Native Company and the 12th Native Company had to be extinct to create budgetary availability. Therefore, the Guarda Republicana consisted of a mounted company of European troops, taking advantage of the horses that had belonged to the extinct dragoon squad, and in an native company recruited among the best landins soldiers of the 12th Company, which was also extinct.

Unusually for a legal diploma, in the preamble to Decree No. 58 can also be found the overall expected savings, comparing the costs of the Guarda Cívica with those of the future GRLM.

On the one hand, global savings of 6.555\textdollar400 (about 135 thousand euros\textsuperscript{12}) were expected in operating budgets, as the costs of the Republican Guard were estimated at 169.314\textdollar000 (3.50 million euros), while saving, among other costs, 175.869\textdollar400 (3.65 million euros) on the three extinct units: 22.122\textdollar650 (457 thousand euros) from the dragoon squadron, 19.472\textdollar750 (402 thousand euros) from the Native Company and 134.274\textdollar000 (2.78 million euros) from the Guarda Cívica.

On the other hand, the service time required of the new guard personnel was doubled, reducing the costs in the transport of European staff to the mainland, as well as in the allowances and expenses for officers and enlistment bonuses of other ranks in a total 16.492\textdollar600 (about 340 thousand euros). Another way to cut spending was to cut the salaries of corporals and soldiers of the guard, which would be lower than those of corporals and guards in the civic

\textsuperscript{11} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{12} After calculating the currency devaluation coefficients to be applied to the assets and rights disposed during 2014, Portaria No. 281/2014 of 30 December. These values are mentioned as a reference only, as they do not factor in account the real values of the cost of living. In any case, to provide a basis for comparison, according to these calculations the monthly basic salary of a Commander of the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Major, 65\$000, would be equivalent to €1343, but with the respective arm bonus (15\$000) and special guard bonus (210\$000) would amount to a monthly salary of nearly 6000 euros.
police, with the remaining graduate staff maintaining the same salaries, in a total 38.512$600 (over 796 thousand euros).

The extinction of the civil police was thus justified, as it was more expensive and it was replaced by a more disciplined, more cohesive, more professional, and above all less costly military guard.

A detailed analysis of Decree 58 will allow us to understand the mission and characteristics of the GRLM.

The GRLM was created by the Government of Portugal at the proposal of the governor of Mozambique, and was tasked with performing duties of policing and inspection of the territory of the Mozambique province, under the direct administration of the State, south of the Save, encompassing the provinces of Lourenço Marques (22,000 square kilometres), Gaza (75,000 square kilometres) and Inhambane (68,000 square kilometres), a region with an area equivalent to almost twice that of mainland Portugal (article 1). Its area of responsibility had borders with the territories of the Mozambique Company to the north and the British colony of the Union of South Africa and the protectorate of Swaziland to the west and south, and its headquarters were established in the city of Lourenço Marques (Moura, 2015, p. 16-17).

The GRLM consisted in a General Staff, a European mounted infantry company and an native foot infantry company with a total personnel of about 460 men and 110 horses, which translated into 12 officers, 18 sergeants and 224 European other ranks, as well as 206 native other ranks\(^\text{13}\), and this staff could effectively be increased, by order of the governor-general, by 50% of the numbers fixed (sole paragraph of Article 6). According to General Ramires de Oliveira ‘the organic personnel of the two companies was always significantly increased’ (1994, vol. 3, p.371).

The tasks assigned to the GRLM were the occupation and military policing of the territory, the policing of roads, villages and farms, special immigration police and other police services, particularly animal health and game, as well as fiscal guard services within and along the borders of the territory (article 2), expanding the responsibilities previously assigned to the Guarda Cívica.

These many different missions meant that the Guard answered to several leaders of the Colony, in particular ‘the competent military authorities; the competent administrative authorities; the intendant of native affairs and immigration, and delegates; and the director of the customs circle and respective delegates’ (Article 4).

\(^{13}\) For the detailed organization, see Annex A.
The post of commander of the Guard was reserved for an army officer from the mainland who had attended the course of his respective arm and held the rank of major, and who could be reassigned the command if he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel in the meantime (art. 7). However, the duties of commander could be performed, exceptionally, by an officer with the rank of captain should he, ‘having rendered important services in the province, meet all the requirements for command’ (sole paragraph, art. 7).

This practice was soon implemented with the appointment of the first commander of the GRLM in July 1913, which meant the scales table for this position had to be clarified in Decree No. 72814 which approved draft law No. 171-E presented in the Senate meeting on 28 June 1914, as follows:

‘Article 1. The commander of the Republican Guard of Lourenço Marques, while holding the rank of captain, will receive as pay the salary and bonus defined for his rank, plus the special command bonus fixed in Table 2 in the annex to the decree of 24 July 1913 for a lieutenant colonel or a major in command’15.

This meant that a captain who was commander of the GRLM would earn a special bonus equivalent to that of a major/lieutenant colonel, resulting in an overall monthly salary nearly 40% higher than his subordinate captains in command of companies.

The first Commander of the GRLM was a young Cavalry captain, Carlos Alberto da Guerra Quaresma, appointed by Ministerial Order 30 July 1913, at only 32 years of age. Born in Elvas on 15 April 1881, he was a former student of the Escola Militar and the Escola do Exército who received recognition for being a lieutenant in command of a cavalry squadron in operations in Vinhais, in October 1911, against royalist conspirators, during the incursion by Paiva Couceiro’s rebels. Captain Quaresma, a republican liberal, was later dismissed on 21 March 1915 by the governor-general, General Joaquim José Machado (1847-1925), an army officer with monarchic affiliations, who had been governor during the monarchy, resulting in a public campaign by the Republican media and nearly in a popular uprising in the capital, Lourenço Marques. The newspaper O Incondicional (an evolutionist Republican weekly) in a front-page piece entitled ‘For Justice’, called for:

So pleased the Governor General, who, with a simple and laconic order issued on 21 of the present month, committed, according to self-respecting people, the most aggravating violence. It pleased, I feel in my conscience, a certain treacherous and vengeful coterie which survives in the shadows and replenishes itself in the ponds, tirelessly and continuously laying its well-organised and methodical groundwork, knowing all, permanently mining the field, conquering positions, permanently wounding, permanently stabbing all those who express Republican and liberal feelings.

This issue of O Incondicional was also accompanied by a supplement entitled ‘For Justice - the people of Lourenço Marques’, which featured an impassioned speech claiming that ‘...his dismissal was an act of violence and a vicious persecution orchestrated by the monarchists in this city. Cowardly, from the shadows, they plot the most infamous persecutions against Republican individuals.

17 AHM. Divisões. Portugal e as Campanhas na Europa. 1ª República (1ª fase). Revoltas e Incursões Monárquicas (1910 - 1914). Caixa 06.
18 Joaquim José Machado (Lagos, 24 September 1847 - Lisbon, 22 February 1925) engineer, Portuguese military officer and politician. He gained renown as Governor of the Mozambique Province (1890-91; 1900; 1914-1915), of the Mozambique Company and of the Portuguese Indias, and as Director of Public Works of Moçâmedes.
19 O Incondicional. A. 5, n.º 158 (29/04/1915).
20 O Incondicional. A. 5, n.º 158, supl (29/04/1915).
The commotion among Republican circles in Lourenço Marques was significant and his departure by train to Cape Town and subsequent return to Lisbon led the association *Grémio Cruzeiro do Sul* to issue a pamphlet calling for a demonstration of support at the Lourenço Marques railway station\(^{21}\). Captain Quaresma returned to Lisbon after his dismissal, but General Joaquim Machado was also dismissed from the office of governor-general of Mozambique a few days later, in May 1915, and was replaced by Colonel Alfredo Baptista Coelho\(^{22}\), who remained in office only four months until October that same year, when he was replaced by Álvaro Xavier de Castro\(^{23}\), who remained in office until April 1918.

The conflict between the Governor-general and the GRLM command had begun in December 1914, when the Governor proposed to the Minister of Colonies that the GRLM corps be extinct and two independent Republican Guard companies be constituted with mixed contingents of European and native troops, one for Lourenço Marques and another for Inhambane\(^{24}\).

Indeed, due to its importance in the colony and the visibility of its actions, the GRLM command could potentially oppose the power of the Governor-general, who therefore considered it a threat.

Let us return to the wording of Decree No. 58, which reveals that the recruitment of officers for the GRLM was highly selective, as these officers were required to be volunteers from the cavalry or infantry arms of the mainland army who had attended the course of the respective arm, that is, who had attended the exclusive Army School (article 8), thus excluding the officers from the sergeants course, for their support to the republican regime, and noncommissioned officers. The wording of the provision also established

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\(^{21}\) AHU. Ministério das Colónias. Direção Geral das Colónias. 5ª Repartição.

\(^{22}\) Alfredo Baptista Coelho (24 December 1865-1952). Army officer who fought in the pacification campaigns in Mozambique and who was appointed governor general of that colony on 8 May 1915. He integrated the CEP sent to France, returning on 22 January 1918. Later that year, on 23 December, he became secretary for the Colonies until 27 January 1919. He later became military general director of the Secretariat of State for the Colonies. He joined the reserves in 31 December 1925 and retired ten years later.

\(^{23}\) Álvaro Xavier de Castro (Guarda, 9 November 1878 - Coimbra, 29 June 1928) was a Portuguese Infantry Major and a politician of the First Republic who participated in the Constitutional Board that ruled Portugal after the overthrow of General Pimenta de Castro’s dictatorship government, in 1915. Among other duties, he later held the office of Governor-General of Mozambique (between 1915 and 1918) and he was twice president of the Ministry (which now corresponds to the office of prime minister).

The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

how to deal with the officers who underperformed. These officers could be dismissed from the Guard service at the request of their commander and find themselves completing their remaining service time in the Mozambique garrison, but with their salaries reduced to those of an ‘ordinary commission’ (sole paragraph, art. 8).

The preferential conditions for the appointment of officers and sergeants consisted in having ‘rendered outstanding services overseas’, having accumulated the ‘most service time overseas’, especially in the Mozambique province, and the ‘most campaign service time’ (art. 9).

As for the European other ranks who would constitute the mounted infantry company, priority was given to volunteers from the Guarda Nacional Republicana and the mainland Guarda Fiscal. Only when these non-commissioned were not sufficient could volunteers be mobilised from different units constituted in the mainland and from their reserve troops, which eventually occurred. The prerequisites consisted in being between 24 and 35 years old, demonstrating good military and civilian behaviour, possessing the robustness needed to serve in the Colony of Mozambique colony, being more than 1.65 meters tall and, the most challenging requirement in an illiterate country, ‘knowing how to read, write and count’ (article 10). There were two other preferential conditions: being an other rank reinstated into active service, thus giving precedence to experience, and being a shooter 1st class (Article 11), which favoured operational competence.

However, some difficulties occurred in the initial recruitment of European soldiers for the GRLM, as can be seen in the following excerpt from a document of the 5th Division of the General Directorate of the Colonies, 1915:

... and we struggled to effectively form the current Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques, because the Guarda Fiscal in the mainland had only two squadrons, the Guarda Nacional Republicana could not spare the soldiers who had not completed their service time, and there was a shortage of staff in the mainland army due to its noncommissioned personnel, and because most other ranks cannot read, write and count and also do not reach the minimum height requirement of 1.65 m...²⁵

The recruitment of native soldiers was demonstrably easier owing to less stringent regulations and to the demobilization of the 12th Native

²⁵ AHU. Ministério das Colónias. Direção Geral das Colónias. 5ª Repartição. Moçambique. G 6/12
Company. It was conducted according to the ‘Regulation for the recruitment of native forces in the Mozambique province’ of 14 July 1906, and the recruits had to demonstrate good conduct, had to be volunteers from one of Lourenço Marques or Inhambane provinces, and had to be from the other rank grades reincorporated in the Colony’s native units (article 12).

Furthermore, it was defined that the service time in the GRLM was four years for officers and for European other ranks (Article 13), and that they would enjoy all the advantages conferred, then or in the future, to the non-commissioned ranks in the overseas military units (article 14).

A rather favourable salary scale was established in addition to these advantages, as well as benefits such as the right to housing and a readmission bonus (Article 14). According to the Decree signed by Manuel de Arriaga on 6 September 1914, ‘... it was for this purpose that all were compelled to serve for four years in that corps, and were granted as compensation special salaries higher than those established for other units in the province garrison’. A limitation on the recruitment of officers was that they should not expect to be promoted during their service, with the exception of sublieutenants, and thus, the co-opted lieutenants and captains were relatively new to their post.

The monthly salary of a GRLM commander with the rank of lieutenant colonel or major, was 65$00 (in the old currency, which corresponds to about €1343), to which were added the gratification of their respective Arm 15$00 (about €310) and a special guard bonus of 210$00 (about €4339), that is, the monthly salary came up to 290$00, the equivalent of almost six thousand euros, about three times more than a colonel’s reserve pension in the mainland at the time, which was approximately 100$000 (approximately €2050).

All non-commissioned ranks had to acquire their own uniform (article 16) but there were, however, other compensations for graduates and European other ranks to make up for the cost. The first, defined in article 17 of the statute, granted the right to a free concession of land at the end of each full four-year commission, preferably near fiscal outposts, with a size of fifty hectares for officers, thirty for sergeants and equivalent, and ten for corporals, soldiers and
equivalent. At the end of the eighth year, a new concession could be granted if at least half of the first concession had been properly exploited and built upon (art. 17 and Table 3). The second compensation ensured the other ranks returning to the mainland would be granted entry into the corps to which they belonged, in the same conditions as when they left, or in the conditions which they had obtained legally, such as in the case of promotions and service time (art. 20), and officers were guaranteed placement on the corps to which they belonged, if they wished to and if a vacancy was available, or of filling the first vacancy available for those positions (article 21).

It was a thorough statute, which offered very attractive conditions for service in the Colony. It was not, therefore, surprising that the company troops, despite the initial recruitment difficulties, often ranked higher than the actual approved troops, as mentioned above (Oliveira, 1994, vol. 3, p.371).

The Republican Guard of Lourenço Marques in combat against the Germans

In Mozambique, the GRLM was responsible for security and policing of all areas of the southern region of the colony, and was capable of performing typical guard tasks such as occupation and military policing of the territory, internal security and public order, immigration policing and other animal health and game services, and also as fiscal guard within the territory and along the border with the colonies of South Africa and Rhodesia, and was also prepared to perform combat operations, column security and reconnaissance.

Indeed, the GRLM was acknowledged as the best military force in Mozambique, not only the best-trained and with the most capabilities for military intervention, as can be seen in various contemporary and later works.

General Ramires de Oliveira, in the volume of his work on the history of the Portuguese Army (1910-1945) dedicated to the Great War, stated that ‘The Guard of Lourenço Marques, with European and native infantry and cavalry troops, was the only force with a proper structure, highly trained and with high combat capability’ (Oliveira, 1994, vol. 3, p.199).

However, the writings of Army officers who participated in campaigns in Mozambique during this period may help us better understand the role played by the GRLM in the campaigns against the Germans north of the Mozambique province, near the border with the German colony, known as Deutsch-Ostafrika, which included the territories later known as Tanganyika (the mainland portion of what is now Tanzania), Burundi and Rwanda.
Their role was mentioned, for example, by Colonel Eduardo Azambuja Martins, Chief of Staff of the 3rd expedition to Mozambique, who wrote extensively on the subject in monographs such as *O Soldado Africano de Moçambique*, 1936, *Expedição a Moçambique*, 1935, *Operações Militares no Barué*, 1917, and some thirty-five articles published in *Revista Militar*, in addition to having contributed the sixth part in the work *Portugal na Grande Guerra* (1934-1935), directed by General Ferreira Martins, entitled ‘A campanha de Moçambique’ (1935).

*Figure 2 - Portugal in the Great War (1934-1935). Face. Source: Martins, Ferreira, dir., Portugal na Grande Guerra, Lisboa: Ática, 1934-1935.*
We shall now highlight a few statements from this last work, by Azambuja Martins (1935):

On 18 May [1916] the Governor-General [Álvaro Xavier de Castro] embarked in Lourenço Marques and set out for the Rovuma, following the reinforcements he had managed to mobilize in the Colony, forming a European mounted infantry company of the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques and an native company of the same unit (which was considered elite, with all officers having completed the course of their respective arm)\(^{30}\).

It was he who insisted most strongly on the immediate crossing of the Rovuma, even before the arrival of the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques, which was the force with the greatest esprit de corps\(^ {31}\).

Sublieutenant Pais de Ramos, who was in command of the Guarda Republicana platoon, entered the river to conduct reconnaissance, was saved by two native soldiers under enemy fire. The officer and the native soldiers were awarded the War Cross\(^ {32}\).

On 27 May [1916] we did not wait for the Guarda Republicana, which was the best colonial force but, in September, the General did not want to repeat this unforgivable error of not concentrating his forces for a decisive operation like the river crossing\(^ {33}\).

The flag was raised on the flagpole of the small fort and the top two native companies, the 21st and the Republican Guard of Lourenço Marques moved to the advanced posts\(^ {34}\).

Brave effort by Captain Curado and his 21st and some good native platoons, one of the Republican Guard and another from the 22nd, after having cooperated in a fierce advance guard combat, which fully deserved to be honoured in a monograph\(^ {35}\).

From 1915 until 1918 in northern Mozambique forces and detachments of the GRLM, belonging both to the European Infantry Company and to the Native Company had barracks in the localities of Palma, Matchemba and Mocimboa da Praia (see Figure 3), from where they set out on mission to the entire area of operations in Niassa.

\(^{30}\) In Subchapter B ‘As Acções no Rovuma de Abril a Junho De 1916’ of Chapter XXIX ‘Depois da Declaração de Guerra a Portugal (1916-1917)’, pp. 147-148.

\(^{31}\) Ibidem, p. 150.

\(^{32}\) In Subchapter A “Reconhecimentos, Passagem do Rovuma e Combate de Maúla” of Chapter XXX “A Ofensiva dos Portugueses e a Contra-Ofensiva Alemã”, p. 150.

\(^{33}\) Ibidem, p. 158.

\(^{34}\) In subchapter B “A Coluna De Massassi E Os Combates De Nevala” of Chapter XXX “A Ofensiva Dos Portugueses e a Contra-Ofensiva Alemã”, p. 165.

\(^{35}\) Ibidem, p. 166.
The Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques

Figure 3 - Map of the Niassa area of operations (1915-1918). We have highlighted the localities of Palma, Mocimboa da Praia and Matchemba.


There are hundreds of documents in the archives of the Expedition to Mozambique\^36 in the Overseas Historical Archive in Lisbon, which unfortunately have not been processed. Among these documents is a letter book recording the documents issued by the GRLM detachments in Matchemba and Mocimboa da Praia, from where we can infer some interesting aspects about the experience of the troops in northern Mozambique.

In 1917 and 1918, a detachment of the GRLM constituted by the foot infantry Company was stationed in Matchemba, with a contingent between 120 and 130 service-ready native soldiers - the numbers were ascertained from requests for blankets and other equipment, armed with 6.5 mm calibre Mauser Vergueiro m/904\^37 service rifles.

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\^36 AHU. Expedição a Moçambique. Quartel-general, 1916; AHU. Expedição a Moçambique, 1917-1918.

\^37 The Mauser-Vergueiro, also known as Portuguese Mauser, was the result of a process which spanned the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to choose a new weapon for the Portuguese army, replacing the Kropatschek rifle that had been the Portuguese army's service weapon until then.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

With regard to health, the sick local troops were evacuated and treated in the local Hospital in Palma. There were six medical officers in Republican Guard for the entire Province of Mozambique: captain-doctor José Augusto Rodrigues in Lourenço Marques, and sublieutenant-doctors Henrique de Barros Lima, director of the Hospital and physician in Infirmary 1, António Antunes Farinha Pereira, physician in Lona, Ramiro de Barros Lima, physician in the ‘officers, 2nd sergeants and bivouac wards’, Francisco Eduardo Peixoto, physician in Namoto and Abílio de Souza Camões, director of the ‘Medicines and pharmacy depot’.38

According to a paper by Fernando Rita, ‘the 2nd expedition embarked for Mozambique in October 1915, commanded by Artillery Major José Luiz de Moura Mendes, structured around the 21st Infantry Battalion, with a total of 1558 men’([2013], p. 9). In the text, the author listed the following units: the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment (Penamacor), the 2nd Battery of the 7th Machine-Gun Group (Castelo Branco), the 5th Battery of the Mountain Artillery Regiment (Évora), the 4th Squadron of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment (Estremoz), and also the Engineering Troops, Health Service and Military Administration, but, like almost every author who wrote about the history of the Mozambique expeditions of the time, there is no mention of the colonial units which reinforced the expedition, often causing the important role of these forces in the conflict to be forgotten.

The objective of the expedition was to retake the Kionga triangle and to conquer certain German territories north of the Ruvuma River. But the Kionga region had since been abandoned by the Germans and was merely occupied by the Portuguese forces, and thus the German territory was not conquered.

However, of the other colonial forces which reinforced the expedition, the European infantry company of the LMGR was moved to the Cabo Delgado province, as can be seen in the letter written in Palma on 4 November 1916 by artillery Lieutenant Colonel Moura Mendes, commander of the Mixed Expeditionary Detachment to Mozambique in 1915, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Expedition to Mozambique in 1916, General José César Ferreira Gil, in the noteworthy text here transcribed:

Aware that the European force of the Republican Guard of Lourenço Marques set out for Lourenço Marques on the 25th of the present month in the steamer Mozambique, I think it my duty to communicate to Your Excellency that the Republican Guard of

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38 AHU. Expedição a Moçambique. Quartel-general, 1916.
Lourenço Marques, under the command of Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel José Almeida Vasconcellos, while serving under my orders, provided excellent service, always acting with discipline, well trained and good organization and keeping, even in the most difficult situations, a high spirit of sacrifice, selflessness and patriotism, evidence of the intelligent action and example set by all officers.

The Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques cooperated with the 1915 expedition forces in the effort devoted to keep the German occupied territories in our possession, in constant manning of the combat outposts and patrolling the area, causing the forces to be exhausted, which certainly drove Your Ex. to do without their valuable services. It is a pleasurable duty that leads me to hereby express to Your Ex. my admiration for services rendered by the honourable Cavalry commander Lieutenant Colonel José de Almeida Vasconcellos, and by all officers, sergeants and soldiers of the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques, who I believe are worthy of the highest praise.

But if the European Infantry Company of the GRLM made the return journey from northern Mozambique to Lourenço Marques in October 1916, after nearly six months of campaigning, the Indian Infantry Company remained in operations in the Cabo Delgado region, based in Palma and with a detachment in Matchemba.

The Detachment of the Native Company of the Matchemba GRLM reached this outpost on 14 February 1917, and sublieutenant Valdomir de Azevedo sent a telegram to his Company Commander informing him of this event: ‘I hereby communicate to Your Excellency that I arrived yesterday to this location with the forces under my command without any problems’.

From this date on, this subunit was tasked with assigning teams to occupy the surveillance and observation posts along the bank of the Rovuma River, or to join liaising and reconnaissance patrols between the different positions, or even to take part in operations beyond the Rovuma to attack German positions.

The activity of this force is documented extensively in the Overseas Historical Archive, for example, as with telegram No. 100 of 29 September 2015, whereby the Commander of the Matchemba Detachment of the GRLM informed the Commander of the Guard that soldier 1349/L Uarreque had

been killed in action on the morning of 22 September 1917, ‘during the attack of the German observation post provided by this detachment for M’Cunha’".

The importance of the region of Lourenço Marques was not insignificant. In fact, the Portuguese occupation of the Lourenço Marques Bay area had always been under pressure by various surrounding tribes, but the Portuguese, who recognized it in 1544 and installed a factory and a military outpost in 1781 also had to deal with the rivalry of the English, who had settled in Natal since

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41 Idem.

42 Circa 1544, the Portuguese navigator and trader Lourenço Marques was the first European to make the reconnaissance of the entire region surrounding the bay which he called bay of the Holy Spirit (now Bay of Maputo), but there are Portuguese references to the bay prior to that date.

43 Vicente Caetano da Maia e Vasconcelos, acting governor of Mozambique who took office on 8 May 1781, was responsible for the installation of ‘a factory and a military outpost’, known as presidio, to protect the Portuguese trade in the Bay.

44 Natal, a province of South Africa from 1910 to 1994, was so named because it was sighted on the east coast of Africa for the first time by a European, Vasco da Gama, in 1497 on Christmas Day.
The Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques

1834 and who had attempted to lay claim to the south area of the Bay (Maputo, Catembe and Inhaca)\(^{45}\) as well as of the Transvaal Boer communities\(^{46}\), which saw the bay as a quick access to the sea, since one of the best ports in Southern Africa was located there. For this reason, Lourenço Marques, which was located in an odd position at the south end of the Mozambique colony, became a city by Royal Decree on 10 November 1887 and became the capital of the colony on 23 May 1907, replacing the city island located in the Nampula province, in the northern region of Mozambique, after which the country was named.

An analysis of the history of the GRLM should take into account the latest developments in historiography, with regard to the surveys of births conducted since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, to the Portuguese colonial project centred on Africa that was meant to make up for the independence of Brazil (Alexander, 2004) and which became the banner of the Republican Party during the partition of Africa and Portugal’s acceptance of the British Ultimatum in 1890 (Severiano Teixeira, 1987).

When the Republic was established in 1910, the interests of the great European powers were concentrated in Africa and their attention was focused on the Portuguese colonies. In fact, since the late nineteenth century, Portugal had established what would become its last empire, centred on the African continent with two vast territories (Angola and Mozambique), a third smaller territory (Guinea), and the strategically located archipelagos of Cape Verde and São Tome and Príncipe on the west coast of Africa.

But it was not only the interests of the security and defence of the colony, and in particular of the Lourenço Marques region due to a possible entry of Portugal in the Great War, that had led to the creation of a Guard with the characteristics of an elite troop (moreover, as we could see, it had been formed in 1913, before the global conflict). Southern Mozambique was not directly under threat by Germany and, at the time, certain voices in the Portuguese political elite advocated for neutrality during the conflict and argued that the country should simply defend the territorial integrity of the colonies (Castaño, 2014).

\(^{45}\) The British opposition was only resolved on 24 July 1875, when the arbitral award made by the then President of the French Republic, Marshal MacMahon, recognized the sovereign rights of Portugal over the region.

\(^{46}\) In the nineteenth century, the name Transvaal meant the territories that constituted a Boer republic called Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (South African Republic), informally referred to as the Transvaal Republic. Those territories occupied the entire northern part of South Africa upstream of the Vaal River to the Limpopo River. Annexed by the British in 1902, the Transvaal became one of the four South African provinces in 1910.
It is our opinion that the GRLM was created out of necessity, on the one hand, to replace an ineffective police force and to ensure the occupation and effective control of a territory ‘under threat’, and, on the other, to gain international recognition for the Republic by investing in a prestigious force that would lend the colony an air of national dignity, marked by historical tradition and nationalist ideals.

An article published by Francisco Veloso in a newspaper of the time, the *Ilustração Cathólica*[^1], on 28 December 1928, already during the time of the national dictatorship which had followed the military dictatorship that ended the First Republic is, therefore, rather interesting. In this article, of which we could not help but transcribe an excerpt below, due to its remarkable expressiveness, the author describes a visit to lands of southern Mozambique that same year of 1928, during which he interviewed an native *Landim* still proudly wearing the uniform of the GRLM at that date[^2].

This moving account clearly shows how important the GRLM had become for that territory. A force recruited among the best soldiers, as if it were an elite troop, which also respected and valued the native contingent selected among the most warlike peoples, garnering honour and fame, in essence, fulfilling the objectives of the Republic: to represent and honour the Portuguese presence in Mozambique.

‘And now let us hear Uamúle:
The lands of Gaza had earned from us special affection and, when in Chibuto, we lingered for a few days visiting in Chaimite, the ruins of the old fort, eating hearty dinners and strolling the beautiful roads, and we learned that in the Canhavane regulado, now ruled by queen Bassanhana, there was a native who had been awarded the War Cross, and to whom, thanks to the kindness of the Administrator, we could talk. This native was tall, well-formed, had an earnest look, head raised and uncovered, and must have been thirty-six years old. He was wearing the uniform of a 1st corporal of the Guarda Republicana. He had never been punished and his records were clean.

[^2]: The GRLM was extinct in 1924, allegedly due to financial reasons, but the political developments in the mainland must have surely played a role.
We asked him his name. He gave us a grand salute and replied:

- I Uamúle, 1st Corporal 1.215 L, Guarda Republicana...

- Are you pleased with the War Cross on your chest?

- I am! Our commander already told us it is a great honour to have the War Cross, and if our commander speaks he is right, and so this War Cross will only end when I die!

We then asked him:

- Why did they award you the War Cross?

He thought, and before answering, said:

- Wait a moment! I want to say my uniform is in trouble because it has no cap, and I want to ask Mr to say this thing to our commander, to send a cap, and discount my pay, because I cannot present proper before our superior without uniform in order ... No cap is not right!

And, even more softly, he said to himself:

- Uamúle, you are right! ...

We promised to intervene so that he would get the cap of the order, which we easily managed through our friend, the distinguished army officer Mr Captain Oliveira Dias.

Uamúle looked straight at us and then told us his story:

- I won the War Cross because I was troublemaker in the War ... I killed many evil enemies; when I saw them, bam! I put down evil who wants to steal our land! ... Our Commander, Mr Bivar have much strength, always playing with fear, and we so cannot be afraid. And that is right...

- But, we interrupted...

- Wait a little... white soldier is really crazy, is not afraid of fire, when bullet pass by whistling he also whistles, like so...

And Uamúle whistled, imitating his comrades in a long, shrill whistle.

He continued:

- You need to go get more cunhetes [ammunition boxes]? I

49 Original dialogue is in broken Portuguese.
go, I have no fear; we need to take another letter to Iado? I go, that is right.
And widening his eyes, as if to make his words more expressive:
- When I am on the trench shooting at enemy evils, it is good ... I remember that I beat those evils in Kiwambo battle on 8 November with Portuguese white soldiers and other black soldiers and our officers and sergeants, no one had no fear, bam, bam, bam, kill scoundrel enemy, die big scoundrel. This is how I won my War Cross!
- It seems you like war?
- I do, that is my job! When commander calls I go quick. I am not afraid. It is our duty, and so it is right...
He added, with great conviction:
- When I die it ends, and that is it!
- Do you have any family?
- I have a wife and three little children... I only earn little money, 18$00 per month, which headquarters sends, because I have this War Cross...
- You live in hardship, then?
- I work little, little... I grow corn and cassava.
(...) 

We asked for the brave Uamúle’s service records and transcribed them here as follows:

Awards and commendations
Praised for fearless bravery and calmness under fire, thus contributing to the success of Kiwambo battle, the 8th of November. (Command Order of the Mozambique Expedition No. 63, of 23 November 1916). (BM No 11, 18 July 1918).
War Cross 3rd class [B.M.C. No. 5, 29 May 1919].
Conclusion

The Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques, its training and organization, tasks and responsibilities, and the operations in which it participated are little known to most military historians and scholars of the colonial campaigns of the Great War of 1914-1918. This is due, in part, to a paucity of references to the colonial forces in the reports and in the history of
the expeditions to Mozambique, including the GRLM and the Army’s Native Companies under the Governor-general.

However, all expeditions to Mozambique had, in one way or another, been reinforced by colonial troops, in addition to the widespread use of local labour.

In the Colony of Mozambique, economic issues led to the near-extinction of the European units formed from the military organization defined in the decree of 14 November 1901, and in 1914 ‘the garrison of the colony was no more than a weak squadron of Europeans and a dozen native companies, whose training did not go beyond drill commands’, and the white troops, in general were ‘exhausted by fevers, were unfit and were ill-prepared in terms of military training because they had never attended a military school’[^50].

The GRLM was an oasis in the desert with regard to organization, recruitment, preparation, instruction and leadership, and conduct in the operations against the Germans.

Having replaced, as early as 1914, the Guarda Cívica in the security and policing of all areas in the south of the colony, performing the typical tasks of a Gendarmerie force, such as occupation and military policing of the territory, domestic security and public order, immigration police, as well as other animal health and game services, and also as fiscal guard both within the territory and along the border with the colony of South Africa.

Special conditions were given for its constitution, in particular a careful recruitment process, as all officers were career officers from the Army School, the European soldiers were recruited in the mainland, preferably in the Guarda National Republicana and in the Guarda Fiscal, and possessed characteristics that were difficult to find in 1914, namely knowing how ‘to read, write and count’, as well as complying with a minimum height requirement, and the native soldiers were recruited from among the best landins, who were known as fearsome soldiers, of whom Gungunhana had said ‘possessed the greatest warrior instinct’.

In addition to the policing missions, the subunits of this force were also prepared to conduct combat operations, column security and reconnaissance. And due to their training and discipline, they were used in the campaigns in northern Mozambique in the fighting against the Germans between 1916 and 1918, during the Great War, proving themselves an asset.

The study of the origin, organization and action of this force during the

first republic, with such specific characteristics for its time, based on recent developments in modern historiography on the creation of a Portuguese colonial empire centred on African territory which had been in planning since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, with the independence of Brazil, also allows us to understand the intentions behind the creation of the GRLM, intentions which went beyond simply defending and securing the territory and its populations. In fact, the creation of this force by Decree No. 58 of 1913, before the onset of the conflict in Europe, in the wake of its declared colonial policy in Africa, the Republic intended to establish a prestigious and efficient unit in the strategic region of Lourenço Marques that would legitimate and lend international credibility to the new republican regime, securing the Portuguese presence in Africa, thus consolidating the colonial empire.
ANNEX A (as per Table 1 of Decree No. 58)
Constitution of the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques

**General Staff**
- 1 Commander, Major or Lieutenant Colonel
- 1 Aide, cavalry or infantry Lieutenant
- 1 Veterinary surgeon, Lieutenant
- 1 Treasurer, Lieutenant from the military administration

**European mounted Infantry Company**
- 1 Commander, Captain
- 1 Lieutenant
- 2 Sublieutenants
- 1 First Sergeant
- 8 Second Sergeants
- 16 First Corporals
- 200 Soldiers
- 4 Farriers
- 2 Trumpeters
- 110 Horses

**Native foot Infantry Company**
- 1 Commander, Captain
- 1 Lieutenant
- 2 Sublieutenants
- 1 Infantry First Sergeant
- 8 Infantry Seconds Sergeants
- 16 First native Corporals
- 190 Native Soldiers
- 9 Trumpeters
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The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: 
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War


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A General Staff Officer in the Great War: two examples from the campaigns in Africa

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Introduction

Upon receiving the invitation to present a communication on the General Staff Service during the period of the Great War at a seminar on the Great War Portuguese African campaigns, we naturally found ourselves facing the challenge of finding points of affinity with the remaining presentations, so that we could properly contextualise our approach. Our work did not focus specifically on the campaigns of Africa; however, during our research, we often ‘came across’ information concerning those campaigns, but as it did not suit our purposes at the time, we did not examine it further. The following text is, therefore, the result of rearranging and combining the previous work1, which is the base for a large part of the present text, with additional data on the African campaigns.

On 5 October 1910, the monarchy fell and a Republic was established in Portugal. Four years later, Europe found itself facing a war so terrifying it became known as the ‘Great War’. Portugal’s young Republic formally declared war against Germany in 1916. By entering the war, Portugal intended to acquire international prestige and a seat on the ‘Concert of Nations’, thus ensuring sovereignty in case of an attempt of annexation by Spain.

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Domestically, the intent was to ensure the legitimacy and consolidation of the Republic and of the party which had led Portugal into the Great War².

Still in 1914, two contingents were deployed to secure the colonies, one to Angola and the other to Mozambique. The total number of troops sent to the African theatre of operations amounted to about 34,600 men from the mainland and 19,500 native troops³.

In 1916, a Division was brought to combat readiness to intervene in the European theatre, a feat which became known as the ‘Miracle of Tancos’. In 1917, the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (PEC), the force put together for operations in the Flanders, comprised 55,000 men and, for a variety of reasons, never operated at full capacity⁴.

The General Staff Service (GS Service), which had been established in the Portuguese Army in 1899⁶ to replace the former General Staff Corps (GS Corps)⁷ founded in 1834, was an integral part of this effort. The law of 26 May 1911 that aimed to reform the Army after the implantation of the Republic kept the name GS Service.

The General Staff Service consisted of officers who had received specific training for the performance of their respective duties. Until 1890, the training of these officers occurred within the rules of the remaining Arms of the Army through a basic course of the Military Academy [Escola do Exército]. It was changed to a complementary course from 1891 onwards, with the GS Corps remaining a separate Corps, although it would be staffed by officers from other Arms of the Army who had also attended that course.

From 1914 to 1918, that is, from the intervention in Africa until the end of the war, this service consisted of 74 officers: 23 from the General Staff Service of the Military Academy (GSS/MA) and 51 from the remaining Arms, qualified with the complementary course.

Of these 74 officers, 15 were involved in the African campaigns: 12 in Angola and three in Mozambique. Of those who were in Angola, two officers

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³ Teixeira, et al., 2004, p. 25.
⁴ Teixeira, et al., 2004, pp. 27,28.
⁵ In order to avoid confusion between the abbreviations for General Staff Service (Arm) and General Staff Service (the basic training course of the Military Academy), we will use the abbreviations ‘GS Service’ for the Arm and ‘GSS/MA to refer to the training course.
⁷ For the same reason as above, we will refer to the General Staff Corps as ‘GS Corps’ and to the General Staff Course as ‘GSC’.
who participated in the campaign in the south of that colony, commanded by General Pereira D’Eça, distinguished themselves for their behaviour under duress. By analysing the careers of these two officers, we could verify that they fit perfectly into a common profile which, incidentally, we had already identified in our previous work. These were officers who, due to their professional careers, possessed tactical and command level experience and management/administration skills, acquired through a variety of placements within the GS Service.

The GS Service played a crucial role in the Army, namely in troubled times like those of the Great War, both in the European front and in the African campaigns, and its members were renowned for their competence, value and adaptability.

1. Historical Characterization of the General Staff Corps/Service

The designation ‘Army General Staff’ (AGS) was first used in Portugal in the Charter issued on 9 July 1763, which aimed to regulate the processing and payment of wages to a group of officers operating under that name. Those were: the General Officers; the Inspectors General; the Deputy Assistants to the Inspectors General; the Quarter Master General\(^8\). This designation, which predated the modern institution called GS created in Prussia\(^9\), did not correspond to a Corps with its own practices and forms of access to command, which would be developed later, but to a group of officers who performed the highest of duties for the Crown, those of commanding the Army.

The General Army Staff Corps was created by decree on 18 July 1834 as an institution which, by that time, had nothing in common with the earlier General Staff\(^10\). Article 9, section 1 of that decree states that general officers from the General Staff would be assigned command of the GS (Army, Engineering and Artillery) of Divisions and Brigades, and of the First Rank Soldiers, and would perform Inspections of the different Arms of the Army. Paragraph 2 of that same article dictates that officers in the General Army Staff Corps (which comprised eight senior officers, 16 captains and 16 lieutenants) would be employed in the GS of Provinces, Divisions and Brigades, and as aides-de-camp to the generals. We verified at this point that this Corps was already meant to perform advisory and decision support duties. Also in this decree, Article 12,

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\(^8\) Sá Nogueira, 1969, p. 9.
\(^9\) Carrilho, 1985, p. 135.
Section 2, determined that the promotions system would be different from that of the other Arms of the Army, without prejudice to the position they previously occupied. This disposition represented the creation of a new Arm/Service.

**a. The training of General Staff officers**

The Military Academy (MA) was created on 12 January 1837 to replace the Academy of Fortification, Artillery and Design. The Military Engineering and Artillery courses were kept in the school curriculum, as well as a common core of Infantry and Cavalry courses. Two new courses were created, for GS officers and civil engineers, respectively.

This was the state of affairs until 1890, at which point the GS course stopped being a basic training course of the MA that gave access to the General Staff Service (GSS/MA), and was changed to a complementary course, thereby opening the GS Corps to all the Arms.

The group consisted of officers trained before and after 1890, and for that reason included officers from both the GSS/MA and the Arms.

**b. General Staff Course (complementary)**

With the 1890 reform of the educational system, the training of GS officers was no longer a basic course of the MA and became a complementary course for the Arms. It was also renamed as Higher Studies in War/War Studies and had a duration of two school years.

In addition to two years of good and effective service as an officer ‘in the active troops of his respective arm’ (art. 24 No. 1 of the OE of 1890) an officer who wished to apply to the War Studies course needed a passing grade in all Preparatory School subjects required to enrol in Military Engineering, and in addition to the subjects required for the Artillery course, which were all related to the Exact Sciences, also required a passing grade in Descriptive Geometry II, Astronomy, Botanic, and Mineralogy and Geology.

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13 Carrilho, 1985, p. 136
15 Spherical Geometry, Integral Calculus, Design, etc...
16 OE, 1890, pp. 516, 517.
In addition to these prerequisites, an age limit was also specified: the officers applying to the course had to be under 29 years old (Engineering), 28 years old (Artillery), and 26 years old (Infantry or Cavalry), and had to present a certificate attesting their fitness for horse riding, issued by the Practical School of Cavalry.

The following vacancies were expected to open every two years: one Engineering officer, two Artillery officers and eight Infantry officers. If the number of candidates was greater than the number of openings, the admission process would take place before a jury; should one of the Arms not fill all its vacancies, those could not be occupied by officers from other Arms.

Once admitted to the MA, officers would complete a two year course; therefore, officers who obtained the War Studies course diploma still belonged to their original Arms and had to undergo a one year apprenticeship consisting of two periods of six months in the remaining Arms. Upon completing this apprenticeship, they were promoted to captains of their Arms after four years as lieutenants, or earlier, depending on the duty roster (art. 32, No. 4)\(^\text{17}\).

Both in the GSS/MA and in the GSC, officers attended classes that were exclusive to these courses, allowing them an overview of the organization as well as of its operation and resources.

c. Duties of the General Staff Service

The GS Corps played an important role within the Army since its inception in 1834, and its duties were defined in the legislation. The GS Corps was extinct in 1899 with the adoption of the name GS Service in that year’s Army Organization\(^\text{18}\).

A reform of the Army followed the Implantation of the Republic and, on 26 May 1911, that reform was operationalized by the War Office through OE No. 11. In the General Army Organization, it was defined that the mainland Army would include: ‘1st – the General Officers; 2nd – the General Staff Service; 3rd – the different arms and services...’\(^\text{19}\). As we could verify, the GS Service emerged here as a different body from the remaining Arms, which is indicative of its formal position in the hierarchy.

As for the Service’s responsibilities, Article 45, Chapter III\(^\text{20}\) states that

\(^{17}\) OE, 1890, p. 518.
\(^{19}\) OE, 1911, p. 580.
\(^{20}\) OE, 1911, pp. 585.
they consisted in conducting studies and work pertaining to the first Direction and to the second Department of the second Direction of the AGS.

The duties of the first Direction of the AGS were, among other tasks, to liaise with military attaches and officers in study commissions abroad; to liaise with the Arms inspections regarding preparation for war (exercises) and instruction; to elaborate operation plans; to conduct studies on the strategic importance of communication routes; to determine strategic locations for fortifications; to conduct studies for the improvement of the mainland Army; to conduct studies on international conventions, laws and war practices; to elaborate the general mobilization plan; to prepare exercises on the instruction of, not only GS Service officers, but the whole AGS.\(^{21}\)

The duties of the second Division of the second Direction were: to conduct studies on railway lines from a military transport perspective; to conduct studies on the general organization and protection of the Army’s lines of communication; to prepare and revise the instructions for sustainment units (logistics support) and for the military railway service; to conduct critical studies on the foreign armies regulations and instructions; and to prepare and coordinate projects on general statistics, needed for conducting the AGS studies.\(^{22}\)

The GS Service consisted of six colonels, 12 lieutenant colonels and 30 captains who served in the AGS, in the Division headquarters, in the Cavalry Brigade headquarters and in the Lisbon Entrenchment Field.

The officers from the GSS/MA were required to command an Infantry or Cavalry Regiment for a period of one year, although they still belonged to the GS Service. The lieutenant colonels of the GS Service Arms returned to their original staffs when promoted to colonels, and returned to the Service as colonels after commanding a Regiment in any of the Arms. Thus, there may have been officers of the GS Service who served in the African campaigns who were not identified, as they were not in the service during the period under study.

2. The officers of the General Staff Service

After identifying the 74 officers who belonged to the GS Service from 1914 to 1918, we established a strict relationship of prosopographic factors to study. We resorted to the following sources to obtain the information we needed:

\(^{21}\) OE, 1911, pp. 673-675.

\(^{22}\) OE, 1911, p. 683.
a. Course of origin and course location

The last elements of our group to enrol in the GSS/MA were José Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos, António Nogueira Mimôso Guerra and Eduardo Augusto Marques (1888), with the first complementary GSC taking place in 1895. Thus, from 1914-1918, 23 officers in the GS Service came from the GSS/MA course, 29 from the Infantry course, 16 from the Artillery course and 6 from the Cavalry course.

We removed the individuals that came from the GSS/MA in order to analyse the percentages relative to the Arms of origin, which revealed a preponderance of officers from the Infantry course, with 56,86%, followed by Artillery with 31,37% and Cavalry with 11,76%. There were no officers from the Engineering course.

As we evaluated the general course ranking when leaving the MA, and referring only to the 51 officers who did not belong to the GSS/MA, we divided the 27 courses of origin into thirds to clarify the relation between relative seniority in the course and frequency of the GSC.

We concluded that 62,75% of the officers were in the first third of their course. It is worth noting that the smallest course, Artillery (1899), only had two students, and that the largest, Infantry (1901), had 76 students. The 27 courses analysed had an average of 54 students per course, with eight courses registering more than 60 students.

This data indicates that the Service was mostly staffed with the best students from each course, at least from an academic perspective, as this relation was calculated according to the grade with which they completed the MA. This seems natural, considering that attending the Preparatory School implied studying subjects in Exact Sciences which were not required for the Infantry and Cavalry Arms. Even though almost 10% came from the bottom
third of their classes, the compulsory scientific training to gain access to a more ‘technical’ and ‘organizational’ Arm can be seen as an obstacle to discourage elements with less than stellar academic performances. Thus, the majority of officers who did not come from the GSC/MA were the best students in their respective courses.

**b. Professional career**

In order to create a picture of what was required from an officer of the GSS/MA or of the GSC during their military lives, we conducted an analysis of the duties performed by GS Service officers not only in the period from 1914-1918 but throughout their entire careers.

To better illustrate the working life of the officers in this Service, we will describe a hypothetical career, showing the differences between those who attended the GSS/MA and those who later attended the GSC as a complementary course.

(1) A hypothetical career

In the late 19th century, a young man who wished to be an officer in the Army after completing the Royal Military College (MC)\(^{23}\), or any other high school, would have to enlist in an Army corps before being allowed to apply to the MA\(^{24}\). At 16 and a half years of age\(^{25}\), our applicant enlisted in an Army unit where, after serving with good behaviour and possessing the aforementioned high school qualifications, he would enrol in a preparatory course for the duration of three years\(^{26}\) at the PS, PA, or UC. Once he had acquired the necessary qualifications, he would then join the GSS/MA course, at about 20 years of age.

Two years later, as he completed the GSS/MA course, the young sublieutenant, now 23 years old\(^{27}\), would join an Infantry or Cavalry unit. In that unit, after a two year apprenticeship, he would be promoted to lieutenant at the

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\(^{23}\) With the establishment of the Republic the name changed to Colégio Militar [Military College]. We will use this designation irrespective of the officer’s appointment having occurred before or after the fall of the monarchy.

\(^{24}\) OE, 1863 n\(^{5}\)54, p. 8.

\(^{25}\) Median of enlistment ages. The youngest officer was António José Garcia Guerreiro, 14 years and 5 months of age, who enrolled in 1872, and the oldest was José Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos, who enrolled in 1887, at 20 years and 8 months.

\(^{26}\) OE, 1863 n\(^{5}\)54, p. 2.

\(^{27}\) The youngest were Tomáz António Garcia Rosado and João Montês Champalimaud, sublieutenants in 1886 and 1890 at the age of 22. The oldest was Alfredo Carlos Pimentel May, sublieutenant at the age of 29 in 1888.
age of 25\textsuperscript{28}. In order to meet the ‘essential prerequisites to join the GS Corps’\textsuperscript{29}, the lieutenant would intern for a year in an Artillery unit and in one other unit, Infantry or Cavalry, alternating the latter with the Arm where he was promoted to sublieutenant.

A GSS/MA officer served in these units until he was placed, depending on the available openings, on the staff of the GS Corps, which he would enter as a lieutenant, being awarded a promotion to captain upon completing 29 years of age\textsuperscript{30}. As a member of the GS Corps, he would carry out several tasks, namely land surveys, field work for the elaboration of road maps and military reconnaissance such as detailed reconnaissance of the border South of the Tejo\textsuperscript{31}, to ‘prepare the conduction of studies needed for his observation and protection of our army’s mobilization’\textsuperscript{32}. Our captain could also be appointed member of the jury for special qualification exams for the MA students, or appointed deputy to one of the sections of the GS Corps/Service, or be assigned duties in one of the GS Brigades, and he would serve on commissions charged with fulfilling certain objectives, such as: elaborating a project for a central military library; perfecting\textsuperscript{33} the GS Corps/Service command; changing the transitional legislation in force in the MA; reorganizing the Military Administration Service; reorganizing the overseas forces or the incorporation of troops from the mainland into the colonial service (the two latter missions only after having served in the colonies). As a captain with experience acquired in the GS Corps/Service, he could also be appointed for a teaching position at the MA, at the MC, at the Pupils of the Army of the Land and Sea Professional Institute (PAI)\textsuperscript{34}, or at the Central School of Officers (CSO)\textsuperscript{35}, or assigned a service commission in another ministry such as Public Works, Commerce and Industry, or Navy and Overseas Territories, the latter being the most common, as this ministry oversaw the officers’ commissions in the colonies.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[28] The youngest and oldest are the same individuals as in the sublieutenant post. The first two were 24 years old and the oldest was 31 years old.
\item[29] Martins, 1937, p. 616.
\item[30] The youngest were Rosado Abel Acácio de Almeida Botelho and Tomáz António Garcia, in 1881 and 1889, respectively, at 25 years of age, and the oldest was Luis António Carvalho Martins in 1899, at the age of 33.
\item[31] It was the case of Tomáz António Garcia Rosado, for example.
\item[33] For example, the committee to ‘perfect’ the GS Service (FM Francisco Correia Mendes) AHM, n.d., p. 1.
\item[34] Founded in 1911 IPE 2014.
\item[35] Founded in 1914, it preceded the Institute of Higher Military Studies and the current Portuguese Joint Command and Staff College.
\end{footnotes}
Our captain would then be sent to the colonies as a deputy commander in the GS of his force. There, if the force was divided, he could serve as Chief of Staff of a province. He could perform multiple military and civilian duties while in service in the colonies, from commander of a native company, commander of a detachment, member of a municipal committee, chief of the military office of a province, Government commissioner charged with demarcating the border separating a province from another state, secretary-general for the Government of a territory, chief of a team conducting topographic and land surveys, as well as performing administrative duties, such as acting administrator of the Goa Bush, or be charged provisionally with the Direction of Public Works of that state. One of our officers was an elected representative between 1906/1907, later returning to the GS Service (1908).

At 42 years of age, after about 12 years as captain, he would be promoted to major. In this rank, our officer was expected to continue participating in committees to develop or improve the Army’s capabilities and procedures, from the GS Service itself to the revision of the Military Justice Code. He could apply to an official notice and become a teacher or head of chair in any of the courses taught at the MA, MC, PAI, or at the CSO, or could be nominated member of the jury charged with evaluating the exams required for promotion from captain to major in the different Arms, in the Military Administration corps and in the GS Corps/Service. He would be assigned command of a Regiment Battalion or Group, or be Chief of Staff in an Army division or Head of a section of an AGS direction. The majors of the GSS/MA were also called upon to serve in the War Ministry or in the Overseas and Navy Ministry. There, if he was assigned to a Colony, he could be appointed chief of the military office or even Governor of a territory, district or region, and even governor-general of a Province. If he was integrated in an expeditionary force to the colonies, he would be appointed Chief of Staff.

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36 It was the case of José Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos AHM, n.d., pp. 2, 3.
37 Alfredo Mendes de Magalhães Ramalho AHM, n.d., p. 2.
38 The youngest officer to gain a promotion to major was Tomáz António Garcia Rosado in 1899, at 35 years of age, after being captain for ten years, and the oldest officer to be promoted was Luís António Carvalho Martins, in 1911, at 45 years of age and after a period of 12 years. The officer who spent less time as captain, five years, was Alfredo Carlos Pimentel May. The maximum period spent in this rank was 14 years (three officers).
39 Battalion and Group are designations for a unit formed by an array of Companies commanded by captains. This means that our officer, having come from the GSS/MA, would be the tactical commander of officers in the Infantry, Cavalry or Artillery.
40 Tomáz António Garcia Rosado was Governor of Mozambique in 1904 AHM, n.d., p. 4.
At 45, he would be promoted to lieutenant colonel\(^41\) and, in this rank, would continue to be appointed to promotion juries and to the aforementioned study committees. He could head a GS section department, be a teacher or head of chair of any of the courses taught at the MA, MC, PAI, or the CSO, or be director of the PAI. He could also be appointed commander of a military force for the provinces, or perform duties as Military Commander of a region or overseas territory, or be director of Public Works for a province\(^42\). He could be appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a technical delegate and, in the event of a national catastrophe, the lieutenant colonel could be called upon to lead a relief and support force to aid a disaster-stricken population\(^43\), or perhaps become the director of the cartography service and photography office of the Army General Staff/Army Staff\(^44\).

At 51, he would be promoted to colonel\(^45\). In this rank, he would lead an Infantry, Cavalry or Artillery Regiment for the GSC officers or, if he came from the GSS/MA, an Infantry or Cavalry Regiment. He would be appointed head of a division of the Army General Staff or of the Ministry of War, and he could be the director of the CSO or the GSC, the head of chair in any of the courses taught at the MA, the MC, the PAI or the CSO, or he could be appointed member or president of one of the many committees for the organization and improvement of the Army, member of juries for promotions to captain and major in the different Arms, or even become Chief of Staff in the Lisbon Entrenchment Field. At this stage in his career, our officer could be appointed military attaché to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There, our officer either placed at the first third of the colonel roster with the required conditions for promotion to general or he would go into the reserves at the age of 62.

If he were promoted to general, that promotion would take place on his 60th birthday\(^46\). With this rank, he could be appointed member of a jury in charge of appraising special aptitude tests for promotions to general, could be

\(^{41}\) The youngest was José Augusto Alves Roçadas, 42 years old, promoted with distinction in 1908 (Serrão, 1968, p. 653) and the oldest was António Nogueira Mimóso Guerra, in 1917, at 50 years of age.

\(^{42}\) João Augusto Crispiano Soares, director of Public Works in Angola in 1919 and in charge of the Angola General Government in 1924.

\(^{43}\) João Augusto Crispiano Soares, director of Public Works in Angola in 1919 and in charge of the Angola General Government in 1924.

\(^{44}\) Carlos Maria Pereira dos Santos em 1925, AHM, n.d., p. 3.

\(^{45}\) The youngest was Tomáz António Garcia Rosado, 47 years old, in 1911, and the oldest was Manuel Maria de Oliveira Ramos, in 1919, at 57 years of age.

\(^{46}\) The youngest was Tomáz António Garcia Rosado, in 1917, at 53. The oldest was Luís António César de Oliveira at 64 years of age, in 1926.
second-in-command of the AGS, Quartermaster General, Commander of the MA and Army Chief of Staff.

(2) Differences in the General Staff Course officers

The duties performed by our group of officers, some which were entirely unrelated to the military life, have led us to believe that these individuals were remarkable people for their time. They had proven academic merit, not only because they attended the Preparatory School but also because many were teachers and assistants in the military schools, as well as for their responsibilities in the Army reforms, which spanned not only the operational level, but also had cultural and legislative scope.

We discovered that, aside from planning and conducting studies, these officers were also appointed to command positions. The member of the GS Service tasked to humanitarian relief in the earthquake of Benavente proves that these were men of action and command.

Thus, and in our opinion, this group was not composed solely of managers/administrators. The command careers of these individuals show that they were operatives, and the legislation reveals that this was in accordance with the wishes of the Army.

As for the participation of these officers in the Great War, we identified 14 individuals who belonged to the PEC, two who were commanders of this same corps, and the remaining officers were members of the various General Staffs and officers liaising with the British Army.

3. The officers of the GSS in the African Campaigns

In our study, we discovered that of the 64 officers, whose AF we analysed, 15 were involved in the African campaigns during the Great War, 12 were in Angola and three were in Mozambique. They performed duties within the General Staffs of forces as chiefs or sub-chiefs of Staff, and Alves Roçadas was the commander of the Expeditionary Force to Angola in 1914.

We selected two officers out of these 15, José Esteves da Conceição Mascarenhas and Henrique Sátiro Lopes Pires Monteiro, who served in Angola in 1915. The reason we focused on these two individuals was that during our research, we came across some personal documents belonging to Henrique

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47 Tomáz António Garcia Rosado and José Augusto Alves Roçadas.

48 The names of these officers are featured in the list at the end of this paper.
Sátiro Monteiro in the Army Library, including letters exchanged between him and José Mascarenhas, three of them during the campaign, some menus and newspaper clippings of meetings held to commemorate the Southern Angola campaign, as well as some reports, which he prepared in the PEC.

a. The campaign in southern Angola in 1915

In February 1915, following the events of 1914 involving Alves Roçadas’ force, General Pereira D’Eça was invited to take on the command of the expeditionary troops in southern Angola. This campaign aimed to reoccupy all the territory that had been abandoned, to provide governors with troops to promptly quash any insurgency and to have forces at readiness to meet any new attack by the Germans, or, if the situation allowed it and there was no danger, to carry out operations to penetrate the German territory, to prepare the occupation of the Kwanhama territory and to cooperate with South Africa’s allies should they force the Germans to head for the border.

In order to meet these objectives, Pereira D’Eça provided liaising and logistics support to the force, improving the lines of communication and ordering supplies to enhance the operational capability in Humbe, approximately 600 km away, which allowed him to conduct operations beyond the Cunene River.

In mid-July, in Lubango, after returning from Humbe (275 km away) to hasten the march of the troops, he received the news that the Damaraland Germans had surrendered, which simplified the task that lay ahead. Given the urgency, the troops had to occupy the Kwanhama and reoccupy the whole territory beyond the Cunene before the rainy season in September and, as he no longer had to deal with the German threat, Pereira D’Eça divided his force into four detachments: the Kwamato, with 1457 soldiers, the Kwanhama, with 2748, the Evale, with 596 and the Naulila, with 905, each advancing to their separate objectives. On 4 September, the Kwanhama detachment entered

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49 Our sincerest thanks to Major Sandro Geraldes for his willingness to let us use his work, which has simplified the task of understanding how the 1915 Angola campaign was conducted.

50 Eça, 1921 p. 1

51 Eça, 1921 p. 84

52 Eça, 1921 pp.7,8

53 Eça, 1921 pp. 22 to 24

54 Geraldes, 2014, p. 39
Ngiva unopposed, as the soba had fled to Damaraland\textsuperscript{55}, thus achieving the reoccupation of the territory.

The two officers carried out their duties in different locations during the campaign, and after the above detachments were formed they were made chiefs of Staff of a detachment (Monteiro, of the Kwanhama detachment, and Mascarenhas, of the Evale detachment).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Scheme of Operations}
\label{fig:operations}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: Geraldes, 2014 adapted from Martins, 1934.}

Now let us look in more detail to the events that occurred in the region of Môngua between 17 and 24 August, during which both officers distinguished themselves in the performance of their duties.

The Kwanhama detachment (the brown line in the image), commanded by Pereira D’Eça himself, began its march to the Ngiva on 12 August 1915\textsuperscript{56}. On the evening of 16 August, the detachment cavalry and auxiliaries spotted a large gathering of ‘savages’ heading towards the ponds of Môngua with an aggressive attitude, this after the troops and the animals had been worn out by the difficult terrain and lack of water during the 14th, 15th and 16th. To prevent the water from being poisoned, and unable to occupy the cacimbas [water holes] that day, Pereira D’Eça commissioned an artillery salvo to keep the mob at bay.

\textsuperscript{55} Eça, 1921 pp. 40,41

\textsuperscript{56} Eça, 1921, p. 573
The next day, 18 August, the detachment marched on the water holes, and as soon as the reconnaissance force drew near, the site began to be heavily hit by fire from the same angry mob. The detachment halted and formed square, collected the reconnaissance force and opened artillery fire; after the enemy had been silenced, the cavalry was sent out, and did not meet with further resistance.

After occupying the water holes, Pereira D’Eça discovered that they were dry, and was afterwards told that the ones that still had water were two kilometres away, and defended. After assessing the conditions of the detachment, the general decided to wait until the next day to move on the water holes. By 8:30 a.m. on August 19, as they were preparing to take down the bivouac, they were hit by heavy fire from ‘enhanced weapons’. They responded at once with artillery, but the defenders managed to approach the square, using the hills and trees as cover, and swept the square from all directions, hitting the members of the detachment, including four officers, many enlisted troops and cattle. By 11:30 a.m., the onslaught subsided and Pereira D’Eça sent out the cavalry, who managed to disperse the attackers, but not without a few more casualties. During the day of fighting, the detachment lost one officer and 15 soldiers, and six officers (including Monteiro) and 24 soldiers were wounded.

Predicting another attack, the general sent instructions to Humbe, to the general staff of the étapes, who managed the supplies and liaised between detachments, requesting more ammunition and inquiring about the possibility of one of the secondary detachments cooperating with the Kwanhama detachment, suggesting an action on Ngiva by the Kwamato detachment to divide the efforts of the attackers.

On the 19th, they were again attacked, with the same momentum, and suffered new casualties. Once the wounded were evacuated, he renewed the request, this time directly to the commander of the Kwamato detachment, inquiring about the convenience of a march on Ngiva. At 15:00 p.m. on the 19th, a march set out to conquer the water holes which were many, but had very little

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57 Cavalry and auxiliary troops, reconnaissance forces to advance in front of the bulk of the detachment, providing security.
58 Eça, 1921, pp. 29,30
59 See Eça, 1921 p. 31, for the General’s description of the fire capability demonstrated by the attackers in that first clash. On the next page, there is even mention of the type of light armament he encountered (European rifles identical to those available to European armies of the time), the abundance of ammunition and how the attackers had obviously been trained.
water; nevertheless, the detachment spent the night preparing the terrain\textsuperscript{60}.

On the 20th, the square came under heavy attack from all sides, which continued throughout the day, and by 16:00 p.m. Pereira D’Eça, unable to send out the cavalry (at this point, he only had four horses), ordered the two faces under heavier attack, the east and the north, to deploy alternating platoons and carry out an assault on the enemy positions. He thus got the attackers to retreat disorganized\textsuperscript{61}.

As they had not received reinforcements, Pereira D’Eça ordered the rations be reduced to $\frac{1}{4}$ during the 21st and 22nd. Unable to deploy forces to the rear, and with only four horses in marching condition, he could only hope that communications would be re-established from the rear forward. From the 21st to the 23rd, they were not attacked, but were also unable to restore communications. At 3:00 p.m. on the 24th, a resupply convoy finally arrived, escorted by the Kwamato detachment. They had learned of the situation from their commander, Colonel Veríssimo and his commander (Captain Mascarenhas), as they were ready to march directly on Ngiva, and instead decided to advance toward the Cunene to restore communications with the Kwanhama detachment\textsuperscript{62}.

**b. Mascarenhas and Monteiro**

Conceição Mascarenhas was born in Lamego on 25 May 1881, and in 1901 joined the MA at the age of 20, where he attended the artillery course. He completed the GSC in 1910 as a lieutenant. Later, already a captain, he volunteered\textsuperscript{63} for the expedition to Angola led by Alves Roçadas and disembarked in Moçâmbe on 9 February 1915, becoming chief of Staff for Alves Roçadas; from 3 March 1917 to 15 March 1918 he was chief of GS of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the PEC. He rose to the rank of general.

Pires Monteiro was born in Lisbon on 12 February 1882, and in 1899, at the age of 17, he joined the MA, where he attended the Infantry course. Later, he finished the GSC as a lieutenant in 1909. He was Chief of Staff of the Kwanhama detachment in the 1915 expedition, and from 30 December 1916 to 6 November 1918, he was in the General Staff of the PEC Division. He rose to the rank of colonel.

\textsuperscript{60} Eça, 1921, pp. 31,32,33
\textsuperscript{61} Eça, 1921, pp. 34,35
\textsuperscript{62} Eça, 1921, pp. 38 to 39
\textsuperscript{63} According to the letter he sent to Monteiro in 1922 (Mascarenhas, 1922).
During the campaign, the two officers carried out their duties in different locations, and, after the formation of the detachments described above, were appointed Chiefs of Staff of a detachment (Monteiro, of the Kwanhama detachment, and Mascarenhas, of the Kwamato detachment).

The three letters sent by Mascarenhas during the expedition, on 12 June, and on 18 and 28 July 1915, respectively, describe the daily life of the expedition, the problems with the wagons and the animals, and also comment on the campaign. Mascarenhas was in Humbe at the time of the last two letters, and in the third letter he replied to Monteiro that he was in Lubango on 16 July, still 280 km from Humbe, which shows that there was a postal service within the force that allowed the exchange of correspondence between detachments (at least between GS officers). These letters were handwritten and are difficult to read, so we could not examine them with the depth that they deserve, as they convey the impressions of an officer who occupied a position in the force that allowed him a general view of the campaign, and constituted a confidential report on what he thought was happening; thus, it would contribute to a better understanding of the campaign if the letters were analysed in more detail.

In the typewritten letter, which was sent from Porto on 5 July 1922, are described in great detail the events leading up to the intervention by his detachment to restore the lines of communication with the Kwanhama detachment.
There is a certain air of indignation to this letter, since, in his opinion, the campaign in southern Angola was treated unfairly compared to other theatres of the time, not only in France but also during the campaigns against the monarchists. He even provided the example of some fellow soldiers (whom he refers to only by name), who were promoted to an upper rank for what he deemed were minor feats, particularly in the PEC and in the campaigns against the monarchists. Thanks to his attitude towards the events that motivated his letter to Monteiro, we have some reservations regarding the description of the events during the intervention of the Kwamato detachment and of the role played by Mascarenhas. We do, however, wish to make it clear that from what we could ascertain, there is nothing in the letter that contradicts the description provided by General Pereira D’Eça’s report.

Both officers were praised by Pereira D’Eça. In his commendation, he mentioned their contributions throughout the Campaign, praising their commitment, intelligence and dedication, but what he praised the most was the way they conducted themselves during the Mõngua incident. He acknowledged Monteiro’s courage and bravery on 18 August, when he was injured during the fight and still rode a horse to deliver an order. Pereira D’Eça also mentioned that taking cover avoided many casualties among the troops. This description gives us a better idea of the courage and bravery required to ride a horse in the rear of troops under cover (thus, closer to the ground) while the square was being hit by enemy fire. As for Magalhães, he had a crucial role in the emergency rescue of the Kwanhama detachment by the Kwamato detachment.

Analysing their AF, we found that both officers, after returning from the Angola campaign, were appointed to serve on the PEC. After the war, both were again involved in operations: Monteiro against the rebels in the north, in 1919, and Mascarenhas against the monarchist insurgents in 1925. They also taught at the MA, at the CSO, and Mascarenhas also taught at the IAEM. They were members of juries to evaluate the exams for admission into the various ranks, and performed duties in the Army General Staff on several occasions in their careers. They were appointed to various committees, from the Committee to reorganise the units after the Great War, to the organizing committee of the Army Arsenal and of the MA.

The fact that the Monteiro estate holds, in addition to the letters, menus

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64 Eça, 1921, pp. 51,52.
65 The bullet went through both his legs, killing his mount.
66 Monteiro was appointed to the committee ‘tasked with choosing the best site in the Batalha Monastery to bury the remains of the Unknown Soldiers’.
and invitations and newspaper clippings for reunions commemorating the ‘Southern Angola Campaign 1914-1915’, one from 1923 and another from 1945, is, in our opinion, proof that the experience and the time spent in this campaign marked the officers who served there, and that it was worthy of remembrance and commemoration.

4. Conclusions

We set out to study the group comprising the army officers who served in the General Staff Service from 1914-1918, and the origins of the concept of ‘GS’ in Portugal, specifying the type of duties expected of the ‘AGS’, and we examined the changes to the training of officers introduced during the 19th century, specifically for this type of duties. Once the group had been selected, we listed a number of sociographic elements to analyse; this allowed us to conclude that these were officers whose military experience spanned all areas of the Army.

In 1837, with the creation of the MA by Sá da Bandeira and the beginning in earnest of the professionalization of the military class, selection criteria were established for applicants to the MA courses, including the GS Service course attended by the future officers of the GS Corps set up in 1834.

In 1891, the concept of the course was changed, and it ceased to be a basic course and became a complementary course open to all Arms of the Army. The individual courses did not undergo significant changes and the students, officers who had by then already trained in the MA, were only required to attend specific GSC courses and/or those in which they had not obtained a passing grade, as was the case of the two officers under analysis.

We were able to ascertain, with regard to course of origin, that in the GS Service of 1914-1918, 23 officers still came from the GSS/MA course, 29 from the Infantry course, 16 from the Artillery course and six from the Cavalry course. With regard to the general course ranking when leaving the MA, we were able to ascertain that, of the officers who attended the GSC, the majority were in the first third of the respective course. This analysis has shown that most of the officers who attended the GSC (complementary course) had the highest grades when leaving their respective courses of the MA, as was the case with Monteiro, who came in fifth out of fifty-six in the Infantry course, and Mascarenhas, who came in first out of eight in the artillery course.

By creating a hypothetical career to better illustrate the careers of this group of officers, we concluded that they had a rich professional life in terms of
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

experience, not only as GS officers but also in the performance of civilian duties and posts, participating in expeditionary actions in command of troops, serving in various ministries and teaching. An examination of their duties has revealed that this was a group with the ability to carry out a wide range of duties, both military and civilian. As for their military experience, in addition to the tasks pertaining to the GS, they commanded companies, battalions and groups, and expeditionary forces, both in the colonies and in Flanders. These were officers with tactical experience combined with extensive management/administration capabilities acquired by serving in several posts in the GS service.

The two officers we selected were no exception, having served in the General Staff of the expeditionary force to southern Angola, where they carried out the duties deemed necessary by the force commander. After returning from Angola, both officers were appointed to the PEC in Flanders. When the war ended both were again called to participate in operations, this time in Portugal; their career was very similar to the one we used to illustrate the hypothetical career of an officer with the GSC.

By analysing the contribution made by the officers of this Service during the campaigns in Africa through the performance of two unknown officers, selected by (happy) coincidence, we confirmed our earlier findings, which we had generalized for the Service as a whole: that this group of officers performed operational missions, and that they were remarkable for their competence, value and adaptability.

The General Staff Service played a crucial role in the Army, including in troubled times such as the Great War, both in the European front and in the African campaigns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Officers in the GS Service from 1914 to 1918</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abel Acácio de Almeida Botelho</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaspar António Azevedo Meira</td>
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<td>Antonio Maria de Matos Cordeiro</td>
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<td>Tomáz António Garcia Rosado</td>
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<td>Augusto da Costa Macedo</td>
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<td>Manuel Rodrigues Ermitão</td>
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<td>Vitoriano José César</td>
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<td>José Augusto Alves Roçadas 1)</td>
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List of Officers in the GS Service from 1914 to 1918 (Cont.)

<table>
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<th>Rank</th>
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<tr>
<td>José Júlio Forbes Costa</td>
<td>Gaspar do Couto Ribeiro Vilas</td>
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<td>Alfredo Carlos Pimentel May</td>
<td>João Ortigão Peres 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francisco Xavier Correia Mendes</td>
<td>Artur Ivens Ferraz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manuel Maria de Oliveira Ramos</td>
<td>Antonio de Sant’Ana Cabrita Júnior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vasco Martins</td>
<td>Augusto Botelho da Costa Veiga</td>
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<td>Pedro Lopes Cunha Pessoa</td>
<td>Fernando Augusto Freiria</td>
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<td>Alfredo Mendes Magalhães Ramalho</td>
<td>Alfredo Balduíno de Seabra Junior</td>
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<td>Luís António César de Oliveira</td>
<td>António Maria de Freitas Soares 1)</td>
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<td>João José Sínel Cordes</td>
<td>Tasso de Miranda Cabral</td>
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<td>João Montês Champalimaud</td>
<td>Fernando Augusto Borges Júnior</td>
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<td>Luís António Carvalho Martins</td>
<td>Carlos Maria Pereira dos Santos</td>
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<td>João de Sousa Eiró</td>
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<td>Eduardo Augusto Marques</td>
<td>Carlos Matias de Castro</td>
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<td>José Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos</td>
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<td>João Pereira Bastos</td>
<td>Joaquim Artur dos Santos Machado</td>
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<td>Amílcar de Castro Abreu e Mota</td>
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<td>Angelo Leopoldo da Cruz e Sousa</td>
<td>Vasco Freire Termudo</td>
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<td>Roberto da Cunha Baptista</td>
<td>António de Sousa Pinto Machado Coutinho</td>
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<td>Abílio Augusto Valdez de Passos e Sousa</td>
<td>José Joaquim Ramos 1)</td>
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<td>Júlio d’Abreu Campos 1)</td>
<td>Jorge Dias da Costa 1)</td>
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<td>Ernesto de França Mandes Machado</td>
<td>António Cândido de Gouveia Castilho Nobre 2)</td>
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<td>Artur Pereira de Mesquita</td>
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<td>Armando Bertoldo Machado 2)</td>
<td>Liberato Damião Ribeiro Pinto 2)</td>
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<td>Vitorino Henriques Godinho</td>
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<td>Joaquim dos Santos Correia 1)</td>
<td>Henrique Sátiro Lopes Pires Monteiro 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mário Augusto Gouveia Xavier de Brito</td>
<td>José Esteves da Conceiçação Mascarenhas 1)</td>
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1) Officers who served in Angola.
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The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

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The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

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A General Staff Officer in the Great War: two examples from the campaigns in Africa


Commanders in Africa (1914-1918): an ill-fated generation.
Commanding officers of the 1st Expedition to Angola

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Introduction

This communication is part of a project funded by the Centre for Research of the Academia Militar (CINAMIL) entitled ‘A Portuguese form of command and military leadership in the Great War - Africa’. The main goal of this project is to characterize a ‘Portuguese form of command and military leadership in the Great War’, specifically in Africa, in the context of the expeditions to Angola and Mozambique from 1914 to 1918, contributing to create a benchmark for military leadership and command that can lead to appropriate performances in conditions of extreme adversity characterized by hostile physical environments and lack of human and material resources.

The relevance of this theme stems from the fact that, at the onset of hostilities, the situation of the units of the Portuguese Army and the commanders deployed to Africa to defend the integrity of the colonial territories was quite atypical thanks to the introduction of two new realities: a technically and tactically superior opponent, in contrast to the engagements in Africa in the previous decades; an inefficient army, the result of political and social instability in the country.

This Communication aims to present the state of the research related to the partial objective of identifying ‘the sociological profile of the commanding officers of the units mobilized for Africa from 1914-1918’. This partial objective is integrated in the research lines ‘commanding officers’ and ‘Army and society’.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

To this end, and at this early stage of the research, we decided to attempt to characterize only the sociological profile of the commanding officers of the units mobilized to Angola during the 1st Expedition (from their deployment in September 1914 until the Naulila battle in December that same year), a total of nine officers.

With regard to methodology, and in terms of what is objectively understood by ‘sociological profile’, the research is still in a phase of reflection and intra-project discussion, as we look for indicators that may be relevant to the pursuit of the main objective of the project. Thus, in this phase, the indicators focus on the main trends regarding social origins, academic life and career, with special attention to the parameters of professional experience, specifically service overseas, command experience, education and training of troops, and in particular any combat experience in the African campaigns (or others) of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, as well as command and/or general staff duties carried out in Portugal and in the colonies. The fieldwork was based on the research of primary sources, namely the individual files of the officers in question (either as students of the Military Academy (MA) or as officers) in the Arquivo Histórico Militar and in the Arquivo Geral do Exército, Ordens do Exército and other orders, as well as official correspondence. Finally, it was deemed relevant at this stage of the research to characterise the military career of the officers according to Morris Janowitz, who defined three types of military career: ‘standard career, routine career, and adaptive career. In the first type, officers follow a career model which includes mandatory stages but also requires a special personal commitment, such as attending command and general staff schools and the proper performance of certain duties. In the routine-type career, officers meet the established minimum standards, but at crucial moments in their career progression are not given - or do not take - the opportunity to overcome certain obstacles, such as special courses, general staff posts, etc. In adaptive-type careers we may find officers who follow a standard-type career, but who also invest (and take risks) in alternative experiences, such as choosing rare, new, or experimental specialties. Although the standard career constitutes the safest way to attain a high rank, adaptive-type careers - not exclusive to technical fields - bring about faster and more dazzling ascents’

The present work is divided into three parts. The first part consists in a brief approach to the evolution of military higher education within the Military

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1 Carrilho, 1985, pp. 53–54.
Commanders in Africa (1914-1918): an ill-fated generation.
Commanding officers of the 1st Expedition to Angola

Academy, which aims to describe that evolution\(^2\), and subsequently allow us to frame the training received by those officers against the timeline of that same evolution. The second part begins by briefly characterising the 1st Expedition to Angola; however, the bulk of this section is devoted to the officers under analysis, and as such it seeks to provide detailed information on the indicators mentioned above. Finally, the conclusions seek to systematise these general ideas on the officers under study with regard to certain indicators: position in the timeline of the evolution of education in the Military Academy; academic path and disciplinary performance at the Military Academy; professional career, with special focus on command, education and general staff experience, disciplinary record, and, especially, any kind of combat experience and service in the colonies; characterization of the military career.

1. The Evolution of Teaching in the Military Academy

   a. The creation of the Polytechnic School and of the Military Academy (1837)

   The Napoleonic wars and the invasions of Portugal by Napoleon’s troops exposed the shortcomings of the Portuguese military system, as it had failed to fulfil its mission - the military defence of the country -, which resulted in Portugal’s main ally, England, taking over those responsibilities. Only after the establishment of the liberal regime was it possible to give a positive response to the plans to update the military education and to give more attention to the training of Portuguese officers, with a view to professionalization. ‘Thus, on 11 January 1837, the Polytechnic School was created to replace the Royal Academies, (...) with the main goal of providing preparatory education to the prospective students of specific military courses of the Army and Navy. (...) The day after the decree that established the Polytechnic School (...) influenced by the then Viscount of Sá da Bandeira, (...) the law creating the Military Academy and terminating the old Academy of Fortification, Artillery and Design was issued’\(^3\). A process was thus put into motion which would lead to a better definition of the military career and to the professionalization of the staff of Army Officers.

   In 1837, after the establishment of the Polytechnic Schools of Lisbon and Porto, preparatory studies of varying duration were created which gave access

\(^2\) Within this same project, the issue of ascertaining ‘what was the academic and technical training of the officers in command of units mobilized for Africa in the period 1914-1918’ was presented at the XXIII Military History Conference in November 2014. See Freire and Varanda, 2014.

\(^3\) Carrilho, 1985, p. 129.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: 
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

to the different arms and services that would be attended by the future officers.
‘Students of Engineering and General Staff required four years; Artillery
students, three years; and Cavalry and Infantry students, only one year. From
1843 onwards, the enrolment in the School was open to candidates (...) holding
a bachelor’s degree in Mathematics from the Universidade de Coimbra, as a
way to promote the military career with the youth in the north (...)’ and centre
‘of the country’ 4. That same year, the Military Academy began operations with
seven core courses 5, ‘three military-related courses and one course to train civil
engineers. The military courses were divided into: Military Engineering and
Artillery, with a duration of three years; General Staff, with a duration of two
years; and Infantry and Cavalry, only one year 6.

b. The reorganization of Military Higher Education in 1863 and
1884

Influenced by the development of higher military education in Europe,
and especially by the events in Prussia, but also because of the advances
in the process of military organization and professionalization arising
from the Crimean War (1853-56) and the American Civil War (1861-65),
and the introduction of new technological developments - the telegraph,
breech-loading artillery and related developments in ballistics – there was the
need ‘to improve the education system, a change which Sá da Bandeira fought
for and managed to introduce in 1863, after his reassignment to the post of
Minister of War. The number of courses offered by the MA was increased’ to
ten in total, ‘and the cultural scope of the subjects taught was scientifically
expanded. The disciplines of Military Law and Administration; History,
Military Geography and Statistics; and Fundamentals of Law was introduced
- in addition to new subjects related to the advancements in artillery and
mechanics. The duration of the Infantry and Cavalry courses was increased
to two years, with Artillery and Engineering becoming separate courses (...) and
a course to qualify officers for fulfilling Military Administration duties
was created’ 7. The reforms were not only introduced in the MA but also in the
preparatory studies at the Polytechnic School, which now required three years

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4 Carrilho, 1985, p. 130.
5 Military Art and Temporary Fortification; Permanent Fortification; Artillery; Construction
Stability and Applied Mechanics for Machines and Hydraulic Works; Civil Architecture
and its Applications and Construction; Topography; and English Grammar and Language.
6 Carrilho, 1985, p. 130.
7 Carrilho, 1985, p. 130-131.
for the Artillery, Engineering and General Staff courses instead of the four years previously required for Engineering and General Staff. Admission to the Infantry and Cavalry courses became more flexible and accessible to officers who had completed the Military College course or the first class high-schools course, in addition to one year of preparatory studies at Polytechnic School.

In 1884, due to lobbying from the faculty of the Military Academy, and influenced by other developments, including the railway, and the outbreak of new wars such as the American Civil War (1861-65), and the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian wars (1870-71), a ‘new organization of subjects’ was created ‘which mainly consisted in furthering the level of expertise in ballistics and artillery equipment, as well as in an attempt to raise the bar of the General Staff courses by extending their length and the number of individual courses’\(^8\). In addition to theoretical education, the school provided practical education, which consisted in the production of work in the study rooms (projects, problems, etc.), topographic surveys near the school grounds, temporary fortification works, sapper work, mines work, as well as visits to industrial and military establishments and to the Lisbon fortifications. With regard to the Arms, tactical training was provided for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, fencing, gymnastics and horse riding, but it was not possible to teach swimming, which was also prescribed, for lack of proper facilities\(^9\).

c. The reorganization of Higher Military Education from 1894-1897

From 1894-1897, the reforms decreed between 1890 and 1892 were enacted, headed by General Luís Augusto Pimentel Pinto, the then Secretary of War, leading to the creation of a boarding school to foster ‘esprit-de-corps’ among students. These reforms included a more rigorous physical inspection of the candidates, better physical preparation of students and greater academic rigour, with an increase in number of core courses to 15\(^10\) in 1894 and 20\(^11\) in 1896, and the introduction of what became known as the ‘final act’, into ‘which were admitted those students who had obtained a grade of at least ten points in the educational groups and subgroups in the previous year’\(^12\).

\(^8\) Carrilho, 1985, p. 131.
\(^9\) Sena, 1922, p.28.
\(^10\) General Tactics course; External Ballistics; Complementary Tactics Course; Roads and Railways.
\(^12\) Carrilho, 1985, p. 134.
The introduction of these measures, which promoted ‘greater rigour’, was also associated with the 1863 attempt to reform the preparatory studies of the Polytechnic School, adding an extra year to the Infantry and Cavalry courses, which now lasted for two years, although the measure was not implemented in 1897 due to lack of sufficient applicants. On the other hand, in the MA, the same rationale was used to add one more year to the Engineering course in 1863, a total of four years. Aside from these predominantly academic aspects, an issue related to international politics proved vital to this reform - ‘the world’s curiosity, interest, and, especially, greed for the African continent’.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Portugal ‘witnessed the journeys of the great explorers of Central Africa: Livingstone, Stanley, Brazza, etc.; attended the Berlin Conference of 1884 and witnessed the birth of the Belgian Congo; and had to solve a number of serious conflicts like the issue of Bolama, the issue of Lourenço Marques, of the Zaire, and finally the issue of the Rose-coloured map and the fixation of the Mozambique borders, which culminated on 11 January 1890, resulting in a ‘campaign to occupy and defend Portugal’s African Empire’ and to safeguard the national interests. Thus, ‘The Portuguese Army saw itself involved in permanent friction, on the one hand, because of the sovereignty dispute with the European powers in Africa, and, on the other, by the resistance posed by local populations in almost all overseas territories. Particularly from 1885 onwards, there were successive clashes in Angola and Mozambique in which the Portuguese troops were often defeated’, and ‘in Guinea, India and Timor, although in smaller numbers, there was also resistance to the Portuguese presence’. Nearly a decade after the beginning of the occupation campaign in 1885, these political upheavals had direct impact on the reform of the Military Academy from 1894-97, and were reflected in the introduction in the syllabus of different courses concerning the organizational, administrative, operational and tactical aspects of colonial affairs, as well as those related to Geography and History.

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2. The Expedition to Angola and its Commanding Officers
   a. The 1st Expedition to Angola

   The 1st expedition to Angola took place in the political-strategic context of West Africa, and the operational commitment was strongly conditioned by the famous ‘Naulila incident’ of 19 October 1914\footnote{On this subject, special attention should be given to the work by (Santos, 1978) and more recently by (Freire, 2015).}. After the declaration of war on Germany by the United Kingdom, Portugal remained neutral at the request of the United Kingdom, sensing, however, the ‘threat’ posed by the German colony - then German Southwest Africa - to the southern border of Angola. This colony, apparently isolated by the Royal Navy blockade, despite the defensive stance ordered by the Colonial Department in Berlin in case of war, had the ‘opportunity to retaliate’ with regard to the events in Naulila. This opportunity emerged due to the failure by South Africa to conduct military operations at the request of the United Kingdom, after a failed campaign\footnote{Van der Waag, 2013.} which was followed by an Afrikaner uprising (15 September 1914).
In the plan of operations prepared in Lisbon in August 1914, the mission of the expeditionary detachment was to march to the province of Angola and, incorporating the troops from the garrison of the colony, form a column capable of acting in accordance to certain objectives: the direct occupation of the Kwanhama country, and the opposition to the progress of any forces, isolated or not, who wished to invade the territory of the colony, as reported by the commander of the expedition, Lieutenant Colonel José Alves Roçadas. Once the objectives and mission were defined, the assets employed were also determined: an infantry battalion from the 14th Infantry Regiment (IR) of Viseu, under the command of Major Alberto Salgado - with four companies, the 9th, the 10th, the 11th and the 12th, commanded respectively by Captain Artur Homem Ribeiro, Captain José da Fonseca Lebre, Captain António Lopes Mateus and Captain Aristides da Cunha; one cavalry squadron from the 9th Cavalry Regiment (CR) of Braga, under the command of Captain Alberto Macedo; a TR 7.5 artillery battery from the 19th Artillery Regiment (AR) of Viana do Castelo, under the command of Captain António Lopes Batista; one machine-gun battery of the 1st Machine-gun Group based in Lisbon, under the command of Captain José Mendes dos Reis; ‘A full headquarters and other services that were not included in the initial project, namely, health services, engineers, military administration, transport and étapes’. The Angola province mobilised an Erhardt battery and the full staff from the 1st and 2nd dragoon squadrons, the 1st and 2nd European companies and the four native companies of the Huila garrison.

Lieutenant Colonel José Augusto Alves Roçadas

José Augusto Alves Roçadas was born on 6 April 1865 in the civil parish of São Pedro, in Vila Real de Trás-os-Montes, to Anna de Jesus Ferreira. On 3 December 1889, he married Maria Clementina Ferreira de Carvalho. They had 5 children.

He joined the army as a volunteer in the 2nd Caçadores [Riflemen] Battalion on 30 November 1882. Having completed the first course of the Polytechnic School - the preparatory course for general staff officers, military engineers and civil engineers - he enrolled in the MA from 1882 to 1886, completing the general staff course in first place out of 7 students in the course, with a final grade of 14.9 points.

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18 Freire, 2015, p.129.
19 Freire, 2015, p.129-130.
20 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 576 e 3620 (EE). Lisboa.
After completing the MA, he was promoted to sublieutenant on 8 January 1889, while serving in the 6th Cavalry Regiment (CR). He was promoted to lieutenant on 31 March 1892 and appointed to the General Staff Corps. From May 1 to November 1, 1893 he was placed in the military reconnaissance service, after which he served as deputy of the 2nd section of the command department of the General Staff Corps. He was promoted to captain on 24 February 1894. On 30 January 1895, he was appointed to the 8th Infantry Brigade, where he was given the equivalent rank of major. On 1 May 1897 he was tasked with carrying out military reconnaissance in the outskirts of Lisbon. On 29 October 1897, he was called to the War Ministry and appointed to serve in Angola as chief of staff of the governor-general of that province. He arrived in Luanda on 3 December 1897 and returned to Lisbon at the end of his commission on 20 November 1900, and was subsequently integrated in the General Staff Corps. On 14 November 1901, he was assigned a service commission in the State of India, where he was chief of staff of the State’s general government and also member of the standing committee for archaeological research in the territory of Goa. On 4 March 1905, he was appointed governor of the Huila province in Angola, stopping in Lisbon in his journey there from India. He disembarked in Luanda on 15 July 1905 and was
integrated in the Mulondo operations column. He commanded the operations in the Huila province between 8 August and 27 November 1906. He participated in the raids of Pacolo, Mucuena, Jau and Barabara. After returning to the mainland, he was appointed officer on the service of King Carlos. Excused from the apprenticeship exams, he was promoted to major on 2 April 1908. He was later appointed governor of the Macao province. He was in the Kwamato operations column in the Angola province and participated in operations in Mufilo; in bivouac protection duty in Anlungo; in the Macuri action; marched under fire from Dameguero to Aluendo; defended the bivouac in Aluendo, in Inhaca, in the invasion of the embala of Little Kwamato and in the invasion of Big Kwamato. In 1909, he was named governor-general of the Angola province, from where he was discharged on 13 October 1910, returning to the mainland on 16 November that same year, where he registered as available for duty. Afterwards, he performed several duties: as chief of staff of the 4th Army Division, chief of staff of the 8th Division, where he requested to be relieved from office on 2 January 1912, was head of the Second Division of the First Directorate of the Army General Staff. On 28 September 1912, he vowed to defend the homeland and the laws of the Republic. On 22 August 1914, he was appointed commander of the expedition to the Angola province, on which he embarked on 11 September, reaching Moçâmedes on 1 October. He was 50 years old at the beginning of the 1st Expedition and had 32 years of service, of which five were spent as subordinate, four as captain and six as lieutenant colonel.

Until the first expedition, his registration file shows seven commendations and several decorations. He was decorated Knight of the Military Order of St. Benedict of Avis (1900), Commander of the Military Order of the Tower and of the Sword, of Value, Loyalty and Merit (1906), was awarded the Gold Medal of Queen Amelia (1907), was decorated Grand Officer of the Military Order of the Tower and of the Sword, of Value, Loyalty and Merit (1907), with the Gold Medal of Distinguished Service (1907) and the Gold Medal of Military Valour (1908).

His commendations mentioned the qualities of zeal and perseverance with which he sought to promote the education of the other ranks, his proficiency, uprightness and loyalty. He was promoted with distinction to lieutenant colonel for his capacity for command, intelligence and foresight in the preparation and conduct of operations in the Kwamatos. In his annual records, his leaders repeatedly mentioned his intelligence, the outstanding

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21 After the establishment of the Republic, all the officers who remained in office had to sign this declaration of loyalty to the republican regime.
performance of his duties and his potential value. These assessments were considered exceptional. He had experience overseas (India, Angola and Macau) and combat experience in Angola.

**Major Alberto Salgado**

Alberto Salgado was born on 21 February 1870 in the east neighbourhood of the civil parish of Bonfim, Porto. He was the son of José Pereira Salgado and Ana Augusta Rodrigues Barbosa. He married Amelia Martins on 21 April 1895, with whom he had three sons: Fernando (04-12-1896); José (20-8-1897); Alexandre (10-28-1898).

He studied at the *Liceu Central* of Porto. At 19, he volunteered for the 9th *Caçadores* Regiment on 31 August 1889, and he was soldier No. 5 in the 2nd Company, No. 1042 in the 1st Battalion. On 3 October 1889, he enrolled in the Infantry course of the MA; his corps number was 171. He was punished with 12 days of detention for contempt in the Castle of St. George, until 1 September 1890, for disobedience and threats to 2nd Sergeant José Lopes Siqueira of the 10th Cavalry, No. 161, as per the latter’s report issued on 21 August 1890. He completed the course in 50th place out of 151 students, with a final grade of 11.1 points.

He was promoted to sublieutenant in the 18th IR on 23 June 1894. Next, he was assigned to the 6th, and later to the 5th IR, from where he deployed to Mozambique on 18 August 1898, disembarking in Lourenço Marques on 11 September. On 30 June 1899 he was promoted to lieutenant on the 1st IR, after which he participated in the Niassa expedition, and took part in the operations against Kwanhama and Mataca, in the Matancolo and Namalando battles and in the action on Nangama. On 18 October he was assigned to the 10th IR and returned to the mainland on 19 December 1899, serving on the 6th IR and, since 27 January 1900, on the 5th IR. Before his promotion to captain on 14 May 1904, he was appointed to the MA and to the Infantry Training School (ITS) in Mafra, where he carried out the duties of subordinate to the Society of Students and Assistant, respectively. He deployed to the Angola province, arriving in Luanda on 4 July, where he took command of the European Infantry Company of the Kwanhama Operations column. After his commission was completed on 25 July 1906, he returned to the mainland, where he was assigned to the 1st *Caçadores* Battalion, and was later asked to perform a service commission under the

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22 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 588 e 7358 (EE). Lisboa. See also Caldeira, 2011 and, for further details on the officers who served in the 14th IR, see Borges, 2014.
Ministry of the Kingdom, until 1910, afterwards serving in the 24th and 35th IR, and again in the 24th IR, from 30 September 1911 onwards. On 16 April 1914, he was promoted to major in the 14th IR, months before taking the command of the 3rd expeditionary battalion, which he left on 17 June 1915, still in Angola, to command the 3rd Battalion of the 18th IR of the Kwamato detachment.

Before his deployment for Angola, he was commended by the commander of the 14th IR, on 7 September 1914, for his ‘zealous and loyal cooperation and dedication to service’ in the constitution of the battalion, but he had already been commended twice for his conduct as commander of the European company in Angola, for his ‘dedication, zeal and high level of competence’ and for his ‘nerve, dedication and bravery’ and for maintaining ‘fire discipline in the Mulondo campaign’. He was awarded the following honours: Knight of the Ancient and most Noble Order of Military Tower and of the Sword, of Value, Loyalty and Merit (May 1900); the Silver Medal of Queen Amelia (June 1900); the Medal of Queen Amelia - Mulondo campaign (April 1905); Knight of the Military Order of St. Benedict of Avis (January 1907).

His assessment records show his commanders’ praise of the following characteristics: intelligence; character; discipline. Already as a sublieutenant, his commander (6th IR) wrote ‘he is, of all the subordinates, the one who manifests the most superior military qualities’ and ‘he is the most skilled subordinate in the Regiment’ (1896).

He was 44 years old and had 25 years of service at the beginning of the 1st Expedition, of which two were spent in the MA, ten as a subordinate, and ten as captain. He was a veteran of the occupation campaigns of Mozambique and Angola, where he was recognized for his ‘nerve, dedication and bravery’ and for maintaining ‘fire discipline in the Mulondo campaign’, where he proved to be a strict but fair commander. The ‘energetic commander, Major Salgado, was an officer most experienced in the colonial campaigns’, in the words of Alves Roçadas. He proved to be a man of action who, even after the difficult mission with the 14th IR battalion, continued in the theatre as commander of the 18th IR battalion.

From early on, his assessments may considered exceptional. Later, he stood out for his ‘intelligence, character, discipline’, ‘dedication, zeal and high level of competence’ and for his ‘zealous and loyal cooperation and dedication to service’.
Captain Artur Homem Ribeiro

Artur Homem Ribeiro was born on 11 November 1874 in Vale de Madeiros, civil parish of Canas de Senhorim, municipality of Nelas, district of Viseu. He was single.

He studied at the Liceu Nacional Central of Viseu - where he took the English exam - and at the Polytechnic School - where he took the first year exam in descriptive geometry. He volunteered as a soldier on 10 September 1897, and was No. 110 in the enrolment records and No. 66 of the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 14th IR. He enrolled in the first common year of the Cavalry and Infantry courses of the MA on 22 October 1898, where he was first sergeant ranked as cadet, and his corps number was No. 143. He did not complete the first year, as he was disqualified from attending the individual courses, and repeated the year in 1899-1900. He completed the infantry course in 55th out of 56 students, with a final grade of 10.8 points.

He began his career as an officer in 1901, as an officer aspiring in the Queen’s 1st Infantry Regiment, then served in the 12th IR, where he was promoted to sublieutenant on 15 November 1902. In 1903, he was transferred to the 14th IR, where he was promoted to lieutenant on 1 December 1906 and assigned to the post of commander of the sappers platoon. In 1909 he was assigned to the Casa de Reclusão [military prison] of the 2nd Military Division in Viseu. In 1913, he was assigned to the 9th IR, where he was promoted to captain on 8 November 1913. In 1914, he was assigned to the 14th IR, where he was appointed commander of the 9th Company of the 3rd Expeditionary Battalion.

He was commended on 21 April 1909 by the commander of the 14th IR for ‘zeal and care in the fulfilment of his duties, along with his substantial readings and study of history for a conference that was held on the Peninsular War - the defence of the Amarante Bridge’.

In his assessment records, his commanders highlighted the following characteristics: intelligent, dedicated to the service and esteemed by his comrades and by civil society (sublieutenant); hard worker and interested in performing all kinds of service (lieutenant of the 14th IR); intelligent, disciplined and perfectionist in the fulfilment of his duties (Casa de Reclusão of the 2nd Military Division). His assessments can be considered normal by the standards of the time.

He was 40 years old and had 17 years of service at the beginning of the 1st Expedition, of which three were spent in the MA and eleven as a subordinate.

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23 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 1262 e 4745 (EE). Lisboa.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

He did not have any combat or overseas experience. He died in the Naulila battle on 18 December 1914.

Captain José da Fonseca Lebre

José da Fonseca Lebre was born on 21 November 1870 in the eastern civil parish of the Sé of Viseu, Municipality and District of Viseu, the son of Silvério António da Fonseca and Maria dos Prazeres da Silveira Lebre. He married Palmira Adília Martins on 3 April 1898. They had 6 children.

He had a standard education until enrolling in the Liceu of Viseu. He volunteered to the Army on 5 February 1890 as a soldier in the 14th IR, and was promoted to second corporal on 22 June 1890, and later to first corporal on 29 December that same year. He was again promoted to second sergeant on 23 February 1891, completed the preparatory course for the MA at the Polytechnic School in Porto from 1891 to 1893, and on November 1893, at the age of 22, he enrolled in the MA where he attended the Infantry course as first sergeant ranked as cadet, with corps number 15. He completed the course on 21 October 1896, and was 14th out of 16 students, with the final grade of 12.1 points. He became an officer aspiring enrolled in the practical apprenticeship for Officer (PAO) in the ITS, in Mafra.

After graduating from the MA, he was promoted to sublieutenant on 3 March 1898, and joined the 4th IR on the same date. On 16 April that same year, he joined the 14th IR in Viseu, and later joined the 20th IR on 6 November 1901, returning to the 14th IR on the 18th of the same month. He was promoted to lieutenant on 28 June 1905 and assigned to the 14th IR as an attaché, as he was going to serve on the Guarda Fiscal (GF) as Commander of the Miranda Section. On 25 April 1908, he became Commander of the Melgaço Section. He was promoted to captain on 14 July 1911 and was assigned to the 29th IR, remaining there from 6 December 1911 onwards, as the attaché assigned to the North Constituency of the Guarda Fiscal as Commander of the 3rd Company. On 19 May 1913, he requested a transfer to the 3rd Army Division and, on 5 July 1913, to the 14th IR to participate in the 1st Expedition to Angola. However, on 30 August that same year, before he was deployed overseas, he was appointed Administrator of the Municipality of S. Pedro do Sul by the Interior Ministry, presenting for duty the following day before the Civil Government of Viseu, only returning to the 14th IR on 25 January 1914, for later deployment in Angola.

24 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 1519 e 4420 (EE). Lisboa.
With regard to his academic path, during his stay in the MA and later in the ITS, he was punished on 4 November 1893 with 10 days of disciplinary detention by the Commander of the Military Academy, for ‘being at Café Martinho at 7:30 pm on 31 October, shouting, gesticulating, and practicing other acts unbecoming of his rank. He was eventually warned by Municipal Guard Sublieutenant Alfredo Pedreira Martins de Lima that he was in no state to be in the premises, and even advised him to leave, to which he responded violently, reluctantly complying with a later order to leave; he proved to be intoxicated’. He received, in accordance to AO No. 10 issued in 1894, the Copper Military Medal of exemplary behaviour. On 27 August 1897, during his stay at the ITS, he was ‘commended for having distinguished himself in the first year of the fencing course’.

His disciplinary record shows two commendations: in 1901, by the commander of 14th IR, for his work on the survey of the floor plans of the dependencies of the Regiment; in 1912, for having ‘quickly warned his superiors of the approaching enemy - monarchist rebels - during an incursion by those same rebels into Valença on 7 July 1912, and by the timely and sustained resistance he had put up until reinforcements arrived’.

There were no negative records on his academic evaluation (MA and PAO); however, he must have made an impression, because on one of his PAO assessment files it is stated that he ‘gets along with his fellow soldiers; is upright in all his actions; is well liked by both military and civil society (…)’ After joining the 14th IR, his reviews were standard, generally positive, and he stood out for being ‘intelligent, studious and disciplinarian. He gets on well with his fellow soldiers; is upright in his actions and is highly esteemed both as a citizen and a soldier. He is a good family man. I have a good impression of him’ (1898 and 1900). He had ‘excellent drawing skills and he conceived a model of shoe for the infantry that was deemed ingenious and functional. He fulfils his professional duties with distinction’ (1902 and 1904); ‘he (...) is very skilled at drawing and fencing’ (1903 and 1904). After joining the GF in the Miranda and Melgaço sections, he was later appointed commander of the 3rd Company of the North Constituency of the GF for being ‘disciplinarian, dignified, cultivated and upright. Quite intelligent, he fulfilled with great zeal and dedication the duties in his charge. I have a good impression of him (...)’ (1905-1912). In 1914, already awaiting deployment in Angola, the commander of the 14th IR stated the following in his brief assessment: ‘this officer is currently Director of the Municipality of S. Pedro do Sul. He was here when I took command of the Regiment and I do not even know him. However, bearing in mind the
information I have been given by his Battalion Commander, I can now state the following: he fulfils his service duties, and seeks to perform them well (…’). His assessments can be considered standard.

He was 43 years old and had 24 years of service at the beginning of the Expedition, of which three were spent as a soldier, second corporal, first corporal and second sergeant, three as first sergeant ranked as cadet in the MA, two as officer aspiring in the ITS, 13 as subordinate - six of which in the GF - and three as captain in the GF. His only combat experience was in 1912, during the invasion by monarchist rebels in Valença, which earned him a commendation.

Captain António Lopes Mateus

António Lopes Mateus was born on 23 April 1877 in Cabril, civil parish of Povolide, in the Municipality and district of Viseu. He was the son of an unknown father and Maria do Céu. He married Maria da Anunciação de Melo on 29 June 1923 and the couple had two children: António Eduardo de Melo Lopes Mateus and Fernanda.

He studied at the Liceu Nacional Central of Viseu. At the age of 20, on 1 October 1897, he volunteered for the 23rd IR, and later that same month he requested leave to study in Coimbra. At the Universidade de Coimbra, during the school year 1897-98, he attended the first year courses of the Faculty of Mathematics.

He was assigned to the 14th IR on 16 June 1898, where he was soldier No. 13 of the 4th Company and No. 363 in his enrolment records on the 1st Battalion of the 14th IR. He joined the Infantry course of the MA that same year, and assigned corps number 200/336, completing the course as first sergeant ranked as cadet in 1900, in 9th place out of 54 students, with a final grade of 12.9 points.

He was an officer aspiring in the 14th IR and was later assigned to the 12th IR, where he was promoted to sublieutenant on 25 October 1900. In 1901 he was assigned to the 7th IR and, in 1902, to the 14th IR, where he was promoted to lieutenant on 24 March 1904. He sailed for Angola the following month, where he served in the 13th Native Company, returning to the Kingdom on 13 June 1906, where he was assigned to the 24th IR. In 1912, he served on the 12th IR, was promoted to captain on 17 June 1912 and was transferred to the 12th IR the following month. In that regiment, he took command of the 11th Company of the 3rd Expeditionary Battalion. He clearly showed himself to be a man of

25 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 719 e 4564 (EE). Lisboa.
action by offering to serve overseas on seven occasions, 1901-1911 (1901, 1902, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910 and 1911).

Captain Lopes Mateus was commended on four occasions until his departure for Angola in 1914. On 22 April 1903, he received a commendation from his division commander ‘for services rendered in fighting a fire in Covilhã (...) in the keeping of order and protection of property’. He received a commendation from the commander of the 13th Native Company on 8 August 1905 for the ‘intelligence, culture and remarkable zeal’ with which he performed his duties in that company, and on 19 June 1906, for his command of detachments to pursue the Kwanhama guerrillas. Still in 1906, he was commended by the military commander of the Gunguelhas and Ambuelhas for his ‘high quality illustrations, and the great care and unmatched zeal with which he organized the topographic map of the region (...).’

Concerning his participation in the Angola campaigns of 1914-15, he was commended by the command of the 11th Company of the Roçadas Expedition ‘as a captain in the 14th Inf. battalion, where he has in his charge the Kwanhama-Ediva-Achigan communications node (...) he distinguished himself for his qualities of intelligence, discretion, energy and dedication to service’ (sic).

He was awarded the Silver Military Medal of exemplary behaviour; the Silver medal for good service; the Order of Distinguished Service by His Majesty the King of England; the Silver medal commemorating the South of Angola campaigns; the Silver medal commemorating the Portuguese Army campaigns in the military operations in the Mozambique Province; the Commemorative Medal of Inter-Allied Victory ‘Africa, 1914-1918’.

In his assessment files, his commanders highlighted the following features: he was active, intelligent and disciplinarian (sublieutenant in the 7th IR); intelligent, hard worker (sublieutenant in the 14th RI); intelligent, good character and very cultivated, very energetic in command (lieutenant, 14th IR); intelligent and cultivated (lieutenant in the 13th Native Company); intelligent and studious, upright and loyal (lieutenant in the 24th IR); a highly competent professional, disciplinarian, good citizen and good family man (captain in the 14th IR).

He was 37 years old and had 17 years of service at the beginning of the 1st Expedition, of which two were spent in the MA and 12 as a subordinate involved in troop command at the 12th, 7th, 14th and 24th IR. Overseas, he served in Angola in the 13th Native Company. As captain, he commanded the 11th Company of the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the 14th IR.
He had experience overseas and in combat in Angola, with the 13th Native Company. He was a dedicated volunteer for overseas service and he had been a volunteer since 1901. His assessments can be considered above average. He was commended in almost all the duties he performed and, between 1901 and until his departure for Angola in 1914, he collected seven commendations.

Captain Aristides Rafael da Cunha

Aristides Rafael da Cunha was born on 11 February 1874 in the civil parish of Santa Engrácia in Lisbon, municipality of the 1st Lisbon district. Son of Francisco Maria da Cunha and Esperança Rafael do Liz Teixeira e Cunha, he married Josefina Candida Liz Teixeira e Cunha on 11 July 1896, with whom he had six children, one boy and five girls born between 1899 and 1909.

He had a standard education until he enrolled in secondary education, which he attended at the Military College. Later, he enlisted as a volunteer in the Army, on 6 August 1890, in the 2nd Regiment known as the Queen’s Caçadores. He enrolled in the MA that same year at the age of 16, where he attended the Infantry Course, as first sergeant ranked as cadet. He completed his course in December 1892, and placed last out of 64 students, with a final grade of 10.2 points. After leaving the MA, he continued to serve in the 2nd Queen’s Caçadores Regiment, as officer aspiring until he was promoted to sublieutenant on 6 February 1896, five years and one hundred eighty-four days after having enlisted in that same regiment.

After he was promoted to sublieutenant, he served on the Lisbon Guarda Municipal until he was promoted to lieutenant on 31 January 1901. He remained on assignment outside his Arm, but now served under the Ministry of the Kingdom. He later returned to the army in order to present himself on 15 November 1902 at the ITS, where he became assistant instructor in topography. One year later, he was appointed attaché, at the request of the Overseas and Navy Ministry, to serve in the Mozambique Caçadores Battalion, in Beira, and there he accumulated the duties of Director of the Shooting Range with those of interim aide-de-camp to the governor of the territory. Later, he was assigned permanent duties of aide-de-camp to the governor of the territory until July 1906, at which time he was called back to the homeland. After some time on availability for assignment, he was sent to the Angola province that same year, setting out on 22 August 1906. There, he served as head of the Military Section of the Moçâmedes Government Secretariat, and was later appointed...

26 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 1680 e 4005 (EE). Lisboa.
aide-de-camp, now to the governor of the Moçâmedes district. He returned to the mainland on July 1908 and was assigned to the 5th IR. He was promoted to captain in August 1909, assigned to the 22nd IR, and later, on April 1911, to the 1st IR by decision of the Provisional Government of the Republic, where he participated in the 1912 Escola de Repetição [Refresher School]. In May 1913 he was transferred to the 5th IR. That same year, and although he was assigned to this regiment, he took part in the Recruits School and in the Escola de Repetição of his former regiment. Finally, he was assigned, on 22 August 1914 to the 12th Company of the Expeditionary Battalion of the 14th IR. He deployed for the Angola province on 11 September and arrived in Moçâmedes on 1 October.

His disciplinary record features two commendations: one in 1902, by the commander of the ITS for his high intelligence, remarkable zeal and assiduous care with which he taught, with great success, the subjects he was entrusted, during his training in 1901 and 1902. Later, in 1906, he was commended by the commander of the Mozambique Caçadores Battalion for the manner in which he prepared the Uniforms Plan for the Military Police of that territory. His disciplinary record contains no admonishments.

He was 35 years old and had 19 years of service at the beginning of the Expedition, of which 11 were spent as subordinate and five as captain. He had experience overseas in Mozambique and Angola, and he did not have any combat experience. He was recognized, however, with qualities as a teacher and instructor in the Escola de Repetição (1912) and Recruits School (1913). His assessments may be considered above average, most notably his remarkable zeal and dedication to service.

**Captain Alberto Cardoso Martins de Menezes Macedo**

Alberto Cardoso Martins de Menezes Macedo was born on 8 August 1878 in the civil parish of Santa Maria de Oliveira, Municipality of Guimarães, District of Braga, son of the Count of Margaride and of the Countess with the same title. He married Arminda Adelaide Baptista Sampaio on 16 January 1902. They had four children (two girls in 1902 and 1907, and two boys in 1903 and 1904).

On 13 August 1897, at the age of 19, he enlisted as a volunteer in the 2nd CR of the King’s Lancers. He enrolled in the MA in 1899, at the age of 21, after having completed the first year of mathematics - Universidade de Coimbra -, and after having successfully completed the descriptive geometry and general

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27 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 2778 e 4698 (EE). Lisboa.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

physics courses at the Polytechnic School of Porto and the English exam in the Liceu Central of Braga. He attended the Cavalry course as first sergeant ranked as cadet and was assigned corps number 140. He completed the course on 18 October 1901, and placed 10th out of 12 students, with a final grade of 11.7 points. The analysis of his disciplinary records at the MA revealed that he was a ‘troubled’ cadet due to the high number of punishments he was administered. Of the many punishments, the last one is worthy of mention, already in June 1902, that is, at the end of his senior year, when he was given a 15-day detention by the General Commander of the MA for not having presented at a time and place superiorly determined, and for ‘having repeatedly committed non-attendance offences, setting a poor example to his fellow company members with his irregular behaviour’.

After completing the MA, he was promoted to sublieutenant on 3 November 1902 and joined the 9th CR. On 1 January 1905, he was admitted to the Guarda Municipal of Porto, where he remained until 20 June 1907, when he was transferred to the 6th CR, already with the rank of lieutenant, as he had been promoted on 1 December 1906. On 14 November 1907 he was admitted to the GF. In that institution, he completed four years of effective service in the service of his Arm. From 8 June 1911 to 12 October 1912 he was on unlimited leave. The request for unlimited leave ‘to direct the agricultural services of his properties’ was made on 31 May 1911, when he was serving in the North Constituency of the Guarda Fiscal, and the request to report back from leave was issued on 30 September of 1912. He was promoted to captain of the 9th CR on 12 October 1912. On 9 November 1912 he was admitted to the Cavalry General Staff. On 19 December 1913, at the age of 35, he was appointed commander of the 3rd Squadron of the 9th CR, the unit he later commanded in the 1st Expedition to southern Angola, and with which he sailed there on 11 September 1914.

As mentioned above, the officer in question had a rather troubled disciplinary path as a cadet at the MA. Still in Torres Novas, at the then Cavalry Training School (CTS), to the question in his assessment file - ‘Is he dedicated to his service?’ - the reviewer replied ‘somewhat’ and to the question - ‘Is he zealous in ensuring the interests of the treasury?’ the same reviewer wrote ‘he has had no occasion to show it; if he is able to change, he may become a good officer’. The following was mentioned regarding the subjects taught in this school: ‘horse riding: plenty of skill, but little dedication; Tactics: little; Topography: none; Telegraphy: little; Handgun shooting: very good; Fencing: little skill’. The assessment conducted as sublieutenant of the 9th CR reads ‘could make a good officer if he studies, as I believe he will, and applies himself to
military service. He is intelligent and endowed with good moral qualities. He is a good rider and is fit for riding work’. In the following years, this impression of lack of dedication disappeared and gave way to repeated references to his ‘high intelligence’ and to how he was ‘endowed with moral qualities.’ In 1913, the then commander of the 9th CR only transcribed the reviews from the previous reviewer, claiming to have been in the regiment only for a short time. However, a year later, and after the Squadron had shipped to southern Angola, the same Regiment Commander wrote ‘He is a good Squadron commander. He is very zealous in the performance of his duties. He has good moral qualities’. In 1915, now after returning from a campaign which was gruelling for the expeditionary forces and where the Squadron was not engaged, the same Commander Colonel wrote ‘he is a resourceful officer, hardworking and dedicated to the service and a good commander to his squadron’.

His disciplinary record shows two commendations, in 1905 and 1909, by the Jury of the Horse-riding Exhibition ‘for the manner in which he taught and presented his enlisted horse to this jury’. On 15 November 1913, he was awarded the Silver Medal of Exemplary Conduct.

At the beginning of the expedition, Captain Macedo (of Margaride) had 17 years of service, two of which were spent as a soldier before joining the MA, three in the MA, ten as Subordinate - seven of which in the Guarda Municipal and Guarda Fiscal, plus an unlimited leave - and two as captain; he did not acquire any combat experience. During his period as a student at the MA, officer aspiring in the CTS and his first year as sublieutenant, his lack of dedication is not only reflected in the many punishments he received as a MA student, but also in the formally recorded judgments in his assessment files. During his years as a subordinate, and afterwards as captain, he demonstrated competence, dedication, intelligence and moral qualities.

**Captain António Lopes Baptista**

António Lopes Baptista was born on 1 August 1867 in the civil parish of Victória do Porto, Western District Municipality, in the District of Porto, son of João Lopes Baptista and Maria Baptista da Silva. He married Alice Maria Coutinho (Wengorovius) on 6 February 1895. They did not have children.

He was recruited into the Army on 5 December 1887, at the 10th IR in Chaves, ‘to serve for 12 years, and belonged to the contingent of 1887’. He presented himself on 8 May 1888 with the rank of soldier, and ‘was credited
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

service time since that day’. He asked for ‘leave to study at the Polytechnic School of Porto’ on 8 November 1888, and was ‘declared’ an ‘officer aspiring’ soldier on 20 March 1889, and granted ‘study leave’ on 8 October 1889. He was assigned to the 6th CR in Porto on 1 February 1889. He enrolled in the Polytechnic School of Porto on 17 October 1889, having completed the preparatory course for the MA on 8 July 1891. He enrolled at the MA at the age of 25, on 24 October 1891, where he attended the Artillery Course as first sergeant ranked as cadet, and was assigned corps number 166. He completed the course on 28 October 1893, placing in 20th out of 37 students, with a final grade of 11.5 points.

After finishing the MA, he was promoted to sublieutenant on 3 November 1893, and joined the 3rd Artillery Regiment (AR) in Santarém, where he attended the Practical Shooting Course for Subordinates in the Artillery Training School (ATS) - Vendas Novas -, from 1893-1894. He was promoted to first lieutenant on 14 November 1895, remaining stationed in the same place. He was promoted to lieutenant on 14 September 1899 and was assigned to the 4th AR in Penafiel, where was appointed Assistant to the Board of Directors from 3 September 1902 to 2 May 1910. He taught the 2nd Regimental Course from 1 November 1902 to 8 January 1903, was the acting Director of the Regimental School from 17 to 22 October 1905, and the acting Teacher of the Qualification Course for first and second sergeants from 3 to 12 November 1905. He was promoted to captain on 15 November 1910, remaining assigned to the same post, and was admitted to the Artillery General Staff on 8 June 1911. He participated in the Recruit Schools of 1912 and 1913. On 8 August 1914 he was transferred to the 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment in Portalegre, to participate in the 1st Expedition to Angola.

His willingness to serve overseas was clear since 1901, when he declared his ‘desire to serve in the Overseas Army in accordance with the provisions in force for the organization’ and every year from 1903 onwards, he expressed the desire to ‘serve Overseas under the decree of November 1901’.

Another issue worth examining is his health. The analysis of his individual records revealed that an undue amount of days of sick leave or medical board leave from the time he joined the 3rd AR until he was transferred to the 4th AR. During that period, he reported 92 sick days in 1894, 92 in 1895, 106 in 1896, 107 in 1897, 151 in 1898 and 157 days in 1899; however, we could not ascertain his specific illnesses for lack of official documents. Later, already on the 4th AR, he was diagnosed with stomach problems for the first time in 1902, and in 1907 with problems related to arthritis, which were later
monitored by the Permanent Military Hospital of Porto, whose hospital board issued the following opinions on several occasions: ‘license to use the water (...) and for more treatments’ or ‘continue treatment and convalesce in the countryside’. During the above period, the following days of medical board leave were granted: 198 in 1900, 30 in 1902, 40 in 1903, 60 in 1905, 70 in 1907 and 157 in 1908.

There are four commendations on his disciplinary record: in 1903, by the general commander of the 6th Military Division ‘as a distinguished organizer of Field Artillery assembly’ after his assignment on ‘special conditions according to orders issued at that time’; in 1908, 1909 and 1910, by the commander of the 4th AR, for his proficient performance during a fire at the Barracks, for the manner in which he organized the Military Flag Oath Party and for the ‘proficiency and zeal and proven precision with which he has always directed the instruction of sublieutenants and other first grade ranks, respectively. He was punished on 4 December 1899 with 10 days of disciplinary imprisonment by the Commander-general of the 1st Military Division, ‘for mutual bodily harm, while he was on prevention duty and the other participant was inspecting the Regiment’ when he was in the 3rd AR, which earned him a transfer to the 4th AR.

With regard to his assessment, there are no negative mentions in the period before and during the MA; however, he left an impression, as his assessment file states that he ‘displayed exemplary behaviour (...) and a good intellect’. After joining the 3rd AR, he received standard reviews, generally positive, even above average in view of the criteria of the time; it was pointed out that he was ‘endowed with great character and had no known “vices”’, fulfilling ‘the duties of his office’ satisfactorily (1895); he had excellent moral qualities, such as ‘being very decisive and energetic; however, his command abilities have not yet been sufficiently revealed’, and his ‘military specialty was active duty’, he was ‘quite intelligent’ and had ‘much zeal’ for the res publica (1896); ‘he is a good officer, with a serious and dignified character, who performs the duties of his office with skill and care, proving himself greatly apt for his command’ and who ‘proves his worth by study and practice’ (1898). His final assessment in the 3rd AR adds that he was skilled for command and had a ‘special aptitude for horse riding training’ (1899). Already in Penafiel, in the 4th AR, his assessments were similar to the previous, especially during the ‘many months of zeal and uprightness in command of a battery’ (1903). After he joined the administrative life, carrying out duties as Assistant (1903) and later as Secretary (1905) and Treasurer (1909) of the Board of Administration of
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

the 4th AR, without command responsibilities, he proved himself ‘intelligent,
dedicated, always displaying good will and zeal in his work’ and ‘good moral
and military qualities’. After his promotion to Captain (1910) he was again
assigned command, instruction and training duties, and his assessment
records show no major changes until the 1st expedition to Africa, where
he was described as an ‘intelligent officer, energetic and hardworking. He
possesses good moral qualities’.

He had 26 years of service at the beginning of the 1st Expedition,
three of which were spent as a soldier, two as first sergeant ranked as cadet
in the MA, 17 as subordinate and four as captain, during all of which he
was always involved in education and training in the 3rd and 4th AR, and
in administrative and regimental teaching duties in the 4th AR. He did not
acquire combat experience, although his professional competence in the
command, instruction and training of his men was well-recognized, as well as
his general industriousness, intelligence, dedication, willingness and zeal in
his military service. He was a staunch volunteer for service Overseas, having
been one since 1901; however his health, based on the leave periods granted
and on his medical diagnosis - stomach problems and arthritis - which his
superiors did not mention, would have been a concern, something to take into
account for his future performances.

**Captain José Mendes dos Reis**29

José Mendes dos Reis was born in Maçapá, State of Pará, United States
of Brazil, and was the son of José Joaquim dos Reis.

In order to apply to the Military Academy, he presented certificates
of approval in the Portuguese, French and Drawing exams he had taken at
the *Liceu Nacional* of Guarda, in Geography at the *Liceu Nacional* of Castelo
Branco, and in Introduction to Mathematics and in Latin at the *Liceu Central*
of Coimbra. He was drafted into the Army in the 7th IR, with the rank of
soldier, and enrolled in the MA on 21 November 1889, at the age of 16,
where he attended the Infantry course. He completed the course in 5th out
of 64 students, with a final grade of 12.8 points. He was 31 years old at the
beginning of the Expedition and had 25 years of service. As there is no data
in his file, it was not possible to give a brief account of his career, as with the
above officers.

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29 Processo individual. Arquivo Histórico Militar, Cx 4089 (EE). Lisboa.
Commanders in Africa (1914-1918): an ill-fated generation.
Commanding officers of the 1st Expedition to Angola

Conclusions

Since the establishment of the MA in 1837 until the reform of 1884, and bearing in mind the foreign influence on military matters, the faculty of the MA, and the Army itself, had as their reference point and framework military subject matters predominantly related to Classical Warfare, which were taught and covered in the 7, and later 10 fundamental courses taught in that school in 1837 and 1863, respectively. However, after the great reform of 1894-97, which was brought about by the major restructuring of the academic system, with the introduction of additional courses, increasing the 15 core courses to 20, of enhanced ‘academic rigour’, and even of a boarding system, and with the inclusion of colonial issues - at the time current and vital to the conduct of a ‘true’ occupation of the colonies - in the subjects taught at the MA.

The training of the officers of the 1st Expedition to Angola differed according to their date of enrolment at the MA: those who were admitted before 1897 and those who enrolled after that date. The first group - Alves Roçadas (1885), Alberto Salgado (1889), Mendes dos Reis (1889), Aristides da Cunha (1890), António Batista (1891) and Fonseca Lebre (1893) - had a more classic military training that did not cover colonial issues, unlike the second group - Lopes Mateus (1898), Homem Ribeiro (1898) and Alberto Macedo (1899). As for higher education degrees prior their enrolment at the Military Academy, only two individuals - Mendes dos Reis (Liceu of Guarda and Liceu of Coimbra) and Aristides da Cunha (Colégio dos Maristas) - did not attend a higher education institution before joining the MA. As for their final grades out of the Military Academy, it is worth noting that most officers of the 1st Expedition were last in their courses (5 in 9) - Alves Roçadas (1st out of 7/14.9 points), Alberto Salgado (50th out of 151/11.1 points), Mendes dos Reis (5th out of 64/12.8 points), Aristides da Cunha (64th out of 64/10.2 points), António Baptista (20th out of 37/11.5 points) Fonseca Lebre (14th out of 16/12.1 points), Lopes Mateus (9th out of 54/12.9 points), Homem Ribeiro (55th out of 56/10.8 points) and Alberto Macedo (10th out of 12/11.7 points).
On the other hand, comparing their geographic origins with the regions where the units under their command were based revealed that only two did not fit this pattern: Aristides da Cunha, who was born in Lisbon and was commander of the 12th Company of the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the 14th IR based in Viseu; and Mendes dos Reis, who was born in Brazil, completed his secondary school studies in Guarda and Coimbra and was commander of the 2nd Machine-gun Battery of the 1st Machine-gun Group, headquartered in Lisbon.

In order to analyse these officers in their professional careers up to the 1st Expedition, we had to consider aspects such as age and service time. Thus, on average, the officers were 40 years of age and had 20 years of service, of which 11-12 years were spent as subordinates and 8-9 years as captains. As for professional experience, four officers had experience overseas: Alves Roçadas, Alberto Salgado, Lopes Mateus and Aristides da Cunha; five had experience in the command, instruction and training of troops - the two mentioned above and Lopes Batista; and only three had combat experience - Alves Roçadas, Alberto Salgado and Lopes Mateus. Finally, the analysis of the annual assessments of the
Commanders in Africa (1914-1918): an ill-fated generation.
Commanding officers of the 1st Expedition to Angola

officers in question revealed that four of them were given normal or standard assessments: Lopes Batista, Homem Ribeiro, Fonseca Lebre and Alberto Macedo; two were above average - Lopes Mateus and Aristides da Cunha; and two were exceptional - Alves Roçadas and Alberto Salgado.

On the whole, after this analysis of the officers’ origins, academic paths and professional careers according to the types of military career defined by Morris Janowitz, we concluded that the only officer that fit into an adaptive-type career profile was Alves Roçadas. Alberto Salgado, Lopes Mateus and Aristides da Cunha are representative of the standard-type career. Finally, Lopes Baptista, Alberto Macedo, Homem Ribeiro and Fonseca Lebre may be included in the routine-type career.

This project is still in its early stages and the research presented here is but a small sample of our research object: nine officers in a group of 53, and one expedition in a set of six (two for Angola and four for Mozambique). The indicators used proved to be useful and relevant, but must be re-evaluated according to the evolution of the research and the data that will be collected by following other lines of research.

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The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War


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The Great War and Medicine in Africa: in pursuit of new questions and in search of new results

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1. A paradigmatic shift - a new kind of global Medicine

It is undeniable that for many contemporaries of the Great War the conflict would shake ideologies and certainties, destroying the belief held by many that Europe had already entered a period of peace, which favoured the construction of a ‘hopefully’ transnational political and economic stability - one that would be felt by all, worldwide. The hasty and somehow abrupt outbreak of the conflict, the mutual accusations exchanged between several European countries - so often based on concerns and fears dragged from a more or less recent past -, the lack of flexibility at the negotiating table, and even the attacks on the more pacifist and anti-war trends, perfectly exemplified by the assassination of Jean Jaurès (1859-1914), perpetrated in Paris early in the conflict, showed that, unfortunately, the world was not on the road to peace, but on one that would twice lead to wars of vast - and often diabolical - proportions1.

As for Medicine and its questions, mainly the ones related to medical assistance to both civilian and military patients, these were years of great

1 Jean Jaurès was one of the best known and most highly regarded socialist politicians of his time, an advocate of social change and democratic social revolution through the power of thought and not by violence. He was assassinated on July 31, 1914 by Raoul Villain, a young French nationalist and an ardent supporter of the war which had just began. He was shot in a cafe, on the eve of the mobilization which had, interestingly, begun in France on that day. He is currently buried in the Pantheon in Paris, and he is considered one of the world’s first renowned pacifists.
discoveries – most of them driven by the conflict itself. At the dawn of a new century, Medicine found that doors were already open to change, embarking on a journey that would push it toward a new ‘Age of Innovation’. As in other areas of knowledge and expertise, progresses were being made towards ‘Modernity’, and this was sought-after, deeply cultivated and widely anticipated by the medical elite of those times. All this would come about at the cost of much suffering, both physical and emotional. But reality is always harsher and crueller than we desire, despite all our deepest and most disinterested expectations. Medicine itself, as all areas of health in general, benefited from vicious and horrific advances, the same ones driven by atrocious belligerence and born from the heart of human evil. That is, those advances that reflected and were reflected by military conflict itself, one that would become the most disabling and deadliest witnessed until then.

These changes, innovations and developments had an impact on several areas of medical knowledge, from prophylaxis to pharmacology, from diagnosis to the treatment of patients. The conflict brought with it technological innovation. And at the same time, it also created new medical dilemmas, making it necessary to find new efficient solutions, a process that needed to be rapidly completed, for there was no time to lose. The war had become a truly voracious and blood-thirsty ‘human beast’, feeding, more and more, on the bodies of those soldiers.

What had already been seen before, although with less impact, in previous conflicts like the Civil War (1861-1865) or the two Boer Wars (1880-1881 - 1899-1902), would now cause increased concern to an entire medical class, which was still not prepared to take care or to cure the bodies and souls of the Great War soldiers.

New weapons brought new categories of wounds and mutilations. High numbers of enlisted men, diet deficiencies and poor hygiene contributed to the spread of old diseases, as well as to the appearance of new ones, entirely unknown. All these new principles reflected in a profound need of adaptation to this unknown and deeply frightening reality made by the health services of the belligerent armies, for they faced so many devastating innovations on a daily basis.

Therefore, Medicine in general, or fields like surgery and military healthcare, had to seek solutions to the most recent military phenomena, such as gassing or face and head mutilations. At the same time, civil society was struggling to reintegrate these men, who were sick, maimed, and gassed in a war that so few really wished to fight. Many were those who desired to receive them with dignity. However, often this was not what happened, and long-time complaints of abandonment and neglect lingered in time, made
by those who, having fought, felt abandoned by those who had sent them to the operations theatres.

With varying intensity, Portugal experienced the same problems as other countries involved directly in this dispute. Portuguese medical doctors also discussed the treatment of their patients, men returning from not one, but two front lines, in the African and Western fronts. Places so different from themselves, as they were geographical apart from one another. Different operations theatres had led to a dissimilar set of problems. And, even today, these problems are reflected, in quite different ways, in a Portuguese historiography that was always more productive in remembering the European front than the events that took place in the African colonies.

2. The multiple uses of Memory and the understanding of War Medicine in Africa

Based on preliminary results obtained by present research, we can indicate that events in France, where the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps was stationed from 1917 onwards, would boost Portugal on the path of discoveries, allowing the treatment of severe amputations and shrapnel wounds, surgery on faces and limbs torn up by bullets and debris, and the discovery of adequate treatment for severe gassing and ‘trench foot’.

With the official entry in the conflict, many physicians would visit different hospitals on the Western Front and in England, in journeys often funded by them, with the sole purpose of enhancing their own wartime learning. Others would travel to several places following official military channels, so they could study in depth the work of the Allies. This was the case of Reinaldo dos Santos (1880-1970), who was sent to France to catalogue the treatments and medical assistance performed by the British and French forces at the Front, bringing back information that allowed us to create our own military health service and treat the soldiers from the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps.

In Aniceto Afonso’s words: ‘The dead were a heavy weight on the feelings of communities, but the millions of maimed soldiers became the visible and continued face of the war’. Not all countries dealt in the same way with the questions raised by the return of their wounded, maimed and traumatized. Afonso, 2006, p. 105.

Inspired by his visit to France, Reinaldo dos Santos published A Cirurgia na Frente Ocidental. Later, he was again directly involved in the Portuguese war effort, becoming one of the most important personalities in the Portuguese military health service established in France. There he stood out among his countrymen, also becoming known for leading a Portuguese team that worked in several hospitals of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) Military Health Service. He also became the main responsible for surgery at the Military Health Service of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (PEC) in France.
However, one among many other questions remains... What really happened in Africa? In order to answer this, we acknowledge that our current research must reconstruct, with all the underlying difficulties it implies, the medical experience on the African front, discovering who were its actors, their endeavours and actions. Perhaps then we may better understand how Portuguese soldiers lived - and also how they survived and died in Angola and Mozambique during the Great War.

In order to solve these problems and answer numerous questions, we believe that it is not only in archives that we may find important information, as there is much data, both processed and raw, in unpublished and published memoirs, as well as in testimonies, stories and family legacies. Literary memoirs and autobiographical literature, as well as oral sources - who replicate soldiers’ words - left to their relatives, neighbours and friends, may contain many stories and many precious memories, that we can and must use today.

For that reason, we must now face the difficult task of remembering these sources of knowledge. The task is difficult because the practice is not consensual, and is often the target of some controversy, despite the international historiography being increasingly willing to use them in order to answer new questions or to validate and confirm both new and old sets of themes and topics. Consequently, the aim of this paper is not to defend the widespread use of these procedures, but to recall the relevance of memoirs and family legacies, as well as diaries and personal correspondence, remembering how they may assist us in understanding the different experiences of war, particularly in questions related to Medicine and health care in Africa during the Great War.

Far from claiming to know or even understand all that really happened in Africa during this conflict, or with the Portuguese military expeditions that landed there from 1914 onwards – for much doubt, hesitation and uncertainty still remains in the present days -, our duty is to be aware and understand that there is unexploited richness, severely underused, reaching out to us through these ‘voices from the Past’, so often forgotten or submitted to a lesser and more reduced role. A number of international projects, as well as national platforms, based on knowledge, are beginning to hear the echoes of those voices, in a movement largely triggered by the Centennial we are living. A new interest on this subject emerged and brought with it new insights, new records and innovations. Now, our duty is to listen, record and analyse those voices from the past, as well as to use them to validate what we know and to inquire about what we do not understand.
3. Africa during the Great War – One ‘Hot Front’

The Great War was, in fact, much more than a European conflict⁴. As early as 1914, at a time when the war was noticeable and declared, the rulers of a young Portuguese Republic understood that the beginning of this European conflict would force them to send more troops to the African colonies, to secure national sovereignty in face of Germany’s obvious and widely known colonial ambitions⁵. However, the path ahead was not an easy one. We must remember the many difficulties and problems that Portugal was undergoing at that time, as well as the obstacles that the belligerent nations, especially our eternal ally, Great Britain, had put in our way, which led the country into a dubious state of belligerent non-belligerence, maintained until March 1916⁶.

Therefore, and aside from these and other obstacles and difficulties, perhaps we should also take into account that the questions of Africa always gathered greater internal consensus, particularly when compared with those of the European front, or at least so it seemed, mainly when the subject was sending troops to these front lines. It was for this reason that expeditions to Angola and Mozambique were prepared immediately in the begging of the global conflict. The reinforcement of colonial troops in the years 1914 and 1915 would increase not only the number of men in those distant colonies, but also the number of wounded and sick, many of which had to wait for a return to their homeland, that often came late for too many.

This merely perpetuated what already existed before, for the colonies already had troops – fewer but present in those territories – and combatants continued to suffer from lack of logistics support and medical treatment, vital for their survival. A harsh reality shows us that colonial troops were poorly equipped, their uniforms were unsuitable for tropical climates, and they were poorly armed and living a life of ill-adjusted goals, compounded by a grave lack of discipline and motivation - as well as a total absence of esprit-de-corps and a lack of awareness regarding their mission or missions to accomplish⁷.

Years later, General Gomes da Costa stated: ‘(...) the single and greatest cause for our disasters comes from the governments and from governments’

⁴ As stated by Hew Strachan: ‘As much from its outset as beyond its formal conclusion, therefore, the First World War was far more than just a European conflict.’ Strachan, 2004, p. 1.
⁵ Afonso, Gomes, 2013, p. 141.
⁶ Portugal officially entered the war in 9th of March, 1916. Until then, Portuguese soldiers that left to fight in Africa, left in a dubious state, for Portugal did not declare its neutrality, but did not state that was a belligerent country either. Afonso, Gomes, 2013, pp. 140, 148.
⁷ Coelho, 2001, p. 15.
lack of concern with the preparation of the Army\textsuperscript{8}. So, the situation in the colonies became ‘hot’, not only because of the harsh climate, but also for difficulties, abuses, intrusions and bad management that turned the African front into a true drainer of souls.

As a result of these decisions - or from their absence, before and during those years of the Great War - these men would remain victims of constant change of plans by their superiors, whether those orders came from Lisbon or from within the colonial space. However, one thing is certain: in the expeditionary mind there will always remain a sense of physical and mental distance, flagrant amidst their rulers, for those lived far from the theatres where they live, fight and die. This was especially obvious on military leaders living in Portugal. This same opinion, shared by so many, was expressed by Américo Pires de Lima in his memoirs:

This caste of cabinet Africanists and desk strategists, of whom the great Mouzinho had complained so much, continue to flourish in the capital\textsuperscript{9}.

If the distress and misery of being forced to follow orders, even the most extravagant or unusual, was not enough, those men continued to suffer from poor, or even non-existent, physical, emotional and material preparation, resulting in real disasters, particularly when added to a considerable lack of knowledge and insufficient context given by their superiors - predominantly perceptible among those who were still in Portugal.

Subsequently, many were the soldiers from the Portuguese expeditionary force in Africa who succumbed during the war. And the high number of casualties was not caused by warfare activities, rather by diseases such as malaria, syphilis and dysentery. ‘Disease, not battle, disabled the armies in Africa’ noted Hew Strachan, without specifying nationalities, belligerent forces or sides, engaged during the war\textsuperscript{10}. Disease became the nemesis of all those actors. And among the Portuguese, as happened with the other belligerent forces, combat casualties were considerably lower than deaths caused by illnesses, mainly tropical ones, aggravated by hunger, thirst, and other logistics-related problems. It is even estimated that, in just six months, about 21\% of the first Portuguese expedition that landed in Porto

\textsuperscript{8} Costa, 1925, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{9} Lima, 1933, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{10} Strachan, 2004, p. 8.
Amelia [Mozambique] in late 1914 was gravely ill and, therefore, unable to engage combat of any kind\textsuperscript{11}.

Months later, in May 1916, something very similar happened when those responsible for the second expedition to Mozambique recorded losses in around 50\% of the contingent. Confronted upon arrival with lack of equipment and food, and with a terrible and deadly rainy season, they could not cope, for a true adaptation to their new tasks was not possible. Even their military leaders were beginning to lose hope. Massano de Amorim will protest about his inability to carry out his mission, because in Africa, strategies could easily collapse for sanitary reasons, added to the neglect of those who should have safeguarded the arrival of men to the colonies, providing local infrastructure and logistics conditions, which will never truly exist\textsuperscript{12}.

4. Medical memoirs of the Great War in Africa

We can find in memoirs of this period, as well as in other contemporary testimonies, several descriptions of events and information of considerable value, related to the experience of war in the African Front. Often what we can read in them, and what we can discover in those words, is very similar to what was reported by those in charge of the Portuguese expeditions to the colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and found also in further official documents and sources. Regarding those accounts, Américo Pires de Lima (1886 - 1966) may well be one of the most valuable testimonials available for us today. As medical doctor, he was sent with one expeditionary force to Mozambique, heading a ‘Section of Hygiene and Bacteriology’. Like Jaime Cortesão (1884-1960), Pires de Lima also published his wartime memoirs. However, it should be noted that his work is much less known than Cortesão’s memoirs, with this being a remarkable politician and Portuguese historian, both a physician and a patient in France, and a political prisoner at the very end of the war\textsuperscript{13}.

Probably due to the fact that Américo Pires de Lima only published his *Na Costa d’África. Memórias de um médico expedicionário a Moçambique*

\textsuperscript{11} Artur Patrício wrote that the 19th Infantry Regiment, stationed in Moçâmbedes, Angola, since February 1915, had only half a dozen men capable of withstanding a 5 km march, as they were all very sick. In the meantime at least ten more men died, as he wrote in memoirs, and some 200 patients were convalescing or hospitalized. In Patrício, 1915, pp. 18–19. For more details on this topic, see also: Afonso, Gomes, 2013, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{12} Afonso, 2015, p. 157.

\textsuperscript{13} Jaime Cortesão published his *Memórias da Grande Guerra: 1916 - 1919* shortly after returning from this conflict; he was gassed and evacuated to Portugal. But this did not prevent the political regime of that time from ordering his arrest, when he was still convalescing and in danger of becoming blind due to gas exposure.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

in 1933, he became less known at that time. By then, Europe was already preparing itself to dive into a new conflict, challenged by a new threat to global peace, once again born in Germany; a menace that would become even more dangerous and more ideological. However, in 1933, it was still in an embryonic stage, although certain ideas were already maturing.

For various reasons, many other documents and stories, both published and unpublished, stood as if frozen in time, locked in libraries or trapped in diaries and oral stories, photographs, letters and postcards\(^{14}\). We are beginning to recover these documents now, and they support and reinforce the material we have obtained so far, bringing us data and information that will improve our vision of this global conflict, mainly in the Portuguese colonies during World War I, and regarding as well several medical and health care questions in that specific region and timeline.

Based upon both old and new evidences and testimonies, such as those now published and rediscovered - as is the case of medical doctor Joaquim Alves Correia de Araújo’s journal, who was in Mozambique between 1917 and 1918 –, we will now highlight some relevant aspects of those soldiers’ lives, reinforced by old references and backed by those new voices. A phenomenon we believe will last, for those voices will continue to reach us through new publications and recompilations of statements, made by soldiers of the Great War to their relatives and friends.

\section{A troubled journey}

Serious health problems began when embarking, and during the journey to Africa, a long, dangerous, fastidious voyage, most of the times absent of any real conditions. This was most evident among the foot soldiers and lower military ranks\(^{15}\). Confined in small vessels that sometimes carried more than 2000 men, Portugal’s future soldiers, so often lacking the robustness to withstand their stay in Africa, were housed in the cargo compartments of the ship, where they

\(^{14}\) There was an obvious decrease in wartime memoirs delivered for publication as Portugal entered the period that came to be known as \textit{Estado Novo}. Arrifes, 2004, p. 176. Today, attempts are being made to remember what was once written, and to publish previously unknown works which never had the opportunity to see the light of day.

\(^{15}\) Ships tried to reproduce life in barracks. Because of it, the officers’ quarters, and those of the sergeants, were located near the deck, and they were entitled to beds with sheets, access to a game room, and even a dining room with linen towels. These details did not go unnoticed by the unranked soldiers, who had to endure the hard life, and were only entitled to a straw mattress and perhaps one or two blankets to cover themselves. See Arrifes, 2004, p. 180.
would remain all through the journey, in a filthy ambiance, filled with the smell of vomit, urine and sweat. Gomes da Costa wrote:

Every ship basement housed 250 men, half dressed, laying in straw mattresses thrown onto the floor, dirty with food and vomit, giving off a foetid odour of sweat and dirty laundry.

These were the deplorable conditions, still horrifying today, in which these troops lived for a month or more, always surrounded by insalubrity. A real nightmare, even before they got to their final destination, where their bodies, already weakened or sick, would be exposed to additional works and dangers... If they did not die from some illness along the way. Joaquim Alves Correia de Araújo, deployed to Mozambique in 1917 as expeditionary medical doctor, stated in his journal: ‘The steamer halted to throw a dead man overboard; he went into the water in a wooden coffin’. This was the final journey for some of the expeditionary troops sent to the Portuguese colonies.

It is also worth mentioning that water was scarce during these journeys, especially if someone wanted a bath or to do the laundry. Hygiene was almost non-existent and the diet, very poor, especially for low rank soldiers, already so disturbed by the living conditions inside the vessel. Over time, outbursts of ‘food insurgency’ arose, meaning that there were several riots caused by troops’ dissatisfaction with conditions and diet.

If these journeys undermined the health of those men, when the vessels docked in some seaport along the way they all received permission to leave and visit the premises. Some took advantage of those opportunities to visit stores and to buy souvenirs, as well as getting some better quality food. Others headed immediately to brothels, where they often contracted syphilis and other venereal diseases. Therefore, once they arrived at their destination, each ship carried dozens of sick soldiers who, from that moment on, were expected to defend vast territories and cross them in long marches, on foot, walking endless kilometres - a difficult task even for the healthier men, made almost impossible for those who arrived debilitated and/or extremely sick.

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16 Cértima, 1924, p. 29.
17 Costa, 1925, p. 124.
18 Afonso, 2015, p. 158.
19 Araújo, 2015, p. 51.
20 Santos, 1959, p. 22.
b. Arriving in Africa: the first logistic problems

Once in African territory, the dangers and the lack of local knowledge could lead not only to attacks from the enemy, but also to other equally violent and deadly assaults, made by large predators such as lions, who so often stole men from military camps, filling the night with the screams of those dragged into the bushes. There were also ants, capable of devouring animals and men, flies, scorpions, poisonous snakes, like the dangerous mamba and surucucu, or the matacanha, a penetrating flea that could lay her eggs under the skin, especially in the feet, around the nails and toes. And there were mosquitoes, which were dangerous, for they could rob those soldiers of their blood, but also contaminate them with malaria, a tropical disease which took many lives. A disease that sometimes would not kill but could mark one’s life permanently, leaving them ill for the rest of their lives. These and other new elements, known and unknown to the troops, remained a constant in the life of those expeditionary soldiers. The old became allied to the new, like hunger and thirst, and those became famous traveling companions for those armies in Africa.

Logistics always defeated those who attempted to treat these men. Joaquim Alves Correia de Araújo, who, as we already mentioned, was a medical doctor in Mozambique during the final years of the conflict, was quite clear when he stated in his memoirs: ‘Our superiors had nothing prepared to receive us. We were amazed with the way we were welcomed. It is miserable!’ And he added, referring to what he witnessed upon his arrival at Mocimboa da Praia in mid-1917, in what was already the fourth expedition landing here: ‘There are many patients, some in miserable conditions. There are no barracks for the soldiers who arrive, nor for those who are taken ill.

As a result, upon arriving in the military camp area, facing the fact that no preparations were made to receive them, the first duty of these soldiers - so many of them exhausted from the voyage, some even ill - was to build their own shelters. Priority was placed on protecting their bodies and building temporary camps. Health-related questions were, at first, seen as secondary.

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22 Araújo, 2015, p. 54; Arrifes, 2004, p. 187.
24 Américo Pires de Lima wrote in his memoirs: ‘Many [patients from a column], when asked about the disease that afflicted them, answered gloomily: “It is only hunger, Dr!” And it was not a rare occurrence having some soldier collapsing on the hard office floor before I could attend to him’. Lima, 1933, p. 53. This was, as Carlos Selvagem recalled in his memoirs, the ‘Epic of Hunger’. Selvagem, 1925, p. 148.
25 Araújo, 2015, p. 54.
26 Araújo, 2015, p. 55.
considering the urgently need to build tents and shelters in order to protect those men. Still, latrines and spaces dedicated to safeguarding, safekeeping and slaughter of animals were prepared. Even so, it was not uncommon that, even with the structures already assembled and ready to use, soldiers preferred not to, relieving for instance their physiological needs near the tents, instead of using the area defined as latrines\textsuperscript{27}. For that, and in general, those military camps often became areas deprived of hygiene, cleanliness and tidiness. This dissatisfied those medical doctors, for they were trying to take care of their soldiers.

c. Food shortages

Life was also hard for those who needed to provide for their men, for there were shortages of basically everything in the colonial territories. If hunger was almost persistent, food sent from Portugal would often contemplate the wrong choices, damaging the soldiers’ health, and not providing for the well-being of the African troops, auxiliaries and porters. Indigenous production was insufficient and suffered from similar transportation problems\textsuperscript{28}. So, men were clearly affected by cohabitation in a warm geographic area - especially difficult for European fighters - but also due to being thrown into places lacking decent lines of communication, such as roads, routes and pathways, which should consistently connect the military outposts located in inland areas. This was a source of serious difficulties, regarding transportation of troops, circulation of animals, and food logistics, vital to the maintenance of military convoys.

It is undeniable that food logistics was filled with dangerous products, harmful to the soldiers’ health: different kinds of beans and dried peas filled with maggots, rice, macaroni and other dried pastas, rotten dried cod, tinned sardines and other kinds of preserved canned fish, which were transported to the colonies, although not always in great conditions\textsuperscript{29}. Wine was frequently of poor quality, sour or mixed with water. And this could only happen when either could be found. Water was a scarce commodity, to drink, wash up or for cooking purposes. A diet with raw or poorly cooked products would aggravate several health problems, for food would be harder to swallow, digest and absorb, causing severe cases of dysentery and digestive failure. Bread gradually

\textsuperscript{27} Arrifes, 2004, pp. 185, 187.
\textsuperscript{28} Arrifes, 2004, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{29} Arrifes, 2004, p. 191.
decreased, in quantity and quality, being replaced by dry biscuits, not always good and rarely appealing.

These occurrences were not unusual and were not exclusive to Portuguese soldiers. According to Hew Strachan, food problems were very similar among other allied troops fighting on African soil. This meant that, throughout the conflict, there were abundant difficulties in feeding those men and their African carriers - who had very different types of diets, frequently diverse from the provided goods, causing fatal problems to their health\textsuperscript{30}. The use of different flours, cooking difficulties, or even the lack of knowledge regarding some local products, such as fruits, led to a severe increase in gastrointestinal diseases\textsuperscript{31}, weakening those who often needed to march numerous kilometres a day, into an unknown and dangerous territory.

In these Portuguese colonies, the reality was that flour, one of the most crucial products, vital for bread production, such a basic necessity to humans, grew scarce over time, along with products like salt and sugar. The substitution of wheat flour by local flours was attempted, but the health of the expeditionary troops did not improve. The final result never made part of their routine, for there was a lack of taste for these new products. Regarding meat, often sick cattle from Madagascar contaminated with tuberculosis, it was of obvious poor quality. Even so, this meat, as well as rotten chouriço and other similar products, spoiled by the African climate, were common ingredients in the daily life diet of Portuguese expeditionary troops\textsuperscript{32}.

Also common in those territories was the existence of a parallel black market, where meat, fish, fruits and eggs could be bought and sold in a system based on extortion rather than normal transactions. Speculation would lead to exponential price increase, with products eventually reaching exorbitant and prohibitive sums\textsuperscript{33}. This chaos was amplified by an almost non-existent refrigeration of food products, both on sea and inland, although some ships had freezers that, in those days, worked based on carbonic anhydrase. However, those were few, frequently unused and very expensive\textsuperscript{34}.

\textsuperscript{31} Arrifes, 2004, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{32} Arrifes, 2004, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{33} Patrício, 1915, p. 192; Arrifes, 2004, 192.
\textsuperscript{34} It was also a common occurrence for the carbonic anhydrase refrigeration fluid to run out during the sea journey, or for freezers to break down during those trips, suffering from lack of care or maintenance. This would ruin tons of food that would then be thrown overboard. Arrifes, 2004, p. 190.
Obvious difficulties could also be found in water supply, as water was often unhygienic or even contaminated. Contamination might occur for natural reasons, when rivers and local streams were not fit for collecting clean water, or by artificial methods, like the poisoning of water holes, regularly done by the enemy, especially in the north of Mozambique, during those days of more intense presence of German expeditions into the Portuguese mainland.

Thirst was a common complaint among Portuguese military in Africa. The climate required a greater consumption of water, the ingestion of fluids, and, as we have seen, those soldiers’ diet did not favour them in this dominion, increasing their need for consumption and causing severe dehydration. Even when water collecting was conducted in a rigorous manner, providing clean and fresh water, storage space was insufficient. It is widely known how small those soldiers’ flasks were and how incapable they were of keeping water at an invigorating temperature. Thirst was surely a common occurrence in any military convoy\textsuperscript{35}. Therefore, in some occasions, in an attempt not to die of thirst, some soldiers resorted to drinking their own urine, ingesting refrigerating fluids used for cooling their machine guns, or to the ingestion of stolen cans of sterilized milk, safeguarded for those who got sick during the convoys’ journeys\textsuperscript{36}.

Some circumstances were also considered by soldiers odd and bizarre. For instance, there were officers that attained certain privileges, gaining access to food and drinks not affordable or unobtainable to lower ranks of the expeditionary corps. This situations triggered grudges against higher military ranks and, subsequently, decreased morale, lowering the necessary ‘esprit-de-corps’ between those fighters and their leaders. This was the case regarding the high ranks’ use of bottled mineral water - for drinking and even for brushing one’s teeth - as well as consumption of evaporated milk (similar to powdered milk), champagne, wine, liquors, and other more or less exotic products, that echoed in references recorded in memoirs of soldiers who lived those years of war\textsuperscript{37}. Once again, this is a clear example of how war memoirs may help us understand actions and situations experienced in those days.

d. Medical dilemmas

Portuguese medical doctors, many of whom did not have any experience in tropical medicine and hygiene, were unmistakably insufficient in Africa,

\textsuperscript{35} Arrifes, 2004, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{36} Arrifes, 2004, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{37} Araújo, 2015, p. 92; Arrifes, 2004, p. 193.
especially those working in military convoys and outposts, in the hearth of those colonial territories. So, they had to adapt to new times and distant places of work, facing as well new and frequent challenges, created by multiple - and often wrong! - ‘high level’ decisions. Carlos Selvagem wrote:

Normal relations between State and the Expedition’s Health Services had been, since the beginning, a war without quarter. It was a silent, petty war, object of futile discussions in documents, notes and circulars of different shapes and forms - the State conscientious of its power, and the medical doctors defending their patients and their professional privileges. This war began precisely in the early days of our arrival at Palma\textsuperscript{38}.

The behaviour of the soldiers was also inappropriate and full of misconceptions, an obstacle to their treatment, as they often resisted prophylaxis, advices and therapeutic practices. Taking care of their health would become a new war for those who wanted to make a difference and help, fulfilling their role and being faithful to their service and oath, one they had taken as physicians and as Portuguese citizens as well.

Requests from members of the Health Services in campaign would be diverse and continuous. However, they were almost never truly met, for the interests of the military high ranks were often quite deviating. Medical doctors often asked their superiors for medicines or for additional fresh water, properly treated and disinfected, to avoid giving to the soldiers any water collected from open-air water holes exposed to the elements, animals and poisons, both natural and artificial. They also requested from those they took care of, their acceptance of rules, asking soldiers for some comprehension, something with which they persistently failed to comply. They advised, and sometimes even demanded, that they stopped eating products of unknown origin, stopped drinking unsafe water, and especially that they avoided lying down with women in seaports and huts, to escape contamination by sexually transmitted diseases.

Furthermore, they encouraged the use of mosquito nets, to avoid the mosquito bite, and subsequently, the transmission of malaria, a dangerous disease easily avoided by taking quinine ampoules, the same ones those soldiers stubbornly threw away. Tablets of that same substance were also used, but soldiers distrusted them and physicians had to take extra care, inspecting inside the mouths of their patients during the prophylactic administration of this drug. All of this to personally ensure that all of it had been swallowed. Medical doctors complained that the Portuguese soldiers were often illiterate.

\textsuperscript{38} Selvagem, 1925, p. 295.
and very ignorant, men from the deepest countryside, used to less scientific treatments, made available by healers and popular practitioners. Those same soldiers persisted in not keeping the camps clean and often did not have any basic knowledge of hygiene. Moreover, they could not be convinced, by word or action, to believe in the efficacy of modern drugs and medicines, refusing, whenever they could, their prophylactic or even curative use.\(^{39}\)

We should perhaps remember that complaints of this nature and with the same gravity were common among other medical doctors, and not just shared by the Portuguese. Neither were these problems debated only by Portuguese professionals, occurring also within the Allies, who also reported their soldiers’ neglect and their careless and improper use of medicines and mosquito nets, promoting high levels of malaria transmission, among other embarrassing situations very similar to those experienced by the Portuguese.\(^{40}\)

These and other medical dilemmas were enough to torment the few physicians sent to the Colonies to accompany the expeditionary forces during the Great War. Amid several references - often offering little depth and very unclear - the most important work, and the one we now must turn to, is the research and publication of Marco Fortunato Arrifes, as this author provided the most enlightening numbers and figures related to the medical and auxiliary staff mobilized during those times, as well as other vital information, such as ‘when’ and ‘where’ some of these medical doctors were stationed in Africa.

Marco Fortunato Arrifes clearly understands the difficulties, and how before the war, or during its early stages, the military health service in the Portuguese colonies was minimal and insufficient. In 1913 there were only 53 professionals in a staff covering the areas of Angola and São Tomé. All these men were based in Luanda. The Mozambique colony was even more impoverished, with a staff of only 28 men assigned to serve in a weak military health service, with headquarters also in the capital, Lourenço Marques. Those numbers would be more or less the same in 1915, even after Portugal entered a state of belligerent non-belligerence, which led the country to the necessity of sending more troops to both African colonies as early as the end of 1914.\(^{41}\)

But we must not fool ourselves into thinking that the above mentioned professionals had any kind of relationship with the military health service in campaign which, from 1914 onwards, left Portugal in the same ships as the

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\(^{39}\) ‘Our peasants from the Beiras and Alentejo – who make up the bulk of these troops - are by nature, by their ancestral customs and by lack of self-care, untidy and dirty’, stated Anthony Cértima in his memoirs of the conflict. Cértima, 1924, p. 30.

\(^{40}\) Strachan, 2004, p. 149.

\(^{41}\) Arrifes, 2004, p. 198.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: 
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

expeditionary troops. This military health service, with a clear expeditionary nature, deployed to Africa with these men during WWI, and was independent and autonomous but also scarce in numbers, especially before 1916 and the official entry of Portugal in WWI. Marco Fortunato Arrifes indicates that the first expedition to Angola had only seven medical doctors, and the first war contingent sent to Mozambique was supposed to include six of these professionals - but only five were actually sent to Lourenço Marques. The subsequent expeditions had the same number of medical recruits. Upon arriving they were theoretically integrated into those preceding operations, working with those who had arrived in previous missions. However, these doctors were never truly enough.

We must also draw attention to the fact that, in 1916, the number of sick leaves, which were already alarming the Portuguese military leaders, originated the desire to better prepare the third expedition to Mozambique, assigning one physician to each embarking unit, and providing eight more medical doctors for the establishment of a hospital, located at the army base camp operations. However, these were only plans, and sometimes plans do not work on site or even on paper. The reality was that casualties, largely due to disease, as well as the huge numbers of sick and disabled sent to Portugal, which even included some medical doctors, never ceased to increase. And these facts and figures left quite a negative impression on the future memory of the African campaigns during the Great War.

Even with the above attempts to increase the numbers of doctors on the spot, there were still military convoys deprived of medical units or quality medical monitoring and care. And even when a military health professional in Africa could follow these men’s journeys, marching with certain groups, units or convoys through Portuguese colonial territory, the service they were usually assigned to do was heavy and intensive, and was too much for only one man. As we have seen, the harsh reality may always defeats logistical plans, and each of these medical professionals would find himself exposed to an excess of work that occurred on a daily basis, putting his life at risk as well as damaging his body and soul, as Joaquim Alves Correia de Araújo reported in one of many memories contained in his journal.

To read this doctor’s words is to dive into the daily life of an unknown physician. His arguments were recorded without giving any thought to the

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possibility that they might one day be read and considered by third parties. Once again, the relevance of such sources has to been proven, for we confirm that they even corroborate archival documentation, telling us also the stories of the cruel reality lived by those men, as well as the ambitious expectations, predictions and plans that did not actually work on the ground.

Joaquim Alves Correia de Araújo was very clear in his journal when he explained the consequences of his intensive work as a member of the medical staff deployed with the fourth expedition to Mozambique: ‘On 18 [July 1917] the weather was normal and I, after dealing with my health rounds to more than one hundred patients, felt some tingling and dizziness’. A month later, on 20 August, he wrote again: ‘Today I did so much work I became exhausted’44. There are at least two more occasions in which he mentions being overworked. However, he would have no chance to escape the tasks he had been assigned with. As a member of the Makonde military convoy, he often travelled through northern Mozambique, experiencing the same hunger and thirst felt by those convoy troops45. Later, in Chomba, the dangers continued. And military doctors may treat diseases, but they surely have never been immune to them. For that reason, there are frequent notes reporting colds, gastrointestinal problems, fevers and even a minor heatstroke46.

44 These statements, and others, may be read in his journal, which has been published recently. The present notes may be found in Araújo, 2015, pp. 69, 73.
45 Araújo, 2015, p. 69. Interestingly, in some pages of his memoirs, Joaquim also alludes to food and various beverages, foreign to that operations theatre, a phenomenon that was also reported by others, for instance in France. Some officers were able to lay hands on these products, such as salted cod and cabbages, or even champagne and Port wine [Araújo, 2015, p. 101]. The medical officers could also have access to products like Ovaltine, which the doctor in question used to treat one health condition that weakened him. Surely these were not common in the diet of those soldiers fighting in Africa [Araújo, 2015, p. 90]. In short, and to conclude this question, here is an extract from another memoir, where Antonio de Cértima states: ‘The sergeants and officers had extraordinary rations with jams and luxury goods. In turn, the soldiers had a terrible diet’. [Cértima, 1924, p. 273].
46 Araújo, and so many other medical doctors, devoted to their profession, stationed in outposts located far from the coast, who had no possibility of grabbing a position in cities such as Lourenço Marques, were often taken ill, just as the men they accompanied and cared for. Second Lieutenant Araújo, promoted to lieutenant by decree in December 1917, suffered from various diseases, from flu to colitis, from gastroenteritis to fevers, and also endured a terrible migraine, which indicated an onset of heatstroke. Self-medication was the solution to continuing to be able to bear all these ‘small Illnesses’, so he said, as well as others, more serious, and to be capable of withstanding his difficult work. Perhaps one of the most interesting statements, somewhat harsh and hard to read, is one mention of severe colitis that afflicted him in October 1917, when the author wrote down his medication and diet for several days, while continuing to carry out his duties, despite fears regarding his own state of mind, for he became acutely aware that he was severely ill. Araújo, 2015, pp. 79 – 80.
Through information like this we can easily understand that, even if the situation was improving, regarding the strong possibility of an increase on professionals deployed to these areas, the reality was that the military contingents sent by Portugal to those African colonies were too large for the number of medical professionals mobilized. The harsh local climate and problems with supplies and/or convoy movements, often caused diseases, deprivation or even death among medical doctors, just as with the soldiers they accompanied and who they wished to take care of\textsuperscript{47}.

For most of these medical doctors, all the support they could provide, all the problems they confronted, all the situations they could not solve, dragging on indefinitely, became the sources of huge physical and emotional fatigue and stress, that worn them down, day-by-day. This was more perceptible among professionals who marched with their men, accompanying regiments and military convoys, for they could not distance themselves from problems, seeing those men sick and feverish, hungry and thirsty.

e. Evacuation and healthcare units memoirs

The sense of helplessness almost reached the absurd when a doctor, after observing one diseased soldier, concluded that he needed to be sent to the safety of some medical facility, hypothetical ward or distant hospital. In cases like this, medical professionals quickly found themselves concerned and distressed, for they knew that, in most cases, they had no means to do that.

Near the battlefields, accompanying military convoys through dangerous and rough terrain, or installed in small forts and lookout posts, there were scarce medical care units, so ill-equipped that sometimes they were almost non-existent. The shortage of staff also led to compromises, poorly accepted by the Portuguese troops, especially when some tasks, which should be performed by a small or even non-existent white nursing staff, had to be carried out by indigenous auxiliaries. António de Cértima called them the ‘black cáfila’ a

\textsuperscript{47} In his memoirs, Américo Pires de Lima described the disappearance of Doctor Silva Pereira when the evacuation column which he was accompanying was attacked by Askari and German troops. Silva Pereira was never seen again, alive or dead. Joaquim Alves Correia de Araújo also described how he had fallen ill, suffering from fever, shortly after his arrival in Mozambique and after his first long march through Makonde territory, this being only one occasion of many in which he was taken ill during his campaign; upon arriving in Africa he had even been forced to remove a tapeworm. Lima, 1933, p. 59; Araújo, 2015, pp. 57, 63.
pejorative statement, displaying a European profound lack of understanding regarding these decisions and the way this problem was solved\textsuperscript{48}.

It was supposed that life in main camps included a daily application of bandages, diagnosis and administration of medicines, performed in care units and wards, and the so-called ‘Health Review’, implemented every day at 8 am. But, despite these efforts and determinations, the system did not always work or was even truly applied. The diseased had no real access to treatment on-site, so they had to be evacuated. If a departure for a better equipped hospital could be arranged, medical doctors would then see them carried away by indigenous porters, sharing a stretcher or carried on their backs, on improvised backpacks, made out of old sacks. Physicians also realized that they might never see those soldiers again, for there were strong chances that they would never reach their destination. The further they were from major population centres, the greater the possibility was of being lost along the way. So, these professionals and fellow soldiers saw their comrades leaving, swinging on some porters’ back, with no prospect of resting or falling asleep, and with a strong possibility of death along the way, as well as being left by some porter at the mercy of wild beasts in the quiet and dangerous African night\textsuperscript{49}.

A simple task of evacuating these men, which should have consisted only in arranging transportation for the sick and injured, became a colossal task, especially overwhelming when facing high numbers of soldiers to evacuate. Medical memoirs can give an accurate account of the task’s difficulty. For instance, when the Germans were likely to arrive in Chomba, Joaquim Alves Correia de Araújo evacuated injured and sick for almost three days. In between, he reported the unfortunate incidents which interfered in this process, describing them with deceptive disinterest and detachment, although they were felt and lived with the emotions emerging along the way\textsuperscript{50}.

On the other hand, hospitals on the ground were also scarce, and those who existed worked under distressing conditions, with doctors and

\textsuperscript{48} ‘The black cáfila was responsible for performing the delicate work of nursing’. Cértima, 1924, p. 94. [Cáfila was a derogatory term, roughly equivalent to ‘gang’]

\textsuperscript{49} Lima, 1933, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{50} Araújo, 2015, pp.83-84. It was only in March 1918 that Joaquim Alves mentioned the establishment in Chomba of a ‘Board of Evacuation’, which took care of the distribution and evacuation of the injured and sick, directly to Lourenço Marques [Araújo, 2015, p. 101]. By that time, he had already evacuated most of the sick and wounded to that location. Arrifes, 2004, p. 202.
other staff having to overcome huge difficulties on a daily basis. Marco Fortunato Arrifes wrote:

In general, the organization of the health system during these campaigns was characterized by lack of rigor, organization and, above all, lack of means.\(^{51}\)

Therefore, many are the gaps that still remain in our knowledge of these military health services in Africa. There are details in need of clarification, as new references to local services emerge in memoirs and other documents. They will increase our knowledge of that specific service network, often chaotic and confusing, which Portuguese soldiers had to count on while stationed in those operations theatres. Meanwhile, although we will try to complete this information in a nearby future, we were still able to list a few of those service units, working in Angola and Mozambique.

In Lubango, Angola, there were the so-called ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Hospitals, as well as one ‘Provisional Hospital’, a first aid post and a pharmacy.\(^{52}\) An ‘Étapes Health Depot’ also provided storage for ‘[…] equipment, tools and apparatus, and items such as dressings, morphine, quinine, pharmaceutical tinctures, petroleum jelly, medical kits, etc.’\(^{53}\) All these units worked in close coordination with the Portuguese Red Cross. And one or two medical posts, as well as some small infirmaries and wards, were spread out, welcoming the sick and injured scattered around Angola.

There was also a mobile campaign hospital in Angola, titled as ‘field ambulance service’, which tried to cover the entire territory. Due to the lack of existing conditions and the massive number of soldiers, ill and injured, its staff never had free time, always overwhelmed by the huge number of cases that needed quick response. Plus, if the sick and injured were numerous, medical and nursing staff, as well as medications and other supporting equipment, were always fewer than required.

Mozambique suffered from the same fate in a more extensive area thanks to the military actions of Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870-1964) in East Africa. Here, the military health system also worked closely with the Portuguese Red Cross. In late 1914, Lourenço Marques would be the chosen location for headquarters of this institution and it was determined that a field

\(^{51}\) Arrifes, 2004, p. 201.

\(^{52}\) CVP, “A formação sanitária da Cruz Vermelha junto da Coluna de Operações no Sul de Angola”, 1920.

ambulance should be arranged. This ambulatory service worked aboard the *Quelimane*, a hospital ship, for a few months in 1916. In 1917 and 1918 it was decided that the field ambulance would drive across the entire territory, conducting treatments and ordering evacuations, working almost as a mobile casualty clearing station. This medical unit visited places like Chomba, Palma, Mocimboa da Praia, Nacature or Patchitembo, providing aid, medication and treatment, and receiving hundreds of ill and injured expeditionaries\(^54\).

In Palma there was a hospital, a first aid post, a water sterilization facility, and even a small military campaign pharmacy. Mocimboa da Praia had one hospital, similar to the one in Palma, as well as a water sterilization facility. Porto Amelia had a true Military Hospital, but it only begun operating later in conflict, already in 1918. However, this hospital provided treatment to all patients, regardless of race or nationality\(^55\).

Lourenço Marques had several hospital facilities, and some of them were visited by General Jacob van Deventer (1874-1922)\(^56\). A report from the Lourenço Marques Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross Society, printed in 1919, also states that patients from Niassa were received in Miguel Bombarda and Paiva Manso hospitals, as well as in several schools: 5th of October School, District Women’s School, District Men’s School, and João de Deus Institute. Or at least those were the orders given by the Chief of the Military Health Services\(^57\). Some artillery barracks and infrastructures from one ‘Company Depot’ were also used to accommodate patients. And in Xefina and Goba there were also convalescent camps\(^58\).

**Final considerations**

As we have seen, creating an effective military health care system in Angola and Mozambique were clearly expectations defeated by the vicissitudes and problems that medical doctors and soldiers had to overcome on a daily basis. Those who were there, as was the case of Américo Pires de Lima,

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\(^{54}\) CVP, “Relatório dos serviços prestados durante a guerra pela Delegação da Sociedade Portuguesa da Cruz Vermelha em Lourenço Marques, apresentado em sessão de 20 de Janeiro de 1919”, 1919.

\(^{55}\) CVP, “Embarque de tropas que iriam estabelecer a formação sanitária da Cruz Vermelha, que tem por fim principal o constituir o hospital militar de Porto Amélia”, 1918.


\(^{57}\) CVP, “Relatório dos serviços prestados durante a guerra pela Delegação da Sociedade Portuguesa da Cruz Vermelha em Lourenço Marques, apresentado em sessão de 20 de Janeiro de 1919”, 1919.

\(^{58}\) Araújo, 2015, p. 117.
categorically stated that, in Africa, those men roamed the camps, feverish and thirsty, waiting for some kind of treatment or for a possible evacuation. And while they waited, many were the ones who crawled into their tents or huts, dying without aid, or barely surviving under the merciless African sky. For many of them, war ended right there; for others, Hell would continue after repatriation. These circumstances, in a way, united them with many of their brothers in arms returning from France, also maimed, sick and traumatized by a conflict that so often seemed endless.

Américo Pires de Lima’s voice is now joined by others, of physicians but also of military men, who saw in those soldiers their comrades, simple men abandoned to their fate. There is still much left to discover about how the Portuguese were treated in those African operations theatres. Nevertheless, we can now imagine a reality in which the mobilized medical doctors and nurses were not enough, for they were never sufficient and were perfectly incapable of dealing with all those situations they found themselves in. Many men suffered from neglect, enduring illnesses and medical disorders that could have been alleviated by the simple existence of a better organization, evacuation and treatment services. And we must not forget that physicians themselves were often ignored, sometimes even silenced, victims of that same system. For medical logistics was never fully implemented, remaining ineffective and deadly throughout all the campaign, endangering the lives of many of these professionals, as they too were affected by disease, fatigue and negligence, just like those they tried to care for.

Currently, these and other voices, of medical doctors and fighters, alert us to the severe reality of life in the African campaigns during the Great War. But they also show us the ‘usefulness of memory’ and the importance of using ‘memoirist documentation’ in academic research, a topic of urgent and frequent discussion in seminars, workshops and conferences. There is a renewed interest, and this call for new solutions is very much in vogue, especially in countries that are now remembering events such as the outbreak of this first global conflagration.

There is a clear and growing awareness that we cannot, or at least should not, neglect these sources of knowledge. However, we must also take into account the various problems arising from their use, such as the subjectivity and emotion deriving from the memoirist discourse, the uncertainty about its historical truth, or the presence of personal and private observations, transforming those explanations into something that, sometimes, we cannot, or we should not generalize, as they are only representative of the individual
experience - or, at best, of the experience of one group/entourage. And there are also questions raised by other human beings, called historians, whose role should not be forgotten, but whose influence can sometimes be found reflected in the subject they report, analyse and research. Or, as Jay Winter stated: ‘Sometimes in this process of reconstructing we add feelings, beliefs, or even knowledge we obtained after the experience’.

But it is unquestionable that, even taking into account all possible ‘dangers’ and ‘precautions’, we must resort to memoirs and memoirists to reconstruct History. This article shows that we should take into account memoirs and memoirist documents and literature, much of it already published, but some yet to be printed and, for that, truly unknown. For this will permit us, for instance, to obtain a better understanding of how soldiers were treated in colonial Africa during the Great War. We also saw how this can reveal information that, in present times, is still hidden in diaries and notebooks, correspondence and memoirs. Due to using these new resources we can now benefit of the daily life experiences of those who lived them first hand, avoiding the exclusive use of archival information, especially those documents used for a long, long time, the same ones that already shaped the official historiography. For we must not forget that those archives and documents, and subsequently, official historiography, were also shaped and subjected to manipulation, especially from those who, in the past, catalogued, cared and preserved the documents confined in today’s files, folders and boxes.

Every researcher, at one time, faced the dilemma of where to discover documentation crucial for their work. And every one of us will, at least once in our lives, wonder where some of those crucial documents are, the same ones that we are certain were produced and therefore must exist, for it was only normal and logical that they were produced in the past - but, at least for now, we do not have any information of their whereabouts. This will surely bring us a set of new questions: were all the documents preserved or were some of them destroyed in the past? Are they still out there, undiscovered, lost in some uncatalogued archive, and, for that reason, still unknown? What were the criteria used for the conservation and preservation of certain documents, and the principles used for the possible destruction of others, which we now know did not survive?

To those who may fear using memoirs, medical ones or otherwise, in the reconstruction of an image of the military health care system in Africa

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Winter, 2006, p. 4.
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War during WWI, we must simply recall that there have always been manipulations, fractional and incomplete views, and personal historiographical judgments. We should not forget that these and other questions have always influenced the criteria and methods used in archives. Methods which were often light years away from those currently recommended and/or used worldwide and, because of that, archival documentation also suffers from mistakes and flaws. This also happens with memoirist documentation, locked in libraries, buried in unpublished diaries and family heritages. For that reason, these two types of documents do not cancel each other, instead they complement one another. And we should always be compelled to use both, in pursuit of new questions and in search of new results.

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Conclusions

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I

An academic meeting in a military institution such as the Seminar ‘Portugal and the campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War’ must inevitably pursue a balance between sensibilities which at times seem to move in opposite directions. On the one hand, military individuals, as actors and stakeholders directly involved in matters of war, generally have the tendency to look for the practical uses of the past. To what extent this past which the military resort to may or may not be called History, is a matter for academic experts to assess. On the other hand, experts possess their own methods and tools to observe the past - preferably as less invasive as possible - , which include, among other things, a constant critical gaze and processes of selection and analysis of sources that require continued training and greatly developed inductive ability. Truth be told, neither the military nor anyone else would know the past if not by the hands of historians.

What the military and historians have in common is circumstances, as defined by Ortega y Gasset. They both need answers to their concerns about the present, whether these concerns are of a more practical nature, or whether they focus on pure research.

It is our belief that this Seminar enriched us with the complementarity of expertise not only from these two quarters, but also from researchers with
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa:
from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War

different kinds of backgrounds, which naturally touch upon History but also on International Relations, Strategy, and International Law.

II

The opening conference organized by Professor Nuno Severiano Teixeira offered a perspective on the reasons which led Portugal from neutrality to belligerence, through three explanatory theories that have been developed at different times and under different circumstances. The Professor spoke to us about the theory which advocates that the safeguard of colonial integrity was tantamount to the defence of the country, which was no more than the perpetuation of an idea that emerged in the late nineteenth century; he also told us of the peninsular, or European, theory of the need for international affirmation of the young Republic, specifically of the Portuguese individuality in the Iberian framework and the recognition of the republican government in the European framework. Finally, he presented the theory of the need to consolidate and gain internal legitimacy for the regime, which, in his view, largely explains the decision to declare war and advance on Flanders under the green-crimson flag.

The first panel, ‘Comprehensive perspectives’, moderated by Major General João Vieira Borges, sought to combine the work produced on the geostrategic context, on the comprehensive views on war and peace, and on the perceptions of the main contenders. The panel consisted in three communications offering alternative perspectives on Europe in the analysis of the Great War.

Professor Alexandre Figueiredo presented a chronological selection of the unification projects for Europe as a counterpoint to the Great War. During this intervention, several proposals were reviewed on the unification of a continent aware of its military destiny, from ancient Greece to the post-war, with particular emphasis on the period from the seventeenth century onwards.

Dr Fernando Dores Costa also spoke on the issues surrounding peace, specifically on the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, which was marked by the Portuguese rapprochement with England, largely due to the influence of the Marquis of Soveral. Despite the important role of the Portuguese delegation, the results were conditioned by the strategies of the major powers and also by the fact that the conference did not receive much attention in Portugal. One of its merits, as noted by the speaker, was that it served as inspiration for the creation of the League of Nations.
The presentation by Colonel Correia Neves plunged us at once into the iron and fire of the Western Front. The communication focused on the failure of the war plans of the main belligerents as a result of the wrong assumptions made in their preparation. In particular, and very briefly, while the German plan underestimated the determination and resilience of the French, the French plan did not take into account the German organizational skills and adaptability. This created problems in the perception of political-military relations, in the conceptualisation of the war, in the planning and conduct of operations and in the assessment of outcomes. According to the speaker, the separation between the political power and the direct conduct of war affairs in France during 1918 greatly contributed to the victory of the Allies.

The discussion that took place after this first panel transported us to the diversity of relations that existed between the states prior to the conflict, which even led to paradox, with alliances in Europe coexisting with competition in the colonial framework. A few of the reasons for the German defeat and the role played by the US were also discussed. A connection was made between the European and the African framework, notably through Kitchener’s experiences in Africa and the role they likely played in the early perceptions of the British commander on the direction of the conflict in the European theatre.

The second panel focused on Portuguese strategic thinking and on the relations between Portugal and Germany at the dawn of the Great War. The panel began with an intervention by Professor António Paulo Duarte on the embryonic Portuguese strategic thinking produced by names such as the then young Raul Esteves, Afonso Costa or José Relvas. The professor presented the idea behind the creation of an Entente between the arc of westernmost European countries to oppose Germany, and recalled and further analysed the role of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps as a vehicle for Portugal’s international credibility.

Dr Marisa Fernandes spoke of the role of East Africa in German geopolitics during the First World War. We were presented with the idea of Mittelafrica and of a German vision which included, at the very least, northern Mozambique as the geographic continuity of German East Africa. She also described how economic interests interfered in colonial geopolitics.

Professor Gisela Guevara brought to us a few observations on the strategy of the German Empire to weaken the Portuguese presence in Africa before the First World War. She reminded us of the concept of Weltpolitik and of the right to expand at the cost of dying nations. We were able to verify to what extent the Portuguese project to unite Angola to the counter coast coincided - and at
the same time clashed - with the German interests in Mittelafrica, particularly in connection to a potential Boer ally and the role of Lourenço Marques as the port closest to Pretoria and the Transvaal.

Links were established with current issues during the discussion that followed, but it was clear how important it is to bear in mind the specific contexts, something which Professor António Paulo Duarte’s succinct observation, that the men and the circumstances in 1914 were not the same as those in 2014, illustrated well.

The third panel featured two interventions and brought us definitively close to the Portuguese military operations in Africa, particularly in the context of the European scramble to assert sovereignty over that continent. Dr Marco Arrifes recalled the singular moment when the Portuguese advanced on southern Cunene, in Angola, which became known as the Pembe disaster of September 1904. He looked for hypotheses that could explain the defeat of the Portuguese detachment and stressed the profound impact of the battle on continental society.

Professor Paulo Jorge Fernandes demonstrated the impact of the military intervention in Mozambique in the late nineteenth century on the development of the campaigns in Africa, both in terms of logistics and technical doctrine and of the social impact of victories such as Mouzinho’s defeat of the Vatwa, and the birth of military heroes. If, on the one hand, these men served well-defined ideological purposes, on the other they were also a group of officers of proven experience and expertise, who eventually later distinguished themselves militarily and/or politically.

In the discussion that closed both this panel and the first day of the conference, aspects that could only be addressed superficially in the communications were further explored, particularly the technical and tactical aspects specific to combat in Africa.

On the second day, we were able to enjoy two more panels exclusively about Africa in the context of the Great War. During the first panel we were again transported to the two colonies, Angola and Mozambique, this time in 1914-15 and 1917-18, respectively. Lieutenant Colonel Luís Barroso gave a presentation on the attack on Naulila and on the German action in southern Angola, which did not focus on the common theory of a punitive attack motivated by vengeance, but rather as part of a deliberate and pre-emptive action to divert the Portuguese troops in the region so there was less need for German forces in the north, as well as to ensure that potential could be concentrated in the south against the British and their then allies, the Afrikaners. This argument is
Conclusions

based, among other factors, on the need to force a retraction of the Portuguese apparatus in order to expand German Southwest Africa in terms of space, time and resources.

Colonel Lemos Pires analysed the tension between political power and military command represented by the contradicting perspectives on the role of German East Africa in the general framework of the War. While Lettow von Vorbeck’s military vision was based on using the colony to attract the forces of the Entente, Governor Heinrich Schnee advocated neutrality and economic development, placing particular importance on gaining access to the Indian Ocean and using the military instrument as the guarantor of internal order. The freedom of action that the German system gave the military commander allowed Vorbeck to advance on the Belgian, British and, later, Portuguese colonial spaces. He achieved all his objectives, although Germany eventually lost all its colonies in Africa.

The discussion allowed us to further explore the theory of a pre-emptive attack on Naulila, Angola, and questions were also raised about the feasibility of a Portuguese strategy for Mozambique. Both speakers were able to present additional data resulting from the analysis of new sources, paving the way for alternative views on the colonial framework of the Great War.

The last panel offered us three perspectives of different Portuguese actors and intervening parties in Africa during the conflict. Major General Rui Moura spoke to us about the Guarda Republicana of Lourenço Marques, shedding light on a real force intervening in Mozambique, including in combat actions which have largely been ignored by historiography.

Major Fernando Ribeiro presented a perspective on the sociographic profile of an officer of the General Staff Service during the Great War and characterised some of the actors in the African theatres.

Lieutenant Colonel Renato Assis brought us an overview of the commanders in Africa, dubbed by him the ‘ill-fated generation’. The presentation was based on an ongoing research project, of which we were shown only partial results but which still immersed us in the profile of the officers who participated in the first expedition to Angola led by Alves Roçadas.

The discussion focused on future research paths that will further our knowledge of these objects of study, which have in common a markedly sociological and corporate nature. It nevertheless allowed us to better understand the difficulties in characterising the careers of these officers in a period as troubled as the end of the Monarchy and the onset of the First Republic.
Remembrance - or evocative - periods such as the current one, from 2014 to 2018, are excellent opportunities for historiographical review, given the considerable investment made on human and material resources during these periods. The Seminar ‘Portugal and the campaigns of Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War’ was one of the contributions made by the IESM to the Research Line of the Coordinating Committee of the First World War Centenary Remembrance Events.

The speakers’ interventions largely reflected the state of play of the ongoing research. Conflicting perspectives were presented which revealed weaknesses in the political leadership and military participation in the conflict, but also revealed evidence of valour and solid performances by the protagonists of the time. The contextualisation provided by the speakers was a clear sign of the historicizing intentions of the different interventions, which steered away from evocative approaches, or from approaches resembling a kind of ‘dissemination’ historicity and instead chose to take a scientific approach.

The Seminar ‘Portugal and the campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War’ was the first meeting held by the IESM’s Research Project under the banner of the First World War, and it demonstrated the vitality of the CISDI. Although still relatively new, this research centre already includes 76 researchers, integrated, associate and temporary, divided by different projects, including the two domains (nuclear and complementary) of military science. Of the 14 interventions conducted in these days, four were the responsibility of CISDI members who joined the ongoing Research Project during their individual research paths.

Alongside the conference panels, the CISDI Knowledge Resource Centre published a catalog in electronic format featuring the acquis of sources and literature on the First World War available in the Centre. Thanks to the longevity of the institutes which preceded the IESM (an autonomous body of the Instituto Universitário Militar - IUM - since October 2015) numerous works have been added to the library’s estate during the twentieth century, some of which are first editions of first-hand reports on the conflict.
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**Nuno Correia Neves**

Infantry Colonel Correia Neves attended the Military Academy between 1981 and 1986. He led companies in Units of his Arm and in the ISM. Still with the rank of Captain, he was a lecturer at ISM and ESPE. With the rank of Senior Officer and Colonel, he was Director of Education and Battalion Commander in EPST, and performed the duties of Head of the Office of the Military North Region Command, of the operational Command and of the Staff Command. He was assigned to the Institute of Military Higher Studies, where he heads the Office of the Director and is an integrated researcher at CISDI.
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Marco Fortunato Arrifes was born in Lisbon in October 1966. He is currently the Pedagogical Supervisor of the Education Directorate of the National Defence Ministry. He holds a Master’s degree in nineteenth and twentieth century History from Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas - Universidade Nova de Lisboa and a Postgraduate degree in Management and Administration from the Instituto Superior de Educação e Ciências.

He holds a graduate degree in History and has a specialization in Library Science, Demographic History and International Relations.

He is a member of the *Ordem da Garança do Brasil* since 1995, and, in 2004, he won the National Defence Prize of the Portuguese Commission of Military History.

He has participated in several research projects on the economic and cultural history of the twentieth century Portuguese colonial space. He coordinated the scientific review of the Portuguese edition of the twentieth century timeline by Anne Thevenin and Beatrice Compagnon and participated in the working group responsible for the *Dicionário de História da Primeira República e do Republicanismo*.

He published the book *A primeira Guerra Mundial na África Portuguesa* (1914/1918). Noteworthy among several articles published in national and international journals is his study of the colonial policies for the defence of Angola between 1926 and 1960.

**Paulo Jorge Fernandes**

Paulo Jorge Fernandes is an Integrated Researcher at Instituto de História Contemporânea and Assistant Professor in the Department of History at FCSH-NOVA, where he teaches History of Contemporary Portugal (nineteenth century), History of Contemporary Brazil, History of Spain, Comparative History of nineteenth century European Colonialism and Political History of Liberalism in Portugal. He holds a PhD in Institutional History and Contemporary Politics from FCSH-NOVA (2007). He recently published: *Mariano Cirilo de Carvalho: o ‘Poder Oculto’ do liberalismo português, 1876-1892* (2010) and *Mouzinho de Albuquerque: um soldado ao serviço do Império* (2010). He has also participated in collaborative works, most recently, in 2014, the publication ‘A fotografia e a edificação do Estado Colonial: a missão de Mariano de Carvalho à província de Moçambique em 1890’ in VICENTE, Filipa Lowndes (dir.), *O Império da Visão. Fotografia no Contexto Colonial Português*
The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War (1860-1960). His work, ‘The press and Portuguese-British relations at the time of the British “Ultimatum”’ in KAUL, Chandrika and GARCIA, José Luís (ed.), Media and the Portuguese Empire, is about to be published by Parlgrave, and he is preparing a book on the campaigns in Africa from 1890 to 1918, which will be published by Imprensa Nacional.

**Luís Barroso**

Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry. He has completed the General Staff Course at the IAEM and the *Curso de Estado-Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas de España.* He holds a Master’s degree and a PhD in History, Defence and International Relations from ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. Researcher at ISCTE-IUL CEI and CISDI. CCIRM/IAQ/J2 Section Head at JFCBS (NATO) in Holland.

**Nuno Lemos Pires**

Colonel, Infantry/Special Operations, PhD in History, Defence and International Relations at ISCTE-IUL (in partnership with the MA), Commander of the Student Body and Professor at the Military Academy. Visiting Professor at ISCTE, at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, at the Institute of Higher Military Studies (IESM) and at the National Defence Institute. He performed training and command duties at Escola Prática de Infantaria, was professor in Military History at IAEM, Intelligence Officer in the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Spain, Military Assistant to the Commander of the Joint Command Lisbon, Commander of the 2nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion of the Mechanized Brigade and Training Director at Escola das Armas in Mafra. He participated in missions in Mozambique, Angola, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. He has published eight works, collaborated on more than 50 books written in Portuguese, English and Spanish and has also published dozens of articles in various magazines and journals, and he is a regular speaker in Portugal and Spain.

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**Rui Moura**

Major-General Rui Moura is a Doctrine and Training Commander in the *Guarda Nacional Republicana.*
He is a speaker in conferences, colloquia and seminars on Military History and on other military and security issues both in Portugal and abroad, and has published texts in military and academic publications, including in Jornal do Exército, in Revista Beira Alta and in Revista Militar. He wrote the book O 14 de Infantaria, co-authored the book O Exército Português e as Comemorações dos 200 anos da Guerra Peninsular and recently wrote the preface to the books O Exército Aliado Anglo-Português (1809-1814) by João Centeno and A Batalha do Buçaco. 15 Dias da História de Portugal by José Matos Duque.

Fernando Ribeiro

Infantry Major Fernando César de Oliveira Ribeiro was promoted to his current rank on 1 January 2013 and he is currently a professor in the Specific Teaching Area of the Army at IESM.

He attended, among other courses, the Military Science Course - Infantry Arm at the Military Academy, the Captain Course of the Escola Prática de Infantaria, the Field Grade Officers Course and Joint General Staff Course (both at IESM).

He served in 1st Mechanized Infantry Battalion (1ºBIMec), in the 1st Infantry Regiment in the office of the Chief of Army Staff, in the Land Forces Command and in IESM.

He participated in the Deployed National Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was platoon commander in East Timor, was company assistant and, in Kosovo, was liaison officer to the Multinational Task Force Centre. He was also commander of the combat support company 1ºBIMec, assigned to NATO Response Force 5 (NRF5).

Renato Assis

Artillery Lieutenant Colonel Renato Afonso Gonçalves de Assis was born on 31 March 1969 in Santarém, where he studied and where he currently resides.

He was assigned to the Mechanized Brigade at the BAAA, Headquarters, 1ºBIMec and GAC, where he performed the duties of Operations Officer, 2nd Cmdt and Cmdt of the BAAA, Logistics and Information Officer at 1ºBIMec - in FND - Operations Officer and Information Officer at GAC, Deputy for the Brigade’s Operations and Logistics Sections, and 2nd Commander at GAC. At GabCEME, he was Head of the Military-Technical Cooperation Section (MTC).
and currently, at the Military Academy, he is Adjunct Professor of General Tactics and Military Operations (TGOM) I and II, Artillery and Fire Weapons Systems II and Artillery Tactics II.

He participated in 4 missions abroad: in East Timor (2003), as Logistics Of. in 1ºBIMec; in Iraq (2006-07), as NTM-I advisor; in Kosovo (2009-10), as Information Of. in 1ºBIMec; and in Afghanistan (2013-14), as GS Of. in CJ5/ IJC/ISAF.


Together with other researchers, he is currently working on the research project ‘Commanders in Africa (1914-1918): an ill-fated generation’, under the heading ‘a Portuguese form of command and military leadership in the Great War – Africa’.

**Margarida Portela**

Margarida Portela is a PhD candidate in Contemporary History at the Institute of Contemporary History of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FCSH/ NOVA), where she currently conducts research on the Portuguese Military Health Service in the Great War, as well as on other issues and themes related to Social History of Contemporary Medicine in Portugal. She is an Integrated Researcher of the Institute of Contemporary History (ICH) and a member of the ICH team for the First World War Centenary Remembrance Events, conducting research and publishing on themes related to Portuguese expeditionary medicine, health and military medicine in the Great War, medical advances and impact on the so-called home front, internationalization of Portuguese Contemporary Medicine and Memoir/Memoirist practices in Portugal and in the theatres of operations in Africa and Europe, under the project ‘Memoirs of the First World War: 1914 – 1918’, coordinated by Professor Maria Fernanda Rollo.
The seminar ‘The Portuguese campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War’ was held at the Institute of Higher Military Studies on 25 and 26 June 2015, under the banner of the First World War Centenary Remembrance Events. The Portuguese colonial space in Africa in the First World War – specifically the territories of Angola and Mozambique – cannot be analysed without considering the contexts of imposition of sovereignty of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as well as the situation in Europe at the time.

These Seminar Proceedings collect the contributions made at the conference, organised according to general themes: 1. Broad perspectives on the conflict; 2. International relations with Africa as a backdrop; 3. Strategy and use of forces in Angola and Mozambique, and; 4. The actions of the protagonists of military operations.

For the most part, the texts now published represent the state of play of ongoing research projects.